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
LITERARY, SCIENTIFIC,  
AND  
POLITICAL VIEWS  
OF  
ORESTES A. BROWNSON.

SELECTED FROM HIS WORKS  
BY  
HENRY F. BROWNSON.

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NEW YORK, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO:  
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To

The Fathers of the Congregation of the Holy Cross

At Notre Dame, Indiana,

WITHIN WHOSE SACRED WALLS THE AUTHOR'S MORTAL REMAINS

AWAIT THE TRANSFORMATION OF GLORY,

THIS COLLECTION

OF THE

IMMORTAL PRODUCTS OF HIS MIND

IS LOVINGLY INSCRIBED BY

THE EDITOR.



## PREFACE.

---

BELIEVING that many persons are deterred by the cost and size of the complete edition of "Brownson's Works" in twenty volumes from owning and reading them, it has been thought likely that a small book of extracts containing that writer's views on questions of great interest would be acceptable.

In this busy age, also, men have not, or fancy they have not, time to read anything larger than a small duodecimo; and although it is impossible to make extracts from any author of the first order of genius that will not suffer by being torn from their connection, and consequently the author is placed at a disadvantage before the public, yet the spread of sound principles on the subjects embraced in this volume seems important enough to warrant the undertaking.

The necessity of calling attention to Christian principles in their application to secular life is especially apparent in this age and country, because nearly all, whether of American or foreign descent, have drifted from their former surroundings and have passed beyond the pale of the domestic and local influences and habits under which they or their parents were born and lived, and are more exposed than were the preceding generations to the pagan spirit now more openly and more generally manifested than in former times.

The line between the cities of God and of the



world which was clearly marked in the fourth and fifth centuries became confused with the irruption of barbarism, and Christians and pagans mutually gave and received to and from each other so many of their principles and habits that they were hardly more distinct than were the administrations of Church and State. Still, throughout the whole period that ensued till almost our own day, nearly every one claimed to be Christian after a fashion; but now we find multitudes tending openly to atheism, scepticism, infidelity, or paganism on the one side, or leaving the Christian city more distinctly marked on the other.

Unfortunately, among those who adhere to the Christian city of God there is still much paganism of thought and action and much leaning to the city of the world, sometimes from ignorance and sometimes in the hope of bringing the two cities to coalesce. But such hope is vain. There is no middle term that can reconcile these opposites, and those liberal individuals who would do it by conforming the city of God to the notions of the world, and include in that city, without conversion, the enemies of God, seem to deserve to be themselves counted as belonging to the city of the world.

The error of those who aim to be Christians in religion and gentiles in literature, education, science, and politics can only be accounted for on the supposition that they regard religion as something additional to nature, but yet separate from it, and not as the leaven that is mixed with the measures of meal till it leavens the whole mass. Now, if Christianity is to be anything, it must be everything. It is not as an extrinsic force applied to nature that it elevates man to a higher order, but by entering into

every fibre of our being and becoming identified with our inmost soul it makes easy what before was hard, if not impossible, and gives to actions apparently trivial a worth and dignity above our highest conception. It is the whole of man (Eccl. xii. 13). It must control him not only in his exterior worship in the church of God, but must pervade his literature, his science, his politics, and his business, so that every act he performs shall be not only the act of a man, but of a Christian. Whoever is not for God is against Him; and whoever leaves God out of his science, his education, or his politics denies Him and is an atheist, even though in his religion he asserts Him.

The prevailing literature and education as well as the conduct of all secular affairs is of this character. In the attempt to emancipate science and politics from religion we have lost God and deified ignorance and passion, so that the very existence of social order is threatened with ruin. The only hope of safety is in bringing men back to sound Christian principles, to the eternal principles of truth which are always and everywhere the same and are the law for all our actions; and to aid in doing this has been the purpose of the editor in selecting these extracts.

H. F. BROWNSON.

Detroit, Oct. 17, 1892.



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# BROWNSON'S VIEWS.

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## LITERATURE.

### AMERICAN LITERATURE.

MUCH is said and written about American literature. Some make extravagant boasts of the excellence to which it has already attained; others make loud and long laments that it does not as yet even exist; others again are busy in devising ways and means of creating it, forcing its growth, or bringing it to maturity; and a very voluminous, if not a very respectable, national literature is growing up among us about the literature we are assumed to have or not to have and the means of obtaining or perfecting national literature. All this is very well; the American people are a very enlightened people, and their authors far in advance of those of any other nation, as it is patriotic to believe; but it seems to us that on this subject of national literature, as on literature in general, there is much loose thinking, if thinking it can be called, and no little want of clear and well-defined views. It is hard to say what is the precise meaning our countrymen attach to the word *literature*, in what they suppose its desirableness to consist, what ends it serves or ought to serve, or wherein it contributes to the glory of nations or of the race. These are important points, and on these, we are sorry to say, our authors leave us in the dark. We have consulted

the best literary authorities of the country, but no light dawns to relieve our darkness, no clear, distinct, definite answers are obtained. This is bad, and makes us suspect that with us very few who talk of literature have any real meaning. It is easy to indulge in vague and general declamation; it is easy to seize upon a few loose and indefinite terms and to have the appearance of talking largely, eloquently, wisely, profoundly, when in fact we are saying nothing at all. Before anything more is said, it would be a real service to many persons, and to ourselves in particular, if our authors would define their terms, tell us precisely what they understand by literature, and for what it is necessary, useful, or desirable. (Works, vol. xix. p. 204.)

If we are not much mistaken, what the world means, or fancies it means, by literature is something which is independent of all moral, religious, or social doctrines, and may be read with equal pleasure and profit by all men, whatever their religion, their ethical code, or their political system. It is something which inculcates no doctrine, instructs man in no particular truth, and urges to the performance of no particular duty. Back and independent of all that relates to man's belief and duties as a moral, religious, and social being, it is assumed that there is a broad and rich field for the man of letters, and the culture of that broad and rich field yields literature proper. But our difficulty in understanding what is meant by this arises from the fact that this supposed field is purely imaginary, an "airy nothing," to which even the poet, with "his eye in a fine frenzy rolling," cannot give "a local habitation and a name." A general literature which teaches nothing special is as unreal as man without men, the

race without individuals. The *genus*, for us human beings at least, is real only in the *species*; what has no specific meaning has for us no meaning at all and is as if it were not. (Vol. xix. p. 205.)

American literary taste is in general very low and corrupt. Irving and Hawthorne have good taste, are unaffected, natural, simple, easy, and graceful, but deficient in dignity and strength; they are pleasant authors for the boudoir, or to read while resting one's self on the sofa after dinner. No man who has any self-respect will read either of them in the morning. Prescott is gentlemanly, but monotonous, and occasionally jejune. Bancroft is gorgeous, glowing, but always straining after effect, always on stilts, never at his ease, never natural, never composed, never graceful or dignified. He has intellect, fancy, scholarship, all of a high order, but no taste, no literary good-breeding. He gesticulates furiously and speaks always from the top of his voice. In general, we may say of American literature that it is provincial, and its authors are uncertain of themselves, laboring, but laboring in vain, to catch the tone and manner of a distant metropolis. They have tolerable natural parts, often respectable scholarship, but they lack ease, dignity, repose. They do not speak as masters, but as forward pupils. They take too high a key for their voice, and are obliged, in order to get through, to sing in falsetto. You are never quite at your ease in listening to them; you are afraid they will break down, and that the lofty flights of oratory they promise you will turn out to be only specimens of the bathos. They fail to give one confidence in their strength, for they are always striving to be strong and laboring to be intense. (Vol. xix. pp. 367, 368.)

The American people have no simplicity, no natural ease, no repose. A pebble is a "rock," a leg or arm is a "limb," breeches or trousers are "unnamables," a petticoat is a "skirt," a shift is a *chemise*, the sun is the "solar orb," the moon the "lunar light." Nothing can be called simply by its proper name in our genuine old Anglo-Saxon tongue. We are always striving to be great, sublime; and simple natural expressions are counted tame, commonplace, or vulgar. We must be inflated, grandiloquent, or eccentric. Even in our business habits we strive after the strange, the singular, or the wonderful, and are never contented with old fashions, quiet and sure ways of prospering. We must make or lose a fortune at a dash. We have no repose—are always, from the moment we are breeched till wrapped in our grave-clothes, in a state of unnatural excitement, hurrying to and fro, without asking or being able to say why or wherefore. We have no homesteads, no family, no fixtures, no sacred ties which bind us, no hearths or altars around which our affections cling and linger. We are all afloat upon a tumultuous ocean, and seem incapable of enjoying ourselves save amid the wildness and fury of the storm. Our authors and orators, as was to be expected, partake of our national character and reproduce it in their works. (Vol. xix. pp. 377, 378.)

#### STRAINING AFTER EFFECT.

WHOEVER would attain to excellence in anything, must repose a generous confidence in himself. He must feel that he is equal to what he undertakes. He must proceed calmly and with a conscious strength to his task. If he doubts himself, if h

feels that he must make an effort, he must strain, he will do nothing but betray his weakness. We Americans, in literary matters, have had no self-confidence. There is no repose in our literature. There is ever a straining after effect, a labor to be eloquent, striking, or profound. This proceeds in a great measure from the fact that we have found our model of excellence, not in our own minds and hearts nor in human nature generally, but in the literature of that land from which our forefathers came. Instead of studying man, we have studied English literature; instead of drawing our inspirations from the universal reason which glows within and agitates the American heart, not less than the English heart, we have sought them in the productions of the English muse. We have written and sung, or at least aimed to write and sing, for Englishmen, and to gain the applause or escape the censure of the English critic. Hence our minds have been crippled and our literature has been tame and servile.

But so long as we retain the memory of our colonial dependence on England, we shall not attain to literary excellence. We shall attain to freedom and originality and produce works worthy of admiration for their freshness and power not till we dare set up for ourselves; till we come to feel that American human nature is as rich as English human nature; that the emotions and the forms of speech natural to an American are as proper in themselves, as conformable to the laws of universal human nature, as those natural to an Englishman; and that Boston, New York, or Providence has as much right to decide authoritatively on matters of taste and composition as London. (Vol. xix. pp. 26, 27.)

## NATIONAL LITERATURE.

BUT at present we are not in the condition to make any important contributions to this national literature. National literature is the expression of the national life and follows the formation of the national character. The Greek character preceded Greek literature, and the Roman character was fixed centuries before there was a Roman literature. Our national character is not yet formed. What we term our national character is merely provisional, and will disappear, or be essentially modified, when the mass of our people cease to be Protestants and infidels and place themselves in harmony with Christian civilization. The real American character is yet to be formed, and to be formed under Catholic influences. It is to Catholic America we are to look; for it alone is living and has the promise of the future, and Catholic America as yet hardly exists. Our Catholic population is not yet homogeneous, has no common national character. It is Irish, French, German, and each division retains the national peculiarities of the country from which it has emigrated. There has been, as yet, no time to melt down the mass and combine its separate elements in a new national character, neither Irish, nor French, nor German, but composed of the real excellences of each. The portion descended from the early American settlers are themselves as far as either of the others from possessing what is to be, ultimately, the American character; for as to their social habits, literary tastes, their general culture, as to all, in fact not strictly of faith, they are Protestant rather than Catholic. Now, till this fusion takes place, till national diversities and peculiarities lose themselves

in one common national character, with common habits, views, tastes, and feelings, we have not the indispensable conditions of a national literature. The native American portion demand a literature which smacks of the provisional national character; the Irish require their national tastes and peculiarities to be addressed; and the French and Germans cannot be pleased to have theirs neglected. All this is natural and inevitable. It implies no reproach to one or to another. Nobody can blame the German because his affections cluster around his fatherland and his heart is moved by the songs of the Rhine as it cannot be by those of the Ohio and the Mississippi; the Irishman is not censurable because his heart turns to "the Green Isle of the Ocean"—all the dearer from the memory of her wrongs—and because no strains can touch him like those to which he listened in his childhood; nor any more the native American for finding dearest to him those accents which soothed him in the caresses of his mother. Cold is the heart that does not beat quicker at the mention of its native land, and that does not linger with its sweetest affections around its early home, the only home it ever finds in this wide world. Dear to us is that home of our childhood, and fresh are the breezes which come freely over the green hills which skirt it. No sky is so serene as that which bends over it; no sun so bright as that which shines on it; no air so pure as that we breathed when in it, before the wanderings, the turmoils and cares of life began. We love that mountain home; we love its very look, its tone, and its simple manners, and we find elsewhere nothing to compensate for their loss. We complain not that the emigrant turns fondly to his fatherland and clings to the life he received from



it. No people ever becomes great which is not thoroughly national and which cannot more easily part with life than with its nationality. All we say or mean to say is that our Catholic population is collected from different nations, with diverse national characters; and while they are so, before they become homogeneous in their character, we cannot find in them the *public* requisite for the creation and growth of a national literature. This, however, is only a temporary obstacle, and will soon disappear. But while it remains we cannot do much for a *national* literature, and must content ourselves with such works as address themselves to the intellect alone, or to those sentiments and affections which are common to all men, whatever the diversity of their national origin or breeding. (Vol. xix. pp. 131, 132.)

#### A STANDARD OF CRITICISM.

THERE is or should be some recognized standard by which to judge in matters of poetry as well as in other matters. But, unhappily for us, we have in English no such standard and consequently no scientific criticism. Alison has given us a work of some merit "On Taste," Campbell says some good things in his "Philosophy of Rhetoric," and much just criticism may be found scattered through the English and American quarterly reviews and other periodical literature; but all is unscientific, empirical, founded on habit, prejudice, or fashion, varying every hour. We have no science or philosophy of art. Till we have such a science or philosophy we can have no good literary or artistic critics, and as long as we are mere sensists or psychologists we can never have it. Burke was a great man, but his "Essay on the Sublime

and Beautiful" is not worth naming, far less worth reading; for the author had a false system of metaphysics, and wrote his work on the supposition that the sublime and beautiful are mere subjective affections, or exist only in the order of conceptions and emotions, not in the order of reality, and are therefore psychological, not ontological. The Germans, indeed, have what they call *Æsthetic* or *Æsthetics*, but, as the word implies, they make the sublime and beautiful either sensations and emotions or simply objects of the sensibility. Or if they rise higher, they base their science of art on a defective and false conception of being, and give us nothing but scientific ignorance hardly superior, if indeed equal, to the practical good sense of English and American critics.

Art, according to the ancients, is imitative, and its aim is to give expression to the sublime and beautiful, or as we say nowadays, all simply to the beautiful. Being imitative, we have first to settle what it is that it does or should imitate. The answer usually is that art should imitate nature. This is correct if we understand by the nature to be imitated the *natura naturans*, not the *natura naturata* of the schoolmen. Its province is to imitate nature in her creative energy, and to realize, or to clothe with its own forms, the beautiful which the soul of the artist beholds. The beautiful itself has an objective reality, and has been happily termed by an Italian, reviewing, in a French periodical, the works of Silvio Pellico, "the splendor of the true." . . .

The contemplation of the creative act in its relation to God gives us the conception of the highest degree of the beautiful, that is, the sublime. Thus Longinus gives as the best and fullest expression of the sublime the passage from Genesis, "And God

said, Let there be light, and there was light." God spoke and it was, he commands and it stands fast. When contemplated in existences, which are the extrinsic form or terminus of the creative act, it gives rise to the conception of the beautiful in a lower form, to the beautiful proper, as distinguished from the sublime. . . .

As art imitates the divine act in the first cycle . . . it will be higher or lower as it takes this act, so to speak, on the side of being or on that of existences, and imitates the divine act in its primary revelation, or only as it is copied by existences in the order of second causes. In the former case art is sublime; in the latter case it is at best beautiful and usually only pretty. Here the ancients excelled the moderns. Modern artists, instead of copying or imitating, so to say, the divine act at first hand, take it only at second hand, in its pale reflex in the order of second causes, and really express or embody in their productions only the activity of creatures. Doubtless there is something of the divine activity in creatures themselves, for God is actively present in all his works, and no creature acts in its own sphere even except by the divine concurrence; but the activity thus seized is divine only in a participated sense. Hence it is that all modern art is feeble, wants grandeur of conception, freedom and boldness in execution, and is admirable only in petty details. (Vol. xix. pp. 419-423.)

At the head of what are called the liberal arts, as the highest species of art, we place poetry, not only because it surpasses all the others in expressing the sublime, but because it expresses the sublime and beautiful in the greatest variety of forms or under the greatest variety of aspects. The other species

of art address themselves chiefly to the senses, and do not of themselves interpret to the understanding the intelligible or ideal. Music, painting, sculpture, architecture, must be interpreted by the poet before their expression is complete. Left to themselves, their expression is vague, dreamy, confused, revealing the splendor, it may be, but not the resplendent. The poet addresses himself not only to sense and imagination, but also to the intellect and heart. He expresses the true and the good under the form of the sublime and beautiful, but so that the form, instead of concealing, reveals them—reveals them as clearly, as distinctly, as does the philosopher, but, as the philosopher does not, in their splendor, their grandeur, and their loveliness. Of all God's gifts in the natural order, true poetical genius is the greatest; and it is surpassed only by his gift of heroic virtue in the supernatural order, expressed in the life of the saint. (Vol. xix. p. 424.)

### IMAGINATION.

THE imagination is commonly regarded as a mixed faculty, partaking both of the rational nature and of the irrational, and in some sense as a union of the two, so to speak—of the soul and body. But it is primarily and essentially rational, or intellectual, and moves as intellect before moving as sensibility; or, in other words, it is intellectual apprehension before it is sensitive affection, as the life and activity of the body are from the soul, not the life and activity of the soul from the body. The beautiful, then, as the proper object of the imagination, must be really objective and intelligible, and therefore belong to the order of the true and the good, and be

at bottom identical with truth and goodness; for the true is, in reality, identical with the good. Consequently imagination, therefore æsthetics, demands truth and goodness for the basis of its operations, as much as does Christian theology or Christian ethics.

This is undeniable if imagination is considered on its intellectual or rational side, and it is not less so if we consider it on its sensitive or irrational side. Undoubtedly we may be and often are delighted, charmed, with what is neither true nor good, pleased with a literature or an art which Christian doctrine and morals do and must repugn; but this is by virtue of the irrational and sensitive side of our nature, which, in consequence of original sin, is in an abnormal state. (Vol. xix. p. 319.)

There are two modes in which art may affect us on this side of our nature—one by exciting corrupt appetites and gratifying perverse tendencies, the other by allaying or tranquillizing the passions, and so diverting us from the sensitive affections as to prevent them from obscuring the understanding or enslaving the will. The art that operates in the first-mentioned mode is not unknown, nay, is quite common. It is the fashionable art of our age, especially if we speak of literature. Under its category we must place the principal part of the poetry of Byron, Moore, and Shelley, all the fashionable novels from Sir Walter Scott down to Georges Sand, and the light, with no small part of the grave, literature of the day, and which the young man or the young woman can no more read without being corrupted than one can touch pitch and not be defiled. But art of this sort is a counterfeit or false art; because just in proportion as we follow the sensitive nature, we run away from God, "the first good and the first fair," the

supreme and absolute truth, the supreme and absolute good, and the supreme and absolute beauty, and tend towards the creature as final cause or ultimate end, therefore towards supreme and absolute falsehood, and consequently towards supreme and absolute nullity, since the creature separated from God is a nullity, and absolute nullity must needs be as far removed from the beautiful as it is from the true and the good.

The beautiful is not a human creation; men do not make it; it is real, and independent of the genius that discovers it or seeks to embody it in works of art, in poetry, eloquence, music, painting, sculpture, or architecture. It, then, like all reality, has its origin in God, and even as created beauty must be, though distinguishable, yet inseparable from God, and like every creature in its degree an image of God. . . .

It is precisely in this image of God in which all things in their degree and according to their nature are created that reside the truth, goodness, and beauty of things. Whatever obscures this image, or leads us away from it, or substitutes for it the image of the creature, obscures the beautiful and leads us away from it into the deformed and the inane, which is evidently the case with the art that takes for its object the pleasure or satisfaction of the inferior soul or the corrupt appetites and passions of our nature. Whence it follows that only the art that operates in the second mode we have defined, that is, to allay concupiscence, to tranquillize the passions, and enfeeble their force, can be true and genuine art, or the art that really and truly embodies the beautiful. This it can do only by elevating us into a region above the sphere of the sensitive soul, above the

merely sensible world, into the intelligible world, by exciting in us noble thoughts, lofty aspirations, and so charming the rational soul, the intellect, and will with spiritual truth and goodness that the sensitive soul, so to speak, is for the time being overpowered and rendered unable to disturb us. This is what the church has always aimed at in her sacred art, whether manifested in her noble hymns, her grand cathedrals, her splendid ritual, or her solemn chants and soul-subduing music—not, as shallow, heretical, and infidel travellers would fain persuade us, the positive enlisting of the senses, the passions, and sensitive affections in her service. (Vol. xix. pp. 320, 321.)

The test of imagination is not a florid style abounding in tropes and figures. Such a style indicates fancy, not imagination, and, in fact, it is the general tendency of our countrymen, nay, of our age, to mistake fancy for imagination. Irving and Hawthorne have imagination, though not of the highest order; Bancroft has fancy, a rich and exuberant fancy, but very little imagination. To test the question whether a man has imagination or not, let him take up a dry and difficult subject, and if he can treat it so that without weariness, and even with interest, you can follow him through his discussion of it, although he uses always the language appropriate to it and seems to employ only the pure intellect in developing it, you may be sure that he has a strong and fervid imagination, so strong and active as to impart life and motion to whatever he touches. (Vol. xix. pp. 370, 371.)

## FRIVOLOUSNESS OF MODERN LITERATURE.

MEN weak and inconstant in all else are often remarkably steady, persevering, and acute in all matters of business. Eminent saints, estimable for their genius and learning, had been dismissed in youth from school for their incapacity. The love of God became with them a ruling passion, made them strong, energetic, firm, constant, and then they showed to all men that they had no lack of intellect. The same thing is evinced by the fact that some men write and speak admirably under excitement who can hardly speak or write at all when unexcited. They do not want intellect, but they want the force of will to use it. Wherever there is a noble purpose, a firm will, a fixed resolution, genius and talent never fail.

The feebleness and frivolousness of modern literature are due to no deterioration of men's intellectual powers, which are as great and as good now as ever they were, but to the want of force and constancy of will, which itself is owing to the neglect of severe studies, the want of true philosophical discipline, and of high and noble aims.

The great artist, if he is to aid religion, if he is to subserve her influence by removing the obstacles which the flesh interposes, subduing the passions, and setting the affections to the key-note of devotion, must, it is true, understand his religion well, and in some sense be himself eminently religious; he must also, if he would be great even as an artist, whatever the sphere or tendency of his art, be a man of genuine science; for art is the expression of the true under the form of the beautiful, and it is obvious that a man cannot express, under the form of



the beautiful, or any other form, what he does not apprehend. Here, perhaps, is the secret of the present low state of art. There is no want of artistic aspiration, skill, or effort, yet throughout the world art languishes, and no great master makes his appearance; because the aspirants do not qualify themselves for success by genuine scientific culture, do not rise to the clear, distinct, and vivid apprehension of the higher order of truth, the eternal verities of things, and there obtain a noble and worthy ideal. The most that art in our days can do is to copy external nature, paint flowers or babble of brooks, woods, and green fields; for we have no science, no philosophy, and even our faith is languid when it is not wholly extinct, and seizes nothing firmly, vividly. Nevertheless, though the artist must be well instructed, be a great theologian, philosopher, and moralist, his province is not to express truth under the form of science, but, as we have said, under that of the beautiful. In a degree, the province of the literature we are contemplating is and should be the same. (Vol. xix. pp. 303, 304.)

#### PROFESSIONAL AUTHORS.

WE cannot give in to the cant so common about American authors and the propriety and necessity of giving them a special preference and encouragement. We have no respect for mere professional authors, whether American or not. An author class, whose vocation is simple authorship, has no normal functions in either the religious or the social hierarchy. Our Lord, in organizing his church, made no provision for professional authors, and in the original constitution of society they have no place

assigned them. They have and can have no normal existence, for the simple reason that literature is never an end and can never be rightfully pursued save as a means. Authors we respect when they are authors only for the sake of discharging or better discharging duties which devolve on them in some other capacity. Authors whose profession is authorship are the lineal descendants of the old sophists, and are not a whit more respectable than their pagan ancestors. We can respect Cicero Cæsar, Thucydides, Plato, Aristotle, because authorship was not their profession, and was resorted to only as incidental to the main business of their lives; we can and do reverence the fathers of the church, for they wrote their immortal works not for the sake of writing them, but as subsidiary to the discharge of the solemn duties of their ministry; we also honor Calhoun or Webster when either publishes a speech, because it is intended to subserve the purposes of their vocation, and that vocation is not authorship. We call no man a professional author, though nearly his whole life be devoted to authorship, who merely uses authorship as a means of effecting the ends of a legitimate vocation; and in speaking against authorship, it is only against it as it is itself adopted as a vocation or a profession.

We say, very frankly, that we regard an author class, or a class of professional authors whose vocation is simply authorship, not only as not desirable, but as a positive nuisance. They constitute one of the greatest pests of modern society. Nothing can be conceived more ruinous to the state, more destructive of faith and manners, of all that constitutes the worth or glory of society or individuals, than a class of men of which your Bulwers, Byrons, Shelleys,

Dickenses, Victor Hugos, Balzacs, Eugene Sues, Paul de Kocks, and, pardoning the bull, Georges Sands, not to mention a whole host of Germans and some Americans, are distinguished specimens. Such a class is a moral excrescence on the body of society, and it would be well if some Christian Socrates would arise to treat its members as the pagan Socrates did the sophists of old. It is not for the interest of our country, nor of any country, whether we speak of moral and social or of religious interest, to support or encourage such a class; and they who complain of the want of encouragement extended to professional authors hardly know what they do. Too much encouragement is already extended to them, as the multitude of our petty novels, Knickerbockers, Graham's Magazines, Lady Books, Saturday Couriers, and Olive Branches can abundantly testify. Every dapper little fellow, every sentimental young lady, or not young, married unhappily, or despairing of getting married, who can scribble a few lines each beginning with a capital letter, or dash off a murderous tale about love, or an amorous tale about murder, is encouraged to turn author by profession, and finds no lack of opportunity to aid in deluging the land with nonsense, cant, sentimentality, sensuality, obscenity, and blasphemy. For decency's sake let us hear no more of professional authors, of the liberal provision which should be made for them, the indifference of the public, the timidity or penuriousness of booksellers. (Vol. xix. pp. 216, 217.)

#### LITERATURE MUST HAVE AN AIM.

THE scholar must have an end to which his scholarship serves as a means. Mr. Emerson and his friends

seem to us to forget this. Forgetfulness of this is the reigning vice of Goethe and Carlyle. They bid the scholar make all things subsidiary to himself. He must be an artist—his sole end is to produce a work of art. He must scorn to create for a purpose, to compel his genius to serve, to work for an end beyond the work itself. All this, which is designed to dignify art, is false and tends to render art impossible. Did Phidias create but for the purpose of creating a statue? Was he not haunted by a vision of beauty which his soul burned to realize? Had the old Italian masters no end apart from and above that of making pictures? Did Homer sing merely that he might hear the sound of his own voice? Did Herodotus and Thucydides write but for the sake of writing, and Demosthenes and Cicero speak but for the purpose of producing inimitable specimens of art? Never yet has there appeared a noble work of art which came not from the artist's attempt to gain an end separate from that of producing a work of art. Always does the artist seek to affect the minds or the hearts of his like, to move, persuade, convince, please, instruct, or ennoble. To this end he chants a poem, composes a melody, laughs in a comedy, weeps in a tragedy, gives us an oration, a treatise, a picture, a statue, a temple. In all the masterpieces of ancient and modern literature, we see the artist has been in earnest, a real man, filled with an idea, wedded to some great cause, ambitious to gain some end. Always has he found his inspiration in his cause, and his success may always be measured by the magnitude of that cause and the ardor of his attachment to it. (Vol. xix. pp. 19, 20.)

## POPULAR ERRORS SHOULD BE WITHSTOOD.

THERE are, and it is worse than idle to deny it, labors indispensable to the progress of mankind, under its moral, religious, intellectual, and social relations, which can be performed only by men who stand out, and are distinguished by their capacity, virtues, and attainments, from the multitude. The most ordinary questions concerning man's destiny or mere every-day ethics can be answered only by the light of a metaphysical and theological science, which the many do not, will not, and cannot be made to understand. Popular passions, popular prejudices, popular ignorance, popular errors and vices, are often to be withstood; but who will there be to withstand them if there be none among us who rise above the level of the mass? for who, not rising above the level of the mass, but must share them? Who among us, having only the wisdom and virtue common to all, for the sake of truth, justice, love, religion, country, humanity, will throw themselves before the popular car, and with their bodies seek to arrest its destructive career? (Vol. xix. p. 74.)

The notion, then, which scholars sometimes entertain, that their scholarship is a personal immunity, a sort of personal luxury, which they have the right to indulge for themselves alone, and that this is wherefore in God's providence they have been blessed with the capacity and means to be scholars, is false, mischievous; and whoso entertains it and acts on it will assuredly fail in discharging his mission as a scholar. Just in proportion as you rise above the level of the mass does your obligation to labor for their welfare enlarge and strengthen; and your true distinction, your true glory, is not that in ability or attainment

you rise above them, but that you more successfully, and under more important relations, contribute to their real growth, than do any of your competitors. The scholarship that rests with the scholar, that seeks only the scholar's own ease, pleasure, convenience, or renown, is worthy only of the unmitigated contempt of all men. Of all men, the scholar is he who needs most thoroughly to understand and practise the abnegation of self; who more than any other is to be laborious and self-sacrificing, feeling himself charged to work out a higher good for his brethren; and that wherever he is or whatever he does the infinite Eye rests upon him, and his honor as a man, as well as a scholar, is staked on the wisdom and fidelity with which he labors to execute his mission. (Vol. xix. p. 76.)

#### LITERATURE SHOULD BE CHRISTIAN.

IN seeking to subject literature to the empire of religion, we are far from seeking to deprive it of any of its power, its variety, extent, delicacy, or grace. We are seeking to provide for these in a higher degree, to give to literature itself a higher order of excellence. Form may still be studied, and must be; and the more truly beautiful and appropriate it is rendered, all the better. Religion looks with no favor on the literary sloven. What is worth doing at all is worth doing well, and no man has the right to send out a literary production, great or small, without having made it as perfect in its kind as possible in his circumstances and with the other duties of his vocation. Crude and hasty productions on which the author bestows no thought and which he makes no effort to mature and perfect are reprehensible under a moral as well as under a literary point of view.

Accomplished scholarship, wide and varied erudition, science in its deepest principles and minutest details, are never to be depreciated, but sought, though not for their own sake. The past may be explored, the present surveyed; all nature—moral, intellectual, social, physical—investigated, experimented, and its facts collected and classified; the boundless regions of fancy and imagination may be traversed and laid under contribution, and should be so far as requisite or useful to the improvement or perfection of the work on which we are engaged. No time, no labor, no patience, no research, is to be spared when requisite to the accomplishment, or better accomplishment, of the ends we have in view and which religion imposes or sanctions. Even the old classics, so far as they can aid in the improvement or perfection of the literary form, where the improvement and perfection of the form is sought only for the purpose of subserving the cause of truth or virtue, by rendering our works better adapted to the ends for which they are designed, may be studied, and, no doubt, with profit; for under the relation of form they are unsurpassed and not to be surpassed. To the pure all things are pure. The only restriction laid on the scholar or the author is a restriction on his motives, that whatever he does he do it from religious motives, for the sake of subserving the great and solemn purpose of existence. Religion, therefore, while it restricts the will, the intention, the motive, by the law of God, leaves as wide a margin for the display of the powers and capacities of the human mind, and for the production of a free, pure, rich, graceful, pleasing, influential, and soul-stirring literature, as the maddest of the modern worshippers of humanity can possibly wish. (Vol. xix. pp. 213, 214.)

## PROTESTANT AND CATHOLIC LITERATURE.

PROTESTANTISM and Catholicity are two separate worlds, and Catholic and Protestant literatures belong to two distinct and separate orders. Literature is nothing but the exponent of the life of a people, the expression of its sentiments, convictions, aims, and ideals. Such your people, such your literature. Catholic literature expresses the life of the Catholic people, Protestant literature of the Protestant people; and as the life of the one is essentially different from the life of the other, so must be the literature of the one from the literature of the other. Catholic literature may have its faults, be exceptionable in detail; but it is in general, in its generic character, Christian—pervaded by a Christian thought and imbued with the Christian spirit. It may or it may not borrow the forms of ancient classical literature; but whether it do or do not, its matter is always Christian. Protestant literature is essentially heathen—a reproduction, under varied forms, of the literature of pagan antiquity. Its form is sometimes Christian, and so are some of its details and embellishments; but its groundwork, its main substance, is heathen. This is the radical difference between the two literatures. The Catholic often accommodates the Christian thought to the classical form; the Protestant sometimes the heathen thought to the Christian form. Thus the Catholic theologian borrows the logic of the ancients, because logic is formal, applicable equally to all subjects on which we can reason, and is necessarily the same, whatever the doctrines to be demonstrated or refuted; the Protestant theologian generally despises the logic, but borrows the *doctrines* of the ancients. (Vol. xix. p. 101.)



### CATHOLIC LITERATURE PERVADED BY A CATHOLIC SPIRIT.

WE do not contend that Catholics should, on all occasions and in all companies, obtrude their faith and church. There is a time for all things. There are the common courtesies of civilized life; there are the reciprocal obligations and the kind offices of good neighborhood—which, of course, are never to be neglected—a respect for the rights and the honorable feelings of others, which are always to be scrupulously observed. But what we urge is that we remember always that the church holds the first place in every Catholic's affections, and that all in life is to be subordinated to the one great end of pleasing God and gaining heaven. This should always be present to our souls and influence or determine the spirit of all we do or say. In regard to literature, we do not ask that the Catholic always wield the tomahawk and battle-axe of controversy, that he be ever formally stating the claims of his church and denouncing all who are not within its pale. There is enough of all this in our literature as it is. But what we do want is the Catholic soul, the Catholic spirit, which shall unconsciously pervade all we write and inform every sentence and word, so that whoever takes up one of our works, at whatever page he opens, shall feel that its author could have been none other than a Catholic. (Vol. xix. p. 136.)

### HARMONY BETWEEN RELIGION AND LITERATURE.

THE poet or novelist has no right to be anti-Christian, to be heretical or immoral in spirit or ten-

dency; to run in anything counter to Catholic truth or virtue; but he is perfectly free to follow nature in all respects in which nature stands simply below grace without standing opposed to it. He is free to write a poem or novel which turns wholly on natural principles and affections and which displays only natural virtues, but he is not free to write a work which opposes his religion and contradicts Catholic morality. Though writing professedly as a literary man, he must still remember that he is a Christian and a gentleman. The law which binds his conscience in his devotions binds him equally in his poem or his novel; and he has no more right, in his own character, to be immoral, indecent, coarse, vulgar, rude, and uncivil, to curse, swear, to lie, to slander, calumniate, or excite impure thoughts or prurient fancies in his literary productions, than he has in well-bred Christian society. He may be natural, but natural only in the sense in which nature is not perverted; in the sense in which nature responds to grace or is in accordance with it. . . .

The principles which should govern him in literature are precisely those which should govern him in every department of secular life—in politics, business, and amusement. In all these he is bound to be at least negatively Catholic. He who follows the evangelical counsels chooses the better part; but no one is absolutely bound to do more than to follow the evangelical precepts. All are not bound to withdraw from the world and to retire to the cloister. It is lawful for Christians to live in the world and to take part in its daily commerce; to love and be loved; to marry and be given in marriage; to laugh and joke; to sing and to dance; to be glad and to be sorrowful—in a word, to do whatever

is innocent, providing no positive duty is neglected. Undoubtedly, he who aims only at this secular life does not aim at the highest, and may be in danger, by aiming no higher, of falling short of the mark at which he aims. He certainly does not aim at perfection; but not all imperfection is sin, and no man is bound to be perfect. It is possible to inherit eternal life by keeping the precepts, without attaining to the perfection which comes from keeping the evangelical counsels. "If thou wouldst be *perfect*, sell what thou hast, give it to the poor, and come and follow me." We envy those privileged souls who are called to the perfection of the religious state; but it will be much for us if we attain to that lower degree of virtue which, though it secures not that perfection, yet, through the mercy of God, may suffice to admit us into heaven. We must be content if we can bring the majority of Christians to keep the commandments; and therefore we must be content to leave to literature all the latitude left to nature by the positive precepts of our religion, or all the liberty which the church concedes to the secular order in general. All secular life is free in so far as not hostile to supernatural faith and morals; and to the same extent our literary aspirants are free to follow their natural genius, taste, and tendencies. If they aim higher and voluntarily assume the counsels as their law, we applaud them; they do what is best; but if they are content with secular literature, we have no right to complain so long as they use their liberty without abusing it.

We dwell on this point because we are approaching the period when Catholics are to make large contributions to our American national literature, and it is of great importance that our literary aspi-

rants should clearly understand their liberty and its restrictions and start on the right track. The danger to be apprehended is that they will take their models from the national literatures of the Old World. We Americans have asserted our political independence, are on the point of asserting our financial independence, and we ought to be instant in asserting our literary independence. We would not speak lightly of the popular national literatures of Europe; but we must be permitted to say that none of them are a suitable model for American literature. A national literature is the exponent of national civilization, and is truly national only in so far as it accords with the elements of its civil life. Our civil life, our *civility*, in the old sense of the word, is, though below, in strict accordance with Catholicity. Here, for the first time in the history of Christendom, have we found a civil order in harmony, as to its principles, with the church. Here, then, only that can be our national literature which accords with Catholic faith and morals. And here, for the first time since the founding of the Christian Church, has such a literature been possible. All the literatures of the Old World, aside from the literature of the church, of which we do not now speak, have been the exponents of a civilization which was pagan in many of its elements, and never in entire harmony with the teachings, the mind, and the wishes of the church. Those old national literatures which proceed from and speak to the popular heart in European nations are the product of a society never thoroughly converted, and they are every day growing more and more pagan, more and more incompatible with Catholicity. The popular national literature even of Catholic Europe is only partially Catholic, and if

we take that as our point of departure and as our model, we shall not contribute to the creation of a literature in perfect harmony either with our church or with our American civil order. We shall retain and exaggerate the discrepancy, now so marked in Catholic Europe, between profane and sacred literature, and place our literature in hostility both to our religion and to our politics or civil polity.

It is a fact worthy of note that we have never, as yet, found in Catholic Europe that harmony between religion and popular literature which strikes us so forcibly in ancient Greece and Rome, or even in modern Protestant nations. No doubt a principal cause of this nearly perfect harmony between religion and literature in the non-Catholic world is that in the ancient pagan, as in the modern Protestant nations, literature and religion both proceed from the same source and have the same end. Both originate in perverted human nature, and give expression, under various aspects, to that nature in its fallen and unregenerated state. Catholicity, on the contrary, is from above, is supernatural, and expresses the divine wisdom, power, and love, and therefore stands opposed to perverted nature. But another reason is that the popular literature of Europe, as distinguished from that of the church, took its rise in a society not wholly converted from paganism, and has retained pagan elements and tendencies. Now, as we are, for the most part, trained in this old European literature, greatly deteriorated as to its principles and tendency by the later influences of Protestantism, humanism, and incredulity, we are predisposed to reproduce it, and we can avoid doing so only by being well instructed in the application of faith and theology, as well as in the nature and

application of the principles of American civilization, and being constantly on our guard against the false principles and tendencies of our literary education. There is not a man in the country who has had in his youth a thorough literary training in strict accordance with our religion and civilization, or that has not been trained in a literature, if he has had any literary training at all, in many respects adverse to both. The nature that has predominated in his training is not nature simply in the sense in which it responds to revelation and grace, but a lawless and licentious nature; and the political principles which underlie and pervade it are either those which presuppose the absolutism of the one or the absolutism of the many. Our popular political doctrines, as expressed in such American literature as we have, are derived chiefly from European sources, and are incompatible either with liberty or with government. The democracy of our institutions is a very different thing from the democracy of our literature. The democracy of our literature is that of European radicals, red-republicans, revolutionists, social despots, and anarchists; for our literature is not yet American and has not yet been inspired by our own American institutions and life, but copied from the literatures of the Old World. In literature we are, as yet, only a European colony, under the tutelage of the mother country, and unaware that we are of age and may set up for ourselves. Only Catholic Americans are in a position to assert and maintain American literary independence; for it is only they who have a religion that demands or that can aid in effecting such independence. We hope our young literary aspirants who are coming forward in such numbers will lay this to heart and pre-

pare themselves for the work that awaits them, not only by prayer and meditation, which are never to be dispensed with, but also by a profound study of the philosophy, if we may so speak, of our religion and of our American institutions; so that they may give us a literature which shall respond to both. We do not ask them to aim at producing a literature for the cloister or one especially adapted to spiritual reading; for in that literature the Catholic world already abounds, and, moreover, that literature is Catholic, not national, and can be produced as well in one age or nation as another. What we ask of them to aim at and prepare themselves for is a popular national literature which, though natural, is pure and innocent; though secular and free, is inoffensive to Catholic truth and virtue; and which, though not doing much directly to advance us in spiritual life, shall yet tend to cultivate, refine, and humanize barbarous nature, and to remove those obstacles to the introduction and progress of Catholic civilization which are interposed by ignorance, rude manners, rough feelings, wild and ferocious passions. The office of popular literature is not precisely to spiritualize, but to civilize a people; and as we look here for the highest development of modern civilization, we demand of our American Catholics the highest and purest secular literature. (Vol. xix. pp. 450-454.)

#### THE NOVEL OF INSTRUCTION.

THERE are works which are sometimes, though not properly, called *novels* to which we do not object, nay, which we prize very highly. An author is not censurable for choosing the form of a fictitious narrative, and he may often do so with great

propriety and effect. But the "novel of instruction," as it is called, designed to set forth a particular doctrine, system, or theory, whether sacred or profane, in an artistic point of view, is, in our judgment, always objectionable. The form of the novel is never proper in those works which are addressed specially to the understanding, and is allowable only in those designed rather to move and please than to enlighten and convince. The novel must always have a story, a plot of some sort, from which its interest arises and in which it centres. But the interest of a story is diverse from the interest excited by a logical discussion and not compatible with it. The one demands action, movement, is impatient of delay and hurries on to the end; the other demands quiet, repose, and suffers only the intellect to be active. It is impossible to combine them both in one and the same piece so as to produce unity of effect.

Especially is this true of what are called *religious* novels. The aim of these novels is to combine a story of profane love with an argument for religion. But the distance between the interest of such a story and that of a theological discussion is much greater than the distance between it and that of any secular or profane discussion. No two interests are more widely separated or less capable of coalescing than the interest of profane love and that of religion. Persons in love or taken up with love-tales are in the worst possible disposition to listen to an argument for religion or to appreciate the sublime and beautiful truths of the Gospel. Love is a partial frenzy, and lovers are always only just this side of madness. Reason is silenced and passion is mistress. The only religion lovers can understand or relish is the religion of the natural sentiments and affections,



that is to say, no religion at all. Nothing is more absurd than for a novelist to mingle in his work a story of profane love and a story of religious conversion, two things which will no more mix than oil and water.

Every subject should be allowed to speak in its own natural language. The natural language of the understanding, and therefore of all works primarily intended for it, is prose. The novel, though unrhymed, is not properly a prose composition; it belongs, according to the critics, to the department of poetry, and should therefore conform to the essential laws of poetry. The primary object of poetry is, not to instruct, but to move and please. It addresses the sentiments, affections, imagination, rather than the understanding. Whenever the author reverses this and seeks, under the poetical form, first of all to instruct, to bring out a theory, or to defend a doctrine, he ceases to be the genuine poet and becomes the doctor or philosopher, and fails to preserve the requisite congruity between the matter and the form of his work. Most readers, we apprehend, find even Dryden's "Hind and Panther" a heavy book, notwithstanding its brilliant imagination, keen wit, various learning, sound and deep theology. No one can read "The Disowned," "Paul Clifford," "Rienzi," or "The Last of the Barons," by Bulwer, without feeling the author's moralizing and philosophizing an annoyance, however much he may admire them in themselves considered. They retard the action of the piece and are usually skipped by the reader. An author may introduce variety, even diversity, in the same piece, but never at random. He has no room for caprice. The diverse elements he addresses must be of the same general group and capable of

coalescing and conspiring to unity of effect. He must follow the law and adhere to the relations which nature herself establishes. (Vol. xix. pp. 225-227.)

## RELIGIOUS NOVELS.

MOST Catholic novels which have fallen under our notice are made up of two distinct and separable portions, the sentimental story and the grave religious discussion. The latter, which is the more important part, is in general what may be found in any of our elementary works intended for those disposed to inquire into the claims of our holy religion, and is often copied *verbatim* from them; and the sentimental portion, as far as it goes, is very much what is found in novels in general. Now, these works are designed for Catholics, for Protestants, or for both together. If for Catholics alone, this graver portion is hardly needed, for they know it already, and the novel will interest and attract them only in so far as it is light and sentimental. If they are designed for Protestants, to instruct them in our faith, to remove their prejudices, and to induce them to examine into the claims of the church, they contain too little solid instruction, pass over too many important points, and dismiss in too summary a manner the real difficulties to be solved. If for both together, they fail, in failing to meet the peculiar wants of either. They offer a certain quantity of light and sentimental reading, on condition that one consents, without a wry face, to take a certain dose of theology, which, if he is well, he does not need, and which, if he is sick, is not enough to do him any good. Moreover, it may be set down as a general rule that they who are seriously disposed would prefer taking the theology

by itself, and those who are not so disposed will skip it. The one class will regard the light and sentimental as an impertinence, and the other the grave and religious as a *bore*. (Vol. xix. p. 144.)

### SENTIMENTALISM.

THE age in which we live is a sentimental age, and sentimentalism is the deadliest enemy to true piety and to all real strength or worth of character. It enervates the soul, subverts the judgment, and lays the heart open to every temptation. The staple literature of our times, the staple reading of our youth of both sexes, is sentimental novels and love-tales, and the effect is manifest in the diseased state of the public mind and in the growing effeminacy of character and depravation of morals. Nature herself has made ample provision for the passion and the sentiment of love, and they cannot be excited to an unnatural activity by the charms of imagination and the magic of poetry without involving the most grave consequences. The early Christians chanted the praises of virginity and employed their imagination and poetry to win souls to God, not to madden two young persons with a blind and often a fatal passion for each other, and we do not well in departing from their example.

All books which seek the sources of their interest in the passion or sentiment of love are to be distrusted, and so indeed are all which, no matter in what degree, foster a sentimental tendency. The more delicate and refined the sentimentality and the more apparently innocent and pure it may be, the more really dangerous it is. Works which are grossly sensual disgust all in whom corruption has not

already commenced; but works which studiously avoid every indelicate expression or allusion, which seem to breathe an atmosphere of purity itself, excite no alarm, are read by the innocent and confiding, insinuate a fatal poison before it is suspected, and create a tone and temper of mind and heart which pave the way for corruption. Corruption generally, if not always, begins in the sentiments, and in sentiments which in themselves are free from blame and which apparently cannot be too strong or active. The devil, when he would seduce us, comes usually disguised as an angel of light. If he came in his own shape, in his real character, we should at once recognize and resist him; but coming disguised under the appearance of something which is held to be innocent and worthy to be encouraged, he is able to destroy the equilibrium of the character, to produce a morbid state of the affections, and to take from us all power to resist in the hour of trial. (Vol. xix. p. 145.)

Amusement, relaxation, has its place, and may be innocent and salutary. But the sentimental is no relaxation, is no amusement. It kills amusement and substitutes the heart's grief for the heart's joy. Why not give us the heart's laughter instead of its tears? Better, far better, to laugh than to sigh and mope. Old Chaucer, who belonged to England unreformed, to "Merry England," is too broad and by no means free from grave faults, but his faults flow from his exuberance of life and health, and his influence is a thousand times less immoral than that of your Bulwers, Disraelis, L. E. L.s, Tennysons, and Nortons. There is always hope of the heart that can laugh out and overflow with mirth. It is the heart oppressed with sadness, overclouded with

gloom, that starts back with horror from a little fun and frolic, that is to be dreaded, both for its own sake and that of others. . . .

Catholic literature is robust and healthy, of a ruddy complexion, and full of life. It knows no sadness but sadness for sin, and it rejoices evermore. It eschews melancholy as the devil's best friend on earth, abhors the morbid sentimentality which feeds upon itself and grows by what it feeds upon. It may be grave, but it never mopes; tender, affectionate, but never weak or sickly. It washes its face, anoints its head, puts on its festive robes, goes forth into the fresh air, the bright sunshine, and, when occasion requires, rings out the merry laugh that does one's heart good to hear. England is sad enough to-day, and her people seem to sit in the region and shadow of death; but in good old Catholic times she was known the world over as "Merry England." It is on principle the Catholic approves such gladsome and smiling literature. It is only in the free and joyous spirit that religion can do her perfect work; for it is only such a spirit that has the self-possession, the strength, the energy requisite for the every-day duties of life. (Vol. xix. pp. 151, 152.)

Now, against this pagan gloom, doubt, despair, and this morbid sentimentality, not pagan, but of modern growth, the curse of the literature of the age, it is necessary to be on our guard, both as authors and readers. If we must have a literature for those who are not serious, for the weak and vain, let us have it, but let it be free, healthy, and joyous. Let it laugh out from the heart, the free, unconstrained laughter of innocence and gladness. Let it throw the sunlight over all the relations of life. If it will unveil the heart, let it be the heart's mirth, not its

grief; and if it will parade the merely human sentiments, let it deck them in gala robes and crown them with fresh-gathered flowers. Let it beat the tambour, sound the trumpets, ring out the merry peal, and go forth with fun and frolic, in the exuberance of joyous spirits, if it will; but let it, in the name of all that is sacred, never sigh, and mope, and talk sentiment. (Vol. xix. p. 153.)

### THE CATHOLIC PRESS.

THE press may have its advantages, but it certainly has its disadvantages and is productive of serious evils. Its natural tendency is to bring literature down to the level of the tastes and attainments of the unreasoning, undisciplined, and conceited multitude, and to lessen the demand for patient thought, sound learning, and genuine science. Under its influence, the more light and superficial literature is, the more popular it becomes and the richer the reward of its authors. It must be adapted to the most numerous class of readers, and win them by appeals to their prejudices or their passions; and if profound, if it go to the bottom of things and treat its subjects scientifically, it will transcend the popular capacity, demand some mental discipline and application on the part of readers, and be rejected as heavy, uninteresting, and therefore worthless. There will be no demand for it in the market, and it will lie on the shelves of the bookseller.

At the same time, too, that the press, in the modern acceptation, tends to make literature light, shallow, and unprofitable, in order to meet the popular demand, it reacts on the public mind and unfits it for a literature of a more respectable character. A

people accustomed to read only newspapers and the light trash of the day can relish nothing else. The stomach that has long been fed only with slops loses its power to bear solid food. We find every day that even newspapers of the more respectable class are too heavy and too learned for the people. It is but a small minority of their subscribers who read their more elaborate editorials. The majority can find time and patience only to glance the eye over the shorter paragraphs, catch a joke here and an item of news there. Nothing that cannot be read on the run and comprehended at a glance is looked upon as worth reading at all. . . .

Moreover, the tendency of the press is to bring before an unprepared public questions that can be profitably discussed only before a professional audience. The people need and can receive the results of the most solid learning and the most profound and subtile philosophy, but they can neither perform nor appreciate the processes by which those results are obtained. Hodge and Goody Jones have little ability to follow the discussion of the higher metaphysical questions or of the more intricate points of theology. The great body of the people are not and cannot be scholars, philosophers, theologians, or statesmen. They must have teachers and masters, and are as helpless without them as a flock of sheep without a shepherd. Do what you will, they will follow leaders of some sort, and the modern attempt to make them their own teachers and masters results only in exposing them to a multitude of miserable pretenders, who lead them where there is no pasture and where the wolves congregate to devour them. You may call this aristocracy, priestcraft, want of respect for the people—what you will; it is

a fact as plain as the nose on a man's face, proved by all history and confirmed by daily experience. There is no use, no sense, no honesty, in attempting to deny or to disguise it. There never was a greater humbug than the modern schemes for introducing equality of education, whether by levelling upwards or by levelling downwards. The order of the world is—the few lead, the many are led; and whether you like it or not, you cannot make it otherwise, and every attempt to make it otherwise only makes the matter worse. (Vol. xix. pp. 269, 270.)

Assuming that the people must have leaders, that they cannot dispense with teachers, it is evident that there must be questions which are not proper to be brought before them—not precisely because of their sacredness, but because of their unintelligibleness to the unprepared intellect; because they involve principles which transcend the reach of the undisciplined mind, and require for the right understanding of them preliminary studies which the bulk of mankind do not and cannot make. The people need and may receive the full benefit of law, and yet they cannot all be lawyers; for the law demands a special study and a long and painful study in those who would be worthy legal practitioners. The same may be said of medicine, and with even more truth of theology. Theology requires a professional study, and men, whatever their genius, natural abilities, and general learning, can only blunder the moment they undertake to treat it, unless they have made it a special study, under able and accomplished professors. Theological science does not come, like Dogberry's reading and writing, by nature, is not a natural instinct, your transcendental young ladies to the contrary notwithstanding. To bring it into



the forum and to discuss it before the populace is only to divest it of all that transcends the popular understanding. (Vol. xix. pp. 271, 272.)

We know that the press cannot take its proper stand without loss of popularity, and that a press that wants popularity can receive but a feeble support. This is one of the evils to which the press is always exposed, and why it can never be so efficient an instrument for good as men suppose. The popularity of a paper is in an inverse ratio to its worth. It is popular by virtue of appealing to popular passion or prejudice, by encouraging popular tendencies, falling in with the spirit of the people or the age—the very things it should resist. We know this very well; but still we believe that this evil is less among Catholics, or more easily overcome among them, than among others, for they have faith and conscience. And we also believe that there is already a body of Catholics in this country, of right feelings and views, numerous enough to sustain a truly Catholic press adapted to the real wants of the times. Catholics are not strangers to deeds of charity, and there are many who have means and who, we doubt not, have the will, to sustain a press beyond the subscription to a single copy for themselves individually. Let the journal take a high stand, be conducted with energy and ability on true Catholic principles, and we will not believe that Catholics will suffer it to languish. (Vol. xix. pp. 285, 286.)

## EDUCATION.

### THE COMMON-SCHOOL SYSTEM.

THE system originated in New England; strictly speaking, in Massachusetts. As originally established in Massachusetts, it was simply a system of parochial schools. The parish and the town were coincident, and the schools of the several school districts into which the parish was divided were supported by a tax on the population and property of the town, levied according to the grand list or state assessment roll. The parish, at its annual town-meeting, voted the amount of money it would raise for schools during the ensuing year, which was collected by the town collector and expended under the direction of a school committee chosen at the same meeting. Substantially the same system was adopted and followed in New Hampshire and Connecticut. In Vermont the towns were divided or divisible, under a general law, into school districts, and each school district decided for itself the amount of money it would raise for its school and the mode of raising it. It might raise it by tax levied on the property of the district, or as it was said, "on the grand list," or *per capita* on the scholars attending and according to the length of their attendance. In this latter method, which was generally followed, only those who used the schools were taxed to support them. This latter method was, in its essential features, adopted in all, or nearly all, the other states that had a common-school system established by law. In

Rhode Island and most of the southern states the inhabitants were left to their own discretion to have schools or not as they saw proper, and those who wanted them founded and supported them at their own expense. In none of the states, however, was there developed at first a system of free public schools supported either by a school fund or by a general tax on property levied by the state, though Massachusetts contained such a system in germ.

Gradually, from the proceeds of public lands, from lots of land reserved in each township, especially in the new states, for common schools, and from various other sources, several of the states accumulated a school fund, the income of which, in some instances, sufficed, or nearly sufficed, for the support of free public schools for all the children in the state. This gave a new impulse to the movement for free schools and universal education, or schools founded and supported for all the children of the state at the public expense in whole or in part, either from the income of the school fund or by a public tax. This is not yet carried out universally, but is that to which public sentiment in all the states is tending; and now that slavery is abolished and the necessity of educating the freedmen is deeply felt, there can be little doubt that it will soon become the policy of every state in the Union.

The schools were originally founded by a religious people for a religious end, not by seculars for a purely secular end. The people at so early a day had not advanced so far as they have now, and did not dream of divorcing secular education from religion. The schools were intended to give both religious and secular education in their natural union, and there was no thought of the feasibility of

separating what God had joined together. The Bible was read as a class-book, the catechism was taught as a regular school exercise, and the pastor of the parish visited the schools and instructed them in religion as often as he saw proper. Indeed, he was, it might be said, *ex officio* the superintendent of the parish schools; and whether he was chosen as committeeman or not, his voice was all-potent in the management of the school, in the selection of studies, and in the appointment and dismissal of teachers. The superiority in a religious and moral point of view to the schools as now developed may be seen by contrasting the present moral and religious state of New England with what it was then.

The religion, as we Catholics hold, was defective and even false; but the principle on which the schools were founded was sound and worked well in the beginning, did no injustice to any one, and violated no conscience; for Congregationalism was the established religion, and the people were all Congregationalists. Even where there was no established religion and different denominations obtained, conscience was respected; for the character of the school, as well as the religion taught in it, was determined by the inhabitants of the school district, and nobody was obliged to send his children to it, and those only who did send were taxed for its support. (Vol. xiii. pp. 242-244.)

#### THE RELIGIOUS DIFFICULTY.

BUT in none of the states is there now an established religion, and in all there are a great variety of denominations, all invested with equal rights before

the state. It is obvious, then, the Massachusetts system cannot in any of them be adopted or continued, and the other system of taxing only those who use the schools cannot be maintained, if the schools are to be supported from the income of public funds or by a public tax levied alike on the whole population of the district, town, municipality, or state. Here commences the difficulty—and a grave one it is, too—which has as yet received no practical solution and which the legislatures of the several states are now called upon to solve.

Hitherto the attempt has been made to meet the difficulty by excluding from the public schools what the state calls sectarianism—that is, whatever is distinctive of any particular denomination or peculiar to it—and allowing to be introduced only what is common to all, or, as it is called, “our common Christianity.” This would, perhaps, meet the difficulty if the several denominations were only different varieties of Protestantism. The several Protestant denominations differ from one another only in details or particulars, which can easily be supplied at home in the family or in the Sunday-school. But this solution is impracticable where the division is not one between Protestant sects only, but between Catholics and Protestants. The difference between Catholics and Protestants is not a difference in details or particulars only, but a difference in principle. Catholicity must be taught as a whole, in its unity and its integrity, or it is not taught at all. It must everywhere be all or nothing. It is not a simple theory of truth or a collection of doctrines; it is an organism, a living body, living and operating from its own central life, and is necessarily one and indivisible, and cannot have anything in common

with any other body. To exclude from the schools all that is distinctive or peculiar in Catholicity is simply to exclude Catholicity itself, and to make the schools either purely Protestant or purely secular, and therefore hostile to our religion, and such as we cannot in conscience support.

Yet this is the system adopted, and while the law enables non-Catholics to use the public schools with the approbation of their consciences, it excludes the children of Catholics unless their parents are willing to violate their Catholic conscience, to neglect their duty as fathers and mothers, and expose their children to the danger of losing their faith and with it the chance of salvation. We are not free to expose our children to so great a danger, and are bound in conscience to do all in our power to guard them against it and to bring them up in the faith of the church, to be good and exemplary Catholics.

Evidently, then, the rule of allowing only our supposed "common Christianity" to be taught in schools does not solve the difficulty or secure to the Catholic his freedom of conscience.

The exclusion of the Bible would not help the matter. This would only make the schools purely secular, which were worse than making them purely Protestant; for as it regards the state, society, morality, all the interests of this world, Protestantism we hold to be far better than no religion—unless you include under its name free-lovism, free-religion, woman's-rightism, and the various other similar *isms* struggling to get themselves recognized and adopted, and to which the more respectable Protestants, we presume, are hardly less opposed than we are. If some Catholics in particular localities have supposed that the exclusion of the Protestant Bible from the

public schools would remove the objection to them as schools for Catholic children, they have, in our opinion, fallen into a very great mistake. The question lies deeper than reading or not reading the Bible in the schools, in one version or another. Of course, our church disapproves the Protestant version of the Bible as a faulty translation of a mutilated text; but its exclusion from the public schools would by no means remove our objections to them. We object to them not merely because they teach more or less of the Protestant religion, but also on the ground that we cannot freely and fully teach our religion and train up our children in them to be true and unwavering Catholics; and we deny the right of the state, the city, the town, or the school district to tax us for schools in which we are not free to do so.


We value education, and even universal education—which overlooks no class or child, however rich or however poor, however honored or however despised—as highly as any of our countrymen do or can; but we value no education that is divorced from religion and religious culture. Religion is the supreme law, the one thing to be lived for; and all in life, individual or social, civil or political, should be subordinated to it, and esteemed only as means to the eternal end for which man was created and exists. Religious education is their chief thing, and we wish our children to be accustomed, from the first dawning of reason, so to regard it, and to regard whatever they learn or do as having a bearing on their religious character or their duty to God. . . . We hold that education, either of the intellect or of the heart, or of both combined, divorced from faith and religious discipline, is dangerous alike to the individual and to society. All education should be religious and

intended to train the child for a religious end; not for this life only, but for eternal life; for this life is nothing if severed from that which is to come. . . .

Of course we do not and cannot expect, in a state where Protestants have equal rights with Catholics before the state, to carry our religion into public schools designed equally for all. We have no right to do it. But Protestants have no more right to carry their religion into them than we have to carry ours; and carry theirs they do, when ours is excluded. Their rights are equal to ours, and ours equal to theirs; and neither does or can, in the eyes of the state, override the other. As the question is a matter of conscience and therefore of the rights of God, there can be no compromise, no splitting of differences or yielding of the one party to the other. Here comes up the precise difficulty. The state is bound equally to recognize and respect the conscience of Protestants and of Catholics, and has no right to restrain the conscience of either. There must, then, be a dead-lock, unless some method can be discovered or devised by which the public schools can be saved without lesion either to the Protestant or the Catholic. (Vol. xiii. pp. 244-247.)

#### THE PUBLIC-SCHOOL SYSTEM NOT TO BE ABANDONED.

~~We~~, of course, ~~deny the competency of the state to~~ educate, to say what shall or shall not be taught in the public schools, as we deny its competency to say what shall or shall not be the religious belief and discipline of its citizens. We, of course, utterly repudiate the popular doctrine that so-called secular education is the function of the state. Yet while we





might accept this second solution as an expedient, we do not approve it and cannot defend it as sound in principle. It would break up and utterly destroy the free public-school system, what is good as well as what is evil in it; and we wish to save the system by simply removing what it contains repugnant to the Catholic conscience—not to destroy it or lessen its influence. We are decidedly in favor of free public schools for all the children of the land, and we hold that all the property of the state should bear the burden of educating the children of the state—the two great and essential principles of the system, and which endear it to the hearts of the American people. Universal suffrage is a mischievous absurdity without universal education; and universal education is not practicable unless provided for at the public expense. While, then, we insist that the action of the state shall be subordinated to the law of conscience, we yet hold that it has an important part to perform and that it is its duty, in view of the common weal and of its own security as well as that of its citizens, to provide the means of a good common-school education for all its children, whatever their condition, rich or poor, Catholics or Protestants. It has taken the American people over two hundred years to arrive at this conclusion, and never by our advice shall they abandon it. (Vol. xiii. p. 252.)

#### SEPARATE SCHOOLS.

WE repeat it, what we want is not the destruction of the system, but simply its modification so far as necessary to protect the conscience of both Catholics and Protestants in its rightful freedom. The modification necessary to do this is much slighter than is

supposed, and, instead of destroying or weakening the system, would really perfect it and render it alike acceptable to Protestants and to Catholics, and combine both in the efforts necessary to sustain it. It is simply to adopt the third solution that has been suggested, namely, that of dividing the schools between Catholics and Protestants and assigning to each the number proportioned to the number of children each has to educate. This would leave Catholics free to teach their religion and apply their discipline in the Catholic schools, and Protestants free to teach their religion and apply their discipline in the Protestant schools. The system, as a system of free schools at the public expense, with its fixtures and present machinery, would remain unimpaired; and a religious education, so necessary to society as well as to the soul, could be given freely and fully to all, without the slightest lesion to any one's conscience or interference with the full and entire religious freedom which is guarantied by our constitution to every citizen. The Catholic will be restored to his rights and the Protestant will retain his.

This division was not called for in New England in the beginning, for then the people were all of one and the same religion; nor when only those who used the schools were taxed for their support. It was not needed even when there were only Protestants in the country. In demanding it now, we cast no censure on the original founders of our public schools. But now, when the system is so enlarged as to include free schools for all the children of the state at the public expense, and Catholics have become and are likely to remain a notable part of the population of the country, it becomes not only practicable, but absolutely necessary, if religious liberty

or freedom of conscience for all citizens is to be maintained; and it were an act of injustice to Catholics, whose conscience chiefly demands the division, and a gross abuse of power, to withhold it. It may be an annoyance to Protestants that Catholics are here; but they are here, and here they will remain; and it is never the part of wisdom to resist the inevitable. Our population is divided between Catholics and Protestants, and the only sensible course is for each division to recognize and respect the equal rights of the other before the state. . . .

The more common objection urged is that if separate schools are conceded to Catholics they must not only be conceded to the Israelites, but also to each Protestant denomination. The Israelites, we grant, if they demand them. To each Protestant denomination, not at all, unless each denomination can put in an honest plea of conscience for such division. All Protestant denominations, without a single exception, unless it be the Episcopalians, unite in opposing the division we ask for and in defending the system as it is, which proves that they have no conscientious objections to the public schools as they are now constituted and conducted. The division to meet the demands of the Catholic conscience would necessitate no change at all in the schools not set apart for Catholic children; and the several denominations that are not conscientiously opposed to them now could not be conscientiously opposed to them after the division. We cannot suppose that any denomination of Protestants would consent to support a system of education that offends its own conscience for the sake of doing violence to the conscience of Catholics. Do not all American Protestants profess to be the sturdy champions of freedom of conscience

and maintain that where conscience begins there the secular authority ends? If the present schools do violence to no Protestant conscience, as we presume from their defence of them they do not, no Protestant denomination can demand a division in its favor on the plea of conscience; and to no other plea is the state or the public under any obligation to listen. If, however, there be any denomination that can in good faith demand separate schools on the plea of conscience, we say at once let it have them, for such a plea, when honest, overrides every other consideration.

But we are asked, What shall be done with the large body of citizens who are neither Catholic nor Protestant? Such citizens, we reply, have no religion, and they who have no religion have no conscience that people who have religion are bound to respect. If they refuse to send their children either to the Hebrew schools or the Catholic schools, or, in fine, to the Protestant schools, let them found schools of their own at their own expense. The constitutions of the several states guaranty to each and every citizen the right to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience; but this is not guarantying to any one the freedom of not worshipping God, to deny his existence, to reject his revelation, or to worship a false God. The liberty guarantied is the liberty of religion, not the liberty of infidelity. The infidel has, under our constitution and laws, the right of protection in his civil and political equality; but none to protection in his infidelity, since that is not a religion, but the denial of all religion. He cannot plead conscience in its behalf, for conscience presupposes religion; and where there is no religious faith, there is, of course, no con-

science. It would be eminently absurd to ask the state to protect infidelity, or the denial of all religion; for religion, as we have said, is the only basis of the state, and for the state to protect infidelity would be to cut its own throat.

These are, we believe, all the plausible objections that can be urged against the division of the public schools we demand; for we do not count as such the pretence of some over-zealous Protestants that it is necessary to detach the children of Catholics from the Catholic Church in order that they may grow up thorough Americans; and as the public schools are very effectual in so detaching them and weakening their respect for the religion of their parents and their reverence for their clergy, they ought on all patriotic grounds to be maintained in full vigor as they are. We have heard this objection from over-zealous Evangelicals, and still oftener from so-called liberal Christians and infidels; we have long been told that the church is anti-American and can never thrive in the United States, for she can never withstand the free and enlightened spirit of the country and the decatholicizing influence of our common schools; and we can hardly doubt that some thought of the kind is at the bottom of much of the opposition the proposed division of the public schools has encountered. But we cannot treat it as serious, for it is evidently incompatible with the freedom of conscience which the state is bound by its constitution to recognize and protect, for Catholics as well as for Protestants. The state has no right to make itself a proselyting institution for or against Protestantism, for or against Catholicity. It is its business to protect us in the free and full enjoyment of our religion, not to engage in the work of unmaking our

children of their Catholicity. The case is one of conscience, and conscience is accountable to no civil tribunal. All secular authority and all secular considerations whatever must yield to conscience. In questions of conscience the law of God governs, not a plurality of votes. The state abuses its authority if it sustains the common schools as they are with a view of detaching our children from their Catholic faith and love. If Catholics cannot retain their Catholic faith and practice and still be true, loyal, and exemplary American citizens, it must be only because Americanism is incompatible with the rights of conscience, and that would be its condemnation, not the condemnation of Catholicity. No nationality can override conscience; for conscience is catholic, not national, and is accountable to God alone, who is above and over all nations, all principalities and powers, King of kings and Lord of lords. But the assumption in the objection is not true. It mistakes the opinion of the American people individually for the constitution of the American state. The American state is as much Catholic as it is Protestant, and really harmonizes far better with Catholicity than with Protestantism. We hold that instead of de-catholicizing Catholic children, it is far more necessary, if we are to be governed by reasons of this sort, to unmake the children of Protestants of their Protestantism. We really believe that in order to train them up to be, in the fullest sense, true, loyal, and exemplary American citizens, such as can alone arrest the present downward tendency of the republic and realize the hopes of its heroic and noble-hearted founders, they must become good Catholics. . . .

We place our demand for separate schools on the ground of conscience, and therefore of right—the

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right of God as well as of man. Our conscience forbids us to support schools at the public expense from which our religion is excluded, and in which our children are taught either what we hold to be a false or mutilated religion or no religion at all. Such schools are perilous to the souls of our children; and we dare avow, even in this age of secularism and infidelity, that we place the salvation of the souls of our children above every other consideration. This plea of conscience, which we urge from the depths of our souls and under a fearful sense of our accountability to our Maker, ought to suffice, especially in an appeal to a state bound by its own constitution to protect the rights of conscience for each and all of its citizens, whether Protestant or Catholic.

One thing must be evident from past experience, that our children can be brought up to be good and orderly citizens only as Catholics, and in schools under the supervision and control of their church, in which her faith is freely and fully taught, and her services, discipline, and influences are brought to bear in forming their characters, restraining them from evil and training them to virtue. We do not say that, even if trained in Catholic schools, all will turn out to be good practical Catholics and virtuous members of society; for the church does not take away free-will nor eradicate all the evil propensities of the flesh; but it is certain that they cannot be made such in schools in which the religion of their parents is reviled as a besotted superstition and the very text-books of history and geography are made to protest against it, or in which they are accustomed to hear their priests spoken of without reverence, Protestant nations lauded as the only free and enlightened nations of the earth, Catholic nations

sneered at as ignorant and enslaved, and the church denounced as a spiritual despotism, full of craft, and crusted all over with corruption both of faith and morals. Such schools may weaken their reverence for their parents, even detach them from their church, obscure, if not destroy, their faith, render them indifferent to religion, indocile to their parents, disobedient to the laws; but they cannot inspire them with the love of virtue, restrain their vicious or criminal propensities, or prevent them from associating with the dangerous classes of our large towns and cities, and furnishing subjects for the correctional police, our jails, penitentiaries, state prisons, and the gallows.

We are pointed to the vicious and criminal population of our cities, of which we furnish more than our due proportion, as a conclusive argument against the moral tendency of our religion, and a savage howl of indignation, that rings throughout the land, is set up against the legislature or the municipality that ventures to grant us the slightest aid in our struggles to protect our children from the dangers that beset them, though bearing no proportion to the aid granted to non-Catholics. Yet it is precisely to meet cases like ours that a public provision for education is needed and supposed to be made. Protestants make the great mistake of trying to cure the evil to which we refer by detaching our children from the church and bringing them up bad Protestants, or without any religion. The thousand-and-one associations and institutions formed by Protestant zeal and benevolence for the reformation or the bringing up of poor Catholic children, and some of which go so far as to kidnap little papist orphans or half-orphans, lock them up in their orphan asylums,



where no priest can enter, change their names so that their relatives cannot trace them, send them to a distance and place them in Protestant families, where it is hoped they will forget their Catholic origin, all proceed from the same mistake, and all fail to arrest, or even to lessen, the growing evil. They necessarily provoke the opposition and resistance of the Catholic pastors and of all earnest Catholics who regard the loss of their faith as the greatest calamity that can befall Catholic children. So long as faith remains, however great the vice or the crime, there is something to build on, and room to hope for repentance, though late, for reformation and final salvation. Faith once gone, all is gone.

It is necessary to understand that the children of Catholics must be trained up in the Catholic faith, in the Catholic Church, to be good exemplary Catholics, or they will grow up bad citizens, the pests of society. Nothing can be done for them but through the approval and co-operation of the Catholic clergy and the Catholic community. The contrary rule, till quite recently, has been adopted, and public and private benevolence has sought to benefit our children by disregarding or seeking to uproot their Catholic faith and rejecting the co-operation of the Catholic clergy. The results are apparent to all not absolutely blinded by their misdirected zeal.

The public have not sufficiently considered that by the law excluding our religion from the public schools, the schools as established by law are Protestant schools, at least so far as they are not pagan or godless. We do not suppose the state ever intended to establish Protestantism as the exclusive religion of the schools; but such is the necessary re-

sult of excluding, no matter under what pretext, the teaching of our religion in them. Exclude Catholicity, and what is left? Nothing of Christianity but Protestantism, which is simply Christianity *minus* the Catholic Church, her faith, precepts, and sacraments. At present the state makes ample provision for the children of Protestants, infidels, or pagans, but excludes the children of Catholics unless we consent to let them be educated in Protestant schools and brought up Protestants, so far as the schools can bring them up.

Now, we protest in the name of equal rights against this manifest injustice. There is no class of the community more in need of free public schools than Catholics, and none are more entitled to their benefit; for they constitute a large portion of the poorer and more destitute classes of the community. We can conceive nothing more unjust than for the state to provide schools for Protestants, and even infidels, and refuse to do it for Catholics. To say that Catholics have as free access to the public schools as Protestants is bitter mockery. Protestants can send their children to them without exposing them to lose their Protestantism; but Catholics cannot send their children to them without exposing them to the loss of their Catholicity. The law protects their religion in the public schools by the simple fact of excluding ours. How, then, say these schools are as free to us as they are to them? Is conscience of no account?

We take it for granted that the intention of the state is that the public schools should be accessible alike to Catholics and Protestants, and on the same risks and conditions. We presume it has had no more intention of favoring Protestants at the expense of Catholics than Catholics at the expense of Prot-

estants. But it can no longer fail to see that its intention is not and cannot be realized by providing schools which Protestants can use without risk to their Protestantism, and none which Catholics can use without risk to their Catholicity. As the case now stands, the law sustains Protestantism in the schools and excludes Catholicity. This is unjust to Catholics, and deprives us, in so far as Catholics, of all benefit to be derived from the public schools supported at the public expense. Were the law to admit Catholicity, it would necessarily exclude Protestantism, which would be equally unjust to Protestants. Since, then, Catholicity and Protestantism mutually exclude each other, and as the state is bound to treat both with equal respect, it is not possible for it to carry out its intention and do justice to both parties but by dividing the schools and setting apart for Catholics their portion of them, in which the education shall be determined and controlled by their church, though remaining public schools supported at the public expense, under the provisions of a general law as now.

This would be doing for its Catholic citizens only what it now does for its Protestant citizens only; in fact, only what is done in France, Austria, and Prussia. The division would enable us to bring all our children into schools under the influence and management of our pastors, and to do whatever the church and a thoroughly religious education can do to train them up to be good Catholics, and therefore orderly and peaceful members of society and loyal and virtuous American citizens. It would also remove some restraint from the Protestant schools, and allow them more freedom in insisting on whatever is doctrinal and positive in their religion than

they now exercise. The two classes of schools, though operating separately, would aid each other in stemming the tide of infidelity and immorality, now setting in with such fearful rapidity and apparently resistless force, threatening the very existence of our republic. The division would operate in favor of religion, both in a Catholic sense and in a Protestant sense, and therefore tend to purify and preserve American society. It would restore the schools to their original intention, and make them, what they should be, religious schools.

The enemy which the state, which Catholics, and which Protestants have alike to resist and vanquish by education is the irreligion, pantheism, atheism, and immorality, disguised as secularism, or under the specious names of science, humanity, free-religion, and free-love, which not only strike at all Christian faith and Christian morals, but at the family, the state, and civilized society itself. The state has no right to regard this enemy with indifference, and on this point we accept the able argument used by the serious Protestant preachers and writers cited in the number of *The Christian World* before us against the exclusion of the Bible and all recognition of religion from the public schools. The American state is not infidel or godless, and is bound always to recognize and actively aid religion as far as in its power. Having no spiritual or theological competency, it has no right to undertake to say what shall or shall not be the religion of its citizens; it must accept, protect, and aid the religion its citizens see proper to adopt, and without partiality for the religion of the majority any more than the religion of the minority; for in regard to religion the rights and powers of minorities and majorities are

equal. The state is under the Christian law, and it is bound to protect and enforce Christian morals and its laws, whether assailed by Mormonism, spiritism, free-lovism, pantheism, or atheism.

The modern world has strayed far from this doctrine, which in the early history of this country nobody questioned. The departure may be falsely called progress and ~~boasted of as a result of "the march of intellect;"~~ but it must be arrested, and men must be recalled to the truths they have left behind, if republican government is to be maintained and Christian society preserved. Protestants who see and deplore the departure from the old landmarks will find themselves unable to arrest the downward tendency without our aid, and little aid shall we be able to render them unless the church be free to use the public schools—that is, her portion of them—to bring up her children in her own faith and train them to be good Catholics. There is a recrudescence of paganism, a growth of subtle and disguised infidelity, which it will require all that both they and we can do to arrest. Fight, therefore, Protestants, no longer us, but the public enemy.\* (Vol. xiii. pp. 253-262.)

\* We desire to call attention to another point which could not be discussed in the foregoing article, and to which we can at present only allude in the briefest manner. Large sums of money have been granted by legislatures to universities and colleges which are controlled by the clergy of different Protestant denominations, in which they teach their religious opinions without restraint, and which they make, as far as they can, training-schools for their theological seminaries. Now, if the outcry against any grant of public funds to schools in which the Catholic religion is taught is taken up and sustained by Protestants, it follows that they must advocate the total secularization of all institutions, without ex-

EDUCATION SHOULD BE UNDER CHURCH  
CONTROL.

WE want our children to be educated as thoroughly as they can be, but in relation to the great purpose of their existence, so as to be fitted to gain the end for which God creates them. For the great mass of the people, the education needed is not secular education, which simply sharpens the intellect and generates pride and presumption, but moral and religious education, which trains up children in the way they should go, which teaches them to be honest and loyal, modest and unpretending, docile and respectful to their superiors, open and ingenuous, obedient and submissive to rightful authority, parental or conjugal, civil or ecclesiastical; to know and keep the commandments of God and the precepts of the church; and to place the salvation of the soul before all else in life. This sort of education can be given only by the church or under her direction and control; and as there is for us Catholics only one church, there is and can be no proper education for us not given by or under the direction and control of the Catholic Church. (Vol. xiii. pp. 291, 292.)

ception, which enjoy any state subsidies, and if they wish to keep control of religious instruction in any of the above-mentioned colleges, must refund to the state everything which they now possess by grant from the state and give up all claim to receive any further endowments. Catholics would never disendow or despoil these Protestant institutions, even if they had full power to do it; but if the party of infidelity ever gains, by the help of Protestants, full sway over our legislation, the latter may prepare themselves for a wholesale spoliation.

## EVANGELICAL AND NATIONAL SCHOOLS.

THE Evangelicals and their humanitarian allies, as all their organs show, are seriously alarmed at the growth of Catholicity in the United States. They supposed at first that the church could never take root in our Protestant soil, that she could not breathe the atmosphere of freedom and enlightenment, or thrive in a land of newspapers and free schools. They have been disappointed, and now see that they reckoned without their host, and that if they really mean to prevent the American people from gradually becoming Catholic, they must change fundamentally the American form of government, suppress the freedom of religion hitherto enjoyed by Catholics, and take the training of all children and youth into their own hands. If they leave education to the wishes and judgment of parents, Catholic parents will bring up their children Catholics; if they leave it to the states separately, Catholics in several of them are already a powerful minority, daily increasing in strength and numbers, and will soon be strong enough to force the state legislatures to give them their proportion of the public schools supported at the public expense.

All this is clear enough. What, then, is to be done? Mr. Wilson, who is not remarkable for his reticence, tells us, if not with perfect frankness, yet frankly enough for all practical purposes. It is to follow out the tendency which has been so strengthened of late and absorb the states in the Union, take away the independence of the state governments, and assume the control of education for the general government, already rendered practically the supreme national government; then, by appeal-

ing to the popular sentiment in favor of education and saying nothing of its quality, get congress, which the Evangelicals, through the party in power, already control, to establish a system of compulsory education in national schools—and the work is done; for these schools will necessarily fall into Evangelical hands. (Vol. xiii. pp. 292, 293.)

The educational question ought not to present any serious difficulty, and would not if our Evangelicals and humanitarians did not wish to make education a means of preventing the growth of the church and unmaking the children of Catholics as Catholics; or if they seriously and in good faith would accept the religious equality before the state which the constitution and laws, both of the Union and the several states, as yet recognize and protect. No matter what we claim for the Catholic Church in the theological order, we claim for her in the civil order in this country only equality with the sects, and for Catholics only equal rights with citizens who are not Catholics. We demand the freedom of conscience and the liberty of our church, which is our conscience, enjoyed by Evangelicals. This much the country in its constitution and laws has promised us, and this much it cannot deny us without breaking its faith pledged before the world. (Vol. xiii. p. 295.)

#### THE STATE HAS NO RIGHT TO EDUCATE.

As American citizens, we object to the assumption of the control of education, or of any action in regard to it, by the general government; for it has no constitutional right to meddle with it, and so far as civil government has any authority in relation to it, it is, under our system of government, the authority



of the states severally, not of the states united. We deny, of course, as Catholics, the right of the civil government to educate, for education is a function of the spiritual society, as much so as preaching and the administration of the sacraments; but we do not deny to the state the right to establish and maintain public schools. The state, if it chooses, may even endow religion or pay the ministers of religion a salary for their support; but its endowments of religion, when made, are made to God, are sacred and under the sole control and management of the spiritual authority, and the state has no further function in regard to them but to protect the spirituality in the free and full possession and enjoyment of them. If it chooses to pay the ministers of religion a salary, as has been done in France and Spain, though accepted by the Catholic clergy only as a small indemnification for the goods of the church seized by revolutionary governments and appropriated to secular uses, it acquires thereby no rights over them or liberty to supervise their discharge of their spiritual functions. We do not deny the same or an equal right in regard to schools and school-teachers. It may found and endow schools and pay the teachers, but it cannot dictate or interfere with the education or discipline of the school. That would imply a union of church and state, or, rather, the subjection of the spiritual order to the secular, which the Catholic Church and the American system of government both alike repudiate.

It is said, however, that the state needs education for its own protection, and to promote the public good or the good of the community, both of which are legitimate ends of its institution. What the state needs in relation to its legitimate ends, or the

ends for which it is instituted, it has the right to ordain and control. This is the argument by which all public education by the state is defended. But it involves an assumption which is not admissible. The state, having no religious or spiritual function, can give only secular education, and secular education is not enough for the state's own protection or its promotion of the public good. Purely secular education, or education divorced from religion, endangers the safety of the state and the peace and security of the community, instead of protecting and insuring them. It is not in the power of the state to give the education it needs for its own sake or for the sake of secular society. The fact is, though statesmen, and especially politicians, are slow to learn it and still slower to acknowledge it, the state, or secular society, does not and cannot suffice for itself, and is unable to discharge its own proper functions without the co-operation and aid of the spiritual society. Purely secular education creates no civic virtues, and instead of fitting unfits the people for the prompt and faithful discharge of their civic duties, as we may see in young America, and indeed in the present active and ruling generation of the American people. (Vol. xiii. pp. 295, 296.)

#### ALL EDUCATION SHOULD BE RELIGIOUS.

ALL education, as all life, should be religious, and all education divorced from religion is an evil, not a good, and is sure in the long run to be ruinous to the secular order; but as a part of religious education, and included in it, secular education has its place, and even its necessity. Man is not all soul nor all body, but the union of soul and body; and

therefore his education should include in their union, not separation—for the separation of soul and body is the death of the body—both spiritual education and secular. It is not that we oppose secular education when given in the religious education, and therefore referred to the ultimate end of man, but when it is given alone and for its own sake. We deny the competency of the state to educate even for its own order, its right to establish purely secular schools, from which all religion is excluded, as Mr. Webster ably contended in his argument in the Girard will case; but we do not deny, we assert rather, its right to establish public schools under the internal control and management of the spiritual society, and to exact that a certain amount of secular instruction be given along with the religious education that society gives. This last right it has in consideration of the secular funds for the support of the schools it furnishes, and as a condition on which it furnishes them. (Vol. xiii. p. 298.)

### COMPULSORY EDUCATION.

WE, of course, protest against any law compelling us to send our children to schools in which our religion cannot be freely taught, in which no religion is taught, or in which is taught in any shape or degree a religion which we hold to be false or perilous to souls. Such a law would violate the rights of parents and the freedom of conscience; but with denominational schools compulsory education would violate no one's conscience and no parental right. Parents ought, if able, to have their children educated, and if they will not send their children to schools provided for them by the public, and in

which their religion is respected and made the basis of the education given, we can see no valid reason why the law should not compel them. The state has the right, perhaps the duty, in aid of the spiritual society and for its own safety and the public good, to compel parents to educate their children when public schools of their own religion, under the charge of their own pastors, are provided for them at the public expense. Let the public schools be denominational, give us our proportion of them, so that no violence will be done to parental rights or to the Catholic conscience, and we shall be quite willing to have education made compulsory, and even if such schools are made national, though we should object as American citizens to them, we should as Catholics accept them. We hold state authority is the only constitutional authority under our system to establish schools and provide for them at the public expense; but we could manage to get along with national denominational schools as well as others could. We could educate in our share of the public schools our own children in our own way, and that is all we ask. We do not ask to educate the children of others, unless with the consent or at the request of parents and guardians. (Vol. xiii. pp. 300, 301.)

The state, representing secular society, its rights and interests, has the right to require that all children should be educated, and to found schools, colleges, and universities, provide sufficient revenues for as full and as extensive an education as is desirable for social interests and the advancement of civilization; but it can itself neither educate nor determine what education may or may not be given in them. That, for Catholics, is the province of the church; for non-Catholics, who recognize no divinely-

instituted teaching church, it is the province of parents, whose rights to the child are always paramount to those of the state or society. Such was the order that obtained throughout Christendom till almost our times. Indeed, it is very nearly the order that obtained even in pagan Rome. Hostile as the empire before its conversion was to Christianity, I do not find that it ever sought to educate the children of Catholics in paganism, to prevent Catholic parents from having their own schools and bringing up their children in their own religion. Julian the Apostate, indeed, closed the imperial schools to Christian teachers and professors, and forbade Christians to read and study the pagan classics and philosophy; but even he respected the rights of parents, and never encouraged, so far as we know, the kidnapping of Christian children and educating them in paganism. That is a refinement which belongs to modern secularism, and never could have obtained even in pagan Rome; for society under pagan, as it ever has been under Christian Rome, was based on the sacredness and inviolability of the rights of the family or of parental authority. (Vol. xiii. pp. 401, 402.)

#### THE EVIL OF SECULAR EDUCATION.

Now unhappily the system of education in vogue is based on the very principle that underlies all these modern revolutionary and social-reform movements, that is, the natural perfectibility of man or his progressiveness by his own natural forces or by natural means; that is, it is based on a falsehood, in plain English a lie, and Carlyle has well said, "the first of all Gospels is that no lie shall live." We do not think the age overrates the importance of educa-

tion, for Solomon has said, "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it." The error is in not discriminating between a false and mischievous education and a true and salutary education. Education based on the principle that man is naturally perfectible, and which aims to cultivate the faculties of the soul in relation to the natural order alone, can never be beneficial either to the individual or to society. . . . The highest possible culture of our whole nature, intellectual, æsthetic, domestic, and social, does not advance us a single step in the way we should go or towards the true end or destiny of life. Man being perfectible or progressive only by aid of the supernatural grace of Christ, no education not based on the supernatural principle in which Christianity itself originates can aid us in our life-work, be a good and salutary education, or help us either individually, socially, or politically.

Here may be seen the reason why the Holy Father and the whole Catholic hierarchy reject the educational system now in vogue with non-Catholics, assert the insufficiency of merely secular education, and demand for Catholics a Catholic education. We do not credit all that is said against our public schools by individuals who are unacquainted with them, nor do we attribute to them or to their influence the growing immorality of American society. The evil is not especially in the schools, but in the paganism, or secularism, which pervades the American community, on which our public-school system is based, and which American children imbibe with their mother's milk, and far more effectually from the domestic and social atmosphere in which they are reared than from the public schools themselves.

But it is clear that we cannot in these schools give our children a Catholic education, or educate them in relation to the supernatural order or in relation to the true destiny of the soul. We cannot, in them, train up the child in the way he should go.

It is not so much what is taught or inculcated in the public schools that renders them objectionable to us Catholics as what is not and cannot be taught or inculcated in them. They are and must be either sectarian or secular schools, and in either case exclude the true principle of moral and religious life. The education they give or permit to be given is a false, because an unchristian education. He who is not for Christ is against him, and separation from him is death; for his is the only name given among men in which there is life for the soul, life for men or nations. An education that omits him as its central and informing principle, or fails to recognize him as its alpha and omega, its beginning and end, is simply an atheistic education, and can train up the young generation only as pure secularists, and to feel that they are free from all moral or social obligation, from all accountability to any power above themselves and from all law not imposed by their own will. The stream cannot rise higher than its fountain. An education founded in nature alone can give nothing above nature nor do anything to strengthen or perfect it; for nature without God or severed from God is simply nothing, and we know no philosophy by which nothing can make itself something. Such an education is repugnant to the principles and conditions of life, and can give nothing better than "death in life."

The only support for private or public virtue is religion, is in training the people in those principles

which religion alone introduces and sustains; and the only religion is Christianity, the Christian religion, inseparable alike from Christ, the incarnate Word, and the Catholic Church. . . . Obviously, then, the church is the only competent educator, and only a thorough Catholic education has or can have any value for men or nations. . . .

Yet we must not hastily conclude that the simple establishment of schools placed under the supervision of Catholics will of itself suffice. The mere fact that a class of boys is taught by a Catholic instead of a Protestant will work no wonders if he teaches substantially the same things and in the same spirit. We have found no worse or more troublesome boys than some of those who attend our parochial schools. Education alone does not and will not suffice. Grace must accompany instruction, or instruction even in the faith will not suffice for virtue. It is little the lessons of the school-room can effect if they are counteracted in the home or the streets. Domestic discipline inspired by Catholic faith must go hand in hand with the school; and in no small number of Catholic families this domestic discipline is sadly wanting. Into the causes of this lamentable lack of domestic discipline we need not now inquire, but there can be no doubt that it is one of the great drawbacks on the efficiency of our Catholic schools. It has been a hard struggle for our Catholic people to pay out of their poverty their quota of the tax to support the public schools, and then to establish and sustain Catholic schools of their own, and we must not be surprised to find them in many respects very defective in their appointments.

But the gravest defects we discover, or think we discover, in our Catholic schools of all grades appear



to us to be comprised in this one grand defect, that the education given in them is not thoroughly Catholic. Most of the text-books used in our colleges and parochial schools are far from being distinctively Catholic. The class readers which have fallen under our notice, with one or two exceptions, though containing pieces written by Catholics, are hardly better fitted for Catholics than Lindley Murray's series of English readers, and far inferior in a literary point of view. They seem to be prepared, with a view of not containing anything offensive to Protestants, by liberal or namby-pamby Catholics, and with the hope of the publishers of getting them introduced into the public schools. We attended, some years since, an examination of the schools of the Christian Brothers in a foreign city, and we found the text-book in natural philosophy in which the pupils were examined absolutely irreconcilable, at least in our judgment, with Catholic principles. The properties of matter as taught to these Catholic children not only exclude the Catholic dogma of the Real Presence, but are such as a sound philosophy itself rejects.

Indeed, in our examination of the higher education given in Catholic schools, colleges, and universities, we have found, or thought we found, it far from being thoroughly Catholic. The Christian schools, colleges, and even the universities of mediæval times, were modelled after, and we may say were based on, the imperial schools of pagan Rome. The branches studied were the same, and their traditions were preserved, as they are even yet in the classical colleges in the United States. For languages the Latin and Greek, and for the division of studies the trivium and quadrivium are retained. Christianity in Catholic

colleges is superadded, but it does not transform the whole system of imperial education. Especially is this true of our higher schools since the fifteenth century, or the so-called renaissance. The pagan classics, in Catholic colleges as in others, have since formed the basis of the education given. Christianity, when introduced at all, has been taught only in juxtaposition with heathenism, as an accessory, not as the principal—seldom, if ever, as the informing spirit of the education imparted. We do not ask that the Greek and Roman classics be excluded from all part in a liberal education, but we do object to their being made its principal part, or foundation. Now our Catholic young men graduate, even from our Catholic colleges, with a pagan substructure, merely varnished over or veneered with Catholicity, which a little contact with the world soon wears off.

The Holy See did not, when a few years since the question was raised in France, forbid the study of the pagan classics in Catholic schools, but it did require that care should be taken that the pupils or students should be well grounded or instructed in the Catholic religion. We have no sympathy with the present infidel movement to abolish the study of the Greek and Roman classics in non-Catholic colleges and to introduce the study of the physical sciences in their place. That would only aggravate the evil we complain of, instead of remedying it, and is part and parcel of that system of education which is intended to exclude God and Christ from the school and to make all education purely secular—of the earth earthy. The world is to-day further removed from Christian principles than it was in pagan Greece and Rome, and the study of the classics in non-Catholic schools can have only a Catholic

tendency. The classics contain the highest religion that is to be found in non-Catholic society. Abolish them, and non-Catholic education would be thoroughly utilitarian, materialistic, and atheistical. Yet Catholics do not draw their religion from the classics, and do not need them as a medium of its instruction or mental culture. Their religion is independent of them, stands on its own bottom, and is infinitely superior to them; but it can only suffer when the pagan classics are, as in the old pagan imperial schools, made its basis and the main structure of education.

Now, we do not deny that in all our Catholic colleges religion is distinctly recognized and taught, and taught in all that is necessary for educated laymen in an age or country where heresies are unknown or the faithful are guarded against them by the civil authorities, but not in all that is needed in an age or country where the dominant public sentiment is intensely anti-Catholic, where all opinions are legally free, and where everything is questioned and nothing is held to be settled, or where atheism is accounted a science and blasphemy a virtue. The graduates from our Catholic colleges come out into the world ill-prepared for the struggle that awaits them, and the majority of them either give up the contest or make a miserable compromise with the enemy. The weakest, the most milk-and-water, and least zealous and efficient Catholics one meets are precisely those who have graduated with high honors from our Catholic colleges. They are taught the principal dogmas of the church, but they are not taught the relation of these dogmas to one another, or shown the light they throw on each other when taken in their dialectic connection and as a whole.

They are taught the practice of religion, but are not shown the dependence of the practice on the dogmas out of which it grows. (Vol xiii. pp. 447-454.)

## EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE.

BUT to return to our subject: we must remember that it is the smallest part of the education of children and youth that is given or acquired in the school-room or the college hall. Much more is acquired in the family, in the streets, in social intercourse, and from the general tone of thought and manners of the country. The children of Catholic parents breathe the atmosphere breathed by the children of non-Catholic parents, and after a little while become assimilated to them, even in their physical features. We cannot, let us do our best, educate the rising generation in schools and colleges much above the average standard of the adult generation. Education itself has no reforming or progressive power. Its office is conservative, and it serves chiefly to perpetuate, and to perpetuate the errors as well as the truths and virtues of the generation that educates. This law is as effective in a Catholic as in a non-Catholic community. In Catholic schools, as in non-Catholic schools, the children of Catholics, without other influences than education itself can exert, may fall below, but can hardly rise above the average faith and virtue of the Catholic community to which they belong.

Hence we cannot expect Catholic schools and colleges themselves to correct the defects even in Catholic education. The great mass of men, educated or not, are men of routine. School-masters and professors follow the beaten track and educate as they have

been educated, nor is it desirable that they should do otherwise or become innovators. The correction must come from an authority above the school or the college, and in subordination to which either must educate. But even authority, however clearly and distinctively it speaks, cannot correct the evil at once. The educators must be themselves educated up to the standard of the reform to be introduced, and as these comprise the parents and the whole Catholic people, the education of parents or the people must precede the introduction of any effective reforms in the schools and colleges. The pagan element, condemned in the syllabus and repudiated by the Council of the Vatican, must be eliminated from the intelligence and manners of the Catholic people before it can be eliminated from the schools.

This work of educating the people and of eliminating from their minds and manners the paganism which has long created in the intelligence and habits of Catholic populations a dualism which has resulted in the destruction of Christendom is the work of the bishops and clergy, aided in some feeble measure by the Catholic press, if really and thoroughly Catholic. The education of the young is also their charge, and should go on *pari passu* with the education of the people; but for ourselves, we hold the education of the people the more important of the two, for if not thoroughly grounded in the principles of Catholicity and thoroughly emancipated in their intelligence, habits, and manners from paganism, they will neutralize the best training childhood and youth can receive in the school or college. We asserted as much nearly forty years ago, and observation, reflection, and experience have tended only to confirm it. The new generation can be

educated only by the old, which can only reproduce its own image and likeness. Hence nations that have not the church and have no supernaturally endowed body of instructors can never be progressive nations, and the nation that ceases to be progressive begins to decline, and if left to itself is sure to fall. (Vol. xiii. pp. 458, 459.)

### CATHOLICS TAXED UNJUSTLY.

THE majority, as Chief Justice Dunne shows, impose upon us a triple tax. They tax us to provide for the education of the children of non-Catholics, in which we cannot share with a good conscience, and then compel us to erect school-houses, found and support schools at our own expense, often out of our poverty, for the education of our own children, and then tax these same school-houses and fixtures, while the public school-houses and fixtures are exempt from taxation. Can there be a more monstrous injustice? It needs only one step in addition, and that threatens to be soon taken, namely, to forbid us to have schools of our own and to make attendance on the public schools compulsory. New York and New Jersey, and perhaps some other states, have already enacted laws making education compulsory, and it would be only carrying out the same policy to make it compulsory on us to send our children to the state, or the public, schools. (Vol. xiii. p. 519.)

### HOW THE DANGER MAY BE AVERTED.

THE real motive for sustaining the system is the belief that by it they may extirpate Catholic faith

and worship from the land. It were fatuity, not charity, to think otherwise. Finding that we are withdrawing our children from the public schools and establishing at our own expense schools of our own, they see clearly that they must fail in their calculations unless they go further and forbid us to establish Catholic schools and compel us to send our children to the public schools. This is the immediate danger. Can it be averted?

It can hardly be averted by human means alone, but, with a firm reliance on divine assistance, we think, if Catholics will but be true to themselves, it can be averted; and even the modifications of the public-school system as now worked, which we as Catholics demand, can be obtained. It is true, we are for the present in a comparatively small minority of the whole population of the country, but a small minority united and determined, and demanding only what is reasonable and just, who must sooner or later obtain success. The discouraging fact is that the Catholic minority are not united on this school question, and do not act as "one man." They take different views of what is needed; many among us are cold or indifferent to the subject and do not enter heartily into the movement for obtaining our rights. Some are engrossed in business, not a few are absorbed in politics, place the interests of their party above the interests of their religion, and dare not move lest they forfeit their chance for some petty office for themselves or for their friends. Catholics in this country have never been accustomed to act in concert as one body, and do not readily unite and concentrate their forces for a given object. They are one in faith and worship, but have never yet been one in striving to obtain their rights in

relation to the public schools. In fact, there is on this subject no unity of purpose and no concert of action.

The first step to be taken is, of course, to effect the union of the entire body of Catholics throughout the country, and to induce them to waive their petty differences and local interests and to look at the paramount interests of the whole body. A great wrong is done us as Catholics and citizens, and we must unite—combine, if you will—and act with an eye single to its redress. If we do this and labor perseveringly with the earnestness and zeal the greatness of the end demands, we shall in time gain our rights, and induce the majority so to amend the public-school system that all classes of citizens can cheerfully support it and share in its benefits. We demand only our rights; we have no wish to interfere with the rights of others or to destroy or to impair the efficiency of the public-school system properly worked. We accept cordially the essential principle of the system, that is, the support of public schools for all the children of the land at the public expense or by a tax levied equally upon all citizens. We only ask that we may have the portion of the fund which we contribute to use in the support of schools under our management, and in which we can teach our religion and make it the basis of the education we give our own children.

Now let us Catholics, all Catholics throughout the Union, unite as one man in demanding this amendment to the system, and listen to no compromise, and give our suffrages to no party and to no candidate for any office that refuses to do us justice, as was some time since recommended by the venerable Bishop of Cleveland in a pastoral address to his diocesans; and



we feel sure the majority will ere long be forced to concede our demand. . . .

The great bulk of our Catholic electors are arranged on the side of the so-called Democratic party and they form so large a portion of that party that by simply withholding their votes from it, without giving them to the opposing party, they could throw it into a hopeless minority and utterly defeat the success on which it now confidently counts. This gives us an advantage which was not apparent to us in the early part of 1873, when we expressed our doubts of the propriety of carrying the school question to the polls. Catholics in New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and some other states, if not strong enough to secure the success of the Democratic party, are yet strong enough to insure its defeat if they choose to place the interest of their religion above their party interests and withhold from it their suffrages. They can thus force the party to espouse their cause and, if they accede to power, to grant us justice in regard to the public schools. Certain it is, as the parties now stand, the Democrats cannot accede to power as a national party without our votes, and it is our duty to let them know that our votes they cannot have unless they pledge themselves to use their power, if they obtain it, to repair the grievous wrong under which we now labor, and to maintain in the civil order the religious equality guaranteed by the constitution.

The great difficulty is no doubt right here, in getting our Democratic Catholics to withhold their votes from the party unless it agrees, if able, to do them justice on the school question. *Hic labor, hoc opus est*, for Catholics have long been accustomed in their political action to follow the maxim,

"My religion has nothing to do with my politics," and, without consciously or intentionally placing their politics above their religion, to proceed as if the interests of party were paramount to the interests of their church. But, after all, this results from want of reflection rather than from any deliberate preference of the temporal to the eternal. When the question is once brought home to his understanding and seen to be a question of conscience, no loyal Catholic will hesitate a moment to subordinate his politics to his religion, or refuse his support to any party that refuses to recognize and vindicate the religious equality of Catholics in the public schools, by giving them their share of them and of the public funds which support them. In the religious aspect of the case, eternal interests are at stake, the welfare of immortal souls and of unborn generations is at stake; and we Catholics know that the stability, the virtue, the morality, and the intelligence of the republic and the preservation of civil and religious liberty are at stake; for these depend on the religious, the Catholic, education of our children. Since Catholics are the salt of the earth, the church is the divine preservative force in every nation where she exists: no greater calamity could possibly befall our republic than her banishment from its territory. How, then, can any Catholic for a moment weigh the ephemeral triumph of a party in the balance against the interests of Catholic education? He is a sorry Catholic, with just Catholicity enough to be damned as a Catholic, and not as a heretic or an infidel, who will do it.

The great question for us Catholics, and the great question even for our country, is the school question; and the preservation of our children to the church,

with their thorough Catholic education, is not less for the interest of the state than it is for the interest of religion. No state can stand without religion, and religion cannot be preserved in any state without the thorough religious training of each new generation as it appears on the stage. The Catholic Church alone is able to give a really religious education and to train children up in the way they should go. This is one of her chief functions. The sects in reality have no religion and can give no religious education, as the public schools amply prove. It is not the influence of Catholics that has made these schools practically godless. It is the influence of the unbelieving portion of the American people; of those who reject all positive doctrines and Christianity itself as a positive religion, or anything more than a vague generality or an indefinable abstraction. If we are debarred from establishing Catholic schools and from giving our children a Catholic education, no religious education will be given to any portion of American children and youth; and debarred we shall be from establishing Catholic schools at our own expense, besides paying a heavy tax for the support of non-Catholic and godless schools, and compelled to send our children to the public schools, if we do not unite and make a vigorous and well-directed effort to prevent it.

This is a perfectly legitimate exercise of the elective franchise, for politics should always be made subservient to religion and morality. We combine ~~and act politically,~~ not to deprive others of their rights or to acquire any control over them, but simply to obtain our own constitutional freedom, of which we are unjustly deprived by the political action of the non-Catholic majority. We have no wish to

prescribe the education non-Catholics must give their children nor to make a law for their government. If they are satisfied with the public schools as at present managed, why, let them have them and make the most of them; all we propose by political action is, if possible, to prevent them in future from taxing us to support them or compelling us to send our own children to them. We are only proposing to secure for ourselves the liberty they claim for themselves—to educate our children in our own way without being taxed to pay for the education of their children. We do not seek to tax them to educate our children—we ask not one cent of them: we only ask the privilege, now denied us, of appropriating our own money, what we ourselves contribute, to schools under our own management, in which we can freely train up our own children in our own way. What demand can be more reasonable or just? (Vol. xiii. pp. 520-524.)

## THE SCIENCES.

### UNCHRISTIAN TONE OF SCIENTISTS.

THE most learned men and profoundest thinkers of our age, as of every age, are no doubt believers, sincere and earnest Christians; but they are not the men who represent the age and give tone to its literature and science. They are not the *popular* men of their times, and their voice is drowned in the din of the multitude. There is nothing novel or *sensational* in what they have to tell us, and there is no evidence of originality or independence of thought or character in following them. In following them we have no opportunity of separating ourselves from the past, breaking with tradition, and boldly defying both heaven and earth. There is no chance for war against authority, of creating a revolution, or enjoying the excitement of a battle; so the multitude of little men go not with them. And they who would deem it gross intellectual weakness to rely on the authority of St. Paul, or even of our Lord himself, have followed blindly and with full confidence an Agassiz, a Huxley, a Lyell, or any other second or third rate physicist who is understood to defend theories that undermine the authority of the church and the Bible.

We are not, we frankly confess, learned in the sciences. They have changed so rapidly and so essentially since our younger days, when we did take some pains to master them, that we do not know

what they are to-day any more than we do what they will be to-morrow. We have not, in our slowness, been able to keep pace with them, and we only know enough of them now to know that they are continually changing under the very eye of the spectator. But if we do not know all the achievements of the sciences, we claim to know something of the science of sciences, the science which gives the law to them, and to which they must conform or cease to pretend to have any scientific character. If we know not what they have done, we know something which they have not done. (Vol. ix. pp. 269, 270.)

No philosopher, no theologian ever did or ever does object to scientific investigation in the proper field of observation and induction, nor to any science which really is science. Thus Cardinal Bellarmine, who may be regarded as speaking with authority for both philosophers and theologians, said to Galileo's friend: "Tell your friend to pursue his mathematical studies without meddling with the interpretation of Scripture, and when he has proved his theory, it will then be time enough to consider what changes, if any, in the interpretation of the sacred text will be necessary." The trouble the Florentine experienced grew out of the fact that he insisted, while his heliocentric theory was still only a theory, an unproved hypothesis, on publishing it and having it received as science. In all the cases in which the scientists complain of having been or of being persecuted by philosophers and theologians, or in which they do really encounter opposition from them or the church, it is never for their science or their scientific discoveries; but for publishing as science theories and hypotheses opposed to the belief of mankind, and in demanding, while they are as yet un-

proved or unverified and are only conjectures more or less plausible, that they shall be received as certain, and philosophy, theology, religion, politics, social order, all that has hitherto been held as settled, as true and sacred, shall be altered or modified so as to conform to them. Let their authors pursue their investigations in quiet, and not disturb the public with their hypotheses till they have proved them, converted them into exact and certain science, and nobody will oppose them; and both the church and society, theologians and philosophers, will accept with gratitude and generously reward their patient labors and unwearied investigations. But this is precisely what the Huxleys, the Büchners, the Taines, the Darwins, the Spencers, the Tyndalls refuse to do; and hence they are opposed by all sensible men, not, as they would have the world believe, for their science, but for their lack of science and their attempt to impose on society as science what is not science, what has no scientific validity, and springs only from their own delusions or distempered brains. (Vol. ix. pp. 512, 513.)

### THE METHOD OF SCIENCE.

BETWEEN the scientists and philosophers, or those who cultivate not the special sciences, but the science of the sciences, and determine the principles to which the several special sciences must be referred in order to have any scientific character or value, there is a long-standing quarrel, which grows fiercer and more embittered every day. We are far from pretending that the positivists or Comtists have mastered all the so-called special sciences; but they represent truly the aims and tendencies of the

scientists, and of what by a strange misnomer is called philosophy; so called, it would seem, because philosophy it is not. Philosophy is the science of principles, as say the Greeks, or of *first* principles, as say the Latins, and after them the modern latinized nations. But Herbert Spencer, Stuart Mill, and the late Sir William Hamilton, the ablest representatives of philosophy as generally received by the English-speaking world, agree with the Comtists or positivists in rejecting first principles from the domain of science and in relegating theology and metaphysics to the region of the unknown and the unknowable. Their labors consequently result, as Sir William Hamilton himself somewhere admits, in universal nescience, or, as we say, absolute nihilism or nullism.

This result is not accidental, but follows necessarily from what is called the Baconian method, which the scientists follow, and which is, in scholastic language, concluding the universal from the particular. Now, in the logic we learned as a school-boy and adhere to in our old age, this is simply impossible. To every valid argument it is necessary that one of the premises, called the major premise, be a universal principle. Yet the scientists discard the universal from their premises and from two or more particulars, or particular facts, profess to draw a valid universal conclusion, as if any conclusion broader than the premises could be valid! The physico-theologians are so infatuated with the Baconian method that they attempt, from certain facts which they discover in the physical world, to conclude, by way of induction, the being and attributes of God, as if anything concluded from particular facts could be anything but a particular fact.



Hence the aforementioned authors, with Professor Huxley at their tail, as well as Kant in his "*Critik der reinen Vernunft*," have proved, as clearly and as conclusively as anything can be proved, that a causative force, or causality, cannot be concluded by way either of induction or of deduction from any empirical facts, or facts of which observation can take note. Yet the validity of every induction rests on the reality of the relation of cause and effect and the fact that the cause actually produces the effect.

Yet our scientists pretend that they can, from the observation and analysis of facts, induce a law, and a law that will hold good beyond the particulars observed and analyzed. But they do not obtain any law at all; and the laws of nature, about which they talk so learnedly, are not laws, but simply facts. Bring a piece of wax to the fire and it melts; hence it is said to be a law that wax so brought in proximate relation with fire will melt; but this law is only the particular fact observed, and the facts to which you apply it are the identical facts from which you have obtained it. The investigation in all cases where the scientists profess to seek the law is simply an investigation to find out and establish the identity of the facts, and what they call the law is only the assertion of that identity, and never extends to facts not identical, or to dissimilar facts.

Take mathematics: as far as the scientist can admit mathematics, they are simply identical propositions piled on identical propositions, and the only difference between Newton and a plough-boy is that Newton detects identity where the plough-boy does not. Take what is called the law of gravitation: it is nothing but the statement of a fact or a class of facts observed, and the most that it tells us is that

if the facts are identical they are identical—that is, they bear such and such relations to one another. But let your positivist attempt to explain transcendental mathematics, and he is all at sea if he does not borrow from the ideal science or philosophy which he professes to discard. How will the geometrician explain his infinitely extended lines, or lines that may be infinitely extended? A line is made up of a succession of points, and therefore of parts, and nothing which is made up of parts is infinite. The line may be increased or diminished by the addition or subtraction of points, but the infinite cannot be either increased or diminished. Whence does the mind get this idea of infinity? The geometrician tells us the line may be infinitely extended—that is, it is infinitely possible; but it cannot be so unless there is an infinite ground on which it can be projected. An infinitely possible line can be asserted only by asserting the infinitely real, and therefore the mind, unless it had the intuition of the infinitely real, could not conceive of a line as capable of infinite extension. Hence the ancients never assert either the infinitely possible or the infinitely real. There is in all gentile science, or gentile philosophy, no conception of the infinite; there is only the conception of the indefinite.

This same reasoning disposes of the infinite divisibility of matter still taught in our text-books. The infinite divisibility of matter is an infinite absurdity; for it implies an infinity of parts or numbers, which is really a contradiction in terms. We know nothing that better illustrates the unsoundness of the method of the scientists. Here is a piece of matter. Can you not divide it into two equal parts? Certainly. Can you do the same by either of the halves? Yes. And

by the quarters? Yes. And thus on *ad infinitum*. Where, then, is the absurdity? None as long as you deal with only finite quantities. The absurdity is in the fact that the infinite divisibility of matter implies an infinity of parts; and an infinity of parts an infinity of numbers; and numbers and every series of numbers may be increased by addition and diminished by subtraction. An infinite series is impossible.

The moment the scientists leave the domain of particulars or positive facts and attempt to induce from them a law, their induction is of no value. Take geology: the geologist finds in that small portion of the globe which he has examined certain facts, from which he concludes that the globe is millions and millions of ages old. Is his conclusion scientific? Not at all. If the globe was in the beginning in a certain state, and if the structural and other changes which are now going on have been going on at the same rate from the beginning—neither of which suppositions is provable—then the conclusion is valid; not otherwise. Sir Charles Lyell, if we recollect aright, calculated that at the present rate it must have taken at least a hundred and fifty thousand years to form the delta of the Mississippi. Officers of the United States army have calculated that a little over four thousand years would suffice.

So of the antiquity of man on the globe. The scientist finds what he takes to be human bones in a cave along with the bones of certain long since extinct species of animals, and concludes that man was contemporary with the said extinct species of animals; therefore man existed on the globe many—nobody can say how many—thousand years ago,

But two things render the conclusion uncertain. It is not certain from the fact that their bones are found together that man and these animals were contemporary; and the date when these animals became extinct, if extinct they are, is not ascertained nor ascertainable. They have discovered traces in Switzerland of lacustrine habitations; but these prove nothing, because history itself mentions "the dwellers on the lakes," and the oldest history accepted by the scientists is not many thousand years old. Sir Charles Lyell finds, or supposes he finds, stone knives and axes, or what he takes to be stone knives and axes, deeply imbedded in the earth in the valley of a river, though at some distance from its present bed, and thence concludes the presence of man on the earth for a period wholly irreconcilable with the received biblical chronology. But supposing the facts to be as alleged, they do not prove anything, because we cannot say what changes by floods or other causes have taken place in the soil of the locality, even during the period of authentic history. Others conclude from the same facts that men were primitively savages, or ignorant of the use of iron. But the most they prove is that at some unknown period certain parts of Europe were inhabited by a people who used stone knives and axes; but whether because ignorant of iron or because unable from their poverty or their distance from places where they were manufactured to procure similar iron utensils, they give us no information. Instances enough are recorded in history of the use of stone knives by a people who possessed knives made of iron. Because in our day some Indian tribes use bows and arrows, are we to conclude that firearms are unknown in our age of the world?

What the scientists offer as proof is seldom any proof at all. If an hypothesis they invent explains the known facts of a case, they assert it as proved and therefore true. What fun would they not make of theologians and philosophers if they reasoned as loosely as they do themselves! Before we can conclude an hypothesis is true because it explains the known facts in the case, we must prove, 1st, that there are and can be no facts in the case not known; and, 2d, that there is no other possible hypothesis on which they can be explained. We do not say the theories of the scientists with regard to the antiquity of the globe and of man on its surface, nor that any of the geological and astronomical hypotheses they set forth are absolutely false; we only say that their alleged facts and reasonings do not prove them. The few facts known might be placed in a very different light by the possibly unknown facts; and there are conceivable any number of other hypotheses which would equally well explain the facts that are known. (Vol. ix. pp. 401-405.)

### THE BIBLE CHRONOLOGY.

BUT suppose you have proved the antiquity of the earth and of man on it to be as you pretend: what then? In the first place, you have not proved that the earth and man on it were not created, that God did not in the beginning create the heavens and the earth and all things therein. You leave, then, intact both the formula and the dogma which presupposes and reasserts it as a truth of revelation as well as of science. But we have disproved the chronology of the Bible. Is it the chronology of the Bible or chronology as arranged by learned men that you

have disproved? Say the chronology as it actually is in the Bible, though all learned men know that that chronology is exceedingly difficult, if not impossible, to make out, and we for ourselves have never been able to settle it at all to our entire satisfaction, is it certain that the Scriptures themselves even pretend that the date assigned to the creation of the world is given by divine revelation and is to be received as an article of faith? There is an important difference between the chronology given in the Hebrew Bible and that given in the Septuagint used by the apostles and Greek fathers, and still used by the united as well as by the non-united Greeks, and we are not aware that there has ever been an authoritative decision as to which or that either of the two chronologies must be followed. The commonly received chronology certainly ought not to be departed from without strong and urgent reasons; but if such reasons are adduced, we do not understand that it cannot be departed from without impairing the authority of either the Scriptures or the church. We know no Christian doctrine or dogma that could be affected by carrying the date of the creation of the world a few or even many centuries farther back, if we recognize the fact of creation itself. Our faith does not depend on a question of arithmetic, as seems to have been assumed by the Anglican bishop Colenso. Numbers are easily changed in transcription, and no commentator has yet been able to reconcile all the numbers as we now have them in our Hebrew Bibles, or even in the Greek translation of the Seventy.

Supposing, then, that geologists and historians of civilization have found facts, not to be denied, which seem to require for the existence of the globe and

man on its face a longer period than is allowed by the commonly received chronology, we do not see that this warrants any induction against any point of Christian faith or doctrine. We could, we confess, more easily explain some of the facts which we meet in the study of history, the political and social changes which have evidently taken place, if more time were allowed us between Noah and Moses than is admitted by Usher's chronology; it would enable us to account for many things which now embarrass our historical science; yet whether we are allowed more time or not, or whether we can account for the historical facts or not, our faith remains the same; for we have long since learned that in the subjects with which science proposes to deal, as well as in revelation itself, there are many things which will be inexplicable even to the greatest, wisest, and holiest of men, and that the greatest folly which any man can entertain is that of expecting to explain everything, unless concluding a thing must needs be false because we know not its explanation is a still greater folly. True science as well as true virtue is modest, humble indeed, and always more depressed by what it sees that it cannot do than elated by what it may have done. (Vol. ix. pp. 277-279.)

#### THE UNITY OF THE HUMAN SPECIES.

THE naturalists have undoubtedly proved the existence of races or varieties of men, like the Caucasian, the Mongolian, the Malayan, the American, and the African, more or less distinctly marked, and separated from one another by greater or less distances; but have they proved that these several races or varieties are distinct species, or that they

could not all have sprung from the same original pair? Physiologists, we are told, detect some structural differences between the negro and the white man. The black differs from the white in the greater length of the spine, in the shape of the head, leg, and foot and heel, in the facial angles, the size and convolutions of the brain. Be it so; but do these differences prove diversity of species, or, at most, only a distinct variety in the same species? May they not all be owing to accidental causes? The type of the physical structure of the African is undeniably the same with that of the Caucasian, and all that can be said is that in the negro it is less perfectly realized, constituting a difference in degree, indeed, but not in kind.

But before settling the question whether the several races of men belong to one and the same species or not and have or have not had the same origin, it is necessary to determine the characteristic or *differentia* of man. Naturalists treat man as simply an animal standing at the head of the class or order mammalia, and are therefore obliged to seek his *differentia* or characteristic in his physical structure; but if it be true, as some naturalists tell us, that the same type runs through the physical structure of all animals, unless insects, reptiles, and crustacea form an exception, it is difficult to find in man's physical structure his *differentia*. The schoolmen generally define man, a rational animal, *animal rationale*, and make the genus animal and the *differentia* reason. The characteristic of the species, that which constitutes it, is reason or the rational mind, and certainly science can prove nothing to the contrary. Some animals may have a degree of intelligence, but none of them have reason, free will,



moral perceptions, or are capable of acting from considerations of right and wrong. We assume, then, that the *differentia* of the species *homo*, or man, is reason, or the rational soul. If our naturalists had understood this, they might have spared the pains they have taken to assimilate man to the brute and to prove that he is a monkey developed.

This point settled, the question of unity of the species is settled. There may be differences among individuals and races as to the degree of reason, but all have reason in some degree. Reason may be weaker in the African than in the European, whether owing to the lack of cultivation or to other accidental causes, but it is essentially the same in the one as in the other, and there is no difference except in degree; and even as to degree, it is not rare to find negroes that are, in point of reason, far superior to many white men. Negroes, supposed to stand lowest in the scale, have the same moral perception and the same capacity of distinguishing between right and wrong and of acting from free will that white men have; and if there is any difference, it is simply a difference of degree, not a difference of kind or species.

But conceding the unity of the species, science has, at least, proved that the several races or varieties in the same species could not have all sprung from one and the same original pair. Where has science done this? It can do it only by way of induction from facts scientifically observed and analyzed. What facts has it observed and analyzed that warrant this conclusion against the Adamic origin of all men? There are, as we have just said, no anatomical, physiological, intellectual, or moral facts that warrant such conclusion, and no other facts are

possible. Wherever men are found, they all have the essential characteristic of men as distinguished from the mere animal; they all have substantially the same physical structure; all have thought, speech, and reason, and though some may be inferior to others, nothing proves that all may not have sprung from the same Adam and Eve. Do you say ethnology cannot trace all the kindreds and nations of men back to a common origin? That is nothing to the purpose; can it say they cannot have had a common origin? But men are found everywhere, and could they have reached from the plains of Shinar continents separated from Asia by a wide expanse of water, and been distributed over America, New Holland, and the remotest islands of the ocean, when they had no ships or were ignorant of navigation? Do you know that they had, in what are to us ante-historical times, no ships and no knowledge of navigation, as we know they have had them both ever since the first dawn of history? No? Then you allege not your *science* against the Christian dogma, but your *ignorance*, which we submit is not sufficient to override faith. You must prove that men could not have been distributed from a common centre as we now find them before you can assert that they could not have had a common origin. Besides, are you able to say what changes of land and water have taken place since men first appeared on the face of the earth? Many changes, geologists assure us, have taken place, and more than they know may have occurred and have left men where they are now found, and where they may have gone without crossing large bodies of water. So long as any other hypothesis is possible you cannot assert your own as certain. . . .

We do not pretend to be able to account for the

differences of the several races, any more than we pretend to be able to account for the well-known fact that children born of the same parents have different facial angles, different-sized brains, different-shaped mouths and noses, different temperaments, different intellectual powers, and different moral tendencies. We may have conjectures on the subject, but conjectures are not science. If necessary to the argument, we might, perhaps, suggest a not improbable hypothesis for explaining the difference of complexion between the white and the colored races. The colored races—the yellow, the olive, the red, the copper-colored, and the black—are inferior to the Caucasian, have departed farther from the norma of the species and approached nearer to the animal, and therefore, like animals, have become more or less subject to the action of the elements. External nature, acting for ages on a race enfeebled by over-civilization and refinement, and therefore having in a great measure lost the moral and intellectual power of resisting the elemental action of nature, may, perhaps, sufficiently explain the differences we note in the complexion of the several races. If the Europeans and their American descendants were to lose all tradition of the Christian religion, as they are rapidly doing, and to take up with spiritism or some other degrading superstition, as they seem disposed to do, and to devote themselves solely to the luxuries and refinements of the material civilization of which they are now so proud and boast so much, it is by no means improbable that in time they would become as dark, as deformed, as imbecile as the despised African or the native New Hollander. We might give very plausible reasons for regarding the negro as the degraded remnant of a once overcivilized and

#### ORIGINAL UNITY OF SPEECH.

corrupted race; and perhaps, if recovered, Christianized, civilized, and restored to communication with the great central current of human life, he may in time lose his negro hue and features and become once more a white man, a Caucasian. But be this as it may, we rest, as is our right, on the fact that the unity of the human species and its Adamic origin are in possession, and it is for those who deny either point to make good their denial. (Vol. ix. pp. 279-282.)

#### ORIGINAL UNITY OF SPEECH.

BUT the Scriptures say mankind were originally of one speech, and we find that every species of animals has its peculiar song or cry, which is the same in every individual of the same species; yet this is not the case with the different kindred and nations of men; they speak different tongues, which the philologist is utterly unable to refer to a common original. Therefore there cannot be in men unity of species, and the assertion of the Scriptures of all being of one speech is untrue. If the song of the same species of birds or the cry of the same species of animals is the same in all the individuals of that species, it still requires no very nice ear to distinguish the song or the cry of one individual from that of another; and therefore the analogy relied on, even if admissible, which it is not, would not sustain the conclusion. Conceding, if you insist on it, that unity of species demands unity of speech, the facts adduced warrant no conclusion against the scriptural assertion; for the language of all men is even now one and the same, and all really have one and the same speech. Take the elements of language as the sensible sign by which men communicate with one

another, and there is even now, at least as far as known or conceivable, only one language. The essential elements of all dialects are the same. You have in all the subject, the predicate, and the copula, or the noun, adjective, and verb, to which all the other parts of speech are reducible. Hence the philologist speaks of universal grammar and constructs a grammar applicable alike to all dialects. Some philologists also contend that the signs adopted by all dialects are radically the same, and that the differences encountered are only accidental. This has been actually proved in the case of what are called the Aryan or Indo-European dialects. That the Sanskrit, the Pehlvi or old Persic, the Keltic, the Teutonic, the Slavonic, the Greek, and the Latin, from which are derived the modern dialects of Europe, as Italian, French, Spanish, Portuguese, English, Dutch, German, Scanian, Turk, Polish, Russian, Welsh, Gaelic, and Irish, all except the Basque and Lettish or Finnish, have had a common origin, no philologist doubts. That the group of dialects called Semitic, including the Hebrew, Chaldaic, Syriac, Coptic, and Ethiopic, have an origin identical with that of the Aryan group is, we believe, now hardly denied. All that can be said is that philologists have not proved it, nor the same fact with regard to the so-called Turanian group, as the Chinese, the Turkish, the Basque, the Lettish or Finnish, the Tartaric or Mongolian, etc., the dialects of the aboriginal tribes or nations of America and of Africa. But what conclusion is to be drawn from the fact that philology, a science confessedly in its infancy and hardly a science at all, has not as yet established an identity of origin with these for the most part barbarous dialects? From the fact that

philology has not ascertained it, we cannot conclude that the identity does not exist, or even that philology may not one day discover and establish it.

Philology may have also proceeded on false assumptions which have retarded its progress and led it to false conclusions. It has proceeded on the assumption that the savage is the primitive man, and that his agglutinated dialect represents a primitive state of language instead of a degenerate state. A broader view of history and a juster induction from its facts would, perhaps, upset this assumption. The savage is the degenerate, not the primeval man; man in his second childhood, not in his first; and hence the reason why he has no growth, no inherent progressive power, and why, as Niebuhr asserts, there is no instance on record of a savage people having by its own indigenous efforts passed from the savage to the civilized state. The thing is as impossible as for the old man, decrepit by age, to renew the vigor and elasticity of his youth or early manhood. Instead of studying the dialects of savage tribes to obtain specimens of the primitive forms of speech, philologists should study them only to obtain specimens of worn-out or used-up forms or of language in its dotage. In all the savage dialects that we have any knowledge of, we detect or seem to detect traces of a culture, a civilization, of which they who now speak them have lost all memory and are no longer capable. This seems to us to bear witness to a fall, a loss. Perhaps when the American and African dialects are better known and are studied with reference to this view of the savage state, and we have better ascertained the influence of climate and habits of life on the organs of speech and therefore on pronunciation, especially of the consonants,

we shall be able to discover indications of an identity of origin where now we can detect only traces of diversity. As long as philology has only partially explored the field of observation, it is idle to pretend that *science* has established anything against the scriptural doctrine of the unity of speech. The fact that philologists have not traced all the various dialects now spoken or extinct to a common original amounts to nothing against faith, unless it can be proved that no such original ever existed. It may have been lost and only the distinctions retained.

Naturalists point to the various species of plants and animals distributed over the whole surface of the globe, and ask us if we mean to say that each of these has also sprung from one original pair, or male and female, and if we maintain that the primogenitors of each species of animal were in the garden of Eden with Adam and Eve or in the ark with Noah. If so, how have they become distributed over the several continents of the earth and the islands of the ocean? *Argumentum a specie ad speciem non valet*, as say the books on logic. And even if it were proved that in case of plants and animals God duplicates, triplicates, or quadruplicates the parents by direct creation, or that he creates anew the pair in each remote locality where the same species is found, as prominent naturalists maintain or are inclined to maintain, it would prove nothing in the case of man. For we cannot reason from animals to man or from flora to fauna. Nearly all the arguments adduced from so-called science against the faith are drawn from supposed analogies of men and animals, and rest for their validity on the assumption that man is not only generically, but specifically, an animal, which is simply a begging the question. (Vol. ix. pp. 282-285.)

## PHYSIOLOGICAL SCIENCE.

THE continual changes that take place from time to time in physiology show—we say it with all deference to physiologists—that it has not risen as yet to the dignity of a science. It is of no use to speak of progress, for changes which transform the whole body of a pretended science are not progress. We may not have mastered all the facts of a science; we may be discovering new facts every day; but if we have, for instance, the true physiological science, the discovery of new facts may throw new light on the science—may enable us to see clearer its reach and understand better its application, but cannot change or modify its principles. As long as your pretended science is liable to be changed in its principles, it is a theory, an hypothesis, not a science. Physiologists have accumulated a large stock of physiological facts, to which they are daily adding new facts. We willingly admit these facts are not useless, and the time spent in collecting them is not wasted; on the contrary, we hold them to be valuable, and appreciate very highly the labor, the patient research, and the nice observation that has collected, classified, and described them; but we dare assert, notwithstanding, that the science of physiology is yet to be created; and created it will not be till physiologists have learned and are able to set forth the dialectic relations of spirit and matter, soul and body, God and nature, free will and necessity. Till then there may be known facts, but there will be no physiological science. As far as what is called the science of human life, or human physiology, goes, Professor Draper's work is an able and commendable work; but he must permit us to say that



the real science of physiology he has not touched, has not dreamed of; nor have any of his brethren who see in the human soul only a useless appendage to the body. The soul is the *forma corporis*, its informing, its vital principle, and pervades, so to speak, and determines, or modifies, the whole life and action of the human body, from the first instant of conception to the very moment of death. The human body does not exist, even in its embryonic state, first as a vegetable, then as an animal, and afterwards as united to an immaterial soul. It is body united to soul from the first instant of conception, and man lives, in any stage of his existence, but one and the same human life. There is no moment after conception when the wilful destruction of the foetus is not the murder of a human life.

Man, though the ancients called him a microcosm, the universe in little, and he contains in himself all the elements of nature, is neither a mineral nor a vegetable, nor simply an animal, and the analogies which the physiologist detects between him and the kingdoms below him form no scientific basis of human physiology, for like is not same. There may be no difference that the microscope or the crucible can detect between the blood of an ox and the blood of a man; for the microscope and chemical tests are in both cases applied to the dead subject, not the living, and the human blood tested is withdrawn from the living action of the soul, an action that escapes the most powerful microscope and the most subtile chemical agent. Comparative physiology may gratify the curiosity, and when not pressed beyond its legitimate bounds it may even be useful and help us to a better understanding of our own bodies; but it can never be the basis of a scientific induction.

because between man and all animals there is the difference of species. Comparative physiology is, therefore, unlike comparative philology; for however diverse may be the dialects compared, there is no difference of species among them, and nothing hinders philological inductions from possessing, in the secondary order, a true scientific character. Physiological inductions resting on the comparative study of different individuals or different races or families of men may also be truly scientific; for all these individuals and all these races or families belong to one and the same species. But the comparative physiology that compares man and animal gives only analogies, not science. (Vol. ix. pp. 293-295.)

#### EFFECT OF PHYSICAL CONDITIONS ON HUMAN DEVELOPMENT.

LET us come to the doctrine for which the professor [Draper] writes his book, namely, individuals, communities, nations, universal humanity, are under the control of physical conditions, therefore of physical law, or law in the sense of the physiologists or the physicists. If this means anything, it means that the religion, the morality, the intellectual development, the growth and decay, the littleness and the grandeur of men and nations depend solely on physical causes, not at all on moral causes—a doctrine not true throughout even in human physiology, and supported by no facts, except in a very restricted degree, when applied to nations and communities. In the corporeal phenomena of the individual the soul counts for much, and in morbid physiology the moral often counts for more than the physical; perhaps it always does, for we know from revelation that

the morbidity of nature is the penalty or effect of man's transgression. It is proved to be false as applied to nations and communities by the fact that the Christian religion, which is substantially that of the ancient patriarchs, is, at least as far as science can go, older than any of the false religions, has maintained itself the same in all essential respects, unvaried and invariable, in every variety of physical change and in every diversity of physical condition, and absolutely unaffected by any natural causes whatever.

The chief physical conditions on which the professor relies are climate and geographical position. Yet what we hold to be the true religion, the primitive religion of mankind, has prevailed in all climates and been found the same in all geographical positions. Nay, even the false pagan religions have varied only in their accidents with climatic and geographical positions. We find them in substance the same in India, Central Asia, on the banks of the Danube, in the heart of Europe, in the ancient Scania, the Northern Isles, in Mexico and Peru. The substance of Greek and Roman or Etrurian mythology is the same with that of India and Egypt. M. Renan tells us that the monotheism so firmly held by the Arabic branch of the Semitic family is due to the vast deserts over which the Arab tribes wander, which suggests the ideas of unity and universality; and yet for centuries before Mohammed, these same Arabs, wandering over the same deserts, were polytheists and idolaters; and not from contemplating those deserts, but by recalling the primitive tradition of mankind, preserved by Jews and Christians, did the founder of Islamism attain to the monotheism of the Koran. The professor is misled

by taking, in the heathen mythology he has studied, the poetic imagery and embellishments, which indeed vary according to the natural aspects, objects, and productions of the locality, for their substance, thought, or doctrine. The poetic illustrations, imagery, and embellishments of Judaism are all oriental; but the Jew in all climates and in all geographical positions holds one and the same religious faith even to this day; and his only real difference from us is that he is still looking for a Christ to come, while we believe the Christ he is looking for has come, and is the same Jesus of Nazareth who was crucified at Jerusalem under Pontius Pilate. (Vol. ix. pp. 307-309.)

The theory that the rise, growth, decay, and death of nations depend on physical conditions alone, chiefly on climate and geographical position, seems to us attended with some grave difficulties. Have the climate and geographical positions of India, Persia, Assyria, Egypt, Greece, and Rome essentially changed from what they were at the epoch of their greatness? Did not all the great and renowned nations of antiquity rise, grow, prosper, decline, and die in substantially the same physical conditions, under the same climate, and in the same geographical position? Like causes produce like effects. How could the same physical causes cause alike the rise and growth and the decay and death of one and the same people in one and the same climate and in one and the same geographical position? Do you say climate and even physical geography change with the lapse of time? Be it so. Be it as the author maintains, that formerly there was no variation of climate on this continent, from the equator to either pole; but was there for Rome any appreciable change in the climate and geography from the time of the

third Punic war to that of Honorius, or even of Augustulus, the last of the emperors? Or what change in the physical conditions of the nation was there when it was falling from what there was when it was rising?

Nations, like individuals, have, according to the professor, their infancy, youth, manhood, old age, and death. But why do nations grow old and die? The individual grows old and dies because his interior physical machinery wears out, and because he must die in order to attain to the end for which he lives. But why should this be the case with nations? They have no future life to which death is the passage. The nation does not rise or fall with the individuals that found it. One generation of individuals passes away and another comes, but the nation survives; and why, if not destroyed by external violence, should it not continue to survive and thrive to the end of time? There are no physical causes, no known physiological laws, that prevent it. Why was not Rome as able to withstand the barbarians or to drive them back from her frontiers in the fourth century as she was in the first? Why was England so much weaker under the Stuarts than she had been under the Tudors or was again under the Protector? Or why have we seen her so grand under Pitt and Wellington and so little and feeble under Palmerston and Russell? Can you explain this by a change of climate and geographical position or any change in the physical conditions of the nation, that is, any physical changes not due to moral causes?

We see in several of the states of the Union a decrease, a relative, if not a positive decrease, of the native population, and the physical man actually

degenerating, and to an extent that should alarm the statesman and the patriot. Do you explain this fact by the change in the climate and the geographical position? The geographical position remains unchanged, and if the climate has changed at all, it has been by way of amelioration. Do you attribute it to a change in the physical condition of the country? Not at all. There is no mystery as to the matter, and though the effects may be physical or physiological, the causes are well known to be moral, and chief among them is the immoral influence of the doctrine the professor and his brother physiologists are doing their best to diffuse among the people. The cause is in the loss of religious faith, in the lack of moral and religious instruction, in the spread of naturalism, and the rejection of supernatural grace—without which the natural cannot be sustained in its integrity—in the growth of luxury, and the assertion of material goods or sensible pleasures as the end and aim of life. There is always something morally wrong where prizes need to be offered to induce the young to marry and to induce the married to suffer their children to be born and reared. (Vol. ix. pp. 312, 313.)

The common sense of mankind, in all ages of the world, has uniformly attributed the downfall of nations, states, and empires to moral causes, not to physiological laws, climatic influences, or geographical position. The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God. Righteousness exalteth a nation, and sin is a reproach to any people. This is alike the voice of inspiration and of universal experience. The traveller who visits the sites of nations renowned in story, now buried in ruins, of cities once thronged with a teeming population, the

marts of the world, in which were heard from morning till night—till far into night—the din of industry, and marks the solitude that now reigns there, the barren waste that has succeeded to once fruitful fields and vineyards, and observes the poor shepherd that feeds a petty flock on the scanty pasturage, or the armed robber that watches for a victim to plunder, receives a far less vivid impression of the dependence of nations on physical causes and conditions than of the influence of the moral world on the natural, and reads in legible characters the meaning of that fearful penalty which God pronounced when he said to the man: “And the earth for thy sake shall be cursed.” The physical changes that have come over Assyria, Syria, Lybia, Egypt, and Palestine are the effects of the moral deterioration of man, not the cause of that deterioration. (Vol. ix. pp. 314, 315.)

#### PLANTS AND ANIMALS.

THE professor [Huxley] speaks of the difficulty of determining the line of demarcation between the animal and the plant; but is it difficult to draw the line between the mineral and the plant or between the plant and the inorganic matter from which it assimilates its food or nourishment? . . . We should like to have the professor explain how ordinary matter, even if *quick*, becomes protoplasm, and how the protoplasm becomes the origin and basis of the life of the plant. Every plant is an organism with its central life within. Virchow and Cl. Bernard by their late discoveries have proved that every organism proceeds from an organite, ovule, or central cell, which produces, directs, and controls or governs the whole

organism, even in its abnormal developments. They have also proved that this ovule or central cell exists only as generated by a pre-existing organism, or parent, of the same kind. The later physiologists are agreed that there is no well-authenticated instance of spontaneous generation. Now, this organite must exist, live, before it can avail itself of the protoplasm formed of ordinary matter, which is exterior to it, not within it, and cannot be its life, for that moves from within outward, from the centre to the circumference. Concede, then, all the facts the professor alleges, they only go to prove that the organism already living sustains its life by assimilating fitting elements from ordinary matter. But they do not show at all that it derives its life from them; or that the so-called protoplasm is the origin, source, basis, or matter of organic life; or that it generates, produces, or gives rise to the organite or central cell; not that it has anything to do with vitalizing it. Hence the professor fails to throw any light on the origin, matter, or basis of life itself. (Vol. ix. pp. 366, 367.)

### THE PHYSICAL BASIS OF LIFE.

It may or it may not be difficult in the lower organisms to draw the line between the plant and the animal, and we shall urge no objections to what the professor [Huxley] says on that point; we will only say here that the animal organism, like the vegetable, is produced, directed, and controlled by the central cell, and that this cell or ovule is generated by animal parents. There is no spontaneous generation and no well-authenticated instance of metagenesis. Like generates like, and even Darwin's doctrine



of natural selection confirms rather than denies it. It is certain that the vegetable organism has never, as far as science goes, generated an animal organism. Arguments based on our ignorance prove nothing. The protoplasm can no more produce or vitalize the central animal than it can the central vegetable cell, and, indeed, still less; for the animal cannot, as the professor himself asserts, sustain its life by the protoplasmic elements till they have been prepared by the vegetable organism. Whence, then, the animal germ, organite, or ovule? What vitalizes it and gives it the power of assimilating the protoplasm as its food, without which the organism dies and disappears?

Giving the professor the fullest credit for exact science in all his statements, he does not, as far as we can see, prove his protoplasm is the physical basis of life or that there is for life any physical basis at all. He only proves that matter is so far plastic as to afford sustenance to a generated organic life, which every farmer who has ever manured a field of corn or grass or reared a flock of sheep or a herd of cattle knows and always has known, as well as the illustrious professor.

We can find a clear statement of several of the conditions of life, both vegetable and animal, but no demonstration of the principle of life, in the professor's very elaborate discourse. Indeed, if we examine it closely we shall find that he does not even pretend to demonstrate anything of the sort. He denies all means of science except sensible experience, and maintains with Hume that we have no sensible experience of causes or principles. All science, he asserts, is restricted to empirical facts with their law, which in his system is itself only a fact or

a classification of facts. The conditions of life, as we observe them, are for him the essential principle of life in the only sense in which the word *principle* has or can have for him an intelligible meaning. He proves, then, the physical basis of life by denying that it has any intelligible basis at all. He proves, indeed, that the protoplasm, which he shows, or endeavors to show, is universal—one and the same, always and everywhere—is present in the already existing life of both the plant and the animal; but that whatever it be in the plant or animal which gives it the power to take up the protoplasm and assimilate it to its own organism, which is properly the life or vital power, he does not explain, account for, or even recognize. With him, power is an empty word. He nowhere proves that life is produced, furnished, or generated by the protoplasm or has a material origin. Hence the protoplasm, by his own showing, is simply no protoplasm at all. He proves, if anything, that in inorganic matter there are elements which the living plant or animal assimilates, and into which, when dead, it is resolved. This is all he does and, in fact, all he professes to do.

The professor makes light of the very grave objection that chemical analysis can throw no light on the principle or basis of life, because it is or can be made only on the dead subject. He of course concedes that chemical analysis is not made on the living subject; but this, he contends, amounts to nothing. We think it amounts to a great deal. The very thing sought, to wit, life, is wanting in the dead subject, and of course cannot by any possible analysis be detected in it. If all that constituted the living body is present in the dead body, why is the body dead, or why has it ceased to per-

form its vital functions? The protoplasm, or what you so call, is as present in the corpse as in the living organism. If it is the basis of life, why is the organism no longer living? The fact is that life, while it continues, resists chemical action and death by a higher and subtler chemistry of its own, and it is only the dead body that falls under the action of the ordinary chemical laws. There is, then, no concluding the principle or basis of life from any possible dissection of the dead body. (Vol. ix. pp. 367-369.)

#### LIFE FROM DEATH.

WE know that some physiologists regard the waste of the body, which in life is constantly going on and which is repaired by the food we take, as incipient death; but this is only because they confound the particles or molecules of matter of which the body is externally built up, and which change many times during an ordinary life, with the body itself, and suppose the life of the body is simply the resultant of the aggregation of these innumerable molecules or particles. But the life of the organism, we have seen, is within it, and its action from the centre, and it is only its life, not its death, that throws off or exudes as well as assimilates the material particles. The exudation as well as the assimilation is interrupted by death. Why the protoplasm could not live unless it died is what we do not understand. . . . The waste of the living organism is not death nor dying, though death may result from it. And the supply of protoplasm in the shape of food does not originate new life nor replenish a life that is gone, but supplies what is needed to sustain and invigorate a life that is already life. In the second

place, the vital force is not built up by protoplasmic accretions, but operates from within the organism, from the organite or central cell, without which there could be no accretions or secretions. The food does not give life; it only ministers sustenance to an organism already living. No chemical analysis of the food can disclose or throw any light on the origin, nature, or constitution of the organic life itself.

It is this fact that prevents us from having much confidence in chemical physiology, which is still insisted on by our most eminent physiologists. In every organism there is something that transcends the reach of chemical analysis, and which no chemical synthesis can reproduce. Take the professor's protoplasm itself. He resolves it into the minerals, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen: but no chemist can by any possible recombination of them reproduce protoplasm. How, then, can one say that these minerals are its sole constituents, or that there are not other elements entering it which escape all chemical tests and, indeed, are not subject to chemical laws? Chemistry is limited and cannot penetrate the essence of the material substance any more than the eye can. It never does and never can go beyond the sensible properties of matter. Life has its own laws, and every physiologist knows that he meets in the living organism phenomena or facts which it is impossible to reduce to any of the laws which are obtainable from the analysis of inorganic or lifeless matter. It is necessary, then, to conclude that there is in the living organism present and active some element which, though using lifeless matter, cannot be derived from it or explained by physical laws, be they mechanical, chemical, or electrical. The law of life is a law *sui generis* and

not resolvable into any other. We must even go beyond the physical laws themselves if we would find their principle.

As far as human science goes, there is, where the nucleus of life is wanting, no conversion of lifeless matter into living matter. The attempt to prove that living organisms, plants, animals, or man, are developed from inorganic and lifeless matter, though made as long ago as Leucippus and Democritus, systematized by Epicurus, sung in rich Latin verse by Lucretius, and defended by the ablest of modern British physico-philosophers, Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his "Biology," has by the sane part of the human race in all times and everywhere been held to be foolish and absurd. It has no scientific basis, is supported by no known facts, and is simply an unfounded, at least an unsupported, hypothesis.

Life to the scientist is an insolvable mystery. We know no explanation of this mystery or of anything else in the universe, unless we accept the creative act of God; for the origin and cause of nature are not in nature herself. We have no other explanation of the origin of living organisms or of the matter of life. God created plants, animals, and man, created them living organisms, male and female created he them, and thus gave them the power to propagate and multiply each its own kind by natural generation. The scientist will of course smile superciliously at this old solution, insisted on by priests and accepted by the vulgar; but though not a scientist, we know enough of science to say from even a scientific point of view that there is no alternative: either this or no solution at all. The ablest men of ancient or modern times, when they reject it, only fall into endless sophisms and self-contradictions. (Vol. ix. pp. 374-376.)

## HEREDITARY GENIUS.

EVEN if it be true that the majority of eminent men spring from families more or less distinguished, it does not necessarily follow that they derive their eminent abilities by inheritance; for in those same families, born of the same parents, we find other members whose abilities are in no way remarkable and in no sense above the common level. In a family of half a dozen or a dozen members one will be distinguished and rise to eminence, while the others will remain very ordinary people. . . . Why these marked differences in the children of the same blood, the same breed, the same parents and ancestors? If Mr. Galton explains the inferiority of the five or the eleven by considerations external or independent of race or breed, why may not the superiority of the one be explained by causes alike independent of breed? Why are the natural abilities of one brother inferior to another's, since they are both born of the same parents? If a man's natural abilities are derived by inheritance from organization, why is one superior to the other? Every day we meet occasion to ask similar questions. This fact proves that there are causes at work on which man's eminence or want of eminence depends of which Mr. Galton's theory takes no note, which escape the greatest scientists, and at best can be only conjectured. But conjecture is not science. (Vol. ix. p. 407.)

This is not all. As far as known, very eminent men have sprung from parents of very ordinary natural abilities, as of social position. The founders of dynasties and noble families have seldom had distinguished progenitors, and are usually not only the first but the greatest of their line. . . .

Then, again, who can say how much of a great man's greatness is due to his natural abilities with which he was born, and how much is due to the force of example, to family tradition, to education, to his own application, and the concurrence of circumstances? It is in no man's power to tell nor in any scientist's power to ascertain. It is a common remark that great men in general owe their greatness chiefly to their mothers, and that in the great majority of cases known eminent men have gifted mothers. This, if a fact, is against Mr. Galton's theory; for the father, not the mother, transmits the hereditary character of the offspring, the hereditary qualities of the line, if the physiologists are to be believed. Hence nobility in all civilized nations follows the father, not the mother. The fact of great men owing their greatness more to the mother is explained by her greater influence in forming the mind, in moulding the character, in stimulating and directing the exercise of her son's faculties, than that of the father. It is as educator in the largest sense that the mother forms her son's character and influences his destiny. It is her womanly instincts, affection, and care and vigilance, her ready sympathy, her love, her tenderness, and power to inspire a noble ambition, kindle high and generous aspirations in the breast of her son, that do the work. (Vol. ix. p. 408.)

#### MEN BORN WITH UNEQUAL ABILITIES.

WE are far from pretending that all men are born with equal abilities and that all souls are created with equal possibilities, or that every child comes into the world a genius in germ. We believe

~~that all men are born with equal natural rights and that all should be equal before the law, however various and unequal may be their acquired or adventitious rights; but that is all the equality we believe in.~~ No special effort or training in the world, under the influence of the most favorable circumstances, can make every child a St. Augustine, a St. Thomas, a Bossuet, a Newton, a Leibnitz, a Julius Cæsar, a Wellington, a Napoleon. As one star differeth from another in glory, so does one soul differ from another in its capacities on earth as in its blessedness in heaven. . . . We are by no means believers in the late Robert Owen's doctrine that you can make all men equal if you will only surround them from birth with the same circumstances and enable them to live in parallelograms.

We are prepared to go even further, and to recognize that the distinction between noble and ignoble, gentle and simple, recognized in all ages and by all nations, is not wholly unfounded. There is as great a variety and as great an inequality in families as in individuals. Aristocracy is not a pure prejudice; and though it has no political privileges in this country, yet it exists here no less than elsewhere, and it is well for us that it does. . . .

There is no doubt that there are noble lines, and the descendants of noble ancestors do, as a rule, though not invariably, surpass the descendants of plebeian or undistinguished lines. . . . We expect more from the child of a good family than from the child of a family of no account, and hold that birth is never to be decried or treated as a matter of no importance. But we count it so chiefly because it secures better breeding and subjection to higher, nobler, and purer formative influences from the earliest



moment. Example and family traditions are of immense reach in forming the character, and it is not a little to have constantly presented to the consideration of the child the distinguished ability, the eminent worth and noble deeds of a long line of illustrious ancestors, especially in an age and country where blood is highly esteemed and the honorable pride of family is cultivated. The honor and esteem in which a family has been held for its dignity and worth through several generations is a capital, an outfit for the son, secures him, in starting, the advantage of less well-born competitors and all the aid in advance of a high position and the good-will of the community. More is exacted of him than of them; he is early made to feel that *noblesse oblige* and that failure would in his case be dishonor. He is thereby stimulated to greater effort to succeed. (Vol. ix. pp. 412, 413.)

#### INFLUENCE OF THE SOUL ON THE BODY.

YET we deny not that there is something else than all this in blood. A man's genius belongs to his soul and is no more inherited than the soul itself. But man is not all soul, any more than he is all body; body and soul are in close and mysterious relation, and in this life neither acts without the other. The man's natural abilities are psychical, not physical, and are not inherited, because the soul is created, not generated; but their external manifestation may depend, in a measure, on organization, and organization is inherited. Mr. Galton's facts may, then, be admitted without our being obliged to accept his theory. The brain is generally considered by physiologists as the organ of the mind, and it may be so without implying that the brain secretes thought,

will, affection, as the liver secretes bile or the stomach secretes the gastric juice.

The soul is distinct from the body, and is its *form*, its life, or its vivifying and informing principle; yet it uses the body as the organ of its action. Hence De Bonald defines man, an intelligence that serves himself by organs, not an intelligence served by organs, as Plato said. The activity is in the soul, not in the organs. The organ we call the eye does not see; the soul sees by means of the eye. So of the ear, the smell, the taste, the touch. We speak of the five senses; but we should speak more correctly if we spoke, not of five senses, but of five organs of sense; for the sense is psychical, and is one like the soul that senses through the organs. In like manner, the brain appears to be the organ of the mind, through which, together with the several nerves that centre in it, the mind performs its various operations of thinking, willing, reasoning, remembering, reflecting, etc. The nature of the relation of the soul, which is one, simple, and immaterial, with a material body with its various organs, nervous and ganglionic systems, is a mystery which we cannot explain. Yet we cannot doubt that there is a reciprocal action and reaction of the soul and body, or at least the bodily organs can and do offer, at times, an obstacle to the external action of the soul. We cannot by our will raise our arm if it be paralyzed, though our psychical power to will to raise it is not thereby effected. If the organs of seeing and hearing, the eye and the ear, are injured or originally defective, our external sight and hearing are thereby injured or rendered defective; but not in other psychical relations, as evinced by the fact that when the physical defect is removed or the physical injury is cured,

the soul finds no difficulty in manifesting its ordinary power of seeing or hearing. So we may say of the other organs of sense, and of the body generally, in so far as it is the organ of the soul or used by the soul in its external display or manifestation of its powers.

No doubt the organization may be more or less favorable to this external display or manifestation, or that, under certain conditions and to a certain extent, the organization is hereditary, or transmitted by natural generation. There may be transmitted from parents or ancestors a healthy or diseased, a normal or a more or less abnormal organization; and so far, and in this sense, genius may be hereditary, and a man's natural abilities may be derived by inheritance, as are the form and features; but only to this extent and in this sense—that is, as to their external display or exercise; for a man may be truly eloquent in his soul, and even in writing, whose stammering tongue prevents him from displaying any eloquence in his speech. The organization does not deprive the soul of its powers. A man's power to will to raise his arm is not lessened by the fact that his arm is paralyzed. And in all ordinary cases the soul is able, at least by the help of grace, freely given to all, to overcome a vicious temperament, control, in the moral order, a defective organization, and maintain her moral freedom and integrity. It has been proved that the deaf-mute can be taught to speak, and that idiots or natural-born fools can be so educated as to be able to exhibit no inconsiderable degree of intelligence.

*See* We do not believe a word in Darwin's theory of natural selection, for all the facts on which he bases it admit of a different explanation; nor in its kindred

theory of development or evolution of species. One of our own collaborators has amply refuted both theories by showing that what these theories assume to be the development or evolution of new species, whether by natural selection or otherwise, is but a reversion to the original type and condition, in like manner as we have proved, over and over again, that the savage is the degenerate, not the primeval man. It is not improbable that your African negro is the degenerate descendant of a once over-civilized race, and that he owes his physical peculiarities to the fact that he has become subject, like the animal world, to the laws of nature, which are resisted and modified in their action by the superior races. We do not assert this as scientifically demonstrated, but as a theory which is far better sustained by well-known facts and incontrovertible principles than either the theory of development or of natural selection.

Yet the soul as *forma corporis* has an influence, we say not how much, on organization; and high intellectual and moral culture may modify it and, other things being equal, render it in turn more favorable to the external manifestation of the inherent powers of the soul. This more favorable organization may be transmitted by natural generation from parents to children, and if continued through several consecutive generations it may give rise to noble families and to races superior to the average. Physical habits are transmissible by inheritance. This is not, as Darwin and Galton suppose, owing to natural selection, but to the original mental and moral culture become traditional in certain families and races, and to the voluntary efforts of the soul, as is evident from the fact that when the culture is neglected

and the voluntary efforts cease to be made, the superiority is lost, the organization becomes depraved, and the family or race runs out or drops into the ranks of the ignoble. The blood, however blue, will not of itself alone suffice to keep up the superiority of the family or the race; nor will marriages, however judicious, through no matter how many consecutive generations, without the culture, keep up the nobility, as Mr. Galton would have us believe; for the superiority of the blood depends originally and continuously on the soul, its original endowments, and its peculiar training or culture through several generations.

It is in this same way we explain the origin and continuance of national characteristics and differences. Climate and geographical position count, no doubt, for something; but more in the direction they give to the national aims and culture than in their direct effects on bodily organization. It is not probable that the original tribes of Greece had any finer organic adaptation to literature and the arts than had the Scythian hordes from which they sprang; but their climate and geographical position turned their attention to cultivation of the beautiful, and the continual cultivation of the beautiful through several generations gave the Greeks an organization highly favorable to artistic creations. Then, again, Rome cultivated and excelled in the genius of law and jurisprudence. But under Christian faith and culture the various nations of Europe became assimilated, and the peculiar national characteristics under gentilism were in a measure obliterated. They also revive as the nations under Protestantism recede from Christianity and return to gentilism, and are held in check only by the reminiscences of

Catholicity and by the mutual intercourse of nations kept up by trade and commerce, literature and the arts. (Vol. ix. pp. 413-416.)

### CIVILIZATION NOT SPONTANEOUS.

THERE is no record or instance of a savage tribe becoming by its own spontaneous and unassisted efforts a civilized people. All the historical authorities known to us agree in this; and we, who have been reading history all our life, have not been able to find an instance of the kind. Theorists who assert it do not pretend that they have any strictly historical authority for it. It is not, they will own, a strictly historical fact, but an induction. If the primeval man was a savage, how has he become civilized if the race is not progressive? The question reveals the true spirit of our modern scientists. They imagine a theory, then imagine another, equally baseless, to prove it. They prove that man began in the savage state by the theory of progress; and the theory of progress by the theory that man was originally a savage, and, consequently, could not become civilized if not progressive. (Vol. ix. pp. 468, 469.)

History presents us, or preserves for us, the memory of no savage ancestors of the oldest civilized nations, the Egyptians, Assyrians, Syrians, Phœnicians, Carthaginians, Ethiopians, Abyssinians, Chaldeans, Persians, and Indians. Where, then, are the people or nations, civilized to-day, whose ancestors were savages, an ignoble herd roaming in the forest, living in dens and caves, on nuts or wild roots, which they disputed with the swine; naked, without arms either of offence or defence except their fists, ignorant of the use of fire and of the simplest agricultu-

ral or mechanical arts? The Greek and Latin poets describe their own ancestors in similar terms, it is true; but they never describe that condition as their primitive condition or as that of the human race. It had, according to them, been preceded by the Saturnian Age of Gold. Their traditions are worth as much for the one state as for the other. Not only is there no instance on record of a savage people having attained to a civilized state by its own unaided efforts, but it is even doubtful if any tribe sunk in the *lowest* barbarism has ever by any means become a civilized people at all. (Vol. ix. p. 470.)

#### THE SAVAGE IS NOT PROGRESSIVE.

THE most striking characteristic of the savage is precisely his stationariness or unprogressiveness. Ages on ages roll over him and bring no change in his habits or in his condition. Heeren remarks truly that the description given by the companions of Alexander the Great of the Fisheaters along the coast of Keramania, eastward of the Persian Gulf, answers equally for them to-day: a fact which affords a passable comment on the theory that fish-eating tends to increase the power and activity of the brain on account of the phosphorus so abundant in fish. The savage is the greatest routinist in the world. Generation after generation follows in the track of its predecessor, fishes, hunts, makes war in the same manner, as regularly as the bee constructs her cell or the beaver builds his dam to-day as did the bee or the beaver four thousand years ago. The savage has to perfection the *nil admirari* of English high life. He has no wonder, no curiosity, no aspirations, no "inward questionings." His senses are acute and

he is a keen observer; but he never speculates or inquires into the meaning of facts beyond their direct bearing on his condition or pursuits in life—fishing, hunting, circumventing an enemy, or eating and sleeping. His life runs from generation to generation in the same unalterable groove, unless something external to him intervenes to lift him to a higher plane and divert his course. He is in some sort a man petrified. Nothing is more absurd than to suppose him capable, without assistance from abroad or from above, of changing his state for that of civilization, which repels rather than attracts him, as all who have studied his character well know. (Vol. ix. p. 471.)

#### ORIGIN OF BARBARISM.

THOUGH we deny that the race began in the lowest barbarism, we hold that no small portion of the human family, after the confusion of tongues at Babel, the apostasy of the gentiles, and their dispersion in the days of Phaleg, lapsed into barbarism, into what the poets call the Iron Age. Those who wandered farthest from the original seats of the race when all “were of one tongue and the same speech” fell the lowest, and perhaps are still savages. Others who wandered less far and remained near the original seats of the race deteriorated indeed, but not to so great a degree, and have been recovered to civilization, though retaining traces of the barbarism or semi-barbarism into which after the apostasy and dispersion they had fallen. This explains both classes of facts noted by Sir John [Lubbock], and accords with Christian tradition, as well as with the gentile traditions preserved and transmitted in the



heathen mythologies and by the heathen poets, as Lord Arundel [of Wardour], guided by the historical light of the Mosaic records, has amply proved, whether we accept the doctrine which his lordship holds in common with the most learned and generally approved mythologists, that the greater gods of the gentiles were Adam and Noah and their sons deified, or whether we reject it; for, as we have seen, these gods gather round them the scriptural traditions and appropriate to themselves the events and facts in the historical personages of that tradition celebrated or commemorated in their memorial festivals, sacrifices, and offerings. The devils cannot create; they can only use and corrupt what already exists.

The history of the human race on this globe is a history of deterioration rather than of progress. Progress there has been by the supernatural teaching and assistance of Christianity, and where the Christian tradition has been preserved and conformed to in its purity and integrity. There was a marvellous progress in Europe from the sixth century to the sixteenth of our era under the powerful influence of the church, the disinterested, self-denying, and persevering labors of her devoted pontiffs, clergy, missionaries, and religious. But I find deterioration rather than progress in the gentile world, both before and since the commencement of the Christian era. Great monarchies grew up, the Egyptian, the Assyrian, the Medo-Persian, the Macedonian, but by conquest, annexation, robbery, and violence, like modern Prussia or the present so-called kingdom of Italy; not by the internal growth of intelligence and virtue, by the strict observance of justice or the law of nations, nor by any elevation of the standard of civilization.

They were all great tyrannies, a curse to the human race, and have all fallen through internal weakness and decay, and have either lapsed into barbarism or have been superseded by barbarous tribes which they once held in subjection without civilizing them, and which now roam over the desolate sites of their former power, pitch their tents, or rob the unwary traveller among the mouldering ruins of their greatness. So, too, mighty Rome rose, became the haughty mistress of the world, but, like her predecessors, fell to pieces from her own rottenness; and it is due to the church she persecuted and sought to destroy that her memory is not as completely lost as that of the great robber empires that once flourished in the East.

The history of these great empires that once grasped the world in their hands is not the history of a progress in civilization, of social amelioration, nor of an advance in the arts and sciences. We find always their earliest civil constitution the most favorable to liberty and social well-being, to intelligence and individual growth. The oldest works of art are the best, the earliest literature is the richest and the soundest. The oldest of the Hindoo sacred books are the freest from superstition and approach nearest to the biblical doctrines and traditions; the two great poets of Greece, Homer and Hesiod, are the earliest known; the soundest elements of Greek philosophy are confessedly derived from the wisdom of the ancients, and the oldest laws are the wisest, the justest, and the most salutary; and the changes introduced, which tend not to restore primitive legislation, are the effects and causes of deterioration in morals, manners, or social and political condition. The people who founded the city of Rome and gave

it its renown were less superstitious, less immoral, and had higher civic virtues as well as domestic than the Romans under the Cæsars, whose corruption, luxury, and effeminacy, as well as cruelty and superstition, made holy men look upon their conquest by the German barbarians as a blessing to mankind.

The history of the apostate nations before the Christian era is a history of deterioration, of political and social corruption, of the progress of tyranny and oppression, of moral and religious degradation. We witness the same tendency in the modern nations that have apostatized from Christianity and rejected the authority of Christian tradition. True religion and real civilization are inseparable; or, rather, true religion is civilization, or, at least, includes it. No people who believes and practises true religion is or can be an uncivilized people. Adam received from his Maker the true religion, preserved by the patriarchs to Noah, and through him down to the building of the Tower of Babel; and so long as the race remained of "one tongue and the same speech" (Genesis xi.) they held and, externally at least, observed the true religion, the Christian religion (for there is and never has been but one religion properly so called), and were civilized. With Nemrod, "the stout hunter before the Lord," probably commenced the great gentile apostasy, and simultaneously the deterioration which resulted in the ignorance, superstition, devil-worship, and barbarism of the heathen. The conversion of a family, tribe, or nation to Christianity brings it within the pale of civilization. Before the opening of the sixteenth century the church had converted and, therefore, civilized the various families, tribes, and nations of Europe, with the exception of the Turks

encamped on its southeastern margin, whom the schismatic Greeks, severed from the source of Christian life and power, were impotent either to convert or to expel; she had opened the route to the East by way of the Cape of Good Hope and had also discovered this Western Continent, and was preparing to convert and, therefore, to civilize the barbarians and savages of the other three-quarters of the globe, when came the so-called reformation, favored by the sovereign princes, to renew the great gentile apostasy, and caused that "falling away" predicted by St. Paul.

The history of these modern apostate nations is the exact counterpart of that of the ancient gentile nations. They reject the law of God and therefore the law of nations, recognize no law that comes from a source above the nation or which man himself does not make. They are every day losing sight of the moral order and of the divine government. They exclude God from the affairs of this world and make either Cæsar or the people supreme and independent. They recognize no authority but that of the prince or that of the majority, and no measure of right, as we have seen, but might or physical force. They may recognize in some extra-mundane region a divinity that dozes all day and sleeps all night and takes no care how the world wags. They may even admit his supreme authority, but only in a vague and indeterminate sense, as an abstraction, without visible organization or organs, and therefore without any practical efficacy in the government of men or nations. They worship Fortune as the supreme goddess and hold Success to be the test of merit. Losing causes are always wrong, and God is always on the side of the strong, just now on the side of Prince von Bis-

marck and Victor Emmanuel; as in my boyhood, when the Pope was held a prisoner at Savona or Fontainebleau, he was said by the preachers to be on the side of Napoleon I., who was identified with the Man-Child of the Apocalypse. These nations are laboring with might and main to make education purely secular, to exclude religion from the schools, and to train up the rising generation in atheism, which they call *science*, as they call religion superstition. They boast of their "enlightenment," but their enlightenment consists in forgetting or despising the wisdom and common sense of their ancestors; they boast of their progress, but in the moral and spiritual order, in religion and the basis of civilization, their progress, as we said years ago, is in losing, in unclothing and reducing themselves to utter nakedness. The only progress they can boast is in the purely material and mechanical order. Their moral, social, political, and educational reforms are all failures or rapid strides towards barbarism. But even in their mechanical and material progress, the good gained is more than counterbalanced by the evil that accompanies it. It enriches a few, but trebles the burdens of the poor. What gain is it to the poor man that he can buy a coat for one-fourth of the price paid by his great-grandfather, when he must have six coats where his great-grandfather needed but one? They boast of the progress of liberty. When was there less liberty in Germany or Italy than now? They boast of democracy, but democracy only substitutes the mob for Cæsar or the irresistible tyranny of soulless corporations for the prince, as we see in our own country, where the cost of living for poor people is greater than in any other country on earth and where corporations govern the government.

When the people have lost the sense of the moral order, when religion has lost its hold on them, or when it is at best only a disembodied idea, without organs through which to make known and apply the divine law, and is practically only what each one's own fancy, prejudices, interests, passions, or caprice make it, or, if organized at all, subordinated to the prince, as the imperial government of Germany and the robber government of Italy contend that it should be; when the law of nations is reduced to a mere convention, pact, or agreement between nations, which in practice is only what the will of the stronger party dictates; and when the government has no authority from God to govern and has no powers but such as it holds from the governed—there is no civilization, and society is undeniably on the declivity to the lowest barbarism, whether we believe it or not. Such is the state towards which modern society is at least tending, and which it has well-nigh already reached. The modern apostate nations may not have, in all respects, as yet sunk to the lowest depths of the ancient world, but in some respects they have sunk lower than Greece or Rome. (Vol. ix. pp. 471-476.)

#### PROGRESS THE CREED OF THE NINETEENTH CENTURY.

THE modern doctrine of progress is not yet a century old, and yet we told the truth when, some thirty years ago, we pronounced it the "creed of the nineteenth century." It is held by almost everybody with unquestioning faith, or, rather, with the blind credulity of the fanatic. It pervades all popular literature, even most scientific treatises; it is iterated

and reiterated *ad nauseam* by the press, from the stately quarterly, the infallible daily, down to the seven-by-nine weekly; it is in the air, it is truly the *Welt-Geist*, and who sings not its praises is outlawed, insulted, laughed at, denounced, is one of the *oscurantisti*, an old-fogy with his eyes on the back side of his head, a dweller among tombs, a spectre, a shadow, not a living, breathing man. It is one of the strangest delusions that has ever seized and carried away the human mind, and in it Satan would seem to have outdone himself. With not a particle of evidence to sustain it, treading on an earth covered all over with ruins we know not how many layers deep, with the unmistakable signs of deterioration, weakness, and decay everywhere staring us in the face, we yet are deluded enough to assert that man is naturally progressive, and that the nations would pursue a steady march towards the realization of an earthly paradise, much more desirable than the heaven hoped for by Christians, but for the priests, but for the Pope, just now but for the Jesuits! Well, it is rather characteristic of insane persons to be spiteful towards their best friends and to be the most enraged at those whom they, when sane, love best and esteem the most. (Vol. ix. p. 477.)

#### THE PRIMITIVE WAS THE TRUE RELIGION.

THE modern theory that religion is a fact of the natural history of man, as carnivorousness is a fact of the natural history of the lion or tiger; or if understood to mean any thing else than that wherever and in whatever condition we find him, savage or civilized, he has some form of religion, is untenable. The human soul does not secrete religion as

the liver secretes bile or the stomach the gastric juice, because even in the grossest superstition the human will intervenes. Man is no more capable of inventing religion than he is of inventing language, and it has been well said that to invent language language itself is necessary. To pretend, as it is the fashion at present to do, that man has by nature the faculty of speech and attains to language by its spontaneous exercise is equally unsatisfactory. The faculty of speech is simply the faculty of using language which one has learned from a teacher, not the faculty of creating or producing language; as is evident from the case of born deaf-mutes, who want neither the faculty nor the organs of speech, and who, if cured of their deafness, can learn to speak. Besides, language embodies ideas, the profoundest philosophy, which comparatively few of those who use it are capable of grasping. Men could have language only by learning it, or by its being infused into Adam along with the knowledge it embodies or the ideas which it signifies or expresses.

Religion could not have originated as a function or a spontaneous operation of human nature, for it is objective as well as subjective. Schleiermacher, so long court-preacher at Berlin, and whose "*Glaubenslehre*" is yet, we believe, held in some repute, makes the essence of religion purely subjective and defines it to be "the sense of dependence." That man has the sense of dependence, or the consciousness that he does not suffice for himself, is unquestionably a fact; but this is not religion till it is bound to some object independent of one's nature, on which one believes himself dependent and which he holds to be able to do him good or to do him harm. This implies the idea or conception of the objec-



tive, and therefore of something which is neither sense nor sentiment. In all religion there is an act of belief in the divine, in the relation of the soul to it, and in its obligation to adore it, as well as the act of adoration itself. Those two acts require the exercise of both intellect and will, and hence religion is not and cannot be a simple spontaneous or a blind and indeliberate product of human nature. The essential nature of religion is such that it could not have been a human invention nor a spontaneous expression of human nature. The object presented is not in man, and therefore could not be developed, as say the heterodox Germans, from his "inner consciousness." It depends on an object not only independent of man, but above him; and in no case does or can the human mind seek and find its object, for in no case can it act without it. To every thought both subject and object are necessary, and both cannot concur in the production of thought unless both are given. The object on which all religious thought depends is the divinity, and the divinity can be given only by its own act. All religion implies God, and God can be thought only through his own act affirming or revealing himself. Religion could, then, never have existed without God or have had any but a divine origin. False religions are therefore impossible without the true.

The primitive religion, since divinely given, must have been not a false, but the true religion, recognizing the true God in his true character and the true relation of man and nature to him. Men may corrupt or falsify religion or the divine tradition of religion, but could never originate it; for the inward sentiment, however you define it, can of itself attain to nothing even in conception or imagination beyond,

above, or distinct from itself. The fetish-worshipper must have believed that God is and is to be worshipped before he could have identified him with his fetish, whether an animal, a block, or a stone. He who has no conception of God cannot identify him with the wind, the storm, the elemental forces of nature, or adore him in the sun, the moon and stars, or in images made by men's hands. Not one of the heathen mythologies, idolatries, terrible and abominable superstitions, could have existed if they had not been preceded by the true religion, of which they are human and satanic corruptions. The theory, then, that the race began in the lowest and grossest fetishism, and that in the various heathen mythologies, idolatries, and superstitions we can trace the upward progress of the human mind to the Christian church, is absolutely untenable, as unphilosophical as it is unhistorical. The very fact that it can find currency with the leaders, or would-be leaders, of the science and erudition of the nineteenth century is a striking proof of its falsity, of the deterioration instead of the progressiveness of the race. (Vol. ix. pp. 480-482.)

#### PROGRESS AND EVOLUTION.

WE proved, in our review of Sir John Lubbock's theory, that man did not begin and could not have begun in utter barbarism, and that the savage is the degenerate, not the primitive man; for man, when deprived both of foreign and supernatural assistance, either deteriorates or remains stationary. We will only add here that progress is motion forward, if taken literally, and is, if taken figuratively, an advance from the imperfect towards the perfect, and

necessarily demands a principle or a beginning, a medium and an end, none of which can be asserted without the supposition of the Creator, who in his creative act is at once all three. You must have a starting-point from which progress moves, an end towards which it moves, and a medium in and by which it moves. These three things are essential, and without them progress is inconceivable: and these three are all independent of the progressive subject. There can, then, be no progress without God as its first and last cause and the divine creative act as its medium, and even then progress only in the line of the specific nature of the progressive subject, whether man or animal. The transformation of one species into another, no matter by what means, would not be progress, but the destruction of one species and the production of another, a higher species if you will, but not the progressive development of a lower species.

Herbert Spencer's doctrine of evolution is open to the same objection. In all evolution there must be motion, and then somewhere a starting-point, an evolving subject and a medium of evolution, for there can be no motion, unless we have forgot our mechanics, without a first mover at rest. Herbert Spencer denies creation or a creator distinct from the cosmos. He must, then, assume the cosmos is self-existent, eternal, then immovable, immutable, and consequently incapable of evolving any existences or forms of existence not eternal in itself. The cosmos, instead of being in a state of ceaseless flux and reflux, as old Heraclitus taught and as Mr. Spencer holds, would be at rest and immovable, both as a whole and in all its parts. There could then be no change of phenomena any more than of substance.

no new combination of matter, motion, and force, no alterations of concentration and dispersion of forces. All the forms and phenomena of the cosmos must be absolutely unchangeable and eternal as the cosmos itself. Consequently there could be no evolution, for evolution necessarily implies change of some sort, and change of no sort is admissible. If the cosmos is not created by God, who is distinct from the cosmos, it is eternal, and if eternal no change of any sort is admissible in it. The theory of evolution, like the modern theory of progress, is untenable and must be dismissed.

Yet, without assuming one or the other of these theories, Mr. Darwin cannot assert his origin of species by means of natural selection or by any other means except that of creation, which it is his purpose to avoid; and what is worse, if he accepts either he is still unable to assert his theory, for the evolution theory denies all change and the origination of any new forms; and progress is predicable only of the specific subject in the line of its own specific nature. We have read Mr. Darwin's books with some care, and though not an absolute stranger to the subjects he treats or to the facts he narrates, we are a little surprised that even a professed scientist could put forth such a mass of unwarranted inductions and unfounded conjectures as science. Not one nor all of the facts he adduces prove that species originate in natural or artificial selection. In all his inductions he is obliged to assume the progress of the species as the principle of his induction, while he ought to know that the assumption of the progress of the species negatives the origin of species in selection. But—and this is fatal to his theory—he nowhere adduces a single fact that proves the species

is progressive, or a single instance in which a lower species by its struggles for life, as he pretends, approaches a higher species, or in which the individuals of a lower species lose any of the characteristics of their species and acquire those of a higher or a different species. (Vol. ix. pp. 486, 487.)

### PROGRESS OF SPECIES.

THE theory of natural selection assumes the Malthusian principle that population has a tendency to outrun the means of subsistence, and applies the principle to every species, vegetable, animal, and human. Hence follows with individuals of every species a struggle for life, in which the weaker go to the wall and only the stronger survive. Well, be it so; what then? Why, these the stronger individuals give rise, or the struggle for life, in which only the stronger survive, going on for a long series of ages, gives birth, to a new and higher species. Is it so? What is the proof? We have found no proof of it, and Mr. Darwin offers no proof of it. Because only the stronger survive, it by no means follows that these in any series of ages give rise to a new and distinct species, that these stronger individuals acquire any new characteristics, or that they lose any of the characteristics of their original species.

The gardener knows that plants and flowers are affected by climate, soil, and cultivation; but he knows also that the changes or improvements produced in this way, if they give rise to new varieties in the same species, do not, so far as known, give rise to a new species. Mr. Darwin compares domestic animals with what he assumes to be wild animals of the same original species, or the species

from which he assumes they have descended. But this proves nothing to his purpose; for it is impossible for him to say which is the primitive, which the derivative, whether the domestic races have sprung from the wild or the wild from the domestic, or whether the differences noted are the result of development of the primitive type or of reversion to it. The assumption that the domestic races have been tamed, or domesticated from the wild, is a mere assumption of which there is no historical or scientific evidence: at least Mr. Darwin adduces none. There is no authority for assuming that the domestic goose has sprung from the wild goose. Why not say the wild goose has sprung from the domestic goose? The wild duck from the tame duck? The wild boar from the domestic pig? Some naturalists contend that the several varieties of the dog family have descended from the wolf, the fox, and the jackal; but supposing them to be only varieties of the same species, of which we are not assured, why not make the dog primitive and the wolf, fox, and jackal derivative? There are no known facts in the case that render it necessary to suppose them, rather than the dog, the parent stock of the whole species. Indeed, scientists have no criterion by which they can determine whether the tame variety or the wild represents the primitive type, and their only reason is the assumption that all species begin at the lowest round of the ladder and reach their perfect state only by progressive development. But this is a perfectly gratuitous assumption. Mr. Darwin adduces no facts that prove it.

So far as there are any known facts or certain principles in the case, species are immutable, and their only development is in the explication of in-

dividuals. So far as our scientists have any knowledge on the subject, there is no progress of species. Individuals may find a more or less favorable medium and vary from one another, but the specific type remains always the same as long as it remains at all, and is reproduced essentially unaltered in each new generation. It is even doubtful if abnormal types are ever really transmitted by natural generation. Cardinal Wiseman inclines to believe they are, at least to some extent. We doubt it, and explain the facts which seem to favor it by the continued presence and activity of the causes which first originated them. There are monstrous births, but they are not perpetuated. The cardinal mentions a family with six fingers on each hand and six toes on each foot, and we have ourselves known at least one six-fingered and six-toed individual, but if perpetuated through three generations, as the cardinal asserts, there did not arise from the family a distinct variety in the human species; and in the case that came under our own observation neither the parents of the man nor his children had more than the normal number of fingers and toes. In any case, after two or three generations, if reproductive, the abnormal individuals revert to the original type. The breed may be crossed, but not permanently improved by crossing. The crossing, as every herdsman or shepherd knows, must be kept up, or the hybrid, after a few generations, eliminates the weaker and reverts to the stronger of the original types.

There is no evidence, as we have already said, of the progress of the species. The sponge to-day does not differ from the sponge of four thousand years ago; and if the wild peach of Persia is poisonous, our cultivated peach, the fruit of which is so delicious,

if neglected and suffered to become wild, would most likely, under the same conditions of climate and soil, become as poisonous as is the Persian wild peach: thereby proving that whatever the effects of cultivation or changes of its habitat, the species remains always unchanged. Even in the cultivated peach traces of its original poisonous qualities are found, if not in its pulp, at least in its *meat*, of which it is unsafe for any to partake largely unless proof against prussic acid. The florist produces, by culture and proper adjustment of soil, great and striking changes in the size, color, and beauty of many varieties and species of flowers, all of which, if neglected and suffered to run wild, revert, after a while, to their original type, which neither natural nor artificial selection alters or impairs.

Then the survival of the strongest in the struggle for life does not affect the species, far less originate a new species. There is no evidence that the rat is more intelligent to-day than was the rat any number of centuries ago, although, according to Mr. Darwin, we must suppose only the strongest have survived, and the process of natural selection has been constantly going on. The bee constructs her cell and the beaver his house and dam not otherwise nor more perfectly than did either at the remotest period in which man has observed the habits of either. Wheat grown from grains deposited in Egyptian mummies three thousand years ago is as perfect as that which is grown from the seed subject to three thousand years of additional culture and struggle for life. (Vol. ix. pp. 487-490.)



## NO NEW SPECIES PRODUCED BY SELECTION.

THESE observations, which might be indefinitely extended, prove that whatever effect natural or artificial selection may have on individuals of the species, it has none on the species itself, and in no case originates, so far as human observation goes, a new species. Consequently all the facts and arguments Mr. Darwin adduces in support of his theory of the descent of man from the ape, or to prove the species *ape* by natural selection has generated or developed the species *man*, count for nothing. If no instance can be adduced of the development of a new species by natural selection and no instance of the progress of a lower species towards a higher, there is and can be no proof that man has originated in a lower species. All the analogies between man and the lower animals, physical or intellectual, adduced by Mr. Darwin, prove simply nothing to the purpose. It was in by-gone days a favorite theory with us, as it perhaps still is with many others, that man, while he is something more, is also the *résumé* of the whole lower creation, or of all orders of existences below him. When we were engrossed with the study of the comparative anatomy and physiology of the brain, we conjectured that there is a just gradation in its convolutions and relative size, from the lowest animal that has a brain distinct from mere ganglia up to man. We regarded man, in fact, as including in himself, in his physical and animal nature, the elements of the entire creation below him, and hence rightly named its lord. So that our Lord, in assuming human nature, a human soul and a human body, assumed the elements of the entire cosmos, and in redeeming man redeemed the whole lower creation

and delivered the earth itself, which had been cursed for man's sake, from bondage. In being made flesh and redeeming the body he redeemed all animal and material nature, which returns to God as its last end in man for whom this lower world was made and over which he received the dominion from his and its Maker. But we never saw in this any evidence that man had been developed from the world below him or that any animal race by transformation had become man. Supposing the gradation assumed, which we are rather inclined to accept even yet, it by no means follows that the higher grade is in any case the development of the next grade below. Indeed it cannot be, for development of any grade or species can only unfold or bring out what is already in it or what it contains wrapped up, enveloped, or unexplicated. Therefore its development cannot carry it out of itself or lift it to the grade next above it. The superior grade is a superior grade by virtue of something which it has that the highest inferior grade has not, and therefore is not and cannot be developed from it.

Say what you will, the ape is not a man; nor, as far as our observations or investigations can go, is the ape, the gorilla, or any other variety of the monkey tribe the animal that approaches nearest to man. The rat, the beaver, the horse, the pig, the raven, the elephant surpass the monkey in intelligence, if it be intelligence and not simply instinct; and the dog is certainly far ahead of the monkey in moral qualities, in affection for his master and fidelity to him, and so is the horse when kindly treated. But let this pass. There is that, call it what you will, in man which is not in the ape. Man is two-footed and two-handed; the ape is four-

handed, or, if you choose to call the extremity of his limbs feet, four-footed. In fact, he has neither a human hand nor a human foot, and, anatomically considered, differs hardly less from man than does the dog or the horse. I have never been able to discover in any of the simian tribe a single human quality. As to physical structure, there is some resemblance. Zoölogists tell us traces of the same original type may be found running through the whole animal world; and therefore the near approach of the ape to the human form counts for nothing in this argument. But here is the point we make, namely, the *differentia* of man not being in the ape cannot be obtained from the ape by development.

This sufficiently refutes Darwin's whole theory. He does not prove the origin of new species either by natural or artificial selection; and not having done that, he adduces nothing that does or can warrant the induction that the human species is developed from the quadrumanic or any other species. (Vol. ix. pp. 490, 491.)

#### WHAT FALSE SCIENTISTS DESERVE.

WE utterly repudiate the doctrine that no one is morally or socially responsible for the opinions he forms and publishes. But where society has no infallible authority to determine what is true and what is not, what is and what is not the law of God, or the truth God has revealed and commanded us to believe, it has no right to punish any one for opinion's sake; for it can act only on opinion, and therefore on no higher authority than that of the opinions it punishes. What is called freedom of opinion and

of publication, or, briefly, the freedom of the press, although incompatible with the rights of truth and the safety of society, as our own experience proves, must be protected, because modern society, by rejecting the infallible authority of the church of God, has deprived itself of all right to discriminate in matters of opinion and therefore of the right even of self-protection. The fact is, society, uninstructed by an authority that cannot err, is incompetent to deal with opinions or to impose any restrictions on their publication; but we cannot so far stultify ourselves as to pretend that this is not an evil, or to maintain with Milton and our own Jefferson that "error is harmless where truth is free to combat it." "Error," says the Chinese proverb, "will make the circuit of the globe while Truth is pulling on her boots." The modern doctrine is based on the assumption that truth is not ascertainable—is only an opinion.

But from the point of view of morals, or tried by a rigidly ethical standard, such scientists as Darwin, Sir Charles Lyell, Sir John Lubbock, Taine, Büchner, Professor Huxley, Herbert Spencer, and others of the same genus who publish opinions, theories, hypotheses, which are at best only plausible conjectures under the imposing name of science, and which unsettle men's minds, bewilder the half-learned, mislead the ignorant, undermine the very bases of society, and assail the whole moral order of the universe, are fearfully guilty, and a thousand times more dangerous to society and greater criminals even than your most noted thieves, robbers, burglars, swindlers, murderers, or midnight assassins. Instead of being held in honor, fêted, and lauded as the great men of their age and country, and held up as the bene-

factors of their race, they richly deserve that public opinion should brand them with infamy as the enemies of God and man, of religion and society, of truth and justice, of science and civilization. They are such men as, if we followed the injunction of St. John, the apostle of love, we should refuse to receive into our houses or even to bid good-day: *Si quis venit ad vos, et hanc doctrinam non affert, nolite recipere eum in domum, nec AVE dixeritis* (2 John x.).

We are thus severe against these men, not because we are narrow-minded and bigoted, not because we have an over-weening confidence in our own opinions or hold them to be the measure of the true and the good, nor because we dislike science that is science or dread its light; but because they do not give us science, but their own opinions and speculations, which they can neither know nor prove to be true, and which we know cannot be true, unless the religion of Christ is false, God is not, and heaven and earth a lie. We condemn them because the truth condemns them; because, instead of shedding light on the glorious works of the Creator, they shed darkness over them and obscure their fair face with the thick smoke that ascends at their bidding from the bottomless pit of their ignorance and presumption. Their science is an illusion with which Satan mocks them, deludes and destroys souls for whom Christ has died, and it comes under the head of the endless "genealogies" and "vain philosophy," against which St. Paul so solemnly warns us. It is high time that they be stripped of their prestige and be treated with the contempt they deserve for their impudent pretension, and be held in the horror which all men should feel for the enemies of truth, and whose labors tend only to the extinction of civiliza-

tion, the abasement of intelligence, to fix the affections on the earth, to blunt the sense of moral obligation, and to make society what we see it every day becoming. They are Satan's most efficient ministers. (Vol. ix. pp. 495, 496.)

## PHRENOLOGY.

WE wish our readers distinctly to understand that we make no war upon phrenology when restricted to its legitimate sphere. As a physiological account of the brain, a treatise on its functions, and as enabling us to explain the causes of the differences we meet with in individual character, we believe it and value it. Within these limits, within which Gall usually confined it, it is, as we have said, a useful and interesting branch of science. The mischief of it lies in attempting, as Spurzheim and Combe do, to make it a system of mental philosophy, which it is not and never can be. The fundamental principles of phrenology are easily reconcilable with a sound spiritual philosophy, and on some future occasion we may attempt to show this. The objections we have brought forward do not bear against those principles, but against the doctrines phrenologists profess to derive from them. We war, then, not against the science, but against what its friends have superinduced upon it or alleged it to be.

They who oppose phrenology by controverting its physiological facts do not seem to us to act very wisely. Mr. Combe's "Lectures," we confess, tended to weaken our faith in the reality of those facts and to induce us to class phrenology with the other humbugs of the day; but our own observations have been somewhat extended, and we are satisfied that the

phrenologists have really made some physiological discoveries not altogether worthless; and their assertion of a connection between the instinctive tendencies of our nature and cerebral organization has led to a kind of observation on the different traits of individual character which has enlarged our stock of materials for a natural history of man. They have also made many valuable observations on education and the means of preserving a sound mind in a sound body, and induced many to turn their attention to the study of mental science who but for them might never have done it. This is considerable; enough to give them an honorable rank among the benefactors of their race, and a rank they should be permitted peaceably to enjoy, unless they claim one altogether higher, and to which no man of any tolerable acquaintance with mental science can believe them entitled.

Admitting all the facts phrenologists allege, all that legitimately belongs to their science, we contend that it throws no light on the great problems of mental philosophy. In relation to all those problems, we stand unaffected by the discoveries of Gall and Spurzheim; and had phrenologists clearly perceived the nature of these problems, they would never have dared to put forth the claims they have, and which we have contested. Phrenology is a physical, not a metaphysical science, and all it can, with any propriety, pretend to do is to point out and describe the physiological conditions to which, in this mode of being, the mental affections are subjected. This it has, to some extent, done; but this does not amount to so much as they imagine. In doing it they do not approach the boundaries of metaphysical science, and therefore we have felt it necessary to

show them that they claim for it more than it is or can be.

We are grateful to all laborers in the field of science and to every man who discovers a new law or a new fact. But we confess we are a little impatient with arrogant pretensions. Let the discoverer of the new law or the new fact describe it to us and claim the merit that is his due, but let him not fancy his merit must needs be so great as to sink out of sight the merit of everybody else. We could bear with our phrenological friends altogether better were they not perpetually addressing us as if all wisdom was born with Gall and Spurzheim. To believe them, before these two German empirics Plato and Aristotle, Bacon and Descartes, Leibnitz and Locke, Reid and Kant sink into insignificance. Now, this is more than we can bear. "Great men lived before Agamemnon," and we believe there were philosophers before Gall and Spurzheim set out with a cabinet of skulls on their wanderings from Vienna. It is because phrenologists lose sight of this fact, and would fain make it believed that nothing can be known of the human mind but by means of their four principles, that we have deemed it necessary to rebuke them. We hope they will bear our reproof with the meekness of philosophers.

We honor the man who has the courage to proclaim a new doctrine, one which he honestly believes and which he knows is in opposition to the habitual faith of his age and country; but we always distrust both the capacity and the attainments of him who can see nothing to venerate in his forefathers and who bows not before the wisdom of antiquity. Progress there may be, and there is; but no man can advance far on his predecessors—never



so far that they shall sensibly diminish in the distance. These arrogant reformers with the tithe of an idea who speak to us as if they had outgrown all the past and grasped and made present the whole future are generally persons who, having advanced on their own infancy, imagine, therefore, that they have advanced on the whole world. But the more we do really advance, the more shall we be struck with the greatness of those who went before us, and the more sincere and deep will be our reverence for antiquity. The darkness we ascribe to remote ages is often the darkness of our own minds, and the ignorance we complain of in others may be only the reflex of our own. Progress we should labor for, progress we should delight in, but we should beware of underrating those who have placed us in the world. "There were giants in those days."

Phrenologists must attribute the ridicule and opposition they have encountered to themselves. Their method of propagating their science, their character of itinerant lecturers, and their habit of manipulating heads, likening their science so much, in its usages and effects, to the science of palmistry, together with their uncouth terminology and the absurd statements which they are continually making, betraying at once their ignorance and simplicity, can hardly be expected not to excite a smile of pleasantry or of contempt in every man of ordinary discernment and information. But if they will betake themselves to their cabinets and study their science in the modest, unpretending manner physiologists in general do, instead of perambulating the country manipulating skulls at so much apiece or treating their science in a way that encourages the ignorant and designing to do it, they will find the public ceasing

to oppose them and gratefully accepting the fruits of their labors. Let them lay aside their pretensions as system-makers, reformers, revolutionists, and throw into the common mass the facts or principles they discover and suffer them to go for what they are worth, and, in common with all studious men, they will contribute something to the well-being of the race and deserve well of humanity. (Vol. ix. pp. 251-254.)

## THE UNITED STATES.

### SELF-KNOWLEDGE NECESSARY TO A NATION.

NATIONS are only individuals on a larger scale. They have a life, an individuality, a reason, a conscience, and instincts of their own, and have the same general laws of development and growth, and, perhaps, of decay, as the individual man. Equally important and no less difficult than for the individual is it for a nation to know itself, understand its own existence, its own powers and faculties, rights and duties, constitution, instincts, tendencies, and destiny. A nation has a spiritual as well as a material, a moral as well as a physical existence, and is subjected to internal as well as external conditions of health and virtue, greatness and grandeur, which it must in some measure understand and observe, or become weak and infirm, stunted in its growth, and end in premature decay and death.

Among nations, no one has more need of full knowledge of itself than the United States, and no one has hitherto had less. It has hardly had a distinct consciousness of its own national existence, and has lived the irreflective life of the child, with no severe trial, till the recent rebellion, to throw it back on itself and compel it to reflect on its own constitution, its own separate existence, individuality, tendencies, and end. (Vol. xviii. pp. 6, 7.)

## THE MISSION OF THE UNITED STATES.

EVERY living nation has an idea given it by Providence to realize, and whose realization is its special work, mission, or destiny. Every nation is, in some sense, a chosen people of God. The Jews were the chosen people of God, through whom the primitive traditions were to be preserved in their purity and integrity and the Messiah was to come. The Greeks were the chosen people of God for the development and realization of the beautiful or the divine splendor in art and of the true in science and philosophy; and the Romans for the development of the state, law, and jurisprudence. The great despotic nations of Asia were never properly nations, or if they were nations with a mission they proved false to it and count for nothing in the progressive development of the human race. History has not recorded their mission, and as far as they are known they have contributed only to the abnormal development or corruption of religion and civilization. Despotism is barbaric and abnormal.

The United States, or the American republic, has a mission, and is chosen of God for the realization of a great idea. It has been chosen not only to continue the work assigned to Greece and Rome, but to accomplish a greater work than was assigned to either. In art it will prove false to its mission if it do not rival Greece, and in science and philosophy if it do not surpass it. In the state, in law, in jurisprudence, it must continue and surpass Rome. Its idea is liberty, indeed, but liberty with law and law with liberty. Yet its mission is not so much the realization of liberty as the realization of the true idea of the state, which secures at once the authority

of the public and the freedom of the individual—the sovereignty of the people without social despotism and individual freedom without anarchy. In other words, its mission is to bring out in its life the dialectic union of authority and liberty, of the natural rights of man and those of society. The Greek and Roman republics asserted the state to the detriment of individual freedom; modern republics either do the same or assert individual freedom to the detriment of the state. The American republic has been instituted by Providence to realize the freedom of each with advantage to the other.

The real mission of the United States is to introduce and establish a political constitution which, while it retains all the advantages of the constitutions of states thus far known, is unlike any of them and secures advantages which none of them did or could possess. The American constitution has no prototype in any prior constitution. The American form of government can be classed throughout with none of the forms of government described by Aristotle, or even by later authorities. Aristotle knew only four forms of government: monarchy, aristocracy, democracy, and mixed governments. The American form is none of these nor any combination of them. It is original, a new contribution to political science, and seeks to attain the end of all wise and just government by means unknown or forbidden to the ancients, and which have been but imperfectly comprehended even by American political writers themselves. The originality of the American constitution has been overlooked by the great majority even of our own statesmen, who seek to explain it by analogies borrowed from the constitutions of other states rather than by a profound study of its

own principles. They have taken too low a view of it, and have rarely, if ever, appreciated its distinctive and peculiar merits. (Vol. xviii. pp. 8, 9.)

### THE CONSTITUTION MISUNDERSTOOD.

It will hardly be questioned that either the constitution of the United States is very defective or it has been very grossly misinterpreted by all parties. If the slave states had not held that the states are severally sovereign and the constitution of the United States a simple agreement or compact, they would never have seceded; and if the free states had not confounded the Union with the general government and shown a tendency to make it the entire national government, no occasion or pretext for secession would have been given. The great problem of our statesmen has been from the first, How to assert union without consolidation and state rights without disintegration? Have they, as yet, solved that problem? The war has silenced the state-sovereignty doctrine, indeed, but has it done so without lesion to state rights? Has it done it without asserting the general government as the supreme, central, or national government? Has it done it without striking a dangerous blow at the federal element of the constitution? In suppressing by armed force the doctrine that the states are severally sovereign, what barrier is left against consolidation? Has not one danger been removed only to give place to another?

But perhaps the constitution itself, if rightly understood, solves the problem; and perhaps the problem itself is raised precisely through misunderstanding of the constitution. Our statesmen have recognized no constitution of the American people

themselves; they have confined their views to the written constitution, as if that constituted the American people a state or nation, instead of being, as it is, only a law ordained by the nation already existing and constituted. Perhaps if they had recognized and studied the constitution which preceded that drawn up by the convention of 1787, and which is intrinsic, inherent in the republic itself, they would have seen that it solves the problem and asserts national unity without consolidation and the rights of the several states without danger of disintegration. The whole controversy, possibly, has originated in a misunderstanding of the real constitution of the United States, and that misunderstanding itself in the misunderstanding of the origin and constitution of government in general. The constitution, as will appear in the course of this essay, is not defective; and all that is necessary to guard against either danger is to discard all our theories of the constitution and return and adhere to the constitution itself as it really is and always has been. (Vol. xviii. pp. 9, 10.)

#### GOVERNMENT IS NECESSARY.

MAN is a dependent being and neither does nor can suffice for himself. He lives not in himself, but lives and moves and has his being in God. He exists, develops, and fulfils his existence only by communion with God through which he participates of the divine being and life. He communes with God through the divine creative act and the incarnation of the Word, through his kind, and through the material world. Communion with God through creation and incarnation is religion, distinctively taken, which binds

man to God as his first cause and carries him onwards to God as his final cause; communion through the material world is expressed by the word property; and communion with God through humanity is society. Religion, society, property, are the three terms that embrace the whole of man's life and express the essential means and conditions of his existence, his development, and his perfection, or the fulfilment of his existence, the attainment of the end for which he is created.

Though society, or the communion of man with his Maker through his kind, is not all that man needs in order to live, to grow, to actualize the possibilities of his nature, and to attain to his beatitude, since humanity is neither God nor the material universe, it is yet a necessary and essential condition of his life, his progress, and the completion of his existence. He is born and lives in society and can be born and live nowhere else. It is one of the necessities of his nature. "God saw that it was not good for man to be alone." Hence wherever man is found he is found in society, living in more or less strict intercourse with his kind.

But society never does and never can exist without government of some sort. As society is a necessity of man's nature, so is government a necessity of society. The simplest form of society is the family—Adam and Eve. But though Adam and Eve are in many respects equal and have equally important though different parts assigned them, one or the other must be head and governor, or they cannot form the society called family. They would be simply two individuals of different sexes, and the family would fail for the want of unity. Children cannot be reared, trained, or educated without some



degree of family government, of some authority to direct, control, restrain, or prescribe. Hence the authority of the husband and father is recognized by the common consent of mankind. Still more apparent is the necessity of government the moment the family develops and grows into the tribe and the tribe into the nation. Hence no nation exists without government; and we never find a savage tribe, however low or degraded, that does not assert somewhere, in the father, in the elders, or in the tribe itself, the rude outlines or the faint reminiscences of some sort of government, with authority to demand obedience and to punish the refractory. Hence as man is nowhere found out of society, so nowhere is society found without government.

Government is necessary. . . . It exists in heaven as well as on earth, and in heaven in its perfection. Its office is not purely repressive, to restrain violence, to redress wrongs, and to punish the transgressor. It has something more to do than to restrict our natural liberty, curb our passions, and maintain justice between man and man. Its office is positive as well as negative. It is needed to render effective the solidarity of the individuals of a nation and to render the nation an organism, not a mere organization—to combine men in one living body, and to strengthen all with the strength of each and each with the strength of all—to develop, strengthen, and sustain individual liberty, and to utilize and direct it to the promotion of the common weal—to be a social providence, imitating in its order and degree the action of the divine providence itself, and, while it provides for the common good of all, to protect each, the lowest and meanest, with the whole force and majesty of society. It is the minister of wrath to

wrong-doers, indeed, but its nature is beneficent and its action defines and protects the right of property, creates and maintains a medium in which religion can exert her supernatural energy, promotes learning, fosters science and art, advances civilization, and contributes as a powerful means to the fulfilment by man of the divine purpose in his existence. Next after religion it is man's greatest good; and even religion without it can do only a small portion of her work. They wrong it who call it a necessary evil; it is a great good, and instead of being distrusted, hated, or resisted, except in its abuses, it should be loved, respected, obeyed, and, if need be, defended at the cost of all earthly goods and even of life itself. (Vol. xviii. pp. 14, 15.)

#### THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT.

THE nature or essence of government is to govern. A government that does not govern is simply no government at all. If it has not the ability to govern and governs not it may be an agency, an instrument in the hands of individuals for advancing their private interests, but it is not government. To be government it must govern both individuals and the community. If it is a mere machine for making prevail the will of one man, of a certain number of men, or even of the community, it may be very effective sometimes for good, sometimes for evil, oftenest for evil, but government in the proper sense of the word it is not. To govern is to direct, control, restrain, as the pilot controls and directs his ship. It necessarily implies two terms, governor and governed, and a real distinction between them. The denial of all real distinction between governor and governed is

an error in politics analogous to that in philosophy or theology of denying all real distinction between creator and creature, God and the universe, which all the world knows is either pantheism or pure atheism—the supreme sophism. If we make governor and governed one and the same we efface both terms; for there is no governor nor governed if the will that governs is identically the will that is governed. To make the controller and the controlled the same is precisely to deny all control. There must, then, if there is government at all, be a power, force, or will that governs, distinct from that which is governed. In those governments in which it is held that the people govern, the people governing do and must act in a diverse relation from the people governed, or there is no real government. (Vol. xviii. pp. 15, 16.)

#### CIVIL LIBERTY.

GOVERNMENT is not only that which governs, but that which has the right or authority to govern. Power without right is not government. Governments have the right to use force at need, but might does not make right, and not every power wielding the physical force of a nation is to be regarded as its rightful government. Whatever resort to physical force it may be obliged to make, either in defence of its authority or of the rights of the nation, the government itself lies in the moral order, and politics is simply a branch of ethics—that branch which treats of the rights and duties of men in their public relations, as distinguished from their rights and duties in their private relations.

Government being not only that which governs,

but that which has the right to govern, obedience to it becomes a moral duty, not a mere physical necessity. The right to govern and the duty to obey are correlatives, and the one cannot exist or be conceived without the other. Hence loyalty is not simply an amiable sentiment, but a duty, a moral virtue. . . .

The assertion of government as lying in the moral order defines civil liberty and reconciles it with authority. Civil liberty is freedom to do whatever one pleases that authority permits or does not forbid. Freedom to follow in all things one's own will or inclination, without any civil restraint, is license, not liberty. There is no lesion to liberty in repressing license nor in requiring obedience to the commands of the authority that has the right to command. Tyranny or oppression is not in being subjected to authority, but in being subjected to usurped authority—to a power that has no right to command or that commands what exceeds its right or its authority. To say that it is contrary to liberty to be forced to forego our own will or inclination in any case whatever is simply denying the right of all government and falling into no-governmentism. Liberty is violated only when we are required to forego our own will or inclination by a power that has no right to make the requisition; for we are bound to obedience as far as authority has the right to govern, and we can never have the right to disobey a rightful command. The requisition, if made by rightful authority, then, violates no right that we have or can have, and where there is no violation of our rights there is no violation of our liberty. The moral right of authority, which involves the moral duty of obedience, presents, then, the ground

on which liberty and authority may meet in peace and operate to the same end.

This has no resemblance to the slavish doctrine of passive obedience and that resistance to power can never be lawful. The tyrant may be lawfully resisted, for the tyrant, by force of the word itself, is a usurper and without authority. Abuses of power may be resisted even by force when they become too great to be endured, when there is no legal or regular way of redressing them, and when there is a reasonable prospect that resistance will prove effectual and substitute something better in their place. But it is never lawful to resist the rightful sovereign, for it can never be right to resist right, and the rightful sovereign in the constitutional exercise of his power can never be said to abuse it. Abuse is the unconstitutional or wrongful exercise of a power rightfully held, and when it is not so exercised there is no abuse or abuses to redress. All turns, then, on the right of power or its legitimacy. (Vol. xviii. pp. 16-18.)

### THE RIGHTS OF MAN.

UNDER ancient republicanism there were rights of the state and rights of the citizen, but no rights of man, held independently of society and not derived from God through the state. The recognition of these rights by modern society is due to Christianity: some say to the barbarians, who overthrew the Roman empire; but this last opinion is not well founded. The barbarian chiefs and nobles had no doubt a lively sense of personal freedom and independence, but for themselves only. They had no conception of personal freedom as a general or uni-

versal right. The doctrine of individual freedom before the state is due to the Christian religion, which asserts the dignity and worth of every human soul, the accountability to God of each man for himself, and lays it down as law for every one that God is to be obeyed rather than men. The church practically denied the absolutism of the state and asserted for every man rights not held from the state in converting the empire to Christianity in defiance of the state authority and the imperial edicts punishing with death the profession of the Christian faith. In this she practically as well as theoretically overthrew state absolutism, and infused into modern society the doctrine that every individual, even the lowest and meanest, has rights which the state neither confers nor can abrogate; and it will only be by extinguishing in modern society the Christian faith and obliterating all traces of Christian civilization that state absolutism can be revived with more than a partial and temporary success. . . .

Now, social despotism or state absolutism is not based on truth or reality. Society has certain rights over individuals, for she is a medium of their communion with God or through which they derive life from God, the primal source of all life; but she is not the only medium of man's life. Man, as was said in the beginning, lives by communion with God, and he communes with God in the creative act and the Incarnation, through his kind, and through nature. This threefold communion gives rise to three institutions—religion or the church, society or the state, and property. The life that man derives from God through religion and property is not derived from him through society, and consequently so much of his life he holds independently of society;

and this constitutes his rights as a man as distinguished from his rights as a citizen. In relation to society, as not held from God through her, these are termed his natural rights, which she must hold inviolable and government protect for every one, whatever his complexion or his social position. These rights—the rights of conscience and the rights of property, with all their necessary implications—are limitations of the rights of society, and the individual has the right to plead them against the state. Society does not confer them and cannot take them away, for they are at least as sacred and as fundamental as her own. (Vol. xviii. pp. 45, 46.)

#### ORIGIN OF GOVERNMENT.

THE right of government to govern, or political authority, is derived by the collective people or society from God through the law of nature. Rulers hold from God through the people or nation, and the people or nation hold from God through the natural law. . . . The political sovereignty under the law of nature attaches to the people, not individually, but collectively, as civil or political society. It is vested in the political community or nation, not in an individual, or family, or a class, because under the natural law all men are equal, as they are under the Christian law, and one man has, in his own right, no authority over another. The family has in the father a natural chief, but political society has no natural chief or chiefs. The authority of the father is domestic, not political, and ceases when his children have attained to majority, have married and become heads of families themselves, or have ceased to make part of the paternal

household. The recognition of the authority of the father beyond the limits of his own household is, if it ever occurs, by virtue of the ordinance, the consent, express or tacit, of the political society. There are no natural-born political chiefs, and wherever we find men claiming or acknowledged to be such, they are either usurpers, what the Greeks called *tyrants*, or they are made such by the will or constitution of the people or the nation.

Both monarchy and aristocracy were, no doubt, historically developed from the authority of the patriarchs, and have unquestionably been sustained by an equally false development of the right of property, especially landed property. The owner of the land, or he who claimed to own it, claimed as an incident of his ownership the right to govern it, and consequently to govern all who occupied it. But however valid may be the landlord's title to the soil—and it is doubtful if man can own anything in land beyond the usufruct—it can give him under the law of nature no political right. Property, like all natural rights, is entitled by the natural law to protection, but not to govern. Whether it shall be made a basis of political power or not is a question of political prudence, to be determined by the supreme political authority. It was the basis, and almost exclusive basis, in the middle ages under feudalism, and is so still in most states. France and the United States are the principal exceptions in Christendom. Property alone or coupled with birth is made elsewhere in some form a basis of political power, and where made so by the sovereign authority it is legitimate, but not wise nor desirable; for it takes from the weak and gives to the strong. The rich have in their riches advantages enough over the



poor, without receiving from the state any additional advantage. An aristocracy, in the sense of families distinguished by birth, noble and patriotic services, wealth, cultivation, refinement, taste, and manners, is desirable in every nation, is a nation's ornament and also its chief support, but they need and should receive no political recognition. They should form no privileged class in the state or political society. (Vol. xviii. pp. 72-74.)

## TWO CONSTITUTIONS.

THE constitution is twofold: the constitution of the state or nation and the constitution of the government. The constitution of the government is, or is held to be, the work of the nation itself; the constitution of the state, or the people of the state, is, in its origin at least, providential, given by God himself, operating through historical events or natural causes. The one originates in law, the other in historical fact. The nation must exist, and exist as a political community, before it can give itself a constitution; and no state, any more than an individual, can exist without a constitution of some sort. . . .

The constitution drawn up, ordained, and established by a nation for itself is a law—the organic or fundamental law, if you will, but a law, and is and must be the act of the sovereign power. That sovereign power must exist before it can act, and it cannot exist, if vested in the people or nation, without a constitution or without some sort of political organization of the people or nation. There must, then, be for every state or nation a constitution anterior to the constitution which the nation gives

itself, and from which the one it gives itself derives all its vitality and legal force. (Vol. xviii. pp. 76, 77.)

### THE CONSTITUTION OF A STATE.

THE providential constitution is, in fact, that with which the nation is born, and is, as long as the nation exists, the real living and efficient constitution of the state. It is the source of the vitality of the state, that which controls or governs its action and determines its destiny. The constitution which a nation is said to give itself is never the constitution of the state, but is the law ordained by the state for the government instituted under it. . . . The constitution is the intrinsic or inherent and actual constitution of the people or political community itself; that which makes the nation what it is and distinguishes it from every other nation, and varies as nations themselves vary from one another.

The constitution of the state is not a theory, nor is it drawn up and established in accordance with any preconceived theory. What is theoretic in a constitution is unreal. The constitutions conceived by philosophers in their closets are constitutions only of Utopia or Dreamland. This world is not governed by abstractions, for abstractions are nullities. Only the concrete is real, and only the real or actual has vitality or force. The French people adopted constitution after constitution of the most approved pattern, and amid bonfires, beating of drums, sound of trumpets, roar of musketry, and thunder of artillery swore, no doubt, sincerely as well as enthusiastically, to observe them, but all to no effect; for they had no authority for the nation, no hold on its affections, and formed no element of its life. The English are

great constitution-mongers—for other nations. They fancy that a constitution fashioned after their own will fit any nation that can be persuaded, wheedled, or bullied into trying it on; but, unhappily, all that have tried it on have found it only an embarrassment or encumbrance. The doctor might as well attempt to give an individual a new constitution or the constitution of another man as the statesman to give a nation any other constitution than that which it has and with which it is born. (Vol. xviii. pp. 80, 81.)

#### MODERN CIVILIZATION.

INDEED, the Roman constitution, laws, and civilization not only gain the mastery in the nations seated within the limits of the old Roman empire, but extend their power throughout the whole civilized world. The Græco-Roman civilization is, in fact, the only civilization now recognized, and nations are accounted civilized only in proportion as they are romanized and christianized. The Roman law, as found in the Institutes, Pandects, and Novellæ of Justinian, or the *Corpus Juris Civilis*, is the basis of the law and jurisprudence of all Christendom. The Græco-Roman civilization, called not improperly Christian civilization, is the only progressive civilization. The old feudal system remains in England little more than an empty name. The king is only the first magistrate of the kingdom, and the house of lords is only an hereditary senate. Austria is hard at work in the Roman direction, and finds her chief obstacle to success in Hungary with the Magyars, whose feudalism retains almost the full vigor of the middle ages. Russia is moving in the same direction; and Prussia and the smaller Germanic

states obey the same impulse. Indeed, Rome has survived the conquest—has conquered her conquerors, and now invades every region from which they came. The Roman empire may be said to be acknowledged and obeyed in lands lying far beyond the furthest limits reached by the Roman eagles, and to be more truly the mistress of the world than under Augustus, Trajan, or the Antonines. Nothing can stand before the Christian and romanized nations, and all pagandom and Mohammedom combined are too weak to resist their onward march. (Vol. xviii. p. 84.)

#### CENTRALISM AND FEUDALISM.

THE Roman system is republican, in the broad sense of the term, because under it power is never an estate, never the private property of the ruler, but, in whose hands soever vested, is held as a trust to be exercised for the public good. As it existed under the Cæsars and is revived in modern times, whether under the imperial or the democratic form, it no doubt tends to centralism, to the concentration of all the powers and forces of the states in one central government, from which all local authorities and institutions emanate. Wise men oppose it as affording no guaranties to individual liberty against the abuses of power. This it may not do, but the remedy is not in feudalism. The feudal lord holds his authority as an estate, and has over the people under him all the power of Cæsar and all the rights of the proprietor. He, indeed, has a guaranty against his liege-lord, sometimes a more effective guaranty than his liege-lord has against him; but against his centralized power his vassals and serfs have only the guaranty that a slave has against his owner.

Feudalism is alike hostile to the freedom of public authority and of the people. It is essentially a disintegrating element in the nation. It breaks the unity and individuality of the state, embarrasses the sovereign, and guards against the abuse of public authority by overpowering and suppressing it. Every feudal lord is a more thorough despot in his own domain than Cæsar ever was or could be in the empire; and the monarch, even if strong enough, is yet not competent to intervene between him and his people, any more than the general government in the United States was to intervene between the negro slave and his master. The great vassals of the crown singly, or, if not singly, in combination—and they could always combine in the interest of their order—were too strong for the king or to be brought under any public authority, and could issue from their fortified castles and rob and plunder to their hearts' content, with none to call them to an account. Under the most thoroughly centralized government there is far more liberty for the people and a far greater security for person and property, except in the case of the feudal nobles themselves, than was even dreamed of while the feudal *régime* was in full vigor. Nobles were themselves free, it is conceded, but not the people. The king was too weak, too restricted in his action by the feudal constitution to reach them, and the higher clergy were *ex officio* sovereigns, princes, barons, or feudal lords, and were led by their private interests to act with the feudal nobility, save when that nobility threatened the temporalities of the church. The only reliance, under God, left in feudal times to the poor people was in the lower ranks of the clergy, especially of the regular clergy. . . .

The fact is that during the period when feudalism was in full vigor the king was merely a shadow; the people found their only consolation in religion and their chief protectors in the monks, who mingled with them, saw their sufferings and sympathized with them, consoled them, carried their cause to the castle before the feudal lord and lady, and did, thank God, do something to keep alive religious sentiments and convictions in the bosom of the feudal society itself. Whatever opinions may be formed of the monastic orders in relation to the present, this much is certain, that they were the chief civilizers of Europe and the chief agents in delivering European society from feudal barbarism. (Vol. xviii. pp. 84-86.)

## ANTAGONISM OF INTERESTS.

GUARANTIES against excessive centralism are certainly needed, but the statesman will not seek them in the feudal organization of society—in a political aristocracy, whether founded on birth or private wealth, nor in a privileged class of any sort. Better trust Cæsar than Brutus, or even Cato. Nor will he seek them in the antagonism of interests intended to neutralize or balance each other, as in the English constitution. This was the great error of Mr. Calhoun. No man saw more clearly than Mr. Calhoun the utter worthlessness of simple paper constitutions, on which Mr. Jefferson placed such implicit reliance, or that the real constitution is in the state itself, in the manner in which the people themselves are organized; but his reliance was in constituting, as powers in the state, the several popular interests that exist, and pitting them against each other—the famous system of checks and balances of English

statesmen. He was led to this because he distrusted power and was more intent on guarding against its abuses than on providing for its free, vigorous, and healthy action, going on the principle that "that is the best government which governs least." But if the opposing interests could be made to balance one another perfectly, the result would be an equilibrium, in which power would be brought to a stand-still; and if not, the stronger would succeed and swallow up all the rest. The theory of checks and balances is admirable if the object be to trammel power and to have as little power in the government as possible; but it is a theory which is born from passions engendered by the struggle against despotism or arbitrary power, not from a calm and philosophical appreciation of government itself. The English have not succeeded in establishing their theory, for, after all, their constitution does not work so well as they pretend. The landed interest controls at one time and the mercantile and manufacturing interest at another. They do not perfectly balance one another, and it is not difficult to see that the mercantile and manufacturing interest, combined with the moneyed interest, is henceforth to predominate. The aim of the real statesman is to organize all the interests and forces of the state dialectically, so that they shall unite to add to its strength and work together harmoniously for the common good. (Vol. xviii. p. 87.)

#### THE NEED OF STATESMEN.

ROME did not fall in consequence of the strength of her external enemies, nor through the corruption of private morals and manners, which was never greater than under the first triumvirate. She fell

from the want of true statesmanship in her public men and patriotism in her people. Private virtues and private vices are of the last consequence to individuals, both here and hereafter; but private virtues never saved, private vices never ruined a nation. Edward the Confessor was a saint, and yet he prepared the way for the Norman conquest of England; and France owes infinitely less to St. Louis than to Louis XI., Richelieu, and Napoleon, who, though no saints, were statesmen. What is specially needed in statesmen is public spirit, intelligence, foresight, broad views, manly feelings, wisdom, energy, resolution; and when statesmen with these qualities are placed at the head of affairs, the state, if not already lost, can, however far gone it may be, be recovered, restored, reinvigorated, advanced, and private vice and corruption disappear in the splendor of public virtue. Providence is always present in the affairs of nations, but not to work miracles to counteract the natural effects of the ignorance, ineptness, shortsightedness, narrow views, public stupidity, and imbecility of rulers, because they are irreproachable and saintly in their private characters and relations, as was Henry VI. of England or, in some respects, Louis XVI. of France. Providence is God intervening through the laws he by his creative act gives to creatures, not their suspension or abrogation. It was the corruption of the statesmen in substituting the barbaric element for the proper Roman, to which no one contributed more than Constantine, the first Christian emperor, that was the real cause of the downfall of Rome and the centuries of barbarism that followed, relieved only by the superhuman zeal and charity of the church to save souls and restore civilization. (Vol. xviii. pp. 91, 92.)



## THE CONSTITUTION OF GOVERNMENT.

BUT in the constitution of the government, as distinguished from the state, the nation is freer and more truly sovereign. The constitution of the state is that which gives to the people of a given territory political existence, unity, and individuality, and renders it capable of political action. It creates political or national solidarity, in imitation of the solidarity of the race, in which it has its root. It is the providential charter of national existence, and that which gives to each nation its peculiar character and distinguishes it from every other nation. The constitution of government is the constitution by the sovereign authority of the nation of an agency or ministry for the management of its affairs, and the letter of instructions according to which the agent or minister is to act and conduct the matters intrusted to him. . . .

The law of the governmental constitution is in that of the nation. The constitution of the government must grow out of the constitution of the state, and accord with the genius, the character, the habits, customs, and wants of the people, or it will not work well or tend to secure the legitimate ends of government. The constitutions imagined by philosophers are for Utopia, not for any actual, living, breathing people. You must take the state as it is and develop your governmental constitution from it and harmonize it with it. Where there is a discrepancy between the two constitutions, the government has no support in the state, in the organic people or nation, and can sustain itself only by corruption or physical force. A government may be under the necessity of using force to suppress an insurrection or rebellion against

the national authority or the integrity of the national territory, but no government that can sustain itself, not the state, only by physical force or large standing armies can be a good government or suited to the nation. It must adopt the most stringent repressive measures, suppress liberty of speech and of conscience, outrage liberty in what it has the most intimate and sacred, and practise the most revolting violence and cruelty, for it can govern only by terror. Such a government is unsuited to the nation. (Vol. xviii. pp. 92-98.)

#### ARE THE UNITED STATES A NATION OR A LEAGUE?

SOVEREIGNTY, under God, inheres in the organic people, or the people as the republic; and every organic people fixed to the soil and politically independent of every other people is a sovereign people and, in the modern sense, an independent sovereign nation.

Sovereign states may unite in an alliance, league, or confederation, and mutually agree to exercise their sovereign powers or a portion of them in common through a common organ or agency; but in this agreement they part with none of their sovereignty, and each remains a sovereign state or nation as before. The common organ or agency created by the convention is no state, is no nation, has no inherent sovereignty, and derives all its vitality and force from the persisting sovereignty of the states severally that have united in creating it. The agreement no more affects the sovereignty of the several states entering into it than does the appointment of an agent affect the rights and powers of the principal. The

creature takes nothing from the Creator, exhausts not, lessens not his creative energy, and it is only by his retaining and continuously exerting his creative power that the creature continues to exist.

— An independent state or nation may, with or without its consent, lose its sovereignty, but only by being merged in or subjected to another. Independent sovereign states cannot by convention or mutual agreement form themselves into a single sovereign state or nation. The compact, or agreement, is made by sovereign states, and binds by virtue of the sovereign power of each of the contracting parties. To destroy that sovereign power would be to annul the compact and render void the agreement. The agreement can be valid and binding only on condition that each of the contracting parties retains the sovereignty that rendered it competent to enter into the compact, and states that retain severally their sovereignty do not form a single sovereign state or nation. The states in convention cannot become a new and single sovereign state unless they lose their several sovereignty and merge it in the new sovereignty; but this they cannot do by agreement, because the moment the parties to the agreement cease to be sovereign, the agreement, on which alone depends the new sovereign state, is vacated. . . .

That a nation may voluntarily cede its sovereignty is frankly admitted, but it can cede it only to something or somebody actually existing, for to cede to nothing and not to cede is one and the same thing. They can part with their own sovereignty by merging themselves in another national existence, but not by merging themselves in nothing; and till they have parted with their own sovereignty the new sovereign state does not exist. A prince can

abdicate his power, because by abdicating he simply gives back to the people the trust he had received from them; but a nation cannot, save by merging itself in another. An independent state not merged in another or that is not subject to another cannot cease to be a sovereign nation, even if it would.

That no sovereign state can be formed by agreement or compact has already been shown in the refutation of the theory of the origin of government in convention, or the so-called social compact. Sovereign states are as unable to form themselves into a single sovereign state by mutual compact as are the sovereign individuals imagined by Rousseau. The convention, either of sovereign states or of sovereign individuals, with the best will in the world, can form only a compact or agreement between sovereigns, and an agreement or compact, whatever its terms or conditions, is only an alliance, a league, or a confederation, which no one can pretend is a sovereign state, nation, or republic.

The question, then, whether the United States are a single sovereign state or nation or a confederacy of independent sovereign states depends on the question whether the American people originally existed as one people or as several independent states. . . .

What, then, is the fact? Are the United States politically one people, nation, state, or republic, or are they simply independent sovereign states united in close and intimate alliance, league, or federation by a mutual pact or agreement? Were the people of the United States who ordained and established the written constitution one people or were they not? If they were not before ordaining and establishing the government, they are not now; for the adoption

of the constitution did not and could not make them one. Whether they are one or many is, then, simply a question of fact, to be decided by the facts in the case, not by the theories of American statesmen, the opinion of jurists, or even by constitutional law itself. The old articles of confederation and the later constitution can serve here only as historical documents. Constitutions and laws presuppose the existence of a national sovereign from which they emanate and that ordains them, for they are the formal expression of a sovereign will. The nation must exist as an historical fact, prior to the possession or exercise of sovereign power, prior to the existence of written constitutions and laws of any kind, and its existence must be established before they can be recognized as having any legal force or vitality. (Vol. xviii. pp. 102-105.)

#### A NATION DE FACTO IS ONE DE JURE.

THE existence of any nation as an independent sovereign nation is a purely historical fact, for its right to exist as such is in the simple fact that it does so exist. A nation de facto is a nation de jure, and when we have ascertained the fact we have ascertained the right. There is no right in the case separate from the fact—only the fact must be really a fact. A people hitherto a part of another people or subject to another sovereign is not in fact a nation because they have declared themselves independent and have organized a government and are engaged in what promises to be a successful struggle for independence. The struggle must be practically over; the former sovereign must have practically abandoned the effort to reduce them to submission

or to bring them back under his authority, and if he continues it, does it as a matter of mere form; the postulant must have proved its ability to maintain civil government and to fulfil within and without the obligations which attach to every civilized nation before it can be recognized as an independent sovereign nation; because before it is not a fact that it is a sovereign nation. The prior sovereign, when no longer willing or able to vindicate his right, has lost it, and no one is any longer bound to respect it, for humanity demands not martyrs to lost causes. . . .

There is no civilized nation now existing that has been developed from a common ancestor this side of Adam, and the most mixed are the most civilized. The nearer a nation approaches to a primitive people of pure unmixed blood, the further removed it is from civilization. All civilized nations are political nations, and are founded in the fact, not on rights antecedent to the fact. A hundred or more lost nationalities went to form the Roman empire, and who can tell us how many layers of crushed nationalities, superposed one upon another, serve for the foundation of the present French, English, Russian, Austrian, or Spanish nationality? What other title to independence and sovereignty than the fact can you plead in behalf of any European nation? Every one has absorbed and extinguished—no one can say how many—nationalities that once had as good a right to be as it has or can have. Whether those nationalities have been justly extinguished or not is no question for the statesman; it is the secret of Providence. Failure in this world is not always a proof of wrong, nor success of right. The good is sometimes overborne and the bad sometimes tri-

umphs; but it is consoling, and even just, to believe that the good oftener triumphs than the bad. . . .

The notion of right, independent of the fact as applied to sovereignty, is founded in error. Empty titles to states and kingdoms are of no validity. The sovereignty is, under God, in the nation, and the title and the possession are inseparable. The title of the Palæologi to the Roman empire of the East, of the king of Sicily, the king of Sardinia, or the king of Spain—for they are all claimants—to the kingdom of Jerusalem founded by Godfrey and his crusaders, of the Stuarts to the thrones of England, Ireland, and Scotland, or of the Bourbons to the throne of France, are vacated and not worth the parchment on which they are engrossed. The contrary opinion, so generally entertained, belongs to barbarism, not to civilization. It is in modern society a relic of feudalism which places the state in the government and makes the government a private estate—a private and not a public right—a right to govern the public, not a right to govern held from or by the public.

The proprietor may be dispossessed in fact of his estate by violence, by illegal or unjust means, without losing his right, and another may usurp it, occupy it, and possess it in fact without acquiring any right or legal title to it. The man who holds the legal title has the right to oust him and reënter upon his estate whenever able to do so. Here, in the economical order, the fact and the right are distinguishable, and the actual occupant may be required to show his title-deeds. Holding sovereignty to be a private estate, the feudal lawyers very properly distinguish between governments *de facto* and governments *de jure*, and argue very logically that violent dispossession of a prince does not invalidate his title. But sov-

ereignty, it has been shown, is not in the government but in the state, and the state is inseparable from the public domain. The people organized and held by the domain or national territory are, under God, the sovereign nation, and remain so as long as the nation subsists without subjection to another. The government, as distinguished from the state or nation, has only a delegated authority, governs only by a commission from the nation. The revocation of the commission vacates its title and extinguishes its rights. The nation is always sovereign, and every organic people fixed to the soil and actually independent of every other is a nation. There can, then, be no independent nation *de facto* that is not an independent nation *de jure*, nor *de jure* that is not *de facto*. The moment a people cease to be an independent nation in fact they cease to be sovereign, and the moment they become in fact an independent nation they are so of right. Hence in the political order the fact and the right are born and expire together; and when it is proved that a people are in fact an independent nation, there is no question to be asked as to their right to be such nation. (Vol. xviii. pp. 105-108.)

#### THE BRITISH SOVEREIGNTY PASSED TO THE STATES UNITED.

THE king, say the jurists, never dies, and the heralds cry, "The king is dead! Live the king!" Sovereignty never lapses, is never in abeyance, and the moment it ceases in one people it is renewed in another. The British sovereignty ceased in the colonies with independence, and the American took its place. Did the sovereignty which before indepen-



dence was in Great Britain pass from Great Britain to the states severally or to the states united? It might have passed to them severally, but did it? There is no question of law or antecedent right in the case, but a simple question of fact, and the fact is determined by determining who it was that assumed it, exercised it, and has continued to exercise it. As to this there is no doubt. The sovereignty as a fact has been assumed and exercised by the United States, the states united, and never by the states separately or severally. Then as a fact the sovereignty that before independence was in Great Britain passed on independence to the states united, and reappears in all its vigor in the United States, the only successor to Great Britain known to or recognized by the civilized world.

As the colonial people were, though distributed in distinct colonies, still one people, the people of the United States, though distributed into distinct and mutually independent states, are yet one sovereign people, therefore a sovereign state or nation, and not a simple league or confederacy of nations. . . .

Moreover, the articles of confederation were drawn up and adopted during the transition from colonial dependence to national independence. Independence was declared in 1776, but it was not a fact till 1782, when the preliminary treaty acknowledging it was signed at Paris. Till then the United States were not an independent nation; they were only a people struggling to become an independent nation. Prior to that preliminary treaty, neither the Union nor the states severally were sovereign. The articles were agreed on in congress in 1777, but they were not ratified by all the states till May, 1781, and in 1782 the movement was commenced in the legis-

lature of New York for their amendment. Till the organization under the constitution ordained by the people of the United States in 1787, and which went into operation in 1789, the United States had in reality only a provisional government, and it was not till then that the national government was definitively organized and the line of demarcation between the general government and the particular state government was fixed.

The confederation was an acknowledged failure and was rejected by the American people precisely because it was not in harmony with the unwritten or providential constitution of the nation; and it was not in harmony with that constitution precisely because it recognized the states as severally sovereign and substituted confederation for union. The failure of confederation and the success of union are ample proofs of the unity of the American nation. The instinct of unity rejected state sovereignty in 1787 as it did in 1861. The first and the last attempt to establish state sovereignty have failed, and the failure vindicates the fact that the sovereignty is in the states united, not in the states severally. (Vol. xviii. pp. 110-113.)

## THE UNION AND THE STATES BORN TOGETHER.

THE key to the mystery is precisely in this appellation *United States*, which is not the name of the country, for its distinctive name is America, but a name expressive of its political organization. In it there are no sovereign people without states and no states without union or that are not *united* states. The term *united* is not part of a proper name, but is simply an adjective qualifying *states*, and has its full

and proper sense. Hence while the sovereignty is and must be in the states, it is in the states united, not in the states severally, precisely as we have found the sovereignty of the people is in the people collectively or as society, not in the people individually. The life is in the body, not in the members, though the body could not exist if it had no members; so the sovereignty is in the union, not in the states severally; but there could be no sovereign union without the states, for there is no union where there is nothing united.

This is not a theory of the constitution, but the constitutional fact itself. It is the simple historical fact that precedes the law and constitutes the law-making power. The people of the United States are one people, as has already been proved: they were one people, as far as a people at all, prior to independence, because under the same common law and subject to the same sovereign, and have been so since, for as *united* states they gained their independence and took their place among sovereign nations, and as united states they have possessed and still possess the government. As their existence before independence in distinct colonies did not prevent their unity, so their existence since in distinct states does not hinder them from being one people. The states severally simply continue the colonial organizations, and united they hold the sovereignty that was originally in the mother country. But if one people, they are one people existing in distinct state organizations, as before independence they were one people existing in distinct colonial organizations. This is the original, the unwritten, and providential constitution of the people of the United States.

This constitution is not conventional, for it ex-

isted before the people met or could meet in convention. They have not, as an independent sovereign people, either established their union or distributed themselves into distinct and mutually independent states. The union and the distribution, the unity and the distinction, are both original in their constitution, and they were born United States, as much and as truly so as the son of a citizen is born a citizen or as every one born at all is born a member of society, the family, the tribe, or the nation. The union and the states were born together, are inseparable in their constitution, have lived and grown up together; no serious attempt till the late secession movement has been made to separate them; and the secession movement, to all persons who knew not the real constitution of the United States, appeared sure to succeed, and in fact would have succeeded, if, as the secessionists pretended, the union had been only a confederacy, and the states had been held together only by a conventional compact and not by a real and living bond of unity. The popular instinct of national unity, which seemed so weak, proved to be strong enough to defeat the secession forces, to trample out the confederacy, and maintain the unity of the nation and the integrity of its domain.

The people can act only as they exist, as they are, not as they are not. Existing originally only as distributed in distinct and mutually independent colonies, they could at first act only through their colonial organizations and afterwards only through their state organizations. The colonial people met in convention in the person of representatives chosen by colonies, and after independence in the person of representatives chosen by states. Not existing outside of the colonial or state organizations, they could

not act outside or independently of them. They chose their representatives or delegates by colonies or states, and called at first their convention a congress; but by an instinct surer than their deliberate wisdom they called it not the congress of the *confederate*, but of the *united* states, asserting constitutional unity as well as constitutional multiplicity. It is true in their first attempt to organize a general government they called the constitution they devised articles of confederation, but only because they had not attained to full consciousness of themselves; and that they really meant union, not confederation, is evident from their adopting, as the official style of the nation or new power, *united*, not *confederate* states. (Vol. xviii. pp. 115, 116.)

#### THE UNITED STATES NOT CREATED BY CONVENTION.

THE convention did not create the union or unite the states, for it was assembled by the authority of the United States who were present in it. The United States or union existed before the convention, as the convention itself affirms in declaring one of its purposes to be "to provide for a *more perfect union*." If there had been no union, it could not and would not have spoken of providing for a *more perfect union*, but would have stated its purpose to be to create or form a union. The convention did not form the union nor in fact provide for a *more perfect union*; it simply provided for the *more perfect representation* or expression in the general government of the union already existing. The convention, in common with the statesmen at the time, recognized no unwritten or providential constitution of a people,

and regarded the constitution of government as the constitution of the state, and consequently sometimes put the state for the government. In interpreting its language, it is necessary to distinguish between its act and its theory. Its act is law, its theory is not. The convention met, among other things, to organize a government which should more perfectly represent the union of the states than did the government created by the articles of confederation.

The convention, certainly, professes to grant or concede powers to the United States and to prohibit powers to the states; but it simply puts the state for the government. The powers of the United States are, indeed, grants or trusts, but from God through the law of nature, and are grants, trusts, or powers always conceded to every nation or sovereign people. But none of them are grants from the convention. The powers the convention grants or concedes to the United States are powers granted or conceded by the United States to the general government it assembled to organize and establish, which, as it extends over the whole population and territory of the union, and as the interests it is charged with relate to all the states in common, or to the people as a whole, is with no great impropriety called the government of the United States, in contradistinction from the state governments, which have each only a local jurisdiction. But the more exact term is, for the one, the general government, and for the others particular governments, as having charge only of the particular interests of the state, and the two together constitute the government of the United States, or the complete national government; for neither the general government nor the state government is complete in itself. The convention developed a

general government and prescribed its powers, and fixed their limits and extent, as well as the bounds of the powers of the state or particular governments; but they are the United States assembled in convention that do all this, and therefore, strictly speaking, no powers are conceded to the United States that they did not previously possess. The convention itself, in the constitution it ordained, defines very clearly from whom the general government holds its powers. It holds them, as we have seen, from "the people of the United States;" not the people of the states severally, but of the states united. If it had meant the states severally it would have said, We, the states; if it had recognized and meant the population of the country irrespective of its organization into particular states, it would have said simply, We, the people. By saying "We, the people of the United States," it placed the sovereign power where it is, in the people of the states united. (Vol. xviii. pp. 120-122.)

#### SOVEREIGNTY OF THE UNITED STATES.

THE sovereign in the republican order is the organic people, or state, and is with us the United States, for with us the organic people exist only as organized into states united, which in their union form one compact and indissoluble whole. That is to say, the organic American people do not exist as a consolidated people or state; they exist only as organized into distinct but inseparable states. Each state is a living member of the one body and derives its life from its union with the body, so that the American state is one body with many members; and the members, instead of being simply individ-

uals, are states, or individuals organized into states. The body consists of many members, and is one body because the members are all members of it and members one of another. It does not exist as separate or distinct from the members, but exists in their solidarity or membership one of another. There is no sovereign people or existence of the United States distinguishable from the people or existence of the particular states united. The people of the United States, the state called the United States, are the people of the particular states united. The solidarity of the members constitutes the unity of the body. The difference between this view and Mr. Madison's is that while his view supposes the solidarity to be conventional, originating and existing in compact, or agreement, this supposes it to be real, living, and prior to the convention, as much the work of Providence as the existence in the human body of the living solidarity of its members. One law, one life, circulates through all the members, constituting ~~them a living organism~~, binding them in living union, all to each and each to all.

Such is the sovereign people, and so far the original unwritten constitution. The sovereign, in order to live and act, must have an organ through which he expresses his will. This organ, under the American system, is primarily the convention. The convention is the supreme political body, the concrete sovereign authority, and exercises practically the whole sovereign power of the people. The convention persists always, although not in permanent session. It can at any time be convened by the ordinary authority of the government, or, in its failure, by a plebiscitum.

Next follows the government created and consti-



tuted by the convention. The government is constituted in such manner and has such and only such powers as the convention ordains. The government has, in the strict sense, no political authority under the American system which separates the government from the convention. All political questions proper, such as the elective franchise, eligibility, the constitution of the several departments of government, as the legislative, the judicial, and the executive, changing, altering, or amending the constitution of government, enlarging or contracting its powers—in a word, all those questions that arise on which it is necessary to take the immediate orders of the sovereign, belong not to the government, but to the convention; and where the will of the sovereign is not sufficiently expressed in the constitution, a new appeal to the convention is necessary and may always be had. (Vol. xviii. pp. 127, 128.)

### THE DIVISION OF POWER.

THE American system, sometimes called the federal system, is not founded on antagonism of classes, estates, or interests, and is in no sense a system of checks and balances. It needs and tolerates no obstructive forces. It does not pit section against section, the states severally against the general government, nor the general government against the state governments, and nothing is more hurtful than the attempt to explain it and work it on the principles of British constitutionalism. The convention created no antagonistic powers; it simply divided the powers of government, and gave neither to the general government nor to the state governments all the powers of government, nor in any instance did it give to the

two governments jurisdiction in the same matters. Hence each has its own sphere, in which it can move on without colliding with that of the other. Each is independent and complete in relation to its own work, incomplete and dependent on the other for the complete work of government.

The division of power is not between a NATIONAL government and state governments, but between a GENERAL government and particular governments. The general government, inasmuch as it extends to matters common to all the states, is usually called the government of the United States, and sometimes the federal government, to distinguish it from the particular or state governments, but without strict propriety; for the government of the United States, or the federal government, means, in strictness, both the general government and the particular governments, since neither is in itself the complete government of the country. The general government has authority within each of the states, and each of the state governments has authority in the Union. The line between the Union and the states severally is not precisely the line between the general government and the particular governments. As, for instance, the general government lays direct taxes on the people of the states and collects internal revenue within them; and the citizens of a particular state, and none others, are electors of president and vice-president of the United States and representatives in the lower house of congress, while senators in congress are elected by the state legislatures themselves.

The line that distinguishes the two governments is that which distinguishes the general relations and interests from the particular relations and interests of the people of the United States. These general

relations and interests are placed under the general government, which, because its jurisdiction is co-extensive with the Union, is called the government of the United States; the particular relations and interests are placed under particular governments, which, because their jurisdiction is only coextensive with the states respectively, are called state governments. The general government governs supremely all the people of the United States and territories belonging to the Union in all their general relations and interests, or relations and interests common alike to them all; the particular or state government governs supremely the people of a particular state, as Massachusetts, New York, or New Jersey, in all that pertains to their particular or private rights, relations, and interests. The powers of each are equally sovereign, and neither are derived from the other. The state governments are not subordinate to the general government, nor the general government to the state governments. They are coördinate governments, each standing on the same level and deriving powers from the same sovereign authority. In their respective spheres neither yields to the other. In relation to the matters within its jurisdiction, each government is independent and supreme in regard of the other and subject only to the convention. (Vol. xviii. pp. 131, 132.)

#### NATIONAL BANKS.

THE United States Bank was manifestly unconstitutional, as probably are the present so-called national banks. The United States Bank was a private or particular corporation, and the present national banks are only corporations of the same sort, though

organized under a general law. The pretence that they are established to supply a national currency does not save their constitutionality, for the convention has not given the general government the power nor imposed on it the duty of furnishing a national currency. To coin money and regulate the value thereof is something very different from authorizing private companies to issue bank-notes on the basis of the public stocks held as private property, or even on what is called a specie basis. To claim the power under the general-welfare clause would be a simple mockery of good sense. It is no more for the general welfare than any other successful private business. The private welfare of each is, no doubt, for the welfare of all, but not therefore is it the "general welfare," for what is private, particular in its nature is not and cannot be general. To understand by general welfare that which is for the individual welfare of all or the greater number would be to claim for the general government all the powers of government, and to deny that very division of powers which is the crowning merit of the American system. The general welfare, by the very force of the words themselves, means the common as distinguished from the private or individual welfare. The system of national banks may or may not be a good and desirable system, but it is difficult to understand the constitutional power of the general government to establish it. (Vol. xviii. pp. 134, 135.)

#### PROTECTIVE TARIFFS AND SLAVERY.

ON the ground that its powers are general, not particular, the general government has no power to

lay a protective tariff. It can lay a tariff for revenue, not for protection of home manufactures or home industry; for the interests fostered, even though indirectly advantageous to the whole people, are in their nature private or particular, not general interests, and chiefly interests of private corporations and capitalists. Their incidental or even consequential effects do not change their direct and essential nature. So with domestic slavery. Slavery comes under the head of private rights, whether regarded on the side of the master or on the side of the slave. The right of a citizen to hold a slave, if a right at all, is the private right of property, and the right of the slave to his freedom is a private and personal right, and neither is placed under the safeguard of the general government, which has nowhere, unless in the District of Columbia and the places over which it has exclusive legislative power in all cases whatsoever, either the right to establish it or to abolish it, except perhaps under the war power, as a military necessity, an indemnity for the past, or a security for the future.

This applies to what are called territories as well as to the states. The right of the government to govern the territories in regard to private and particular rights and interests is derived from no express grant of power, and is held only *ex necessitate*—the United States owning the domain and there being no other authority competent to govern them. But, as in the case of all powers held *ex necessitate*, the power is restricted to the absolute necessity in the case. What are called territorial governments to distinguish them from the state governments are only provisional governments, and can touch private rights and interests no further than is necessary to

preserve order and prepare the way for the organization and installation of a regular state government. Till then the law governing private rights is the law that was in force, if any such there was, when the territory became by purchase, by conquest, or by treaty attached to the domain of the United States.

Hence the supreme court declared unconstitutional the ordinance of 1787 prohibiting slavery in what was called the territory of the Northwest, and the so-called Missouri compromise prohibiting slavery north of the parallel  $36^{\circ} 30'$ . The Wilmot proviso was for the same reason unconstitutional. The general government never had and has not any power to exclude slavery from the territories, any more than to abolish it in the states. But slavery being a local institution, sustained neither by the law of nature nor the law of nations, no citizen migrating from a slave state could carry his slaves with him and hold them as slaves in the territory. Rights enacted by local law are rights only in that locality, and slaves carried by their masters into a slave state even are free unless the state into which they are carried enacts to the contrary. The only persons that could be held as slaves in a territory would be those who were slaves or the children of those who were slaves in the territory when it passed to the United States. The whole controversy on slavery in the territories, and which culminated in the civil war, was wholly unnecessary and never could have occurred had the constitution been properly understood and adhered to by both sides. True, congress could not exclude slavery from the territories, but neither could citizens migrating to them hold slaves in them; and so really slavery was virtually excluded, for the inhabitants in nearly all of them, not emigrants from the states

after the cession to the United States, were too few to be counted. (Vol. xviii. pp. 135, 136.)

### NATURALIZATION.

THE general government has power to establish a uniform rule of naturalization, to which all the states must conform, and it was very proper that it should have this power, so as to prevent one state from gaining by its naturalization laws an undue advantage over another; but the general government has itself no power to naturalize a single foreigner, or in any case to say who shall or who shall not be citizens either of a state or of the United States, or to declare who may or may not be electors even of its own officers. The convention ordains that members of the house of representatives shall be chosen by electors who have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the state legislature, but the state determines these qualifications and who do or do not possess them; that the senators shall be chosen by the state legislatures, and that the electors of president and vice-president shall be appointed in such manner as the respective state legislatures may direct. The whole question of citizenship, what shall or shall not be the qualifications of electors, who shall or shall not be freemen, is reserved to the states as coming under the head of personal or private rights and franchises. In practice the exact line of demarcation may not always have been strictly observed either by the general government or by the state governments, but a careful study of the constitution cannot fail to show that the division of powers is the division or distinction between the public and general relations and inter-

ests, rights and duties of the people and their private and particular relations and interests, rights and duties. As these two classes of relations and interests, rights and duties, though distinguishable, are really inseparable in nature, it follows that the two governments are essential to the existence of a complete government or to the existence of a real government in its plenitude and integrity. Left to either alone, the people would have only an incomplete, an initial, or inchoate government. The general government is the complement of the state governments, and the state governments are the complement of the general government. (Vol. xviii. pp. 136, 137.)

#### THE MERIT OF THE STATESMEN OF 1787.

THE division of the powers of government between a general government and particular governments, rendered possible and practicable by the original constitution of the people themselves as one people existing and acting through state organizations, is the American method of guarding against the undue centralism to which Roman imperialism inevitably tends; and it is far simpler and more effective than any of the European systems of mixed governments, which seek their end by organizing an antagonism of interests or classes. The American method demands no such antagonism, no neutralizing of one social force by another, but avails itself of all the forces of society, organizes them dialectically, not antagonistically, and thus protects with equal efficiency both public authority and private rights. The general government can never oppress the people as individuals or abridge their private rights or personal freedom and independence, because these are not within



its jurisdiction, but are placed in charge, within each state, of the state government, which within its sphere governs as supremely as the general government: the state governments cannot weaken the public authority of the nation or oppress the people in their general rights and interests, for these are withdrawn from state jurisdiction and placed under charge of a general government, which in its sphere governs as supremely as the state government. There is no resort to a system of checks and balances; there is no restraint on power and no systematic distrust of power, but simply a division of powers between two coördinate governments, distinct but inseparable, moving in distinct spheres, but in the same direction, or to a common end. The system is no invention of man, is no creation of the convention, but is given us by Providence in the living constitution of the American people. The merit of the statesmen of 1787 is that they did not destroy or deface the work of Providence, but accepted it and organized the government in harmony with the real order, the real elements given them. They suffered themselves in all their positive substantial work to be governed by reality, not by theories and speculations. In this they proved themselves statesmen, and their work survives; and the republic, laugh as sciolists may, is, for the present and future, the model republic—as much so as was Rome in her day; and it is not simply national pride nor American self-conceit that pronounces its establishment the beginning of a new and more advanced order of civilization: such is really the fact. (Vol. xviii. pp. 139, 140.)

## THE WEAK POINT IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM.

THE only apparently weak point in the system is in the particular states themselves. . . . The general government takes care of public authority and rights; the state protects private rights and personal freedom as against the general government: but what protects the citizens in their private rights, their personal freedom and independence, against the particular state government? Universal suffrage, answers the democrat. Armed with the ballot, more powerful than the sword, each citizen is able to protect himself. But this is theory, not reality. If it were true, the division of the powers of government between two coördinate governments would be of no practical importance. Experience does not sustain the theory, and the power of the ballot to protect the individual may be rendered ineffective by the tyranny of party. Experience proves that the ballot is far less effective in securing the freedom and independence of the individual citizen than is commonly pretended. The ballot of an isolated individual counts for nothing. The individual, though armed with the ballot, is as powerless if he stands alone as if he had it not. To render it of any avail he must associate himself with a party and look for his success in the success of his party; and to secure the success of his party he must give up to it his own private convictions and free will. In practice individuals are nothing individually and parties are everything. (Vol. xviii. p. 140.)

## POLITICAL PARTIES.

PARTIES are formed one hardly knows how and controlled no one knows by whom, but usually by

demagogues, men who have some private or personal purposes for which they wish, through party, to use the government. Parties have no conscience, no responsibility, and their very reason of being is the usurpation and concentration of power. The real practical tendency of universal suffrage is to democratic instead of an imperial centralism. What is to guard against this centralism? Not universal suffrage, for that tends to create it; and if the government is left to it, the government becomes practically the will of an ever-shifting and irresponsible majority. Is the remedy in written or paper constitutions? Party can break through them, and by making the judges elective by party for short terms and reëligible, can do so with impunity. In several of the states the dominant majority have gained the power to govern at will, without any let or hindrance. Besides, constitutions can be altered and have been altered very nearly at the will of the majority. No mere paper constitutions are any protection against the usurpations of party, for party will always grasp all the power it can. (Vol. xviii. p. 141.)

#### LOCAL SELF-GOVERNMENT.

YET the evil is not so great as it seems, for in most of the states the principle of division of powers is carried into the bosom of the state itself; in some states further than in others, but in all it obtains to some extent. In what are called the New England states, the best-governed portion of the union, each town is a corporation, having important powers and the charge of all purely local matters—chooses its own officers, manages its own finances, takes charge of its own poor, of its own roads and bridges, and of

the education of its own children. Between these corporations and the state government are the counties, that take charge of another class of interests, more general than those under the charge of the town, but less general than those of the state. In the great central and northwestern states the same system obtains, though less completely carried out. In the southern and southwestern states the town corporations hardly exist, and the rights and interests of the poorer classes of persons have been less well protected in them than in the northern and eastern states. But with the abolition of slavery and the lessening of the influence of the wealthy slaveholding class, with the return of peace and the revival of agricultural, industrial, and commercial prosperity, the New-England system, in its main features, is pretty sure to be gradually introduced or developed, and the division of powers in the state to be as effectively and as systematically carried out as it is between the general government and the particular or state governments. So, though universal suffrage, good as far as it goes, is not alone sufficient, the division of powers affords with it a not inadequate protection.

No government whose workings are intrusted to men ever is or can be practically perfect—secure all good and guard against all evil. In all human governments there will be defects and abuses, and he is no wise man who expects perfection from imperfection. But the American constitution, taken as a whole and in all its parts, is the least imperfect that has ever existed, and under it individual rights, personal freedom and independence, as well as public authority or society, are better protected than under any other; and as the few barbaric elements retained

from the feudal ages are eliminated, the standard of education elevated, and the whole population americanized, moulded by and to the American system, it will be found to effect all the good, with as little of the evil, as can be reasonably expected from any possible civil government or political constitution of society. (Vol. xviii. pp. 141, 142.)

## POLITICAL ECONOMY.

### THE MODERN INDUSTRIAL SYSTEM.

THE distinguishing feature of modern civilization, if we take what is positive in it, is the application of the discoveries of science to the mechanic and productive arts. . . .

Since railroads, steamboats, and the various applications of science to the invention and construction of labor-saving machinery have been introduced and the modern world is adjusted to them, we could not well do without them and it would be a calamity to be deprived of them; but there are grave thinkers who greatly doubt if real civilization has been advanced by them or if the world gets on any better with than it did without them. They have completely changed the face of the industrial world, to some extent the mutual relations of capital and labor, and vastly increased the power of production; but that they have made it easier for a poor man to earn his living or added anything to the real happiness or well-being of the people is not so certain. Under the new system the rich as a class grow richer and the poor as a class grow poorer. The small home industries of the olden time give way to large industries, in which capital, as necessary to introduce machinery, counts for more and labor for less. Wages may be nominally higher, but are less in proportion to the wants of the laborer. (Vol. xiii. pp. 16, 17.)

## THE ESSENCE OF POLITICAL ECONOMY.

THE political economists consider man only as a producing, distributing, and consuming machine, and seek only to get the greatest possible supply with the greatest possible demand. . . . I look upon man as having a sentient, intellectual, and moral nature, and I seek for him the greatest possible sum of virtue and happiness. It is not likely, then, that the political economists and I should think alike. It adds not to the well-being of the poor that the aggregate wealth of a nation increases if they are all the time growing poorer and find it every day more difficult to supply their wants or to obtain by honest industry their bread. Under the new system it may be that wealth increases, but the tendency in the great industrial nations is to concentrate it in fewer hands or in huge overgrown corporations, which in your country are stronger than the government and control, not always the elections, but the legislative assemblies, both state and national. . . .

To make a man happy we should study not to increase his stores, but to diminish his desires. The political economists study to increase a man's desires and to develop new wants in him in order to increase as much as possible consumption, which, in turn, will increase the demand, and the increased demand will stimulate increased production. The demand creates the supply and the supply stimulates consumption, which, in turn, creates an increased demand. This, if I understand it, is the essence of your modern science of political economy. But what is the gain to the laborer? . . .

The more wants one has that one is unable to satisfy, the more one suffers. A man's happiness does

not consist in the number of wants satisfied, but in having no wants unsatisfied. It may well be conceded that if the laboring classes were thrown back into the condition in which they were in the middle ages, or even in the sixteenth century, they would be far more wretched than they are now; but that is not the question. Were their means of satisfaction less in proportion to their actual wants than they are now in proportion to their present actual wants? No doubt more wants may now be satisfied, but that is nothing if there is a proportionate increase of wants that are not and cannot be satisfied. (Vol. xiii. pp. 17, 18.)

#### SUPPLY OUTFRONS DEMAND.

THIS is an age of forgetfulness. You seem to forget that no longer ago than 1848 nearly all European society was convulsed by the loud demand for what was then called the "right to labor," the right to gain one's bread by the sweat of one's face. Thousands, millions even, of men in the great industrial and commercial nations, able and willing to work, were standing idle, gaunt and grim, because there was no work to be had. The labor market was overstocked; supply had outrun the demand. The demand for labor depends on the state of the markets throughout the world, and a surplus of labor is the normal state in all your great industrial and commercial centres. Were the whole productive force at the command of industry employed to its full extent, more could be produced in any one year than could be disposed of to the actual consumer in any four years, as I am told by those who profess to know, and consequently the operatives are either thrown



out of employment or compelled to work on short time for what is equivalent to three out of every four years. Hence the frequency of distress in manufacturing districts, which finds relief only in public or private charity. Various expedients are suggested by political economists and tried by governments, but as yet with indifferent success. A favorite measure with one class is what is called protection, or a tax imposed on the importation of foreign productions for the protection and encouragement of our own. But this does not help the operative class, for its only effect is to increase the profits of the capital employed in the industries protected, and these enhanced profits must be paid by labor or, at best, by labor and land. (Vol. xiii. p. 18.)

#### FREE TRADE AND PROTECTION.

I do not know whether the free traders or the protectionists are the wiser; I only know that neither can remedy the evil. Free trade simply gives the advantage to those nations that have already got the start of the others in the production of exchangeable commodities. Its maxim is to buy where you can buy cheapest and to sell where you can sell dearest, and its interest is therefore to enhance as much as possible the profits of capital by diminishing the cost of labor, and therefore the value to the laborer of his labor, the only commodity he has to dispose of. The only difference I can see between the two systems is that the protective system taxes the land and labor of the nation that adopts it, and the free trade system taxes the land and labor of all trading nations for the benefit of capital, especially of the capital of the nation that has already the start of the others. Free

trade is, undoubtedly, the interest of British capital, for Great Britain is the greatest manufacturing and commercial nation in the world; and perhaps for the United States, so largely engaged in the production of agricultural staples and raw materials. Free trade between Great Britain and France, Spain, Germany, Italy, would operate to the advantage of British capital. Besides, trade itself creates a competition for the markets of the world which originates nearly all the wars of modern times and necessitates those large standing armies of European states which are such a heavy burden on land and labor. (Vol. xiii. p. 19.)

#### COMMERCE DOES NOT CIVILIZE.

THAT the great commercial nations have been and are civilized nations, and that they have extended the area of civilization by establishing colonies of emigrants from their own bosom, is undoubtedly true; but the point is, has commerce ever civilized a nation it found on opening trade with it uncivilized? I recollect no instance of the kind. As far as my historical reading goes, the only force that has ever civilized a savage, barbarous, or semi-barbarous tribe or people is religion. Commerce brings civilized and uncivilized nations in contact, no doubt, but as a rule the uncivilized are broken, as the earthen pot that comes in contact with the iron pot. What has the commerce of Great Britain done for India, where civilization was once far superior to what it is now? Great Britain and perhaps other Christian nations have gained by it, but India herself has lost her autonomy and been impoverished by it. The people of India are poorer to-day, find it harder to live, than when the English East-India Company was formed.

England, to obtain a market for her own wares, broke up the native manufactures and reduced the poor people to abject dependence. The same process has been begun with China and Japan, though it may not be so successful there as it has been in India, where the natives have thus far deteriorated and in no sense advanced in civilization. Commerce has only one principle—"to buy cheap and sell dear;" it does not concern itself with civilization. (Vol. xiii. pp. 19, 20.)

### WE CANNOT GO BACK.

I PROPOSE no going back to former industrial arrangements. True, I do not believe all is gold that glisters, nor that the people are really any better off under the new system than they were before it was adopted; but since it is adopted and habits and modes of action are conformed and adjusted to it, we could not dispense with it without causing a far greater evil than was caused by its introduction and adoption. The church can use your railroads and steamboats for her missionaries, and your lightning telegraphs for rapid communication between her head and members. If it was no advantage to make the change, it still would be a great disadvantage to be forced to return to the past. (Vol. xiii. pp. 20, 21.)

The world, with its present passions and interests, knows not how to dispense with the modern industrial and mercantile system, ruinous to the real virtue and happiness of the people as it may be. It is the reigning order, and even they who dislike it cannot live without it and are obliged to conform to it. The world, which does not and cannot appreciate the superiority of the spiritual to the temporal, nor take

any very broad and comprehensive views even of the temporal, cannot spare Great Britain or suffer her to be eclipsed. Her downfall would carry with it the downfall of the whole credit and funding system, that ingenious device for taxing posterity for the benefit of the present generation. Stock-gambling would fall, the whole system of fictitious wealth would disappear, and the greater part of modern shams and illusions. The downfall of Great Britain would produce a universal convulsion and produce effects of hardly less magnitude than the downfall of ancient Rome. The emancipated nations would not know how to use their newly-recovered liberties. The keystone would be struck from the arch of the modern world. The crash some day must come, but no nation is ready for it, and the nations most hostile to Great Britain will rather labor to sustain her in order to prevent the catastrophe than to hasten her downfall. Trade as yet is sovereign, and as commerce is likely for some time to come to be substituted for religion and the trader for the Christian missionary, it would be exceedingly imprudent to hazard a prediction that the power of England has culminated. The devil will not readily let go the gripe he has through the system we condemn on the modern world. Great Britain represents the city of the world as Rome represents the city of God, and as the complete triumph of the city of God will not take place before the last day, we can hardly believe that Great Britain will experience any serious reverses, and we shall not be surprised to find even her enemies uniting to guaranty her a new lease of power, (Vol. xvi. pp. 545, 546.)

## THE WEALTH OF GREAT BRITAIN.

NOWHERE did I find the extremes of wealth and poverty so striking as in Great Britain. The wealth of her nobility was often great, but that was in most cases due to the enhanced value of their landed estates and led to no painful reflections. But the huge wealth of her merchant princes, her cotton or industrial lords, her bankers and money-changers, contrasted sadly with the mighty mass of pauperism, every day increasing and supported by rates levied on householders, themselves often but a shade above the pauper. I could not but think by what a terrible tax on the laboring classes their enormous wealth must have been accumulated. Their wealth has been gained at the expense not only of the laboring class of their own country, but at the expense of the laboring classes of British India and of all nations against which Great Britain holds the balance of trade. It has been gained by coining the toil, the sweat, the tears, and the blood of millions; and what can I say in defence of the system that permits, encourages, nay, demands for its success, such gross outrages upon our fellow-men? (Vol. xiii. p. 21.)

## OUR OWN DANGER.

I SEE the same system adopted in my own country, whose prosperity, up to the breaking out of the late civil war, was due to three principal causes—the large tracts of fertile land, easily accessible and cheap; to southern slavery, which stimulated the production of cotton; and the mighty influx into the non-slaveholding states of foreign laborers. To these and not to our democratic institutions, nor to

any wise legislation, state or national, which has from the first been about as unwise, as short-sighted, and as blundering as it well could be, do we owe our prosperity. Slavery is abolished, the public lands are remote from the great centres of population and the best and richest of them have been given away to great corporations, and the British system, before the war confined mostly to the northern states, and against which the confederate states waged their disastrous war, can now spread over the whole Union and produce, in time, more fatal results than in England, for it meets here no counterpoise in a landed aristocracy, and the government operates simply as its agent or instrument.

We declaim against feudalism under which the great vassals of the crown were more powerful than the crown itself and often reduced the central authority to a legal fiction. How much better is it with us, where the effective power is vested in huge railroads and other corporations? The government, both state and national, is only the factor of these corporations, which, though its own creations, it cannot control but must obey. (Vol. xiii. p. 22.)

The great danger of modern times is this growing industrial feudalism which is springing up in all the more *advanced* nations of Christendom and taking the place of the old feudalism founded on conquest and territory. It is, in many respects, worse than the feudalism of the middle ages, and so far as we can see, better in none. The old feudalism was territorial, and the serf lived on and drew his support from the land he tilled, and his means of living were in proportion to the productiveness of his labor. He might, indeed, sometimes want, but only in seasons of general scarcity. This new feudalism is founded

on trade, much more fluctuating than agriculture, and the operative's means, instead of being in proportion to the productiveness of his labor, are in proportion to the demand in the market. As his products, owing to the vast increase of the productive power of all industrial nations, run always ahead of the demand, he suffers most, experiences his greatest want, when warehouses and granaries are the fullest. (Vol. xv. pp. 425, 426.)

#### TRADE DOES NOT ENRICH A PEOPLE.

BUT there are things of greater value to a nation than trade. No nation is really enriched by trade. Trade accumulates luxuries, but luxuries impoverish, not enrich a people. All real wealth is in land and labor, and that nation is richest in which labor can the easiest obtain from the land the means of subsistence and comfort. The land is with us vastly more burdened than it was fifty years ago, and hence it is far harder for the laborer to maintain his independence. Land and labor have to sustain with us a lavish expenditure, a luxury and extravagance that tax their energies far beyond their present capacity, since our indebtedness, our drafts on the future, must be counted by hundreds, if not by thousands of millions. All credit is a draft on the future, and the amount of a nation's indebtedness is the excess of its expenditures over its income. The actual addition to our productive capital in any one year does not equal the indebtedness we contract during that year, and hence with all our trade and industry we rather grow poorer than richer, and the difficulty of living becomes greater. The fact of this difficulty every poor man feels, and feels notwithstanding the new

lands opened to cultivation and the immense additions made every year to our wealth by the immigration of hardy, healthy, able-bodied adult laborers, men and women. The reason of this is the fact that by the modern system of trade and commerce we increase the burdens of land and labor. Let China engage in trade with the energy and enterprise displayed by Great Britain, and she would soon find herself unable to support her four hundred millions of inhabitants, and the want and wretchedness of her population would be increased a hundred-fold; for the additional burden it would impose on land and labor would be expended in luxuries, and worse than a dead loss to the nation. . . . The evil that weighs us down is in the immense numbers of non-producers land and labor have to support, and to a great extent in luxury and extravagance. (Vol. xvi. pp. 541, 542.)

#### POLITICAL ECONOMISTS TAKE TOO NARROW A VIEW.

WE know that we do not follow Adam Smith or any of the political economists, though it is possible that we have studied him and them as much as most men have. They are right enough from their point of view and in their narrow sphere, but the system they defend, when carried into practice and made the rule of national policy, is about as absurd and mischievous a system as the devil ever assisted the human mind to invent. If all the modern political economies had been strangled in their birth, it would have been a blessed thing for the human race. We know there are few at present to agree with us, and the leading minds of the age and country, if they notice us at all, will set down what we are saying to



our ignorance, our eccentricity, or our love of paradox. Be it so. That will not make what we say less true or prove the wisdom of those who regard commerce as the pioneer of Christianity, and the merchant who does his best to master or circumvent unchristianized nations for the purposes of gain as the most successful Christian missionary. But believing, as we do, the modern industrial and mercantile system the greatest curse of the times, we of course cannot regret as untoward any of those events which tend to break it up. (Vol. xvi. p. 542.)

We are far from believing that the modern industrial and commercial system inaugurated by the treaty of Utrecht, 1713, and at the head of which is Great Britain, is a system really advantageous to the world or destined, in fact, to be a permanent system. We believe it impoverishes more than it enriches nations, while it favors their moral degradation. It multiplies luxuries to an enormous extent, as we can see by simply looking about us in our own city, but it does not render a people really wealthier or render it more easy for them to obtain a living. Expenses are increased at a greater ratio than gains. The general style of living requires an income larger than can possibly be obtained in the slow and regular way of business or industry. Hence the rage for speculation, the reliance on a lucky hit, in which few can be successful, to make a fortune. Hence the innumerable failures, bankruptcies, insolvencies, frauds, dishonest contrivances which are the disgrace of modern states and are fast destroying all confidence of man in man. We sometimes think that Great Britain, by carrying with her everywhere this demoralizing system, more than overbalances the good she does by her advocacy of the great principles

of civil freedom and constitutional government. A war with her that should break up this system and force us to become less a commercial and more an agricultural people would, we have no doubt, in the long run, prove an advantage to us, both under an economical and a moral point of view. But as long as the system remains each nation must in self-defence adopt it, defend it, and draw from it all the advantage it can. Therefore, though disliking the system, we still urge our government to guard it with vigilance. (Vol. xvi. pp. 485, 486.)

#### COMMERCE AND MANUFACTURES ARE OVERDONE.

COMMERCE and manufactures have their bounds, and cannot be pushed beyond certain limits without a ruinous revulsion. The great evil of our modern society lies precisely in the fact that commerce and manufactures are pushed too far. They are overdone. They call around them a larger population than they can feed. To secure to capital its returns or to save the merchant and manufacturer from ruin, the laborers dependent on them must be thrown out of employment about a third or fourth part of their time and left to steal, beg, or starve, and not infrequently to all three. Hence the terrible misery of the laboring classes all through Europe in modern times; and hence your red-republicans and your socialistic insurrections and revolutions which within the last year have astonished and shaken the world. Any further extension of the modern industrial system, save as it comes in the natural course of things, is madness. Commerce lives only by agriculture and manufactures. . . . The application of steam

to navigation and production, the invention and adoption of labor-saving machinery, during the last half-century, have caused the power of production to exceed, in the existing economical systems of society, the power of consumption; and you cannot, unless you can double the latter, extend the former without a loss which must fall somewhere, and which, wherever it falls in the first instance, must inevitably in the last fall on the laborer. In other words, the interests of agriculture and labor cannot, in the present state of the world, sustain a more extended system of commerce and manufactures than is now in operation. These have reached the highest proportion they will bear, and, if we do not misunderstand the late European revolutions, a far higher proportion than they will bear. Their continuance on their present scale must necessarily result, not in stimulating labor and developing the agricultural resources of nations, but in depressing agriculture and in reducing wages below the minimum of human subsistence, and therefore, ultimately, in their own ruin and that of the people. (Vol. xvi. pp. 163, 164.)

#### RESULTS OF THE MODERN SYSTEM.

GOING along through the streets of Boston the other day, we remarked that it has become the fashion to convert the basement floors of our churches into retail shops of various kinds of merchandise. How significant! The church is made to rest on TRADE; Christ on Mammon. Was anything ever more typical? The rents of these shops in some cases, we are told, pay the whole expense of the minister's salary. Poor minister! if thou shouldst but

take it into thy head to rebuke Mammon, as thy duty bids thee, and to point out the selfishness and iniquity of the dominant spirit of trade, thy underpinning would slide from under thee, and thou wouldst—— But land is valuable; and why should it lie idle all days in the week but one because a meeting-house stands on it? Ay, sure enough. Oh, blessed thrift, great art thou, and hast learned to coin thy God and to put him out at usury! (Vol. iv. pp. 449, 450.)

We might go further in proof of the sad state to which we are coming or have already come. We are told, on tolerable authority, that in this city of Boston, which we take it is the model city of this country, there are some four thousand wretched prostitutes out of a population of about one hundred thousand. This fact is not only a lucid commentary on our morals, but also on the difficulty there is in getting a living by honest industry; since prostitution is resorted to in this and all other countries rarely through licentiousness, but chiefly, almost wholly, through poverty. We are also told by the agents of the police, who have the best means of knowing, that the principal supply of these victims to poverty and men's infamy comes from the factories in the neighboring towns!—no uninteresting comment on the workings of the factory system built up by our banks and high tariffs, and which the chiefs of our industry have taken and are taking so much pains to fasten on the country!

But whence come these sad results? There must be somewhere a fatal vice in our social and industrial arrangements, or there would not, could not, be these evils to complain of. Never till within these last few centuries were men, able and willing to

work, brought to the starving-point in times of peace and in the midst of plenty. (Vol. iv. p. 435.)

There can be no question that within the last three hundred years there has been a most wonderful increase of industrial activity, of man's productive power, and of the aggregate wealth of the world. Great industries, so to speak, have within these three hundred years sprung up, never before conceived of; man has literally made the winds his messengers and flames of fire his ministers; all nature works for him; the mountains sink and the valleys rise before him; the land and the ocean fling out their treasures to him; and time and space are annihilated by his science and skill. All this is unquestionable. On the other hand, equally unquestionable is it to him who has looked on the matter with clear vision that in no three hundred years known to us since men began to be born and to die on this planet, upon the whole, it has fared worse, for soul or for body, with the great mass of the laboring population. Our advance, it would seem, has been that ordered by the militia captain, an "advance backwards!" This statement may or may not make sad work with our theories of progress of the race, progress of light, of political and social well-being, and all that; but it is a fact, an undeniable, a most mournful fact, which get over we cannot, try we never so hard.

For these last three hundred years we have lost or been losing our faith in God, in heaven, in love, in justice, in eternity, and been acquiring faith only in human philosophies, in mere theories concerning supply and demand, wealth of nations, self-supporting, labor-saving governments; needing no virtue, wisdom, love, sacrifice, or heroism on the part of their managers; working out for us a new Eden,

converting all the earth into an Eldorado land, and enabling us all to live in Eden Regained. We have left behind us the living faith of the earlier ages; we have abandoned our old notions of heaven and hell; and have come, as Carlyle well has it, to place our heaven in success in money matters, and to find the infinite terror which men call hell only in not succeeding in making money. We have thus come—where we are. Here is a fact worth meditating. (Vol. iv. pp. 437, 438.)

Even your modern slaveholder is obliged to recognize a relation between him and his slave of a more generous and touching nature than any recognized by the master-worker between himself and his workman. The slave when old or sick must be protected, provided for, whether the owner receives any profit from him or not; the master-worker has discharged all the obligation to his operative he acknowledges when he has paid him the stipulated wages. These wages may be insufficient for mere human subsistence, and the poor worker must die; but what is that to the master-worker? Has he not paid all he agreed to pay, even to the last farthing, promptly? We have not heard on our southern plantations of Stockport cellars, of bread-and-soup societies by the charitable, and men stealing in order to be sent to the House of Correction so as not to starve. This much we can say of the slave, that if he will tend pigs in the wood he shall have some parings of the pork, and so long as his master has full barns he is not likely to starve. Would we could say as much of the hired laborer always! (Vol. iv. p. 441.)

## WHAT IS THE REMEDY?

BUT, after all, what is the remedy? Let us not deceive ourselves. The whole head is sick, the whole heart is faint. Our industrial arrangements, the relations of master-workers and workers, of capital and labor, which have grown up during these last three hundred years are essentially vicious, and, as we have seen, are beginning throughout Christendom to prove themselves so. The great evil is not now in the tyranny or oppressions of governments as such; it is not in the arbitrary power of monarchies, aristocracies, or democracies; but it is in the heart of the people and the industrial order. It is simply, under the industrial head, so far as concerns our material well-being, in this fact, this mournful fact, that there is no longer any certainty of the born worker obtaining always work whereby he can provide for the ordinary wants of a human being. Nor is this altogether the fault of the master-workers. To a very great extent the immediate employer is himself in turn employed; and as all who produce produce to sell, their means of employing constantly and at reasonable wages evidently depend on the state of the market; workmen must, therefore, with every depression of trade, be thrown out of employment, whatever the benevolence of the master-workers.

Nor is it possible, with the present organization, or rather *disorganization* of industry, to prevent these ruinous fluctuations of trade. They may undoubtedly be exaggerated by bad legislation, as they may be mitigated by wise and just administration of government, but prevented altogether they cannot be. For this plain reason, that more can be pro-

duced in any given year with the present productive power than can be sold in any given five years—we mean sold to the actual consumer. In other words, by our vicious method of distributing the products of labor we destroy the possibility of keeping up an equilibrium between production and consumption. We create a surplus—that is, a surplus, not when we consider the wants of the people, but when we consider the state of the markets—and then must slacken our hands till the surplus is worked off. During this time, while we are working off the surplus, while the mills run short time or stop altogether, the workmen must want employment. The evil is inherent in the system. We say it is inherent in the *system of wages*, of cash payments, which, as at present understood, the world has for the first time made any general experiment of only now, since the Protestant reformation. *A new capitalism*

Let us not be misinterpreted. We repeat not here the folly of some men about equality and every man being in all things his own guide and master. This world is not so made. There must be in all branches of human activity, mental, social, industrial, chiefs and leaders. Rarely, if ever, does a man remain a workman at wages who could succeed in managing an industrial establishment for himself. Here is our friend Mr. Smith, an excellent hatter, kind-hearted, charitable, and succeeds well; but of the fifty hands he employs not one could take his place. Many of these journeymen of his have been in business for themselves, but failed. They are admirable workmen, but have not the capacity to direct, to manage, to carry on business. It is so the world over. There must be chiefs in religion, in politics, in industry; the few must lead, the many must follow. This is



the order of nature; it is the ordinance of God; and it is worse than idle to contend against it. The great question concerns the mode of designating these chiefs and the form of the relation which shall subsist between them and the rest of the community. Our present mode of designating them in the industrial world—in the political we manage it in this country somewhat better—is obviously defective, and the relation expressed by wages in our modern sense of the term is an undeniable failure. Under it there is no security, no permanency, no true prosperity, for either worker or master-worker; both hurry on to one common ruin.

This, we are well aware, will not be believed. We do not believe ourselves ill. We mistake the hectic flush on the cheek for the hue of health. "We have heard," say our readers, "this cry of ruin ever since we could remember, and yet we have gone on prospering, increasing in wealth, refinement, art, literature, science, and doubling our population every thirty years." Yes, and we shall continue to prosper in the same way. The present stagnation of trade will last not much longer; business will soon revive, nay, is reviving; and we shall feel that the evil day is too far off to be guarded against. We shall grow richer; we shall build up yet larger industries; the hammer will ring from morning till night—till far into the night; the clack of the cotton-mill will accompany the music of every waterfall; the whole land be covered by a vast network of railroads and canals; our ships will display their canvas upon every sea and fill every port; our empire shall extend from the Atlantic to the Pacific and from the Northern Ocean to the Isthmus of Darien; we shall surpass England as much as ancient Carthage sur-

passed the mother Phœnicia; be the richest, the most renowned nation the world ever saw. All this it needs no prophetic eye to foresee; prosperity of this sort we may have, shall have. It is not of outward, material ruin we speak. But what will avail all this outward prosperity—our industries, our wealth, our arts, our luxuries, our boundless empire, our millions of people—if we contain in our midst a greater mass of corruption, of selfishness, of vice, of crime, of abject misery and wretchedness than the world ever saw before? And yet such will be our fate if we continue on in the path, nay, the broad road, in which we are now travelling.

But once more, we are asked, what is the remedy? Shall we go back to the middle ages? . . . No, dear countrymen, no. This is no longer possible even if it were desirable. We have got firearms, heathen literature, printing, and the new world; with these it is not possible to reconstruct the middle ages. How often must we remind you that there is no going back? Who ever knew yesterday to return? From the bottom of our heart we believe these much-decried middle ages were far preferable—regarded as definitive—to our own. What we have as yet obtained by departing from them—unless we make it the stepping-stone to something more—is far beneath them. The Israelites in the wilderness, we must needs believe, were—saving the hope of reaching the promised land—worse off than in Egypt making bricks for their task-masters; but this promised land, flowing with milk and honey, lay *before* them, not behind them, and could be reached not by returning to Egypt, but by pressing *onwards through* the wilderness. . . .

We would have men *governed*, and well governed,

let who will be the governors or what form adopted there may be for selecting them. God's curse and humanity's curse also do and will rest on the no-government schemers. Satan himself was chief anarch, and all anarchs are his children. Men need government, nay, have a *right* to demand government, without which there is no life for them. We would also see revived in all its mediæval force and activity the Christian faith, and as the interpreter of that faith the Christian church, one and indivisible; the ground and pillar of the truth; clothed with the authority which of right belongs to it; and enjoining and exercising a discipline on high and low, rich and poor, as effective as that of the middle ages, but modified to meet the new wants and relations of Christendom. There is no true *living* on this God's earth for men who do not believe in God, in Christ, in the ever-present spirit of truth, justice, love; in the reality of the spiritual world; nor without the church of Christ, active and efficient, authoritative over faith and conscience, competent to instruct us in the mysteries of our destiny, to direct us wisely and surely through the creation of a heaven here on earth, to a holier and higher heaven hereafter. We must revoke the divorce unwisely and wickedly decreed between politics and religion and morality. It must not be accounted a superfluity in the politician to have a conscience; nor an impertinence to speak and act as if he believed in the eternal God and feared the retributions of the unseen world; nor inconsistent with the acknowledged duties of the minister of religion to withhold absolution from the base politician, the foul wretch, whatever his private morals, who will in public life betray his country or support an unjust policy through plea of utility or mere ex-

pediency. It must not always be in vain that a public measure is shown to be unjust in order to secure its defeat or just in order to secure its adoption. Nations must be made to feel that there is a Higher than they, and that they may lawfully do only what the Sovereign of sovereigns commands. Right must be carried into the cabinet councils of ministers, into legislative halls, into the bureaus of business, and preside at the tribunals of justice; men must be made to feel deep in their inmost being, whether in public life or in private life, that they are watched by the all-seeing Eye, and that it is better to be poor, better to beg, better to starve, than to depart in the least iota from the law of rigid justice and thrice-blessed charity. This is what we need; what we *demand* for our country, for all countries; and demand too in the reverend name of Him who was, and is, and is to be, and in the sacred name of humanity, whose maternal heart is wounded by the least wound received by the least significant of her children. (Vol. iv. pp. 452-456.)

#### TRUE POLITICAL ECONOMY.

No good thing will God withhold from them that love him. And he gives us all good in giving us, as he does, himself. Nor does he give us only the goods of the soul. He that will lose his life in God shall find it. "Seek first the kingdom of God and his justice, and all these things"—the things which the gentiles seek after—"shall be added to you." They who lay up the most abundant treasures in heaven have the most abundant treasures on earth. The true principle of political economy, which the old French economists and Adam Smith never knew,

is self-denial, is in living ~~for God and not for the world~~, as a Louvain professor has amply proved with a depth of thought, a profound philosophy, and a knowledge of the laws of production, distribution, and consumption seldom equalled. "I have been young, and now I am old, but never have I seen the righteous forsaken, or his seed begging bread." No people are more industrious or more bent on accumulating wealth than our own, but so little is their self-denial and so great is their extravagance that the mass of them are, notwithstanding appearances, really poor. The realized capital of the country is not sufficient to pay its debts. We have expended the surplus earnings of the country for half a century or more, and the wealth of the nation is rapidly passing into the hands of a few money-lenders and soulless mammoth corporations, already too strong to be controlled by the government, whether state or general. If it had not been for the vast quantities of cheap unoccupied land so easy of access, we should have seen a poverty and distress in this country to be found in no other. The mercantile and industrial system inaugurated by the Peace of Utrecht in 1713, and which is regarded as the crowning glory of the modern world, has added nothing to the real wealth of nations. (Vol. iii. pp. 345, 346.)

#### DUTY OF CAPITALISTS.

Of industrial reforms properly so called we speak not. Owenisms, Saint-Simonisms, Fourierisms, Communisms, and *isms* enough in all conscience are rife, indicating at least that men are beginning to feel that the present industrial relations are becoming quite unbearable. Three years ago we brought

forward our "Morrison Pill," but the public made up wry faces and absolutely refused to take it; so much the worse for them. We cannot afford to throw away our medicines, even if they are quack medicines. We cease attempting to prescribe. We leave this matter to the natural chiefs of industry, that is, to bank presidents, cashiers, and directors; to the presidents and directors of insurance offices, of railroads and other corporations; heavy manufacturers and leading merchants; the master-workers, in Carlyle's terminology, the Plugsons of Undershot. Messrs. Plugsons of Undershot, you are a numerous and a powerful body. You are the chiefs of industry, and in some sort hold our lives in your pockets. You are a respectable body. We see you occupying the chief seats in the synagogues, consulted by secretaries of the treasury, constituting boards of trade, conventions of manufacturers, forming home leagues, presiding over lyceums, making speeches at meetings for the relief of the poor and other charitable purposes. You are great; you are respectable; and you have a benevolent regard for all poor laborers. Suffer us, alas! a poor laborer enough, to do you homage and render you the tribute of our gratitude. Think not that we mean to reproach you with the present state of industry and the workingmen. We have no reproaches to bring. But ye are able to place our industry on its right basis, and we call upon you to do it; nay, we tell you that not we only, but a Higher than any of us, will hold you responsible for the *future* condition of the industrial classes. If you govern industry only with a view to your own profit, to the profit of master-workers, we tell you that the little you contribute to build workhouses and to furnish bread and soup will not be held as a final

discharge. If God has given you capacities to lead, it has been that you might be a blessing to those who want that capacity. As he will hold the clergy responsible for the religious faith of the people, as he will hold the political chiefs responsible for the wise ordinance and administration of government, so, respected Masters, will he hold you responsible for the wise organization of industry and the just distribution of its fruits. Here we dare speak, for here we are the interpreter of the law of God. Every pang the poor mother feels over her starving boy is recorded in heaven against you and goes to swell the account you are running up there, and which you, with all your *financiering*, may be unable to discharge. Do not believe that no books are kept but your own, nor that your method of book-keeping by double entry is the highest method, the most perfect. Look to it, then. What does it profit, though a man gain the whole world and lose his own soul? Ay, respected Masters, as little as ye think of the matter, ye have souls, and souls that can be *lost*, too, if not lost already. In God's name, in humanity's name, nay, in the name of your own souls, which will not relish the fire that is never quenched nor feel at ease under the gnawings of the worm that never dies, let us entreat you to lose no time in rearranging industry and preventing the recurrence of these evils, which with no malice we have roughly sketched for you to look upon. The matter, friends, is pressing, and delay may prove fatal. Remember, there is a God in heaven who may say to you, "Go to now, ye rich men, weep and howl for your miseries that shall come upon you; your riches are corrupted, and your garments are moth-eaten, your gold and silver is cankered; and the rust of them shall be a witness

against you, and shall eat your flesh as it were fire. You have stored up to yourselves wrath against the last days. Behold the hire of the laborers who have reaped your fields of which you have defrauded them, crieth out; and the cry of them hath entered into the ears of the Lord of Sabaoth." This is not our denunciation; it is not the declamation of the agrarian seeking to arm the poor against the rich; but it is God himself speaking to you now in warning, what he will hereafter, unless you are wise, speak to you in retribution. (Vol. iv. pp. 458-460.)

#### PRETENDED REMEDIES.

DISCOVERIES like the one Fourier professes to have made are not in the order of human experience. There is nothing to be found in the experience of the race analogous to them. Discoveries which reverse what the race had hitherto regarded as the settled order have never yet, so far as history goes, been made in any department of life—in religion, in morals, in politics, or in social and industrial arrangements. Every man who has come forward with any such pretended discovery has failed to gain a verdict in his favor, and in the judgment of mankind has been finally condemned either as deceiving or as deceived, or both at once. M. Charles Fourier, a man, if you will, of an extraordinary intellect and of philanthropic aims—although, we confess, we find in his writings only wild extravagance and a pride, an egotism, which amount very nearly, if not quite, to insanity—professes, not, indeed, to have *invented*, but to have *discovered* the law of a new social and industrial world. This law he professes to have drawn out and scientifically established in all its ram-



ifications, and he and his followers propose to reorganize society and industry according to its provisions. Similar pretensions have often been made, now in one department of life, now in another; but has one of them ever succeeded? Is there one of them that has not been finally adjudged, at best, to be only visionary? Is there on record a single instance of a fundamental reorganization of society, industry, or even of government, that has ever been effected? Have not all who have labored for such reorganization been opposed by their age and nation? And can the associationists name an instance in which posterity has reversed the judgment of contemporaries? They cannot do it. We are aware of the instances they will cite, but not one of them is to the purpose. Why, then, suppose the whole order of human experience is reversed or departed from in the case of M. Charles Fourier? The fact is, fundamental changes in the religious, moral, social, political, or industrial order of mankind—changes which throw off the old order and establish a new order in their place—never have been, and, it requires no great depth of philosophy to be able to say, never can be, effected, unless by the intervention of a supernatural cause. When attempted they may go so far as to break up the old order, never so far as to introduce and establish a new order. Man can be a destroyer; he can never be a CREATOR. (Vol. x. pp. 40, 41.)

### IS POVERTY AN EVIL?

MOREOVER, is it certain that poverty, in itself considered, is evil or opposed to our destiny? Where is the proof? Wealth and poverty are both relative

terms, unless the term poverty be restricted to those who have not even so much as their will which is their own, and then we should be obliged to predicate wealth of all who possess something, however little. But the associationists do not so restrict the sense of the word, for they include in the number of the poor people who have something of their own, at least their will and bodily activity. What, then, is the real distinction between wealth and poverty? Where draw the line so that the rich shall all be on one side and all the poor on the other? John Jacob Astor is said, when told of a man who had just retired from business with half a million, to have remarked that he had no doubt but the poor man might be just as happy if he were rich! To John Jacob Astor the man worth half a million was a poor man; to most men he would be a rich man. One man counts himself poor in the possession of thousands; another feels himself rich if he have a coarse serge robe, a crust of bread, and water from the spring. Which of the two is the rich, which the poor man? If the Italian lazzaroni, the scandal of thrifty Englishmen and Yankees, have what contents them, or are contented with what suffices for the present moment, unsolicitous for the next, wherein are they poorer than our "merchant princes," who have a multitude of wants they cannot satisfy? and wherein would you enrich them, by increasing their possessions, if you increased their wants in the same ratio?

But pass over this difficulty. Suppose you have some invariable standard by which to determine who are the poor and who are the rich: whence does it follow that poverty is in itself an evil? Many emperors, kings, princes, nobles, and innumerable

saints have voluntarily abandoned wealth and chosen poverty, even made a solemn vow never to have anything to call their own. Is it certain that these have acted a foolish part, abandoned good and inflicted evil on themselves? If not, how can you say poverty is in itself an evil? Do you say poverty breeds discontent and leads to vice and crime? Is that true? Does it do so in all men who are poor? Did it do so in St. Anthony, St. Francis of Assisi, St. John of God, St. Thomas of Villanova, St. Philip Neri, and thousands of others we could mention who observed evangelical poverty to the letter? Are all the poor discontented, vicious, and criminal? No man dares say it. Then what you allege is not a necessary result of poverty and must have its efficient cause elsewhere, in the person or in some circumstance not dependent on wealth or poverty. In the world's history poverty, vice, and misery are far from being inseparable companions; and so are wealth, virtue, and happiness. Was wealth a good to the rich man mentioned in the Gospel? Was poverty an evil to the poor man that lay at his gate full of sores, begging to be fed with the crumbs that fell from his table?

We might go through the whole list of physical evils drawn up by the associationists, and ask in relation to each, so far as it is physical, the same or similar questions. Whence, then, the certainty that what they propose to remove as evil is evil? Whence, then, the proof that the end they propose is a good end? Suppose—and the case is supposable—that what are called physical evils are dispensed by a merciful Providence, designed to be invaluable blessings, and are such to all who receive and bear them with the proper dispositions: could we then

pronounce them evils? Would it not follow that in themselves they may be indifferent, and that the good or the evil results from the disposition with which they are received and borne? Now, this may be the fact. If it is, then the good or the evil depends on ourselves, and we may make them either blessings or curses, as we choose. 'Then to remove evil would not necessarily be to remove them, but to cure that moral state which makes a bad instead of a good use of them.

It is easy to declaim, but it is important that we declaim wisely; and to be able to declaim wisely we must know what to declaim against. It is easy to harrow up the feelings by eloquent descriptions of physical sufferings, and no doubt physical sufferings are often an evil of no small magnitude; but this is nothing to the purpose. Is the evil in the physical suffering itself or in the moral state of him who causes or suffers it? Suppose we transport ourselves to the early ages of our era and take our stand in proud, haughty, imperial, and pagan Rome; suppose we assist at the trial, tortures, and martyrdom of the persecuted Christians, behold them cast to the wild beasts in the amphitheatre, see them broiling slowly on gridirons, their flesh torn off with pinchers, or their living bodies stuck full of splinters besmeared with pitch, lighted, and ranged along the streets of the city by night as so many lamps. Here is physical pain. Ingenuity, aided by diabolical malice, has done its best to refine upon torture, to produce the greatest amount possible of physical suffering. Yet what is it that excites our horror? This pain beyond conception of the Christian martyrs? Not at all. We glory in it; we bless God for it; and so do the sufferers themselves. They *choose* it,

voluntarily submit to it, and joy in the midst of it, and would not have it less for all the world. There is no joy on earth so sweet, so great, so ecstatic as that of the martyr. The horror we feel is not at the physical suffering, but at the malice which inflicts it—not at the fact that the martyrs are enabled heroically to win their crowns, but at the refined cruelty which delights to torture them. It is very possible, then, to conceive the most exquisite physical sufferings, the most excruciating tortures, and the most cruel death as even a great and invaluable good to those who suffer them. Their presence, then, is not necessarily an evil to the sufferer, and consequently exemption from them not necessarily a good. For the same reason it does not necessarily follow that the wealth, and luxury, and other things you propose are necessarily in themselves at all desirable. You must go further, and before attempting to decide what is good or what is evil, tell us WHAT IS THE DESTINY OF MAN; for it is only in relation to his destiny that we can pronounce this or that good or evil. “Am I not a happy man?” said Cræsus to Solon after showing him his treasures. “Whether a man is happy or not,” replied the Athenian sage, “is not to be known before his death.” (Vol. x. pp. 43, 44.)

### PHILANTHROPY AND CHARITY.

NAV, philanthropy itself is a sort of selfishness. It is a sentiment, not a principle. Its real motive is not another's good, but its own satisfaction according to its nature. It seeks the good of others, because the good of others is the means of its own satisfaction, and is as really selfish in its principle as any

other of our sentiments; for there is a broad distinction between the *sentiment* of philanthropy and the *duty* of doing good to others—between seeking the good of others from sentiment and seeking it in obedience to a law which binds the conscience. The measure of the capacity of philanthropy as a sentiment is the amount of satisfaction it can bring to the possessor. So long as, upon the whole, he finds it more delightful to play the philanthropist than the miser for instance, he will do it, but no longer. Hence philanthropy must always decrease just in proportion to the increase of the repugnances it must encounter, and fail us just at the moment when it is most needed, and always in proportion as it is needed. It follows the law so observable in all human society, and helps most when and where its help is least needed. Here is the condemnation of every scheme, however plausible it may look, that in any degree depends on philanthropy for its success.

The principle the associationists want for their success is not philanthropy—the love of man for man's sake—but divine charity, not to be had and preserved out of the Catholic Church. Charity is, in relation to its subject, a supernaturally infused virtue; in relation to its object, the supreme and exclusive love of God for his own sake and man for the sake of God. He who has it is proof against all trials; for his love does not depend on man, who so often proves himself totally unamiable and unworthy, but on God, who is always and everywhere infinitely amiable and deserving of all love. He visits the sick, the prisoner, the poor, for it is God whom he visits; he clasps with tenderness the leprous to his bosom and kisses his sores, for it is God he embraces and whose dear wounds he kisses. The most

painful and disgusting offices are sweet and easy, because he performs them for God, who is love and whose love inflames his heart. Whenever there is a service to be rendered to one of God's little ones he runs with eagerness to do it, for it is a service to be rendered to God himself. "Charity never faileth." It is proof against all natural repugnances; it overcomes earth and hell and brings God down to tabernacle with men. Dear to it is this poor beggar, for it sees in him only our Lord who had "not where to lay his head;" dear are the sorrowing and the afflicted, for it sees in them Him who was a "man of sorrows and acquainted with infirmity;" dear are these poor outcasts, for in them it beholds Him who was "scorned and rejected of men;" dear are the wronged, the oppressed, the down-trodden, for in them it beholds the Innocent One nailed to the cross and dying to atone for human wickedness. And it joys to succor them all, for in so doing it makes reparation to God for the poverty, sufferings, wrongs, contempt, and ignominious death which he endured for our sakes; or it is his poverty it relieves in relieving the poor, his hunger it feeds in feeding the hungry, his nakedness it clothes in throwing its robe over the naked, his afflictions it consoles in consoling the sorrowing, his wounds into which it pours oil and wine and which it binds up. "Inasmuch as ye did it unto the least of these my brethren, ye did it unto me." All is done to and for God, whom it loves more than men, more than life, and more than heaven itself, if to love him and heaven were not one and the same thing. This is the principle you need; with this principle you have God with you and for you and failure is impossible. But with this principle Association is, at best, a matter of indiffer-

ence; for this is sufficient of itself at all times, under any and every form of political, social, or industrial organization. He who has God can have nothing more. (Vol. x. pp. 61, 62.)

#### THE CHURCH'S METHOD OF REMOVING EVILS.

BUT is her method adequate? Let us see. The men who have manifested, under their highest forms, the virtues which are required to remove all real evils and to procure every true good of which men in this world are capable, are undeniably to be found in the Catholic Church, and nowhere else. If all men were like, for instance, St. Raymond of Penafort, St. John of God, St. Vincent de Paul, or even Fénelon, a great and good man, yet far below the standard of a Catholic saint, there could and would be no lack of the good desirable and no real evil could exist. There is not a form of evil in society, a single ill that flesh is heir to, which some one or more of our saints have not made provision for removing or solacing, and which they would not have removed or solaced if they had been duly seconded, as you must know if you have made yourselves but passably acquainted with the charitable institutions of the church. Yet these saints did not go out of the church, and did but come up to that standard of perfection which she proposes to all and exhorts all her children to aspire to, and to which all may attain by the grace of God, and that, too, without any change of the existing political, social, or industrial order. All may have in the bosom of the church, whatever the external order, all the means needed for attaining to the highest perfection of which they are capable; and by attaining to that perfection all is secured that is or can be desired for society.



But, you say, all are not saints. True; but whose is the fault? It is not the fault of the political, social, or industrial order, otherwise these of whom we speak could not have become saints; not the fault of the church, for she proffers to all the same means and assistance she extended to these; nor precisely the fault of human nature, for these were no better by nature than others, and many of the saints have even been wild and dissolute in their youth. All may not be called by Almighty God to the same degree of heroic sanctity, nor is it necessary; but all are called to Christian perfection, and the means which have proved effectual in the case of those who have attained to it are extended to all and must needs be, if adopted, equally effectual in the case of all. The fault, whenever any one falls below the standard of perfection, is his own, is in the fact that he refuses to comply with all the church commands and counsels. The church cannot take away free will; and as long as men retain it they will, to a greater or less extent, abuse it. . . . God himself respects our free will and governs us only according to our *choice*. He gives us, naturally or supernaturally, the ability to will and to do as he wills, and motives sweet and attractive as heaven and terrible as hell to induce us to will as he wills; but he does not will for us; the will must be our own act. If the church proposes perfection to all, exhorts all to aspire to it, furnishes them all the assistance they need to gain it, and urges them by all the motives which can weigh with them to accept and use them, the fault, if they do not, is theirs, not hers, and she is not to be accused either of inefficiency or insufficiency; for she does all that, in the nature of the case, it is possible to do,

But even a far lower standard of Christian worth than we have been speaking of, and which is possible in the bosom of the church to all, will suffice for the purpose of the associationists. Suppose every one should do, not all the church counsels, but simply what she commands, enjoins, as of precept and which every one must do or fall under her censure: what real evil could remain or what desirable social good would be wanting? There would be no wars, no internal disorders, no wrongs, no outrages, no frauds or deceptions, and no taking the advantage one of another. There would be no unrelieved poverty, no permanent want of the necessities or even comforts of life; for the church makes almsgiving a precept and commands all her children to remember the poor. There would remain no ruinous competition, for no one would set a high value upon the goods of this world. The real cause of all the social and industrial evils the associationists deplore, so far as evils they are, is covetousness, which is said to be the root of all evil, and covetousness the church condemns as a mortal sin. Eradicate covetousness from the heart, and your reform, so far as desirable, is effected; and it is eradicated or held in subjection by every obedient Catholic. Hence all that is needed is in the church; let every one submit to her and follow her directions; nothing more will be wanting. All can submit to her, for God, in one way or another, gives to every one sufficient grace for that if it be not voluntarily resisted; and she herself is the medium through which is communicated all the strength any one needs to do all she commands. The way to destroy the tree of evil is to lay the axe at the root, and this the church does. She seeks always to purify the heart, out of which are the issues of life, and she

never fails to do it in the case of any one who submits himself to her discipline. (Vol. x. pp. 65-67.)

The church, then, offers an easy and effectual method of removing all real evils and of securing all that is really good in relation even to our present existence. She offers a feasible and an effectual way of serving our fellow-men—of acquiring and of giving practical effect to the most unbounded charity. Submit to the church, follow her directions, and you will need nothing more. You can secure all you desire, so far as wise in your desires, whatever be the form of the government or the social or industrial order under which you live. The internal can be rectified in every state and condition of life; and when the internal is right you need have no fears for the external. This is a speedy way and within the power of each individual, without his being obliged to wait for the coöperation of his brethren; for each can individually submit himself at any moment he chooses. It is an effectual way; for the reliance is not on human weakness and instability, but on the infinite and unchangeable God. (Vol. x. pp. 67, 68.)

#### CONNECTION OF THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT WITH BANKS.

In consequence of adopting the rule that the government may do incidentally what it may not do directly and what is not necessary to the discharge of its constitutional functions, three systems of policy have grown up, which not only create obstacles to a return of the government to its legitimate province, but also perpetuate inducements for it to depart farther and still farther from it. These are the sys-

tem of internal improvements; the American system, as it is called; and the connection of the government with banking. There is no constitutional grant of power to the federal government in favor of any one of these. Congress has the right to establish post-offices and post-roads and to provide for the general welfare; therefore it has been contended that it may intercept the whole country with great roads and undertake any work of internal improvement that promises to be generally useful. It has no right to lay a protective tariff, but inasmuch as it has the right to lay imposts for the purposes of revenue, it may lay them to double the amount needed for revenue, and so lay them as to tax one portion of the community to enhance the profits of another, and in point of fact so as to affect all the business relations of the whole country. Under the grant of power to regulate commerce, to coin money and fix the value thereof, it is contended that it has the right to be connected with the banks and the whole business of banking. By means of its connection with the banks and banking business it is brought into the closest connection with every man, woman, and child in these twenty-six confederated states. We say nothing against banks and the banking system. We are not now inquiring whether the system be a good or a bad one. What we are contending for stands above and independent of any views anybody may entertain on banks or banking. The banks are intimately connected with all the business concerns of the community; they affect the private fortune of every individual; they determine, to a great extent at least, the price of every article bought or sold, produced or consumed. The government, by being connected with them, becomes connected with the business con-

cerns of every individual citizen, and controls those concerns just in proportion as it is connected with the banks or exerts a controlling influence over their operations. . . .

We mean not by this that the government is to wage a war against the banks, but that it shall let them alone. If the states have not yielded up to the general government their right to institute banks, the banks are matters wholly within the jurisdiction of the states, and we should be the first to repel any attacks the federal government might be disposed to make on them; and this, too, whether we approved the banking system or not. The states are competent to manage their own affairs. We ask nothing of the federal government in relation to banks, but to provide for the management of its fiscal concerns without making any use, directly or indirectly, of their agency. (Vol. xv. pp. 90-93.)

The real governments of the Old World are at this moment on 'change or the Bourse, and the regulation of funds is the principal business of government. Government, instituted for the social weal of the people, becomes thus the mere instrument of private interest, of stock-jobbers, speculators in the funds. We do not want this state of things here. We want a government simple, open, and direct in its action, performing in the simplest and plainest manner possible the functions assigned to it.

We have also commenced in this country a new system of government, not in form only, but in spirit. We reject the maxim that it is necessary to deceive the people for the people's good, and adopt the maxim that honesty is the best policy. To carry out this maxim, it is necessary that the government should always tell the truth, both in its words and its deeds.

It has a right to impose taxes, but only for defraying the expenses incurred in the legitimate exercise of its constitutional powers. It may lay imposts and collect revenues for this purpose, and for this purpose only. It has, then, no right to use its revenues or to suffer them to be used for any other purpose. Now, when it deposits its revenues in the banks, whether in a national bank or in a state bank, in general deposit, as it is contended it should, it uses its revenues or suffers them to be used for other purposes than those of defraying its expenses. They are not deposited there for safe-keeping, as the people are taught to believe, but to be made the basis of loans to the business part of the community. They serve the purpose of sustaining the credit of the banks and, through the banks, of the merchants and manufacturers. This is to collect the revenues for one purpose and to appropriate them to another. This is to deceive the people and to depart from the fundamental maxim of our state policy. If it be necessary to tax the community some thirty millions of dollars annually to sustain the credit of the business men and to enable them to carry on their extensive operations, let them be so taxed; but let it be openly and avowedly. The people will know then what they are taxed for. But so long as the revenues are avowedly collected for the purpose of defraying the expenses of the government, they should be sacred to that end. If in this way a portion of the funds of the nation be useless, it may operate as an inducement to make the taxes as light as possible, which in its turn will relieve the people and keep the government poor; and by keeping it poor keep it honest, free from corruption.

The greatest objection, or one of the greatest ob-

jections to the deposit system, in either a national bank or in state banks, is that it gives to the banks the use of the government funds. Being given to the banks, the use of these funds is virtually given to the business community. The business community, so long as it has the use of them, will not be anxious to reduce the revenues. It will prefer high taxes and favor the accumulation of a surplus, because by having the use of the funds to sustain its credit it gets back more than it is obliged to pay in taxes. . . .

It has never, we believe, been the intention of the people to place the real government of the country in the bank corporations. They have, we believe, always intended that the government should maintain its supremacy and follow its own interest and that of the country, regardless of the special interests of the presidents and directors of banks. In case the government maintains its supremacy, the amount of its funds, the time, place, and extent of its appropriations must always be matters beyond the control of the banks, and also matters which they may not always foresee or be prepared to meet. Government will have it in its power to disturb, whenever it chooses, their nicest business calculations and thwart them in their most cherished plans. It may call upon them for its funds when they are all loaned out and when they cannot be called in without great detriment to the business operations of the community, often not without producing a panic, financial embarrassment, commercial distress. If there be but one bank, or if there be one mammoth bank, it may perhaps profit by panics, financial embarrassments, commercial distress, but the banks generally cannot. Their interest is one and the same with

that of the business community; it is best promoted by sustaining credit, by keeping the waters smooth and even, the times good and easy. They ought, then, to be free from all connection with a partner over whose operations they have no control, and who may choose to withdraw his investments at the very moment when they are most in need of them. It is altogether better for them to trust to their own means and to keep to their proper vocation than it is to mix up their interests with those of the government. (Vol. xv. pp. 90-96.)

We do not believe that the business men will maintain, in general thesis, that government ought to favor them, facilitate their operations, in order to enable them to advance the interests of the farmer and the artisan. There is, we devoutly hope, nobody among us to contend that the government should hire one class to take care of another. For here, everybody knows, government can give to one class only what it takes from another. We go against all special protection, against all special favors. We wish well to commerce, well to manufactures, well to agriculture, well to mechanic arts. These are all sister interests; and when government does not choose to single out one as the special object of its caresses, they all live harmoniously together and add to each other's comfort.

If, however, any interest in this country needs to be protected more than another, it is the interest of what may be termed productive labor. Commerce and manufactures do not need with us any especial care of the government. Of all interests among us, they are those which can best take care of themselves. Money always secures the influence needed for its own protection. It is those who come not into



the moneyed class, honest but humble laborers, who are usually deficient in the power to protect themselves. But for these we ask no special protection, no special governmental action. Leave industry free, unshackled, and they will work out their own salvation. (Vol. xv. pp. 105, 106.)

We are also disposed to concur with Mr. Calhoun in the position he has assumed, that the federal government cannot place its funds in the banks in general deposit without violating an express clause of the constitution. He contends that when the revenues are collected and deposited in the banks they are, if ever, in the treasury. The constitution says expressly that "No money shall be drawn from the treasury but in consequence of appropriations made by law." The public funds deposited in the banks are drawn from them for other purposes than those of meeting appropriations made by law; they are made by the banks the basis of discounts and are frequently all loaned out to their customers. Can this be done without violating the constitution? (Vol. xv. pp. 97, 98.)

#### BANK-NOTES AS CURRENCY.

It was unquestionably the intention of the framers of the constitution that the federal government should provide for a currency which should be uniform and of equal value throughout all the states. The union of the states was desired and effected principally to facilitate their commercial intercourse with one another and with foreign nations. Commerce craved and effected the Union, made us one people. Without the Union the states would have been to each other foreign nations, and the commer-

cial transactions between the citizens of one state and those of another would have been subjected to the laws which govern the trade of our citizens with the subjects of England, France, or any other foreign nation. This was a thing to be avoided. It was desirable to bind the states together in a closer intimacy than that of foreign states, and to make the business intercourse between the citizens of one state and the citizens of another state as facile and as safe as the business intercourse between citizens of the same state.

But this was to be effected only by giving to the federal government the power to provide for a uniform currency, to "coin money and regulate the value thereof." Had this power over the currency been retained by the states individually, there might have been as many currencies as states. What was coin in one state would have been bullion in relation to another. Coins of the same denomination might have varied in value as you passed from state to state, and there would have been no currency in the Union with which debts could be discharged alike in all the states. To avoid this last result, the states were prohibited from issuing bills of credit and from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender. This prohibition was not laid on the states for the purpose of protecting the citizens of the same state against one another, but the citizens of one state against those of another state. The object in view was still a uniform currency. It was to secure to every creditor payment in currency which would be of equal value in whatever part of the Union he might wish to use it.

But we do not find that this implies an obligation on the part of the federal government to provide a

currency of bank paper which shall be safe and of uniform value throughout the states. We cannot find that the constitution and laws know any other currency than that of gold and silver; and when we consider the object which led to the prohibition of the states from issuing bills of credit and from making anything but gold and silver a legal tender, we may safely conclude that it was the intention of the framers of the constitution that gold and silver alone should constitute the legal currency. Bank-notes may circulate because they are convenient and because it may be believed that they will be redeemed in specie on demand, as may bills of exchange and the promissory notes of individuals; but however much they may circulate, they do not constitute a legal currency. (Vol. xv. pp. 90-100.)

#### LINCOLN'S FINANCIAL ADMINISTRATION.

THERE may be men in the country who are respectable bankers and private financiers, but there was not a man connected with the administration, in either house of congress, that understood the science of public finance or how to turn the credit of the government to the best possible account. Mr. Bowen, in his "American Political Economy," asserts, and appears to us to prove, that during the war the people paid in the shape of taxes, if they had been equally distributed throughout the four years for which the war lasted, enough to have met all the necessary expenses of the war, so as to have left at its conclusion not a cent of public debt. Yet the public debt incurred by the war was, at its conclusion, at least three thousand millions of dollars, and the larger part of it, in spite of treasury reports, remains as

yet unliquidated, and a most crippling burden on the industry of the country, especially when coupled with the extravagance and constantly increasing expenditures of the government itself. Mr. Lincoln and his secretary of state never understood anything of public economy, and appeared to act on the principle that men were to be induced to support the war policy of the government by finding it making them millionaires. The secretary of the treasury, Mr. Chase, was an honest, well-meaning man, but the energies of his mind had been employed chiefly in the agitation of the slave question, in organizing a political combination for the overthrow of slavery, and in dreams of an impracticable equality. He knew comparatively little of finance, and sought instruction of Jay Cooke and others, who knew still less and had far less honesty and integrity than he, as their support of the fallacy that "a national debt is a national blessing" and their subsequent disastrous failures in their own private business operations amply proved. These bankers were in the habit of treating debt as capital and trading on it as such, and consequently, in their estimation, the larger the national debt the larger the national capital and the larger the business and profits of—the brokers.

The secretary's first financial operation was a blunder; we might say, a financial suicide. His first loan was taken by the banks, and he drew from them all, or nearly all, their specie, and thus forced them throughout the country to suspend payment. He might have avoided this disaster by leaving the money in the banks and paying its principal creditors in bank certificates, which would, to a great extent, have circulated as currency, and the smaller

creditors in drafts on the banks in which the loan was deposited. As the banks were solvent and paid specie when demanded, both the notes and certificates would have circulated at par, and very few would have been presented for redemption in coin, not more in proportion than in ordinary times, for the holders would have been in general satisfied to receive either a transfer of credit or the bills of the bank. There need have been no extraordinary demand for gold or silver coin—not greater than the banks could meet without crippling themselves. In this way the necessity of the suspension of the banks might have been avoided and the currency kept at par. If it was thought that the sub-treasury act which requires the receipts and disbursements of the government to be made in gold and silver coin stood in the way of this arrangement, which we think it did not, nothing would have been easier than to have obtained an act of congress suspending its operations in this respect during the war. The policy of the government should have been to strengthen the currency and keep it at par with gold, in order to keep down the prices of what it had to purchase: and this, with a little foresight, it might easily have done, and thus have maintained an equilibrium between its war expenditures and the war taxes it levied on the people. But instead of this it began by taking from the banks their reserve of gold and compelling them to suspend, and forcing the business operations of the country and its own to be carried on in an irredeemable and constantly depreciating paper currency.

The exhaustion of the banks of their specie reserve and the bank suspensions left the country without any currency or money in which it could receive

loans when negotiated. This, we suppose, led to the issuing of treasury notes and making them a legal tender for all dues except the customs, which were still to be paid in gold. We will not say that the act of congress authorizing the issue of these treasury notes as a national paper currency was not a necessity at the time it was passed, for we are not sufficiently well informed on the subject to decide so important a question; but this much we may say, if it was a necessity it was the previous blundering of the treasury department in having exhausted, unnecessarily, the banks of their gold that made it so. It has been said that the secretary himself disapproved of the desperate measure; but our memory is strangely at fault if he did not urge it upon congress and talk a large amount of nonsense about *demonetizing* gold and silver, as if that were possible while they constituted the currency of all civilized nations, unless we ceased to have any commercial relations with them, and while we made the duties on imports and the interest on government bonds payable in coin. They could be demonetized and made simple merchandise only on condition that the government dispensed entirely with their use as money and made the treasury notes a legal tender for all debts due to it and from one citizen or denizen to another, which the act did not do. It simply created a double currency: the one of gold and silver for certain purposes, and the other of treasury notes, resting on the credit of the government, for other purposes.

The bill creating the so-called legal tenders was in the nature of a forced loan, without interest and irredeemable. It was an act of downright public robbery, especially since the notes were not receivable for *all* dues to the government, but only for a

certain portion of them. The original bill, we believe, contained a provision that after a certain time the notes might be converted into interest-bearing bonds payable in gold; but that provision was soon struck out, and the government need never redeem them unless it chooses. The measure seemed to supply the government with ample funds. Loans to any amount desired could easily enough be obtained at six per cent, or from the people at seven three-tenths. The financial operations of the government were considered a grand success, and its expenditures were equally great. But what need of loans at interest at all? Why not have paid out directly the greenbacks and saved the interest on its bonds and the obligation to pay the bonds in gold, since the loans were received not in gold, but in greenbacks or legal tenders, that is, in currency supplied by the treasury itself? The interest and bonds payable in gold, declared to be demonetized, were quite unnecessary, for the notes were worth as much in the treasury when received from the printer as when borrowed from the people, the banks, or the brokers.

But as gold was *not* demonetized it remained the standard, and the greenbacks were worth only the amount of gold dollars they could purchase. They were not and could not be retained at par. We spoke of the premium on gold, but it was not that gold was at a premium, but that greenbacks were at a discount. Gold did not appreciate, but the currency depreciated, and at one time to thirty-five per cent, if we do not mistake. The government received on some of its loans only forty cents on the dollar, and, if we are rightly informed, only sixty cents on an average of all its loans, for which it bound itself to pay one hundred cents in gold, that is,

nearly twice the amount received, besides interest. Is it possible to imagine a more miserable financial policy, one more destructive to the interests of a country? The depreciation of the currency had the appearance of raising the price of all goods, agricultural and industrial products, and wages of labor; but it was all an illusion, for the country was only contracting a debt, if you count the several state debts, municipal debts, and corporation debts, to say nothing of individual indebtedness, to more than one-half of the whole assessed value of the United States before the war, excluding the property invested in slaves. In 1866 the taxes collected by the general government alone were, if we can trust statistics, within one hundred and forty millions of the whole income for that year of the entire Union. Several millions of taxes of one sort or another have been remitted, but still the business of the country is depressed, and men and institutions supposed to abound in wealth are every day failing, and proving that our business prosperity was built on debt, called, by way of euphony, credit, not capital. (Vol. xviii. pp. 586-589.)

#### THE CREDIT SYSTEM.

THE fact is, the mercantile system, introduced by England, or the credit system, that is, the system of making debt pass for capital, is itself failing, in consequence of its own expansion. The principle of the system, as we understand it, is to do business on credit and to rely on the profits of the business done to pay the interest on the borrowed capital and to discharge in time the loan itself. This would, perhaps, be well enough if the capital borrowed were real capital, for the volume of business would then



not exceed the ability of the country to sustain and no general depression of business could occur. But it is credit, not capital, that is borrowed. The banks do not lend money, they simply lend their credit, and consequently depend on their debtors for the means to sustain their own credit or to redeem their bills; and these depend on the amount and profits of the business they do on their borrowed credit. If they fail the bank fails, or *suspends*, as it is politely called. The greater the facility of borrowing credit, the greater the extension of business. The multiplication of banks of discount facilitates the borrowing of credit, tempts an undue proportion of the young men of the country into business, and those already engaged to extend their business operations, till business is expanded far beyond the wants of the community or the ability of the industry and productions of the soil to support; and a collapse and business depression, as well as wide-spread financial ruin, inevitably follow. No wisdom, foresight, or prudence, no business tact or capacity, can save a house that has borrowed or given credit from failing, for it will be carried down by the collapse of credit or the demand for payment of the debt hitherto used as capital; and the means to pay it will not be forthcoming when business has been overdone.

Business men feel the pressure and, with us, demand of the government more currency or more banks to facilitate credit. Fatal delusion! The difficulty is not the lack of currency nor of institutions of credit, but that people have nothing to part with to sustain credit. We presume the business of the country, trade, manufactures, and internal improvements, is even now in excess of its actual ability, and consequently things must be worse before they can

be better. All nations that turn their energies in the various channels of business, or make business their leading interest and push it beyond the ability of labor and the soil to sustain, must be constantly experiencing what we have been experiencing since September, 1873. In reality, the depression complained of is only an effort of nature, so to speak, to expel a disease that, if not expelled, must prove fatal. It is the result of the operation of the *vis medicatrix* of nature, and however painful it may be, it will bring with it a cure unless we immediately rush, as we are not unlikely to do, on the first symptoms of returning health, into another business debauch.

What remedy the government can apply we are neither statesman nor financier enough to say, but we do not believe there is any effectual remedy possible short of breaking up entirely the system that treats debt as capital; for in the long run the interest that must be paid on the borrowed credit used as capital will more than absorb the average net profits of the business that can be done with it. Individuals may succeed and enormous estates be accumulated, but the business classes as a body will fail and end poorer than they began. The nation will be only impoverished and weakened. Government may aggravate the evil, but we see little it can do to mitigate it. Neither resumption of specie payments nor inflation of the currency will cure it or permanently lessen it. We are an old man, but we cannot remember a time when we did not hear a loud demand for more currency; and even when the banks professed to redeem their bills in coin, the same periodical panics occurred, or seasons of business depression and hard times that have occurred

under our present irredeemable paper money, only more frequently. We remember 1819, 1829, 1836-7, 1849, 1857, which were as disastrous as 1873 or as is 1875. We know no way of preventing these periodical panics, if you choose to call them so, with a mixed currency of gold and paper, or with banks of discount authorized to pay out their own notes as money, that is, to lend their credit instead of their capital.

Our studies of finance and political economy were made many years ago, say from 1829 to 1843, and we are too old to revise the views we then formed. We then became a "hard-money" man and opposed to all banks except banks of exchange, deposit, and transfer of credit. Such a policy may be objected to as likely, if it is adopted, to diminish largely the volume of business and to keep idle the little savings of the people; but that is precisely the result we would bring about. We grant our views are old-fashioned and directly opposed to those of the modern business world, to the spirit of enterprise now so loudly boasted; but we are not so silly as to suppose that any community will adopt them, and so we forbear to urge them. Yet we would restrict the volume of business, the trade and enterprise of the community to its real capital, and instead of facilitating the entrance of young men without capital into business, we would send them to cultivate the soil, employ them in agriculture or the mechanic arts; and that not for purposes of exchange or the acquisition of wealth, but to gain an honest living by the sweat of their face. This is the normal condition of man on the earth, and every departure from it is attended with more or less evil to body or soul, or to both. Yet by our age of material progress and "advanced

ideas" this can be regarded only as very absurd and as betraying complete ignorance of the world we live in. (Vol. xviii. pp. 589-592.)

## NATIONAL BANK NOTES.

THE measure which we dislike the most of any that we have heard suggested is to suppress the national banks and to make the currency consist entirely of treasury notes, or legal tenders, resting entirely on the credit of the government. This would give the government the power to expand or contract the currency at will and to change at any moment the measure of values, besides making the currency consist of that worst of all financial evils—an irredeemable paper currency, which no possible contrivance can keep at par with coin. Parties would be formed for expanding or contracting the currency, money as a measure of values would vary as the one party or the other succeeded in the elections, and business would be brought to a stand-still, for business men would never know on what to depend, since the policy of the government to-day may be reversed to-morrow. Besides, if we are to have banks issuing their notes to circulate as money—and have them in some shape we shall, at least for a long time to come—we are disposed to believe that no better or safer system can be devised than the existing national-bank system. Compel the national banks to redeem their notes on demand in specie, and they would furnish as uniform, safe, stable, and steady a paper currency as is possible. As banks of issue and circulation they would be absolutely safe. Their defect is in not affording due protection to depositors, which it is impossible for any system of banks

managed by imperfect men to afford amid the constant fluctuations of business if the bank is allowed to make its deposits a basis of its discounts. The objection that the national banks, banking on government bonds, receive a double profit on the bonds they hold, or which are deposited in the treasury as security to their bill-holders, first, in the interest on them, and, second, in the profits arising from using them as bank capital, would be in a measure obviated by resumption and the necessity of having coin reserves. The objection is equally valid against the whole modern system, which treats paper evidences of debt as capital. As long as we retain the system, it is not worth while to insist on so trite an objection. It is part and parcel of the system by which "the rich are made richer and the poor poorer," especially favored by all popular governments, or so-called free governments. (Vol. xviii. pp. 592, 593.)

#### FINANCIAL REMEDIES.

THE various remedies suggested, whether by the president or by prominent merchants, traders, and bankers, are puerile, and not even palliatives. There is no remedy for a gangrenous limb or safety for the patient but in amputation, and not always even in that. The essence of the present system is in using debt as capital. Under it no debts are ever really paid; there is only a transfer of the debt, and all debts are mortgages on the future. A debt discharged in bank-notes becomes a debt against the bank; in greenbacks, it becomes a debt against the government, but in neither case is there any liquidation of the indebtedness. If the government credit fail—and a revolution or gross mismanagement may

cause it to fail—somebody must lose; if the bank fail—and fail it must if it overdoes its business, if its debtors fail, if it lock up its means in unavailable or worthless assets, if there is a considerable shrinkage in their market value, or if its officers are speculators, stock-gamblers, swindlers, or defaulters—its creditors necessarily lose. The bank depends on its debtors for its ability to pay its own debts, and the government would bankrupt the whole people were it to attempt to liquidate at once its entire indebtedness. It is more than it now is able to do to meet its ordinary expenses and pay the interest on the public debt. For remedy, say some, create more banks, repeal all restrictions on their circulation, and relieve them of obligations to keep a reserve on hand. Authorize free banking, or banking by anybody that pleases, say others. Let the government issue more greenbacks or treasury notes, say others still; that is, remedy the evil by increasing it, or inflating still more our over-inflated credit!

The fact is, we have been attempting to be a great business community as distinguished from an agricultural community, and have subjected agriculture itself to the laws of commerce and manufactures. We have attempted to do more business than the country required or its capital and labor could sustain. We have been in too great a hurry and wished to plant and reap the same day. We have been carrying out vast schemes of internal improvements which exceed our means, and we are crippled with debt. We have operated on borrowed capital, which we have received in the shape of perishable merchandise and which we have consumed, leaving the original loan uncanceled. These loans, being paid chiefly in goods imported, have greatly stimu-

lated the extravagance of the people and introduced a love of show and the habit of living beyond their income, while they are left to pay for the internal improvements, as far as paid for at all, out of their own pockets, and still taxed in one form or another to pay the interest constantly accruing to the foreign creditor, or the domestic creditor to whom the claim has been transferred. This tax for interest on debt and to support the extravagance generated by our foreign loans received for the most part in the shape of perishable merchandise, is too heavy for our land and labor, productive as is the one and intense and long-continued as is the other, and the consequence is that the people are in debt, and, speaking generally, live on credit or draw on their capital, hitherto chiefly in land, the better portion of which has already been parted with, eaten up, or worn out.

The remedy is not easy, for the ruling classes have not either the wisdom or the virtue to apply any effectual remedy. The most that they will tolerate is such measures as will enable them to tide over the present crisis or palliate its severity, but leave in full force all the causes that have produced it. Many of these causes are moral and social and beyond the reach of legislative or governmental action. So far as the remedy depends on the government, it consists: 1, in the total repeal of the legal-tender act and making nothing a legal tender but gold and silver; and, 2, in the restriction of the banks in the issue of their notes or bills to their actual ability at any time to redeem them in the lawful money of the United States. The twenty-five per cent reserve the banks are now required to keep in their vaults affords no adequate security either to bill-holders or to depositors, as the present crash proves. The banks

must not be allowed to draw interest on their debts which exceed their means of redeeming them on demand, nor use deposits as capital. We do not disguise the fact that these two measures would cause a considerable shrinkage in values and greatly diminish the volume of the business of the country; but they would tend also to check wild and reckless speculation and to place the business of the country on a safe and wholesome basis. Matters must become worse before they can become better. The volume of business we are doing is too large for the capital of the country, and it cannot be lessened without more or less suffering for a time to the mass of individuals. We have nothing with which to extinguish our indebtedness, whether foreign or domestic, but the produce of land and labor, and till we are compelled to bring our expenses within the income from land and labor, and so far within as to leave a surplus for a sinking-fund, we shall be afflicted with periodical panics like the present. Trade and large manufacturing establishments, as distinguished from domestic industries, are ruining us, as they ruin, in the long run, every nation that depends on them. The political economists are the most consummate fools going, for they regard man only as a producing and consuming animal and are ignorant of the sources of real wealth.

We do not expect either of the two measures we recommend—measures designed to put a stop to the use of debt as capital or stock in trade—will be adopted, nor do we expect to see any efficient remedy applied to the evils of which everybody complains. The present crisis will, after ruining thousands, perhaps hundreds of thousands, who will be unheeded as the slain in battle, exhaust itself, and the surviv-



ors, unwarned by experience, will resume the old course and count the battle won; till a new crisis, a new crash, or prostration of credit comes, from which the widow and orphan, people of moderate means, and the laboring classes, as usual, will be the principal sufferers. Men will not believe that the worship of Mammon is suicidal and that political economy, to be successful, must, like virtue, be based on the principle of self-denial. The modern system of business and finance, which is that of using debt for capital, has too strong a hold on most modern nations, especially Great Britain and the United States, for any power in them to cast it off. It is rapidly becoming universal; it has triumphed over statesmanship, morality, and religion, and we suppose it must run its course till the modern nations find their boasted civilization evaporating in smoke. "The wicked shall be turned into hell, and all the nations that forget God." (Vol. xviii. pp. 549-554.)

### THE PROTECTIVE POLICY.

WE trust that our views are too well known for us to be suspected of favoring the wild notions of free trade advocated by the late William Leggett and others. We are no friends to what has been aptly termed the Let-us-alone policy. We believe in government, in the permanent necessity of government, in a *strong* government, able to speak with authority, to command, and to enforce its commands. Of all evils that can befall a country, a weak government is one of the greatest. Nor do we believe that it is never proper or necessary for government to interfere in the business affairs of individuals, or to attempt to give a new direction or a new stimulus to

industry or to a particular branch of industry. We do not base our opposition to a protective tariff on the ground that individuals are the best judges of their own interest, and that free competition among individuals is the best and surest means of national and individual prosperity. We are no believers in the sovereign virtue of free competition. In our judgment the common reasoning on this subject is fallacious, and competition is productive of immense evils, if, indeed, of some good. There are times and cases when government is needed to control it, to set bounds to it; when the government itself should take the initiative and assume the direction. There may be a branch of industry of great national importance which would be wholly neglected if the government should not adopt measures to induce the citizens to cultivate it, but which, when once fairly engaged in, will yield ample returns and open new sources of wealth and independence to large masses of the people. But if it is a branch of industry that needs more than a *temporary* protection from the government, it is not one of those which should be protected; because if it cannot flourish without a *permanent* protection, it is evidently unsuited to the country and can be prosecuted only at a national outlay for which no adequate return can be made.

Yet in our own country the initiative and direction of the government in industrial operations can rarely, if ever, be necessary; because here, such is the activity and enterprise of our citizens that they stand in no need of a stimulus from government, but will of themselves seek out and carry on every industrial enterprise by which either national or individual prosperity may be promoted. And if not, the only stimulus or protection to be demanded from the

government must be demanded of the state governments, not of the federal government. The state governments have the constitutional right to protect and foster industry, and this is one of their chief duties. But the federal government has no right to meddle with the subject. . . . We cannot first determine what citizens have the right to demand of government as such, and then go and demand it of the federal government, for it is a special government, having only certain special powers, and by no means the general powers of government. We have the right to demand of it only what it has the right to do; and it has the right to do only what it was expressly created for the purpose of doing. (Vol. xv. pp. 496-498.)

#### EXPRESS AND INCIDENTAL POWERS.

WE mean not, by saying that the federal government is restricted to express powers, to say that it has no *incidental* powers. It has incidental powers; but the incidental powers can be exercised only for the purpose expressed in the substantive powers. The end for which the incidental power is exercised must always be the end specified in the substantive power; for any power claimed to be incidental not necessary to carry into effect the substantive power cannot be said to be an incidental power. For the moment it is a power to effect any other end it ceases to be incidental and becomes substantive; and then, if not expressed in the constitution, it is unconstitutional and not lawful to be exercised.

Now, the power to lay a tariff for the protection of any branch of industry is not a substantive power in the constitution, as is agreed on all hands. Con-

sequently a tariff laid for the express purpose of protection would be unconstitutional. The substantive power touching a tariff is the right to impose a tariff for revenue, and for revenue alone. The incidental power is the right to discriminate, but to discriminate only for the general purpose of the substantive power—namely, revenue. To discriminate in favor of protection would be to contemplate an end not contemplated in the substantive power, and therefore to convert the incidental power into a substantive power. The right to discriminate in favor of protection as incidental to the right to impose a tariff for revenue can be claimed only on condition that to discriminate for protection and to discriminate for revenue are one and the same thing. But to discriminate for protection is to discriminate *against* revenue. Therefore the right to discriminate for protection cannot be an incident of the right to impose a tariff for revenue. (Vol. xv. pp. 498, 499.)

### A PROTECTIVE TARIFF DEFEATS REVENUE.

OUR Democratic politicians do retain some reverence for the constitution. They see clearly that a tariff expressly for protection would be unconstitutional, but they do not seem to see with equal clearness that a tariff incidentally for protection is equally unconstitutional; for they do not seem to be aware that a tariff defeats its substantive purpose of revenue just so far as it incidentally discriminates effectually for protection. A protective tariff, we all know, is repugnant to a revenue tariff, and defeats revenue just so far as it is really protective. Then a tariff discriminating for protection is repugnant to a tariff for revenue just so far as its discrim-

ination is really protective. Discrimination for revenue proceeds on principles directly opposed to the principles on which proceeds discrimination for protection. This is a fact which should never be lost sight of.

A protective tariff, if true to the purpose for which it is imposed, must needs be restricted to such foreign articles as come into competition with similar articles the growth or manufacture of our own country; but a revenue tariff, if true to its purpose, must not be so restricted, but must be lighter on these articles and heavier on those articles which enter largely into the consumption of the people and which are obtained only from abroad. The protective tariff must, as far as possible, shut out foreign importations and secure the home market to the home producer; the revenue tariff must by no means shut out foreign productions nor check importations *beyond the point where the increased rate of duty will not compensate for the diminished imports*. In discriminating, that is, in laying a heavier duty on some articles and a lighter duty on others, the same principle must be observed. A protective tariff lets in tea, coffee, and such articles as are not the growth or manufacture of this country, free of duty or at a merely nominal duty, while it imposes a heavy tax on cottons, woollens, iron, etc. A revenue tariff reverses this and taxes the first class of articles more heavily than the last, because, by so doing, it obtains *the greater amount of revenue at the same average rate of duty*. It is obvious, then, that a revenue tariff discriminating in favor of our own industry is unconstitutional and suicidal. Unconstitutional, because there is no substantive power in the constitution to impose a tariff for protection, and suicidal,

because so far as protective it defeats revenue.  
This is conclusive. (Vol. xv. pp. 499, 500.)

typical

### PROTECTION OF ALL INTERESTS ABSURD.

THE proposition to afford a positive protection to all the great industrial interests of the country is, as we have said, an absurdity; for protection is, directly or indirectly, a bounty to the protected interest, and government has nothing to give in the shape of a bounty to one interest except what it takes from some other interest or interests. The government would encourage the manufacture of woollens, and therefore lays a duty on them when imported. But it must protect all interests alike; so it lays another duty on foreign wool, which, by increasing the cost of the raw material, neutralizes, as far as it goes, the benefit the manufacturer derives from the duty on woollens. The government imposes a duty on foreign silks to encourage the domestic manufacture, and then destroys it, wholly or in part, by imposing another duty on the raw material for the encouragement of the silk-grower. And this miserable quackery is wise legislation and supported by the most eminent statesmen both of the Whig and Democratic party, your Clays, Websters, Polks, Wrights, and Buchanans! (Vol. xv. p. 501.)

### PROTECTION INJURES AGRICULTURE.

THE manufacturing population do not and cannot, in a country of such vast agricultural resources as our own, afford an adequate home market for all our surplus produce. A manufacturing population large enough to consume all the surplus agricultural prod-

ucts we could easily produce would, with the present improvements in labor-saving machinery, be large enough to manufacture the principal articles of consumption for the whole world, and then the manufacturers would labor under the difficulty of having no adequate market for their goods. But this is certain: our manufacturing towns do not and cannot furnish an adequate market for our surplus agricultural produce. This surplus must either lie on the producers' hands or else find a foreign market. But how is it to find a foreign market? Foreigners can buy of us only on condition of selling to us in return. We can refuse to buy of them only on condition of rendering ourselves unable to sell to them; for all trade is necessarily, directly or indirectly, an exchange of products. Purchases depend on sales and sales on purchases. If we shut the foreigner out of our markets we shut ourselves out of his; if foreigners shut us out of their markets they equally shut themselves out of ours. But our protective duties, if they are really protective, restrict importations, that is, the sales of foreigners to us, and therefore, to precisely the same extent, our sales to them. Consequently we restrict the foreign market to our agricultural produce to exactly the same extent that we restrict the home market to foreign manufactures. Here is a positive disadvantage to the agriculturist, for which you can give him no compensation.

Nor is this the only disadvantage. The price of manufactures is determined by the demand for home consumption and is not affected by the foreign demand, as is proved by the fact that a duty on foreign importations can be protective. When any article, no matter what, depends on the foreign de-

mand for its price, it is beyond the reach of protection, for protection secures only the home market, but this article has already secured that and demands a foreign market. But the price of our agricultural produce is determined, not by the demand for home consumption, but by the foreign demand, and is determined by the price we can command for the surplus which seeks a foreign market. But the protective tariff lessens this foreign demand and, consequently, the price the agriculturist can command for his produce, whether at home or abroad, for a lessened demand always lowers the price. Thus under the protective tariff the farmer sells less and at a lower price. But the tariff raises the price of manufactures, for if it do not it is not protective. Consequently, under the operation of a protective tariff the farmer sells less and at a diminished profit, while at the same time he is compelled to pay a higher price for what he buys. You diminish his means and increase his expenses. Here is the necessary operation of a tariff for the protection of manufactures. Will the advocates of protection tell us how they propose to compensate the agricultural interest? The simple truth is, if you will impose a duty for the benefit of the manufacturing community, you must do it at the expense of the agricultural community, for this is the only way in which it can be done. As honest men you should, then, boldly avow that you mean to tax the farmer and planter for the benefit of the manufacturer, or else repeal your protective tariff and refuse to grant a special protection to any industrial interest. (Vol. xv. pp. 502, 503.)



## DIRECT TAXATION.

*THE only possible way of protecting all interests alike is for the government to afford special protection to none.*

The only wise course for an American statesman to recommend to his countrymen is that of free commercial intercourse with all nations. We wish we were, as a people, wise enough and honest enough to refuse to raise our revenue by duties on imports, and to raise it only by a direct tax on property. Politicians may say what they please, may express all the horror they can contrive to affect at the proposition; but ~~a direct tax on property is the only honorable, the only just, the only wise tax.~~ When the revenue is raised directly the government is sure to be kept pure by being kept poor. Each man knows how much he pays and is sure to look closely after its expenditure. But it is, at present, idle to contend for the system of direct taxation. That would be equal and just and therefore must needs be offensive. The present system, which raises the revenue without any man's knowing precisely how much he pays, enables the government to plunder the people much more effectually and to a much greater extent than it could under a system of direct taxation, and, what is equally to the purpose, compels the poor man to pay relatively altogether a larger proportion of the tax than the rich. Your Abbot Lawrences pay no portion of the tax to the government, but receive a bounty from it; while the poor girl in their mills pays a tax of at least some thirty per cent average on every manufactured article she consumes. So, of course, direct taxation is out of the question. It would be horrible to make the rich bear their due proportion of the expenses of the

government. Are not the poor the lowest *stratum* of society? On whom else, then, should rest its weight? But in case we cannot go to direct taxation, but will continue to raise the revenue by imposts, we insist the duties should be laid on revenue principles, and for revenue alone. This is what, and all that, the opponents of the tariff contend for; we are all of us willing to support a revenue tariff with discrimination—but discrimination *for revenue*, not *for protection*. (Vol. xv. pp. 503, 504.)

#### ACTIVE PARTISANSHIP OF OFFICE-HOLDERS.

THE man and the citizen are not sunk in the officer. An office-holder may do whatever he has a right to do as a man and a citizen not incompatible with the faithful discharge of his official duties. In what manner he exercises these rights is no concern of the federal executive, for he is accountable for their exercise to another tribunal. To inquire how he votes, how many speeches he makes, or how much money he spends for electioneering purposes is as extra-judicial, if we may say so, as it would be to inquire whether he lives in a frame house or a log-cabin, drinks hard cider or champagne, eats white bread or brown, and sleeps on a feather-bed or a pallet of straw. The relation between the executive and the office-holder is purely official, and no question transcending that relation can be rightfully entertained. If the officer neglect his official duty he should be removed, not for taking part as a citizen in politics, but for neglecting the duties of his office; if he transgress the laws of the state in which he resides he should be turned out, not for his electioneering, but because every government is bound to see

that its agents respect the laws of the sovereign within whose limits they reside.

The rule, furthermore, is indefinite. What is interfering in election—"active partisanship," as it is called? He who goes quietly to the polls and deposits his vote is an active politician compared with one who votes not at all, and a partisan, for he most likely votes for one party or another. Shall the citizen be deprived of his right to vote because he is an office-holder under the federal government? We have not heard this pretended. Where, then, will you stop? May not the officer, without forfeiting his office, tell his honest convictions to his neighbor on political matters? If not, you abridge the freedom of speech, a thing which no branch of the federal government can attempt without violence to the constitution. If he may tell his honest convictions to one man, why not to as many as choose to listen to him? If in one place, in one position, why not in another? Where, then, will you draw the line between simple non-interference at all and the most active interference compatible with official fidelity, the laws of the state, and general morality? . . .

The evil does not lie here, but elsewhere. It lies not in any interference of the officer as a citizen, but in his *official* interference. No office-holders, except such as have patronage to bestow, can cause any portion of the evil; and those who have patronage to bestow cause it not by voting, writing, or lecturing, but by bestowing their patronage, not with reference to fitness for office, but with reference to services rendered or to be rendered to the party. A collector of the customs, for instance, brings his office to bear on elections when he appoints to office or removes from office with reference to these services. His

duty is to select his officers with sole reference to the public service, and he transcends the line of his duty when he has reference to anything else. Other things being equal, he may, no doubt, select his personal or political friends in preference to those who are neither the one nor the other; but he interferes officially whenever in his appointments he leaves it to be understood that the persons appointed, in addition to faithful officers, are to be also active partisans, or when he removes a faithful and efficient officer who is not an active partisan and appoints to his place one who is. The supreme executive, however, causes the chief part of the evil and is guilty of direct official interference when, on his accession to power, he removes from office those who had opposed his election and fills their places with the most active and least scrupulous of his partisans. (Vol. xvi. pp. 177-179.)

## CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

### VIRTUE AND INTELLIGENCE NECESSARY TO SUSTAIN FREE INSTITUTIONS.

WE are Americans, American born, American bred, and we love our country and will, when called upon, defend it against any and every enemy to the best of our feeble ability; but though we by no means rate American virtue and intelligence so low as do those who will abuse us for not rating it higher, we cannot consent to hoodwink ourselves or to claim for our countrymen a degree of virtue and intelligence they do not possess. We are acquainted with no salutary errors and are forbidden to seek even a good end by any but honest means. The virtue and intelligence of the American people are not sufficient to secure the free, orderly, and wholesome action of the government, for they do not secure it. The government commits every now and then a sad blunder, and the general policy it adopts must prove in the long run suicidal. It has adopted a most iniquitous policy, and its most unjust measures are its most popular measures, such as it would be fatal to any man's political success directly and openly to oppose; and we think we hazard nothing in saying our free institutions cannot be sustained without an augmentation of popular virtue and intelligence. We do not say the people are not capable of a sufficient degree of virtue and intelligence to sustain a democracy; all we say is they cannot do it without virtue

and intelligence, nor without a higher degree of virtue and intelligence than they have as yet attained to. We do not apprehend that many of our countrymen, and we are sure no one whose own virtue and intelligence entitle his opinion to any weight, will dispute this. Then the question of the means of sustaining our democracy resolves itself into the question of augmenting the virtue and intelligence of the people.

The press makes readers, but does little to make virtuous and intelligent readers. The newspaper press is, for the most part, under the control of men of very ordinary abilities, lax principles, and limited acquirements. It echoes and exaggerates popular errors and does little or nothing to create a sound public opinion. Your popular literature caters to popular taste, passions, prejudices, ignorance, and errors; it is by no means above the average degree of virtue and intelligence which already obtains, and can do nothing to create a higher standard of virtue or tone of thought. On what, then, are we to rely?

"On education," answer Frances Wright, Abner Kneeland, Horace Mann, and the educationists generally. But we must remember that we must have virtue *and* intelligence. Virtue without intelligence will only fit the mass to be duped by the artful and designing, and intelligence without virtue only makes one the abler and more successful villain. Education must be of the right sort if it is to answer our purpose, for a bad education is worse than none. The Mahometans are great sticklers for education, and if we recollect aright it is laid down in the Koran that every believer must at least be taught to read; but we do not find their education

does much to advance them in virtue and intelligence. Education, moreover, demands educators, and educators of the right sort. Where are these to be obtained? Who is to select them, judge of their qualifications, sustain or dismiss them? The people? Then you place education in the same category with democracy. You make the people, through their representatives, the educators. The people will select and sustain only such educators as represent their own virtues, vices, intelligence, prejudices, and errors. Whether they educate mediately or immediately, they can impart only what they have and are. Consequently, with them for educators we can, by means even of universal education, get no increase of virtue and intelligence to bear on the government. The people may educate, but where is that which takes care that they educate in a proper manner? Here is the very difficulty we began by pointing out. The people take care of the government and education; but who or what is to take care of the people, who need taking care of quite as much as either education or government?—for, rightly considered, neither government nor education has any other legitimate end than to take care of the people. (Vol. x. pp. 3, 4.)

#### TENDENCY TO INEQUALITY.

THE great danger in our country is from the predominance of material interests. Democracy has a direct tendency to favor inequality and injustice. The government must obey the people; that is, it must follow the passions and interests of the people, and of course the stronger passions and interests. These with us are material, such as pertain solely to

this life and this world. What our people demand of government is that it adopt and sustain such measures as tend most directly to facilitate the acquisition of wealth. It must, then, follow the passion for wealth and labor especially to promote worldly interests.

But among these worldly interests some are stronger than others and can command the government. These will take possession of the government and wield it for their own special advantage. They will make it the instrument of taxing all the other interests of the country for the special advancement of themselves. This leads to inequality and injustice, which are incompatible with the free, orderly, and wholesome working of the government.

Now, what is wanted is some power to prevent this, to moderate the passion for wealth, and to inspire the people with such a true and firm sense of justice as will prevent any one interest from struggling to advance itself at the expense of another. Without this the stronger material interests predominate, make the government the means of securing their predominance, and of extending it by the burdens which, through the government, they are able to impose on the weaker interests of the country.

The framers of our government foresaw this evil and thought to guard against it by a written constitution. But they intrusted the preservation of the constitution to the care of the people, which was as wise as to lock up your culprit in prison and intrust him with the key. The constitution as a restraint on the will of the people or the governing majority is already a dead letter. It answers to talk about, to declaim about, in electioneering speeches, and even as a theme of newspaper leaders and political essays



in reviews; but its effective power is a morning vapor after the sun is well up. (Vol. x. pp. 8, 9.)

#### PROTESTANTISM UNABLE TO SUSTAIN FREE INSTITUTIONS.

WE may be told that enlightened self-interest will suffice—that only instruct the people what is for their interest and they will do it. This is plausible, but all experience proves to the contrary. Who does not know that it is for his real interest, both for time and eternity, to be a devout Christian? And yet are all devout Christians? The wisdom and prudence of men's conduct cannot be measured by their intelligence. A corrupt man uses his intelligence only as the minister of his corruption. The more you extend intelligence, unless you extend the moral restraints and influences of the gospel at the same time, the more do you sharpen the intellect for evil. The people of the United States are far more instructed than they were fifty years ago, and yet have not half so much of the virtue necessary to sustain a republican government. We are never to expect men to act virtuously simply because their understandings are convinced that virtue is the best calculation. You must make them act from a higher motive. They must be governed by religion; act from the love and the fear of God—from a deep sense of duty; be meek, humble, self-denying; morally brave and heroic; choosing rather to die a thousand deaths than swerve from right principle or disobey the will of God; or they will not practise the virtues without which liberty is an empty name—a mere illusion.

Now, Protestantism never has produced and never can produce the virtues without which a republican

government can have no solid foundation. It may have good words; it may say wise and even just things; but it wants the unction of the spirit. It does not reach and regenerate the heart, subdue the passions, and renew the spirit. It has never produced a single saint, and the virtues it calls forth are of the sort exhibited by the old heathen moralists. It praises the Bible, but studies the Greek and Roman classics; boasts of spirituality, but expires in a vain formalism. For the three hundred years it has existed it has proved itself powerful to destroy, but impotent to found; ready to begin, but never able to complete. Whatever it claims that is positive, abiding, it has inherited or borrowed from the ages and the lands of faith. Its own creations rise and vanish as the soap-bubbles blown by our children in their sports. It has never yet shown itself able to command human nature or to say to the roused waves of passion, Peace, be still. It lulls the conscience with the forms of faith and piety; soothes vanity and fosters pride by its professions of freedom; but leaves the passions all their natural force and permits the man to remain a slave to all his natural lusts. It never subdues or regenerates nature. Hence, throughout all Protestantdom, the tendency is to reproduce heathen antiquity with all its cant, hollowness, hypocrisy, slavery, and wretchedness—to narrow men's views down to this transitory life and the fleeting shows of sense, and to make them live and labor for the meat that perisheth. We appeal to England, Sweden, Denmark, Protestant Germany, Holland, and our own country for the truth of what we say. They were Protestant traders who trampled on the cross of Christ to gain the lucrative trade of Japan. It is in no spirit of exultation we allude to

Protestant worldly-mindedness and spiritual impotency. Would to God the sketch were from fancy or our own diseased imagination!

We do not mean to deny that in words Protestantism teaches many, perhaps most, of the Christian virtues. It has even some good books on morals and practical religion. Its clergy give good exhortations and labor, no doubt in good faith, for the spiritual culture of their flocks. No doubt much truth, much valuable instruction, is given from Protestant pulpits. The Protestant clergy take no delight in the state of things they see around them. They would gladly see Christ reign in the hearts of men; they no doubt would joyfully dispense the bread of life to their famished people; and they do dispense the best they have. But alas! how can they dispense what they have not received? The living bread is not on their communion table. They communicate, according to their own confession, only a figure, a shadow; and how shall the divine life be nourished with shadows? What we mean to say is, not that Protestantism does not aim to bring men to Christ, to make them pure and holy, but that it has no power to do it. It does not control human nature and produce the fruits of a supernatural faith, hope, and charity. Its faith is merely an opinion or persuasion, its hope a wish, and its charity natural philanthropy. It necessarily leaves human nature as it finds it, and no pruning of that corrupt tree can make it bring forth good fruit. It is of the earth—earthy; and it will bear fruit only for the earth. With unregenerated nature in full activity, we can have only sensuality and mammon-worship.

Hundreds and thousands among us who are by no means favorably disposed to Catholicity see this and

deplore it. They say the age has no faith. They see the impotency of Protestantism; that under it all the vices are sheltered; that in spite of it all the dangerous passions rage unchecked; and they turn away in disgust from its empty forms and vain words. Witness the response the biting sarcasms and withering irony of Carlyle bring from thousands of hearts in this republic, the echoes which the chiselled words and marble sentences of Emerson also bring. Witness, also, the movements of the Come-outers, the Socialists, Fourierists, Communists. All these see that Protestantism has nothing but words, while they want life, realities, not vain *simulacra*. They err most egregiously, no doubt; they go from the dying to the dead; but their error proves the truth of what we advance.

Now, assuming our view of Protestantism to be correct, we demand how it is to sustain, or we, with it alone, are to sustain our republican government. Do we not see, in this growing love of place and plunder, with this growing devotion to wealth, luxury, and pleasure, with these fierce electioneering contests, one no sooner ended than another begins, each to be fiercer and more absorbing and more destructive than the last, and each drawing within its vortex nearly the whole industrial interest of the country and touching almost every man in his honor and his purse, that we want the moral elements without which a republic cannot stand? A republic can stand only as it rests upon the virtues of the people; and these not the mere natural virtues of worldly prudence and social decency, but those loftier virtues which are possible to human nature only as elevated above itself by the infused habit of supernatural grace. This is a solemn fact to which it is

in vain for us to close our eyes. Human nature left to itself tends to dissolution, to destruction, decay, death. So does every society that rests only on those virtues which have their origin, growth, and maturity in nature alone. This is the case with our own society. We have really no social bond; we have no true patriotism; none of that patience, that self-denial, that loyalty of soul which is necessary to bind man to man, each to each and each to all. Each is for himself. *Save who can (Sauve qui peut)*, we exclaim. Hence a universal scramble. Man overthrows man, brother brother, the father the child and the child the father, the demagogue all; while the devil stands at a distance, looks on, and enjoys the sport. Tell us, ye who boast of the glorious reformation, if a republican form of government is compatible with this moral state of the people?

Even in matters of education we can do little but sharpen the wit and render brother more skilful and successful in plundering brother. With our multitude of sects we may instruct, but not educate. Our children can have no moral training, for morality rests on theology and theology on faith. But faith is expelled from our schools because it is sectarian, and there is no one faith in the country which can be taught without exciting the jealousy of the followers of a rival faith. Cut up into such a multitude of sects, there is and can be no common moral culture in the country, no true religious training. We give a little instruction in reading, writing, arithmetic, grammar, geography, perhaps history, the Greek and Roman classics, and in the physical sciences; and send our children out into the world to form their morals and their religion without other guide or assistant than their own short-sighted reason and

perverted passions. How can we expect anything from such a sowing but what we reap? and how, under Protestantism, which broaches everything and settles nothing, raises all questions and answers none, and therefore necessarily giving birth to a perpetual succession of sects, each claiming with equal reason and justice to have the truth, and the claims of all equally respected, as they must be, by the government, is this terrible evil to be remedied? (Vol. x. pp. 29-32.)

## CATHOLICITY THE SAFETY OF THE REPUBLIC.

BUT with Catholicity the republic may be sustained, not because the Catholic Church enjoins this form of government or that, but because she nourishes in the hearts of her children the virtues which render popular liberty both desirable and practicable. The Catholic Church meddles *directly* with no form of government. She leaves each people free to adopt such form of government as seems to themselves good, and to administer it in their own way. Her chief concern is to fit men for beatitude, and this she can do under any or all forms of government. But the spirit she breathes into men, the graces she communicates, the dispositions she cultivates, and the virtues she produces, are such that, while they render even arbitrary forms of government tolerable, fit a people for asserting and maintaining freedom. In countries where there are no constitutional checks on power she remedies the evil by imposing moral restraints on its exercise, by inspiring rulers with a sense of justice and the public good. Where such checks do exist, she hallows them and renders them inviolable. In a republic

she restrains the passions of the people, teaches them obedience to the laws of God, moderates their desires, weans their affections from the world, frees them from the dominion of their own lusts, and, by the meekness, humility, loyalty of heart which she cherishes, disposes them to the practice of those public virtues which render a republic secure. She also creates by her divine charity a true equality. No republic can stand where the dominant feeling is pride, which finds its expression in the assertion, "I am as good as you." It must be based on love; not on the determination to defend our own rights and interests, but on the fear to encroach on the rights and interest of others. But this love must be more than the mere sentiment of philanthropy. This sentiment of philanthropy is a very unsubstantial affair. Talk as we will about its excellence, it never goes beyond love to those who love us. We love our friends and neighbors, but hate our enemies. This is all we do as philanthropists. All the fine speeches we make beyond—about the love of humanity and all that—are fine speeches. Philanthropy must be exalted into the supernatural virtue of charity before it can become that love which leads us to honor all men and makes us shrink from encroaching upon the interests of any man, no matter how low or how vile. We must love our neighbor, not for his own sake, but for God's sake—the child, for the sake of the Father; then we can love all and joyfully make the most painful sacrifices for them. It is only in the bosom of the Catholic Church that this sublime charity has ever been found or can be found.

The Catholic Church also cherishes a spirit of independence, a loftiness and dignity of soul, favorable to the maintenance of popular freedom. It

ennobles every one of its members. The lowest, the humblest Catholic is a member of that church which was founded by Jesus Christ himself; which has subsisted for eighteen hundred years; which has in every age been blessed with signal tokens of the Redeemer's love; which counts its saints by millions; and the blood of whose martyrs has made all earth hallowed ground. He is admitted into the goodly fellowship of the faithful of all ages and climes, and every day, throughout all the earth, the universal church sends up her prayers for him, and all the church above receives them, and, with her own, bears them as sweet incense up before the throne of the almighty and eternal God. He is a true nobleman, more than the peer of kings or Cæsars; for he is a child of the King of kings, and, if faithful unto death, heir of a crown of life, eternal in the heavens, that fadeth not away. Such a man is no slave. His soul is free; he looks into the perfect law of liberty. Can tyrants enslave him? No, indeed; not because he will turn on the tyrant and kill, but because he can die and reign forever. What were a mere human tyrant before a nation of such men? Who could establish arbitrary government over them or subject them to unwholesome or iniquitous laws?

Here is our hope for our republic. We look for our safety to the spread of Catholicity. We render solid and imperishable our free institutions just in proportion as we extend the kingdom of God among our people and establish in their hearts the reign of justice and charity. And here, then, is our answer to those who tell us Catholicity is incompatible with free institutions. *We tell them that they cannot maintain free institutions without it.* It is not a free government that makes a free people, but a free



people that makes a free government; and we know no freedom but that wherewith the Son makes free. You must be free within before you can be free without. They who war against the church because they fancy it hostile to their civil freedom are as mad as those wicked Jews who nailed their Redeemer to the cross. But even now, as then, God be thanked, from the cross ascends the prayer, not in vain, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." (Vol. x. pp. 33-35.)

#### PROTESTANT OPPOSITION WILL FAIL.

PROTESTANTISM, afraid to meet the champions of the cross in fair and open debate, conscious of her weakness or unskilfulness in argument, true to her ancient instincts, resorts to the civil arm and hopes by a series of indirect legislation—for she dare not attempt as yet any direct legislation—to maintain her predominance. But this gives us no uneasiness. We know in whom we believe and are certain. We see these movements, we comprehend their aim, and we merely ask in the words of the Psalmist, "Why have the gentiles raged, and the people devised vain things? The kings of the earth stood up, and the princes met together, against the Lord and against his Christ. Let us break their bands asunder, and let us cast their yoke from us. He that dwelleth in the heavens shall laugh at them, and the Lord shall deride them. Then shall he speak to them in his anger, and trouble them in his rage" (Ps. ii. 1-5). They wage an unequal contest who wage war against the church of the living God, who hath said to its Head, "Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee. Ask of me and I will give thee the gentiles

for thy inheritance, and the utmost parts of the earth for thy possession" (Ib. 7, 8). These may combine to put down Catholicity, form leagues against it, enlist all the powers of the earth against it; but what then? Nero tried to crush it in its infancy. Diocletian tried it. And Nero and Diocletian have passed away, and their mighty empire has crumbled to pieces and dissolved, leaving scarce "a wrack behind;" yet the church has lived on, and the successor of the fisherman of Galilee inherited a power before which that of Rome in her proudest day was merely the dust in the balance. Pagan and Saracen tried to crush it, but pagan and Saracen are scattered before its glory as the morning mist before the rising sun. Heretic and schismatic have tried to exterminate it—Luther, and Calvin, and Henry of England, like the great dragon whose tail drew after it a third part of the stars of heaven; and their own children are rising up and cursing their memory. The powers of the earth have tried to do it—Napoleon, the Colossus who bestrided Europe and made and unmade kings in mere pastime; but Napoleon, from the moment he dared lay his hand on the Lord's anointed, loses his power and goes to die at last of a broken heart in a barren isle of the ocean. Jew, pagan, Saracen, heretic, schismatic, infidel, and lawless power have all tried their hand against the church. The Lord has held them in derision. He has been a wall of fire round about her, and proved for eighteen hundred years that no weapon formed against her shall prosper; for he guards the honor of his spouse as his own. Let the ark appear to jostle, if it will; we reach forth no hand to steady it and fear no harm that may come to it. The church has survived all storms; it is founded upon a rock, and the

gates of hell are impotent against it. It is not for the friends of the church to fear, but for those who war against her and seek her suppression. It is for them to tremble—not before the arm of man, for no human arm will be raised against them; but before that God whose church they outrage and whose cause they seek to crush. The Lord hath promised his Son the gentiles for his inheritance and the utmost parts of the earth for his possession. He must and will have this nation. And throughout all the length and breadth of this glorious land shall his temples rise to catch the morning sun and reflect his evening rays, and holy altars shall be erected, and the “clean sacrifice” shall be offered daily, and a delighted people shall bow in humility before them and pour out their hearts in joyous thanksgiving; for so hath the Lord spoken, and his word shall stand. (Vol. x. pp. 35, 36.)

#### AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY.

God is the absolute, underived, and unlimited sovereign and proprietor of the universe. Here is the foundation of all authority and also of all liberty. Before God we have no liberty. We are his and not our own. We are what he creates us, have only what he gives us, and lie completely at his mercy. We hold all from him, even to the breath in our nostrils, and he has the sovereign right to dispose of us according to his own will and pleasure. In his presence and in presence of his law we have duties, but no rights, and our duty and his right is the full, entire, and unconditional submission of ourselves, soul and body, to his will. Here is authority, absolute,

full, entire, and unbounded—as must be all authority in order to be authority. *hmm...*

In the presence of authority there is no liberty; where, then, is liberty? It is not before God, but it is between man and man, between man and society, and between society and society. The absolute and plenary sovereignty of God excludes all other sovereignty, and our absolute and unconditional subjection to him excludes all other subjection. Hence no liberty before God and no subjection before man; and therefore liberty is rightly defined, full and entire freedom from all authority but the authority of God. Here is liberty, liberty in the human sphere, and liberty full and entire, without restraint or limit in the sphere to which it pertains. Man is subjected to God, but to God only. No man, in his own right, has any, the least, authority over man; no body or community of men, as such, has any rightful authority either in spirituals or temporals. All merely human authorities are usurpations, and their acts are without obligation, null and void from the beginning. If the parent, the pastor, the prince has any right to command, it is as the vicar of God, and in that character alone; if I am bound to obey my parents, my pastor, or my prince, it is because my God commands me to obey them, and because in obeying them I am obeying him. Here is the law of liberty, and here, too, is the law of authority. Understand now why religion must found the state, why it is nonsense or blasphemy to talk of an alliance between religion and liberty, a reconciliation between authority and freedom. Both proceed from the same fountain, the absolute, underived, unlimited sovereignty of God, and can be no more opposed one to the other than God

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can be opposed to himself. Hence absolute and unconditional subjection to God is absolute and unlimited freedom. Therefore, says our Lord, "If the Son makes you free, you shall be free indeed."

The sovereignty of God does not oppose liberty; ~~it founds and guarantees it~~ Authority is not the antagonist of freedom; ~~it is its support, its vindicator.~~ It is not religion, it is not Christianity, but infidelity, that places authority and liberty one over against the other in battle array. It is not God who crushes our liberty, robs us of our rights, and binds heavy burdens upon our shoulders too grievous to be borne; it is man, who at the same time that he robs us of our rights robs God of his. He who attacks our freedom attacks his sovereignty; he who vindicates his sovereignty, the rights of God, vindicates the rights of man; for all human rights are summed up in the one right to be governed by God and by him alone, in the duty of absolute subjection to him, and absolute freedom from all subjection to any other. Maintain, therefore, the rights of God, the supremacy in all departments of the divine law, and you need not trouble your heads about the rights of man, freedom of thought, or civil liberty, for they are secured with all the guaranty of the divine sovereignty. The divine sovereignty is, therefore, as indispensable to liberty as to authority.

We need not stop to show that the divine sovereignty is not itself a despotism. The essence of despotism, as we have said, is not that it is authority, but that it is authority without right, will without reason, power without justice, which can never be said of God; for his right to universal dominion is unquestionable, and in him will and reason, power and justice, are never disjoined, are identical, are

one and the same, and are indistinguishable save in our manner of conceiving them. His sovereignty is rightful, his will is intrinsically, eternally, and immutably just will, his power just power. Absolute subjection to him is absolute subjection to eternal, immutable, and absolute justice. Hence subjection to him alone is, on the one hand, subjection to absolute justice, and, on the other, freedom to be and to do all that absolute justice permits. Here is just authority as great as can be conceived and true liberty as large as is possible this side of license; and between the two there is and can be in the nature of things no clashing, no conflict, no antagonism. How mean and shallow is infidel philosophy! (Vol. x. pp. 124-126.)

Hegel  
modern  
religion

#### THE CHURCH SAVES FROM DESPOTISM.

It is not the church that establishes spiritual despotism; it is she who saves us from it. Spiritual despotism is that which subjects us, in spiritual matters, to a human authority, whether our own or that of others—for our own is as human as another's; and the only redemption from it is in having in them a divine authority. Protestants themselves acknowledge this when they call out for the pure word of God. The church teaches by divine authority; in submitting to her we submit to God and are freed from all human authority. She teaches infallibly; therefore, in believing what she teaches we believe the truth, which frees us from falsehood and error, to which all men without an infallible guide are subject, and subjection to which is the elemental principle of all spiritual despotism. Her authority admitted excludes all other authority, and therefore frees us from heresiarchs and sects, the very embodi-

ment of spiritual despotism in its most odious forms. Sectarianism is spiritual despotism itself; and to know how far spiritual despotism and spiritual slavery may go, you have only to study the history of the various sects and false religions which now exist or have heretofore existed.

In the temporal order, again, the authority claimed and exercised by the church is nothing but the assertion over the state of the divine sovereignty, which she represents, or the subjection of the prince to the law of God, in his character of prince as well as in his character of man. That the prince or civil power is subject to the law of God, no man who admits Christianity at all dares question; and if the church be the divinely-commissioned teacher and guardian of that law, as she certainly is, the same subjection to her must be conceded. But this, instead of being opposed to civil liberty, is its only possible condition. Civil liberty, like all liberty, is in being held to no obedience but obedience to God; and obedience to the state can be compatible with liberty only on the condition that God commands it or on the condition that he governs in the state, which he does not and cannot do unless the state holds from his law and is subject to it. (Vol. x. p. 128.)

#### CHURCH AND STATE.

THE church and the state, as administrations, are distinct bodies; but they are not, as some modern politicians would persuade us, two coördinate and mutually independent authorities. The state holds under the law of nature and has authority only within the limits of that law. As long as it confines itself within that law and faithfully executes its provi-

sions, it acts freely, without ecclesiastical restraint or interference. But the church holds from God under the supernatural or revealed law, which includes, as integral in itself, the law of nature, and is therefore the teacher and guardian of the natural as well as of the revealed law. She is, under God, the supreme judge of both laws, which for her are but one law; and hence she takes cognizance in her tribunals of the breaches of the natural law as well as of the revealed, and has the right to take cognizance of its breaches by nations as well as of its breaches by individuals, by the prince as well as by the subject, for it is the supreme law for both. The state is, therefore, only an inferior court bound to receive the law from the supreme court and liable to have its decisions reversed on appeal.

This must be asserted, if we assert the supremacy of the Christian law and hold the church to be its teacher and judge; for no man will deny that Christianity includes the natural as well as the supernatural law. Who, with any just conceptions, or any conceptions at all, of the Christian religion, will pretend that one can fulfil the Christian law and yet violate the natural law?—that one is a good Christian if he keeps the precepts of the church, though he break every precept of the decalogue?—or that Christianity remits the catechumen to the state to learn the law of nature, or what we term natural morality? Grace presupposes nature. The supernatural ordinances of God's law presuppose the natural, and the church, which is the teacher and guardian of faith and morals, can no more be so without plenary authority with regard to the latter than the former. Who, again, dares pretend that the moral law is not as obligatory on emperors, kings, princes,



commonwealths, as upon private individuals?—upon politicians as upon priests or simple believers? Unless, then, you exempt the state from all obligation even to the law of nature, you must make it amenable to the moral law as expounded by the church, divinely commissioned to teach and declare it. (Vol. x. pp. 129, 130.)

We need hardly say that we advocate no amalgamation of the civil and ecclesiastical administrations. They are in their nature, as we have said, distinct, and the supremacy of the church, which we assert, is by no means the supremacy of the clergy as politicians. We have no more respect for clergymen turned politicians than we have for any other class of politicians of equal worth, perhaps not quite so much; for we cannot forget that they, in becoming politicians, descend from their sacerdotal rank, as a judge does in descending from the bench to play the part of an advocate. We have had political priests ever since there was a Christian state, and many of them have made sad work of both politics and religion. We have nothing to say of them but that they were politicians, and their censurable acts were not performed in their character of priests. The principle we assert does not exact that the church should turn politician, and thus from the church become the state, or that the clergy should turn politicians; it exacts that both she and they should not. The clergy as politicians fall into the category of all politicians, and their supremacy as politicians would still be the supremacy of the state, not of the church. The state is supreme if politicians as such be supreme, let them be selected from what class of the community they may. The principle exacts, indeed, the supremacy of the clergy, but solely as the church,

in their sacerdotal and pastoral character as teachers, guardians, and judges of the law of God, natural and revealed, supreme for individuals and nations, for prince and subject, king and commonwealth, noble and plebeian, rich and poor, great and small, wise and simple; not as politicians, in which character they have and can have no preëminence over politicians selected from the laity, and must stand on the same level with them. We do not advocate—far from it—the notion that the church must administer the civil government; what we advocate is her supremacy as the teacher and guardian of the law of God—as the supreme court, which must be recognized and submitted to as such by the state, and whose decisions cannot be disregarded, whose prerogatives cannot be abridged or usurped by any power on earth, without rebellion against the divine majesty and robbing man of his rights. As Christians we must insist on this supremacy; as Catholics it is not only our duty, but our glorious privilege, to assert it, and to understand and practise our religion as God himself, through his own chosen organ, promulgates and expounds it. (Vol. x. pp. 133, 134.)

#### RELIGIOUS LIBERTY.

You talk of religious liberty. Know you what the word means? Know ye that religious liberty is all and entire in the supremacy of the moral order? The church is a spiritual despotism, is she? Bold blasphemer, miserable apologist for tyrants and tyranny, go trace her track through eighteen hundred years, and behold it marked with the blood of her free and noble-hearted children, whom God loves and honors, shed in defence of religious liberty. From

the first moment of her existence has she fought, ay, fought as no other power can fight, for liberty of religion. Every land has been reddened with the blood and whitened with the bones of her martyrs in that sacred cause; and now, rash upstart, you dare in the face of day proclaim her the friend of despotism! Alas! my brother, may God forgive you, for you know not what you do. (Vol. x. pp. 135, 136.)

#### CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS TOLERATION.

RELIGIOUS liberty, as we understand it, is *the absolute freedom of religion in its doctrines, discipline, and worship from all human authority*, and therefore implies *the absolute incompetency, in spirituals, of all human authority, whether public or private*. We say the absolute freedom of religion; by which we, of course, mean the true, that is, the Catholic religion. Consequently we recognize no religious liberty where our church is not free in her doctrine, discipline, and worship, and where all men have not full and entire freedom to profess the Catholic religion without restraint from or responsibility to any human power whatever, whether vested in the king, the aristocracy, or the people. Where this freedom is wanting there is no religious liberty. This freedom we demand, not as a favor, not as a gracious concession from the prince or the republic, but as our right, as the indefeasible right of our church, for the reason that she is the church of God, the representative of the divine sovereignty on the earth; and this freedom we are bound in conscience to assert and to vindicate, if need be, as did the early Christian martyrs under the persecuting emperors of pagan Rome, not indeed by slaying, but by submitting to be slain.

From this view of religious liberty it is evident that when we speak of *toleration* we have and can have no reference to our church; for she holds immediately from God, and we recognize no power on earth that has the right to restrain her worship, and therefore none that has the right to *tolerate* it. The question of toleration lies below the question of religious liberty and relates solely to false religions—to infidel, heretical, and schismatical sects. Are these to be tolerated or are they to be prohibited? Shall we assert the natural right of every man to choose his own religion, or shall we assert, and as far as able enforce, the moral obligation of all men to profess the true religion? Shall we be intolerant and exclusive or assert and maintain universal toleration? This is the question.

To answer this question we must distinguish between two sorts of toleration—political or civil toleration and religious or theological toleration; that is, toleration of false religions in the temporal order and toleration of the same in the spiritual order. These two tolerations are often confounded and supposed to be inseparably connected. Hence many assert religious or theological toleration as the condition of justifying the assertion of political or civil toleration, and many also deny political toleration, in order, as they suppose, not to be obliged to assert religious toleration. But the two are in reality distinct, and one has no necessary connection with or dependence on the other. Political toleration of religion is the permission conceded by princes or republics to their subjects to profess the religion they choose; religious toleration is the permission granted by Almighty God to all men to profess any religion they please or none at all, and implies the equal

right or the indifference of all religions before God or in reference to eternal life. Universal political toleration presupposes that all religions are compatible with the peace and safety of civil society; universal religious toleration presupposes that all religions are acceptable to God and available for salvation. The state regards religion solely under its relation to social interests, and the theologian regards it primarily in its relation to the future life or the salvation of the soul. It is easy, therefore, if we understand the distinction of the two orders, to see that it is possible to be politically tolerant and yet religiously intolerant, if not politically intolerant and yet religiously tolerant.

The question of the political toleration of religion we shall consider at some length before we close; but for the moment we must confine ourselves to religious or theological toleration. Religious or theological toleration is what is commonly called *indifferentism*, that is, the doctrine that men may be saved in all religions, in one as well as in another, or that every one may be saved in his own religion, the religion of his country or of his sect. To concede this doctrine is religious or theological toleration as distinguished from political or civil toleration; to deny it is religious or theological intolerance and exclusiveness, expressed in the Catholic dogma, "Out of the church there is no salvation." Whatever conclusion we may or may not come to on the subject of political toleration or the indifference of religions before society and the civil authority, we must, unless bereft of reason, be religiously or theologically intolerant and exclusive; for toleration in the spiritual order is, at bottom, neither more nor less than the denial of the religious principle itself. (Vol. x. pp. 208, 209.)

RELIGIOUS TOLERATION CANNOT BE CON-  
TENDED FOR.

CERTAIN it is, from natural reason, that no man can be saved unless he renders to God an acceptable worship, and that no worship is or can be acceptable to God except the worship which he himself prescribes. Moreover, it is equally certain that no man can be saved who does not at least fulfil the law of nature. By the very law of nature all men are bound to worship God, and to worship him in the way and manner he himself prescribes. If he leaves them to the natural law and prescribes his worship only through natural reason, undoubtedly such worship as they can render by a prudent, diligent, honest use of reason and the means bestowed for such purpose will be the acceptable worship, and all that can in justice be demanded of them; but if he prescribes a supernatural religion and promulgates it with sufficient motives of credibility, as he must needs do if he promulgates it at all, then are they bound to worship him according to that supernatural religion—bound by the very law of nature itself to receive and practise it; and they want even natural morality if they do not. Such a religion, with sufficient motives of credibility, he has prescribed in Christianity. How, then, can we assert the indifference of religions and contend for religious toleration? Since God prescribes the Christian religion, the law of nature, as well as of revelation, binds us to believe and obey it. If we do not, we fail to fulfil the law of nature as well as to render the acceptable worship, and are convicted of sin under both the natural law and the revealed. How, then, can we hope to be saved? (Vol. x. p. 210.)

## CIVIL TOLERATION.

WE assert rigid intolerance of all false religions in the spiritual order; but it must not, therefore, be supposed that we deny or do not assert the legitimacy of their toleration in the political order. It is true, as we have said, that in speaking of toleration we exclude our church; for there can never be rightfully any question at all whether she shall be free or not. She is God's church and is free by divine right, not by the concession of the prince or the commonwealth. As much, we concede, we do not and cannot say for the sects. They are contrary to the will of God, forbidden by his law, and have no divine right to be at all. But not therefore does it follow that the civil authority is bound to suppress them or is not bound even to tolerate them. The state—and we beg that the fact be borne in mind—is not commissioned to execute the *whole* law of God; and though it can never rightfully do anything contrary to that law, it has authority to enforce it only in externals, and even in externals only so far as necessary to the maintenance of the peace and welfare of society. There are mortal sins against the law of God, of daily and hourly occurrence, that transcend the reach of the civil magistrate and which he has no right to punish. We may transgress against God in thought as well as in deed; but the state must leave our punishment to him who has said, "Vengeance is mine, and I will repay"—save when our sinful thoughts break out in deeds contrary to the rights of our neighbor or the real interests of civil society. Till then our offences pertain to the spiritual order and do not fall under the cognizance of the civil magistrate, who has no competency in

spirituals. There are also virtues—such as faith, hope, charity, meekness, gentleness, humility, benevolence—all strictly obligatory upon all men, which the civil authority cannot enforce and has no right to enforce; for though of the last importance to the peace and safety of society, they lie, as to their principle and motive, wholly within the spiritual order. Everybody knows this, and nobody, to our knowledge, directly contradicts it. It does not, then, follow, from the exclusiveness of religion in her own order, that the political order must always enforce the same exclusiveness and suppress whatever is opposed to it.

All must agree that the state has no right to establish a false religion or to prohibit the true religion; because every man has from Almighty God himself full and entire freedom to profess the true religion, and no one can, under any circumstances whatever, be bound to profess or adhere, even externally, to a false religion. To profess the true religion is the duty of all men, and no government has or can have the right to hinder its subjects from performing their duty. (Vol. x. pp. 219, 220.)

But though the state has no right to enjoin the profession of a false religion or to prohibit the profession of the true religion, yet is it not bound, we may be asked, to enjoin the profession of the true religion and to prohibit that of the false? It certainly would be if it were commissioned to promulgate and execute the *whole* law of God and if there were nothing in religion left to conscience and free will. But the latter, we know, is not true. . . .

The state has civil, but no spiritual functions; it is not in holy orders; it has not received the mission of evangelizing the world; and it has no vocation to



preach the Gospel or to assume the direction of consciences. It is certainly bound to recognize and protect the full and entire freedom of the true religion, and to suppress by force, if necessary, all external violence against it, for this is included in the civil rights of those who profess it; but it can legitimately use coercion, either in favor of the true or against a false religion, only for purely social reasons, and only so far as necessary to the maintenance of the order and interests of society; for, as we never cease to repeat, its functions are purely civil and it has no spiritual competency.

Certainly the obligation or right of civil governments not Catholic—where there is no publicly recognized infallible spiritual authority to determine which is the true religion—to enjoin the profession of the true worship and to prohibit others cannot be asserted; because the government having only civil functions cannot judge in spirituals or discriminate between one religion and another. It cannot, then, enjoin one worship or prohibit another, for fear, if for no other reason, that it may enjoin a false religion and proscribe the true; and therefore it must, even in common prudence, tolerate all religions not obviously immoral, like the obscene and cruel rites of many pagan nations, or directly incompatible with the safety and welfare of society. This binds all governments not Catholic to universal toleration, because all religions but the Catholic are confessedly fallible, and can, on their own showing, offer the government no infallible judgment by which it may form or to which it is bound to submit its own.

With regard to Catholic governments, or governments of Catholic countries, where there is an infallible spiritual authority publicly recognized by the

nation, we distinguish between those governments which have only the ordinary obligations of civil government and those governments which hold from the church, or under the express condition of professing and defending the Catholic religion. Governments of the first-mentioned class are bound to acknowledge the true religion and to throw their *moral* influence into its scale; for the state, as well as the individual, is bound to have a conscience, and even a good conscience; but nothing in the constitution of the state binds these governments to enforce the profession of the Catholic religion or to prohibit that of other religions, and as these religions, if not palpably immoral, are not, in themselves, social offences, the government has no right to declare them so or to suppress them. These governments having by their constitution only the ordinary functions of civil governments, can do no more for the true religion or against false religions than the interests of society demand; and as such governments themselves presuppose a state of society in which false religions, as such, are not incompatible with these interests, they are bound to tolerate them and leave their suppression to the operation of moral causes.

As to the second class of Catholic governments distinguished, that they are bound to recognize the Catholic religion as the law of the land and are not free to tolerate all religions, we grant. But there are few, if any, such governments now in existence; and the reasons which formerly demanded and justified them have, in the social changes which have taken place in recent times, lost their force, and cannot now be urged for the establishment or the maintenance of similar governments. In the middle

ages nearly all the European governments not pagan were professedly Catholic, and did and had the right to punish open infidelity, heresy, and schism—always sins against God—because then they were directly crimes against society, forbidden by the public law; and crimes against society, the civil government has always the right to punish. But now, when that political order has passed away, and in the altered circumstances of our times these sins against God are no longer to be treated as direct crimes against society, the government is not bound and has no right to punish them; because civil government has never the right, we repeat, to punish any sin, except for the reason that it is a social offence which society cannot, with a just regard to its own safety, suffer to go unpunished.

We do not assume that infidelity, heresy, and schism were social offences merely because they were declared such by the laws or made such by the fundamental constitution of the state. The laws, as in pagan Rome, or in England before Catholic emancipation, may establish a false religion and prohibit the true; but that does not make the profession of the true religion a social crime or incompatible with the legitimate interests of society. If religion and the laws come in conflict, it is the laws that are to be reformed, not the religion that is to be suppressed. To say otherwise—to say that false religions are justly punishable by civil society simply because contrary to the civil law—would be to concede that the profession of the true religion may be justly punished in those states in which the civil law prohibits it. The laws must themselves be just or they do not bind; and the fundamental constitution of a state must be legitimate, for a measure is not justi-

fiable simply because authorized by it or necessary to preserve it. What we assert is that the political order which in former times declared infidelity, heresy, and schism, when breaking out into overt acts, social offences, was itself just; because then they were such offences in fact as well as in law, and the laws only declared a truth which existed independently of them. The intolerance of the government was justifiable, because demanded by its fundamental and essential constitution, and that constitution was itself justifiable by its absolute necessity, under the circumstances, to the existence of society and the interest of civilization. (Vol. x. pp. 221-224.)

#### CHURCH AND STATE IN THE MIDDLE AGES.

IN the barbaric ages which followed the destruction of the western Roman empire—ages against which we hear so many noisy and senseless declamations, and in which we ourselves find little except Catholicity and what proceeded from it, which does not revolt us—the church of God had a double mission to perform, and was obliged to add to her spiritual functions the greater part of the functions of civil society itself. She was the sole repository of what had been saved from the wrecks of the old Roman civilization, and the only civilizing force that remained after the barbarian irruption and devastations. The lay society was dissolved by the ruin of the empire and of the civilized populations, and was no longer adequate to the management of secular affairs in accordance with civilized order. The church was obliged to add to her mission of evangelizer, which is her mission of all times and

places, ~~the temporary and accidental mission of civilizer of the nations.~~ She must tame the wild savage, humanize the ruthless barbarian, reestablish social order, revive science and the arts, and restore and advance civilization. All had been demolished, and she had all to reconstruct. She had to be statesman, lawyer, physician, pedagogue, architect, painter, sculptor, musician, agriculturist, horticulturist, bookbinder, and common mechanic or artisan—in fine, everything but money-changer and soldier. Having thus the chief part of the work of civil society to perform, it became absolutely necessary that she should have a civil and political existence and authority—that she should be incorporated into the state as an integral element of the civil constitution and have her worship, without which she could have as little social as religious influence, recognized as the law of the land as well as the law of God. There was no other condition of rescuing society from the chaos and barbarism in which it was plunged and of reviving civilization and securing its progress. Infidelity, heresy, and schism, which were as directly in opposition to her mission of civilizing the nations as to her mission of evangelizing them, were then directly and proximately crimes against society, and as such were justly punishable by the public authorities. In attacking the church they attacked civil society itself, struck at the very conditions of social order, and jeopardized every social interest.

But from the nature of the case this mission of civilizer of nations is restricted to barbarous ages and countries, for the very good reason that the church cannot be called upon to civilize nations when they are already civilized. This mission she has now, in great measure, accomplished in what is called Chris-

tendom; and the necessity of that particular political order which specially protected her in its performance, or which was requisite to enable her to perform it, does not now exist. The lay society she has rescued from barbarism and civilized. It has now the arts of civilized life in its own possession, and does not need, as it once did in barbarous ages, the church to teach it how to make shoes, bind books, or brew hop-beer. It is now competent, under the *spiritual* direction of the spiritual society, to the management of secular affairs. It has in these affairs, which properly belong to it, attained to majority, and no longer needs in regard to them, so far as purely secular and as they involve no moral principle, to be under ecclesiastical tutelage. The church is now free to resign her temporary civil functions and to devote herself exclusively to the mission of evangelizing the world. It is not necessary that she should be now incorporated into the state, in the sense she was in the barbaric ages; and consequently infidelity, heresy, and schism, though as great sins against God as ever, are not now crimes against society in the sense they then were or to be punished as such; and therefore, as long as their adherents demean themselves peaceably, offer no external violence to the true religion, and discharge their ordinary social obligations, they are to be politically tolerated and left to answer for their sinfulness, great as it unquestionably is, to God himself. (Vol. x. pp. 224-226.)

#### THE STATE MUST TOLERATE ALL RELIGIONS.

It is evident from what we have said that though we assert the most rigid theological intolerance and the wisdom and justice of the political intolerance

which nobody denies was during many centuries asserted and sometimes practised by Catholic states, we are bound by Catholic principles to assert for our times the toleration of all religions compatible with the existence and interests of society. (Vol. x. p. 227.)

#### THE CHURCH USES ONLY MORAL FORCE.

THE church cannot tolerate the punishment by the civil authority of offences purely spiritual, because the civil authority cannot do it without trenching upon her province. She allows no one to be molested merely for his want of faith, because for his want of faith the unbeliever is answerable to God alone. Faith is voluntary and cannot be forced. Whoever chooses to run the risk of the penalty of eternal damnation annexed to infidelity is free to be an infidel, and Almighty God neither does violence nor suffers any power on earth to do violence to his free will. He proffers eternal life to all men, tells them the conditions on which they may receive it, gives them the necessary graces to accept and secure it, urges them by the most powerful motives which can be addressed to reason, conscience, free will; but he forces no one to accept it. He demands the heart, its free, voluntary obedience, and will accept and reward only the free-will offering. Hence the church strictly and solemnly forbids any one to be forced or compelled to receive the faith. Hence her missionaries are never armed soldiers, but humble preachers, bearing only the crucifix and pastoral staff. Never has she allowed the unbaptized—Jews, pagans, Mahometans, infidels—to be forced to profess the Catholic faith or force to be employed against them, except to compel them to tolerate the preaching of

the Gospel. If in Catholic states they have ever been disturbed or molested on account of their unbelief, it has been against her authority or because they practised violence against the profession of the true religion, or because they were dangerous subjects to the state and could not, under the circumstances, be safely tolerated—as, for instance, in Spain under Charles V., when the Jews and Moors conspired in secret and with the enemies of the church, not simply to secure the peaceable enjoyment of their own religions, but to overthrow both altar and throne, both of which the state had the right and was bound to protect and defend, to the full extent of its power, against any and every class of enemies.

The church certainly claims authority over all baptized persons, by whomsoever they may have been baptized; for they are, in the sacrament of baptism, born her subjects, and she has a right to their obedience. Heretics and schismatics are her rebellious subjects, and she has the same right to reduce them to obedience and to compel them to conform their life to their baptismal vows that a temporal sovereign has to reduce a rebellious province to submission to his legitimate authority. But she can reduce them only by such means as she possesses, and can inflict on them for their rebellion only such punishments as she has at her command, which are all spiritual. If they make war on her and attempt to seize her churches, to rob her of her possessions, to desecrate her altars, and to suppress her worship or restrain its freedom, as was the case with the early Protestants in every country where they had power enough, and which caused the terrible religious wars of the sixteenth century and the persecution of Protestants



by Catholic princes, she has the right to call in the secular power to her aid, and it is bound to repel them by force; because they themselves then transfer the controversy from the spiritual order to the temporal, and attack the social and civil rights of the church no less than her spiritual rights. But when they themselves restrain their heresy and schism within the limits of the spiritual order, make no attempt to propagate their pestilential errors or iniquity by violence, and attack none of the rights of the church or of the faithful, she, as we have seen, recognizes no right in the secular authority to molest them unless guilty of other crimes against society—and then only on principles which apply equally to all classes of social offenders. As simple heresy and schism, she cannot call in the secular authority to aid her in suppressing them. She is therefore reduced to her own spiritual resources, to addresses to their reason and their conscience, and can inflict on them only spiritual punishments, ecclesiastical censures, of which the greatest is excommunication. This, to a believer, is a terrible punishment, we grant; but to those who do not believe, who excommunicate themselves and glory in being severed from her communion, it is not a punishment too severe to be borne.

But even in inflicting her spiritual censures and in all of her dealings with her rebellious subjects, the church always has their reformation at heart, and never forgets that her mission is to save men's souls and not to destroy them. She pleads with them and leaves no measure untried that is likely to be successful, and she keeps the door always open for the return of the penitent. When she is under the painful necessity of delivering over to Satan those who set at naught her discipline, it is for "the destruction

of the flesh," that "they may learn not to blaspheme." To the very last she pleads with all a mother's sweetness, affection, and grief; and if they are finally melted and willing to return to their duty, she opens wide her arms and wide her heart to receive them, and generously forgets their past disobedience. Even the much decried and calumniated Inquisition, which it is possible politicians in some instances have abused, owed its origin to her maternal solicitude, and was instituted no less for the protection than for the detection of the misbelieving. She would interpose the shield of her maternal love between her rebellious subject and the secular arm to the last, till all hope was gone, till all her resources to reclaim him were exhausted. They know little of the church of God who call her cruel, proud, haughty, revengeful, thirsting for the blood of heretics, and rejoicing in their punishment by the civil authority. Long, long does she forbear with them—long, long does she suffer them to rend her own bosom—before she can endure to withdraw her affectionate embrace and abandon them to their self-chosen doom.

And here we are admonished of what should be the spirit of our intercourse with our unbelieving and heretical neighbors and fellow-citizens. Rousseau asserts that the dogma, Out of the church there is no salvation, is anti-social, and that whoever professes it should be banished from the commonwealth. But he might as well have said that the dogma, No one who dies guilty of mortal sin can be saved, is anti-social, and he who holds it should be banished from society. We certainly regard infidels and heretics as guilty of mortal sin before God, and therefore, if dying in their infidelity and heresy, as con-

demned to hell. But they are not the only persons whom we regard as mortal sinners; and all who die mortal sinners, even though they should die nominally in our own communion, must, according to our faith, receive the same doom. There are persons in the church who will talk, write, fight for their religion, do anything for it but live it, whose doom will be far more severe than that of many heretics and unbelievers; nay, we know not but we ourselves may be of the number, for no man knoweth whether he deserves love or hatred unless he has received a special revelation from God. We live in a world of sinners, and there may be in our own families, in our bosom companions, sinners for whose salvation we have as little reason to hope as we have for that of the unbeliever or the heretic. These things are so and must be so, and our rule of conduct is and should be the same towards sinners of all classes, that is, to conduct ourselves so as, if possible, to win them all to the love and practice of true religion.

It is very true that all who are not joined to the Catholic communion, if they die as they are, will come short of salvation. This we know by infallible faith; but we do not know that all who are not now joined to that communion will die as they are, and have no right to presume that they will. Nothing assures us that their hearts will not be softened, their pride subdued, their eyes opened—that they will not one day behold, love, and conform to the truth, and enter into the kingdom of heaven, while perhaps we ourselves shall be thrust out into exterior darkness, where there shall be weeping and gnashing of teeth. It is no less an error to hold that all out of the church will be damned than it is to hold that they can be saved without being in the church. If

we so held there would be some foundation for Rousseau's charge; our doctrine would be anti-social and we should be unable to discharge our social duties towards those out of our church. But we hold no such doctrine. There is a place of repentance for them as well as for us, and nothing forbids us to hope and to labor for their salvation. The Lord alone knoweth who are his, and we have no right to presume, as long as there is life, that the doom of any one is sealed. We must, then, treat all men, those without as well as those within, as persons for whom Christ died, as persons who may be saved and whose salvation is to be desired by us with an unbounded charity, and for which we are to rejoice to make any sacrifice in our power. Here is the reason why the dogma objected to is not anti-social and why to profess it is no breach of charity to our neighbor, but if done in the proper spirit is the very reverse—is, in fact, the highest evidence we can give of the truth and fervor of our charity.

The object of the church in all her dealings with those without as well as with those within is the salvation of souls. This must be ours also as her faithful children. This object we shall be able to further only as we live in accordance with the spirit of our religion. It requires no deep or extensive knowledge of mankind to know that the road to their convictions lies through their affections. If we would be instrumental, under God, in converting them, we must begin by loving them and by our love winning their love. Nothing is gained by convincing a man against his will; often the very logic that convinces, where the affections are not won, serves only to repel from obedience to the truth. We succeed in influencing others for their good only in proportion as we

set before them an example fit for them to follow—are meek, gentle, humble, charitable, kind, and affectionatè in our intercourse with them. And why shall we not love these neighbors and countrymen of ours who have not the inconceivable happiness of being in the church of God? Who are we that we should set up ourselves above them—that we should boast over them? What merit is it in us that we are not even as they? or how know we that ours will not be the greater condemnation? Are they not our kinsmen according to the flesh? Has not our God loved them with an infinite tenderness? Does he not proffer them his love with infinite sweetness? and has he not so longed for their love that he has died to win it? How, then, shall we not love them and labor for their salvation with a charity that burns with an intensity proportioned to their danger? Is it not here where we come short? Repelled by the bigotry, fanaticism, and hard-heartedness of some, attracted by the sweetness, affection, and kind offices of others, are we not prone to look upon these countrymen of ours who are out of the church either as persons whose conversion is hopeless or as persons who need no conversion—excusing ourselves from zealous labors to bring them to God by persuading ourselves that their conversion either is not possible or not necessary—forgetful that in either case we sin against faith and charity, and in both show ourselves wanting in true love of our neighbor and therefore of God? Is not here, in this double error, the reason why so few, comparatively, of our countrymen are brought into the one fold, under the one Shepherd? (Vol. x. pp. 229-233.)

## CATHOLICITY COMPATIBLE WITH TOLERATION.

OUR religion contains nothing, in case we should become the majority and the political power should pass in this country into our hands, which would require any external changes in our existing political institutions, in our domestic and social economies, or in the present mutual relations of the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. In taking possession of a barbarous country, Catholicity must labor to change the institutions, the laws, the manners and customs as well as the religion and interior sentiments of the people. It has to do the same in taking possession even of a falsely civilized country, like India, China, or Japan. Catholicity can never tolerate the social institutions which are cherished by these oriental nations, as the decisions of Rome in the controversies between the Jesuits and Dominicans fully prove. It can tolerate any form of government, but it can, wherever it becomes resident, tolerate no despotism, no government that is not a government of law. The prince, whether monarch, aristocracy, or democracy, must govern according to law, and as far as possible according to just law, for she recognizes no security for the worship of God where there is no protection for the rights of our neighbor, any more than she recognizes love to God where there is none to our brother. She can never tolerate the oriental doctrine of castes, for she teaches that all men are of one blood, are brethren, equals before God and should be equals before the law. The great reason why Christianity penetrates so slowly into these oriental nations is, no doubt, the fact that not their religion only, but their whole order of society, their whole political, social, and domestic life, is

unchristian, and must be changed in order to make them Christian nations. A Chinese or a Hindoo might object, with truth, to the introduction of Christianity, that it would change his political and social institutions as well as his religious beliefs and usages.

But when Catholicity took possession of the Roman empire it changed nothing except the spiritual order and what held from it. It stepped into the Roman civilization as if it had been expressly prepared for it—as it no doubt, in a great measure, had been—abolished the false gods, purged the temples of their idolatry, cleansed them with holy water, converted them into churches, and consecrated them to the true God—changed the manners and customs of the people as far as they depended on the false religions which had been professed, but retained the social institutions, the schools, the academies, the laws, the whole exterior domestic and social economy as she found it, only infusing her own spirit into it and animating it with a purer, a higher, and a more vigorous life. The same will be the case here. Our civilization is founded on a right basis—is Roman and Christian in its groundwork; and there never has been a state constituted throughout more in harmony with Catholic principles than the American. Its founders were not Catholics; far from it; but they would have been startled to have seen how much they were indebted to Catholicity for every important movement they adopted. Their innovations were, for the most part, borrowed from Catholic teachers. Our American fathers had, unhappily for them, turned their backs upon the church; but they had been nursed in the bosom of her civilization. That civilization they brought with them to this

New World, purged of the barbaric leaven which was still, in some measure, retained in the mother country, and against which the popes and the whole spiritual society had protested for ten centuries. Whoever will examine the respective civil institutions of England and this country will hardly fail to perceive that what of England we have rejected is what she owes to her barbarous ancestors, and what we have added which she has not has been borrowed from Roman and Catholic civilization. Indeed, just in proportion, under a civil and political point of view, as we have receded from England, we have approached Rome and Catholicity. They betray no little simplicity and ignorance of modern civilization who suppose that the triumph of Catholicity here would be the subversion of our political and civil constitution. Our institutions throughout are based upon the great principles of reason and common sense, which our church presupposes and sanctions, inspired by Catholic tradition and sustained by that portion of Catholic life which the Protestant population were able to carry with them when they broke away from its source, and which, we would fain hope, is not yet wholly extinct. Indeed, the body for Catholicity seems to us to be here already prepared. It is moulded from fine, rich red earth, in a form of majestic proportions and of surpassing beauty, wanting nothing but the divine breath to be breathed into its nostrils in order to become a living soul. The conversion of the country would destroy, would change nothing in this admirable body, but it would quicken it with the breath of the Almighty and secure its continuance and its beneficent and successful operation.

We have not, we grant, defended the political tol-



eration of different religions on infidel or even Protestant principles. It would have been idle to have done so; for everybody knows that those principles are not ours, and cannot be unless we give up our religion. We cannot place the sects on a footing of perfect equality with the church and defend their freedom on the same ground that we do hers, because error can never exist by the same right that truth exists. The popular ground of defending the toleration of all religions by the state is the assumption of their equal right before God. This ground cannot be held by a Catholic; and if we had assumed it, and on the strength of it asserted that Catholic states are bound to maintain universal toleration, who would have had any confidence in our sincerity, or not have supposed that our assertion was made merely for the purpose of escaping the odium of appearing to oppose the toleration by Catholic states of heretical or schismatical religions now, when toleration is popular, and we stand in need of it for ourselves? Every intelligent Protestant or unbeliever, with the history of the middle ages before his eyes, would have said, "Yes, these Catholics here in this country, where they are weak, are exceedingly liberal and preach universal toleration; but let them become strong, let them once get the political power, and we shall quickly see that they are as intolerant in the political order as they are confessedly in the spiritual order." We Catholics must never forget that Protestants and unbelievers have a theory, to which they are wedded, that we are all ready to lie and swear to anything for the sake of Catholicity, and that we can go so far as to profess indifferentism, infidelity, or even Puritanism if we think we can thereby promote the interests of our church. Our

assertions count for nothing with them. We are, in their estimation, fools when honest and knaves when intelligent. Externally considered, it is evidently for our interest here in this country, and, indeed, in many other countries at the present time, to preach toleration; and they suppose interest governs us as it does them, and therefore they place no confidence in our preaching unless we show clearly and undeniably that it is in harmony with the principles of our church where she is strong as well as where she is apparently weak.

We have therefore defended the political toleration of the sects as a Catholic statesman, on strictly Catholic principles, without the least compromise—without descending for a moment from the high ground of the infallibility and immutability of our church—without blinking or hesitating to justify, in its fullest extent, the political intolerance manifested by Catholic states to infidelity, heresy, and schism in past times. We have shown that not mere policy, but the very principles of our holy religion require us now—on the supposition that modern unbelievers, heretics, and schismatics are civilized and no longer barbarians or addicted to barbarous practices—to assert and maintain as broad a toleration as our American constitution guaranties; that they forbid the punishment by the civil authority of sins against God, however great, when not incompatible with the peace and welfare of society; and that the church can of herself inflict only spiritual punishments, and no greater spiritual punishment than excommunication. If this does not satisfy, it is not our fault nor that of our church. (Vol. x. pp. 235-238.)

## THE CHURCH IN THE DARK AGES.

THE assumption that the church reigned quietly and peacefully during the middle ages is warranted by no authority and is contradicted by the whole history of the period. That period extends from the beginning of the sixth century to the close of the fifteenth. A simple glance at its history will suffice to dissipate the illusion that the middle ages were all the work of the church or that she worked throughout them comparatively at her ease. Those ages open with the destruction of the western Roman empire and the permanent settlement of the northern barbarians on its ruins. For all western Europe the old Græco-Roman civilization is destroyed, save the wrecks preserved by the church and some few towns in Italy and Gaul. The old cultivated populations are in great measure exterminated, and the few that survive have been plundered, impoverished, and for the most part reduced to slavery. Over the vast extent of the once flourishing, wealthy, and highly civilized and christianized provinces of the empire you see nothing but ruined cities, deserted towns and villages, large tracts of once cultivated land becoming wild, a thin population composed of miserable, trembling slaves and rude, ignorant, proud, arrogant, and merciless barbarian masters. The churches and religious houses have been demolished or plundered; the schools and institutions of learning, so numerous and so richly endowed under the empire, have disappeared; the liberal arts are despised and neglected; the domestic arts, except a few, are lost or forgotten; war, pillage, general insecurity, misery, want, have loosened all moral restraints, unchained the passions, and given free scope to vice

and crime; the clergy are few, poor, illiterate, for their conquerors, as subsequently in Ireland, have left them no means of education; and besides, they belong for the most part to the conquered races and are therefore despised. The barbarian conquerors and masters, moreover, are not all even nominally Catholic. Many of them are Arians; more of them are pagans, still adoring their old Scandinavian and Teutonic deities and looking with proud disdain on the Christians' faith and the Christians' worship. An Arian kingdom has been erected in northern Africa, another is establishing itself in northern Italy; what is now Switzerland and eastern France was subject to the part heretical, part pagan, but wholly savage Burgundians; in the rest of France there are portions of the old Gallo-Roman population that have not yet received the faith, and portions of the old Celtic population who in their dense forests still cherish their ancient Druidism; the barbarian kingdom in Spain has but recently and imperfectly yielded to Catholicity; the British churches have lost their vigor and are confined to the narrow district of Wales, and through all the rest of Britain paganism is rampant and the altars smoke with sacrifices to Woden and Thor. Ireland alone at this period is a Catholic oasis in the immense desert of heresy and barbarian infidelity. Belgium in part, all Germany, all northern and all eastern Europe above the Byzantine empire, are one unbroken Cimmeria of heathenism; and even Rome herself is not all Catholic or even all Christian. Such is a bird's-eye view of what is now the most civilized and the ruling part of the globe at the opening of the middle ages; and such, after having once christianized the empire, was the new world committed to the charge of the

church. Far more disheartening were her prospects than when she concealed herself in the catacombs, or bled under Nero, Decius, Maximian, and Diocletian; and far more laborious was the task now before her than that which she had accomplished in passing from that "upper room" in Jerusalem to the throne of the Cæsars.

Nor was it only at the beginning of the middle ages that the church found herself in face of a hostile world. The hostility continued till the close of the period, and even then did not cease, but broke out under a new form, that of Protestantism, with undiminished virulence. It was in the middle ages, we must remember, that Mahometanism sprang up in the desert, and, breaking forth with wild and ferocious fanaticism, for eight hundred years devastated the fairest and most fertile regions of the earth; that the Iconoclasts persecuted the church and sought to prepare it for Islamism; the Greek schism originated and was consummated; the Huns made their new invasion from the East; the Saracens ravaged the south of Italy and France and established themselves in Spain; the fierce and shaggy Norsemen came down from the frozen North, with their wild courage, their savage cruelty, and their Scandinavian superstitions; the dissolute Albigenes renewed the heresy of Manes and perpetrated their horrors; the Beghards, Wicliffites, followers of the *Évangile Éternel*, and other sectaries, arose, and by their pantheistic and socialistic movements and insurrections in England, France, and the Low Countries preluded not unworthily the pantheistic and socialistic revolutions which we have seen during the last year convulse all Europe and threaten the destruction of all law all order, all society, both civil and religious. Add

to these great facts, the deplorable effects of which are still widely and deeply felt, that during these same ages there was scarcely a moment of peace between the civil and the ecclesiastical powers. The civil authority never ceased to encroach on the spiritual, and the church was obliged to maintain a constant and severe struggle to prevent herself from being swamped, so to speak, by the state, as the schismatical and heretical churches of England, Russia, Scandinavia, and northern Germany have been and now are. In order to protect society and herself against armed heathenism, Mahometanism, and barbarism, the church was obliged to revive, or suffer to be revived, in Charlemagne, the western Roman empire, before Europe was prepared for it; and ever after she was but too happy when in his successors she did not find, instead of a protector, a cruel, oppressive, and sacrilegious spoiler. It is easy now to say that the revival of the empire was premature and bad policy; but it was the best thing possible at the time, or, if it was not, it was inevitable so far as the church was concerned, and she could not have prevented it if she had tried. Pious as Charlemagne was, he never suffered religion to interfere with his ambition or the church to stand in the way of realizing his projects of temporal aggrandizement. The empire once reëstablished, barbaric as it necessarily was, a formidable schism between the temporal authority and the spiritual commenced which continued to widen as long as the empire existed. Rarely was there a "Kaiser" of "the Holy Roman Empire," from Charlemagne to Charles V., that respected the freedom of the church, that allowed her to exercise her spiritual discipline without his interference, that permitted her without restraint to manage her own

affairs, or that did not wage open or secret war against her. Rarely did the church, in her struggles for religious liberty against the temporal powers, come off victorious; never was she able, through the whole period of the middle ages, to gain, and never yet has she gained, in even a single Catholic state, the freedom and independence she enjoys here in these United States, which is all she asks and all she has ever struggled for. The very instance of Philip the Fair of France insulting Boniface VIII. and successfully braving his authority cited . . . to prove the "enormous power of the popes," is a striking proof of their weakness and of how completely they lay at the mercy of the crowned despots and tyrants. The sainted Hildebrand, the seventh Gregory, one of the most powerful of the successors of St. Peter, was driven from his throne by the temporal authority and died in exile. We all know that the rivalries and machinations of the temporal powers effected and sustained the great and scandalous schism of the West, which the church could never have survived if she had not been upheld by the arm of the Almighty. It is all a delusion, the notion which some seem to cherish, that the church met no resistance in the middle ages, and that emperors, kings, princes, and nobles demeaned themselves as her obedient sons. Their submission was the exception, not the rule, and their protection of the church was seldom anything but a pretext for enslaving her. They seem never to have responded to her call to execute the sentences she pronounced, unless it suited their humor, flattered their ambition, or promised them some temporal aggrandizement. They seldom heeded her spiritual censures or her excommunications if they persuaded themselves that they

could guard against their evil temporal consequences; and it was rare, indeed, that a prince, even excommunicated and deposed, could not command the support of his army, of the greater part of his own subjects, and even of the national clergy. Godfrey of Bouillon, subsequently the pious Crusader, fights for Henry of Germany after the pope has deposed him, against his competitor Rudolph, sustained by the church. If the barons of England desert John Lackland, it is for reasons of their own, not because he is under excommunication; and a few years after they can conspire against him at Runnymede, under the lead of Archbishop Langton, in defiance of the excommunication pronounced by the pope against them.

Nothing is more evident to every one who has studied them without being captivated by their romance or blinded by his hatred of Catholicity, than that the church was by no means the only force at work in the middle ages, and that she was far enough from being able to carry out into practical life all her own views and of having everything to her own liking. She had by no means a "thousand years of almost triumphant ascendancy for the full trial of experiments," as our Unitarian friend rashly asserts. She was resisted on every side; her rights were perpetually invaded; her authority was continually braved; her discipline was seldom suffered to have free course; her clergy, when they did not add the feudal to their ecclesiastical character and become princes and barons as well as priests, were treated by the representatives of the barbarian conquerors with contumely and contempt; and her doctrines, her precepts, her admonitions, were scorned or set at naught by the great whenever it suited their humor



or their passions. The church became the possessor of great riches, it is true; but her wealth bore witness full as much to the vices, the crimes, and the disorders as to the piety and zeal of the times, and, moreover, she possessed them in no small part simply in her accidental character of the public almoner. The donations and bequests she received were not seldom made by a tardy and doubtful repentance, in the hope, we fear often vain, of purchasing repose for the soul of a sinner whose life had been spent in breaking every precept of the decalogue. The "baron bold" of romantic poetry was not infrequently a bold blasphemer, a dissolute and sacrilegious wretch, an oppressor of his people, measuring his rights only by his might. We are not insensible to the charms which romance lends to the middle ages or to the golden hues which a rich and fervid imagination spreads over them when contemplating them at a distance or in the brilliant lamp-light; but whoever has ventured to look at them stripped of all the deceptive coloring of his own fancy, in their nakedness, as they actually were, will quickly dismiss the pleasing illusion that they were in any peculiar sense "ages of faith," or that it is from them that we are to form any adequate notions of what are really *Mores Catholici*, or Catholic morals and manners. Not in them, indeed, had our good mother the fair field and the fitting opportunity to realize her idea of Catholic secular life. Faith there was, and piety, and charity, and heroic sanctity, such as has never been surpassed, and the blessed fruits of which we and all modern civilized nations are now reaping; but, alas! something else was there too—something which did not proceed from the church, which she did not sanction, which

she never ceased to oppose, but which resisted all her supernatural efforts and continued to exist in spite of her.

Undoubtedly it will not answer to recognize in modern society only the human element, and to attempt to explain all its phenomena from the point of view of simple human activity. In no age, certainly in no age since the advent of our Lord, is it true to say that all in human history is the product of man alone. The Christian religion, the Catholic Church, has placed in the modern world a divine element, supernatural in its source, in its principle, in the mode of its operation, and in its effects. This element was in the middle ages, represented there by the Catholic Church; and all the phenomena or historical facts of those, as of all other ages, which proceeded from her or have received her sanction, we as Catholics are bound to maintain and are ready to maintain against all challengers to be just, right, pure, holy, and salutary to the life of society and of the individual soul. But if we are bound to recognize the part of the church, we are equally bound to recognize the part of man. Because we recognize the church in the dark ages, it must not be supposed that we recognize only her and hold her, or concede that she is to be held, responsible for all the phenomena we meet in their history. She never subsists alone, and neither in society nor in the individual, in professedly Catholic states nor in professedly Catholic men, is she the only efficient cause or operative force. In the individual believer human nature remains after regeneration; the flesh survives and as long as we live lusteth against the spirit, making the Christian's life, whatever its interior peace or consolation, one unremitting warfare, from which there

is no escape. This, since true of the individual, must also be true of society. In every society, large or small, by the side of the church subsists fallen human nature, with its evil concupiscence, its grovelling propensities, its disorderly affections, its fierce and ungovernable passions. It will not answer to overlook the facts which have their origin in this source, nor will it answer to charge them to the account of the church. Both elements coexist, both have their respective phenomena which are intermingled and grow together in history, as grow together the wheat and the tares in the same field. In forming our judgment we must discriminate between them; and if we do this and assign to each element its own phenomena or the class of facts of which it is the principle, we shall have no difficulty in granting all that the most unscrupulous of the enemies of Catholicity allege against the middle ages themselves, and yet maintaining the claims of the church as the infallible church of God. (Vol. x. pp. 244-250.)

#### CATHOLICS INDIFFERENT TO MEDIÆVAL HISTORY.

WE may, perhaps, find here one of the reasons why Catholics who have from earliest infancy been reared in the bosom of the church appear so indifferent to mediæval history and show so little solicitude to prove that on its secular side it was not as dark and forbidding as Protestants heretofore have been accustomed to represent it. They have, in fact, no special interest in vindicating it. They seek their Lord, not in the dead past, but in the living present—in the church that is and is to be until the consummation of the world unvaried and invariable; and

they may well leave the history of their antiquity, save so far as necessary to repel charges preferred against the church, to those outside of her communion. Hence the attempted rehabilitation of mediæval society in our days is the work of Protestants; the romantic school is of Protestant-German origin; the greater part of the recent historical works, many of them really able and learned, which have refuted the stale charges against the popes and the church in the middle ages are nearly all from Protestant, at least uncatholic, authors; and the mania which rages for reviving mediæval arts, tastes, usages, and institutions chiefly affects Oxford men and their friends, disturbing the equilibrium of comparatively few Catholics. It is an admirable economy that they who see that their church is a mere corpse should seek to dress her in the robes of the past instead of those of the present. It spares the living and does no harm to the dead. Indeed, we are expecting the assailants of the church to shift, ere long, their position, and to attempt to rob her of the glory of having subdued the barbarians and founded modern civilization, by stoutly maintaining that there were no barbarians to subdue; that the Goths, Vandals, Huns, Franks, Burgundians, Longobards, etc., were highly cultivated and polished tribes, far in advance of the degenerate races they invaded and supplanted; that the middle ages were admirable for their successful and complete realization of the loftiest and most perfect civilization; and that we poor Romanists fail to be Catholic because we fail to be sufficiently mediæval! We are looking for books and pamphlets intended to prove that the grand error of the popes, their grand apostasy, which caused and justified the reformation, consisted in

their regarding the invaders and destroyers of the Roman empire as barbarians, in resisting their advanced civilization and laboring to impose upon them the inferior and effete civilization of Greece and Rome. Nay, we already see evident indications that we are soon to be subjected to this new line of attack; and in more than one Puseyite publication we detect the germs of the view we here suggest, and which the romanticists seem to us to be pledged by their fundamental principles to develop and mature. (Vol. x. pp. 254, 255.)

#### THE HUMANISTS AND ROMANTICISTS.

UNDER many relations we believe that after the tenth century to the middle of the fourteenth the middle ages were far superior to the present, though not under the relations of civilization properly so called. But what they are principally lauded for by our sentimentalists and romanticists is precisely that in them which was the least in accordance with Catholicity and genuine civilization; for it is what proceeded from their barbaric, not from either their Christian or their Græco-Roman elements. The revival of letters in the fifteenth century—that century of wonderful activity and enterprise—was a great event, and its bearing on human culture has hardly ever been overestimated; but it came in a shape hostile to the schoolmen and old Græco-Roman gentilism. The humanists of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries have produced the romanticists of the nineteenth century. They seized upon the Græco-Roman elements of modern society, sought to render them exclusive, to develop and realize them independently, on the one hand, of the church, and, on the other,

of mediæval barbarism, and they deprived them of life and brought forth a dead and petrified classicism, as offensive to good taste as to true piety—as incapable of aiding the growth of a truly human as of a truly Christian life. The romanticists revolted at this petrified classicism, and, already gentilized by the old humanists, had no alternative but to seek a living literature in developing the barbaric elements of the middle ages and realizing them independently of the Greek and Roman elements and also of Catholicity. This they attempted, and their success would be the restoration, not of cultivated and polished gentilism, but of rude, unpolished, barbaric heathenism, after the Teutonic and Scandinavian modes.

We are not disposed to deny that the schoolmen were defective in taste. They wrote barbarous Latin and were seldom good Greek scholars; their humor was grotesque rather than delicate, and their jokes smacked of men who live among themselves, remote from the great world; their forms were dry and rigid and their rules too narrow and too unelastic for the play of the free spirit and expansive genius of man. The humanists, in combating them and substituting the purer taste and the more symmetrical and graceful forms of ancient art, did a valuable service to the cause of human culture and refinement. So the romanticists, in freeing us from the fetters of a dead classicism, from the narrow and pedantic rules of men who servilely copied the exterior forms, but were incapable of producing in the free and original spirit of the ancient classics, and permitting us to move more at our ease, according to our natural dispositions, have served the cause of good literature. By their excavations of mediæval

romance from the tombs of centuries and their importations from the old mystic East they have enlarged our literary horizon and augmented our literary materials, for which we cheerfully render them all fitting acknowledgment. But as the humanists, along with their classicism, revived old gentile theories and speculations, by which they ruined philosophy and shook the faith of no small part of Christendom while professing to labor to confirm it, so the romanticists, to the extent of their influence, must revive the old barbaric heathenism and tend to ruin literature, art, philosophy, and through them both religion and civilization. The humanists gave us heathenism, but it was cultivated heathenism which, as to its forms, was repugnant neither to good taste nor to Christianity; the romanticists, the humanists of our time, give us heathenism to an equal extent, and what is worse, rude, uncouth, barbaric heathenism, with its grotesque images, its gigantic figures, its huge disproportioned shapes, its hideous and grinning monsters, which no Christian art can baptize, no power can lick into a Christian shape, inform with a Christian soul, or train to a civilized behavior. Do the best possible, it will always remain the man-bear of recent German romance.

Nothing would be more amusing, if the matter were not so grave, than to see our romanticists parading the old mediæval romances, chronicles, ballads, lays, and roundelays as genuine specimens of Christian literature. Indeed, the irony is too obvious to be witty. Even if sometimes the thought and sentiment happen to be Christian, the form is barbarian. The mediæval romancers frequently profane Christian thoughts and expressions, as the old magicians profaned the Sacred Host in their spells; but the

substance of their works is always derived from heathen sources. The troubadours of Provence are moved by their own corrupt passions and sing under Arabic, Moorish, and Manichean influences; the trouvères of Normandy, the bards of Armorica and Wales, the minnesingers of Germany, recite or sing, for the most part, the old barbaric and heathen memories and superstitions of their respective nations, which long survived and are not even yet wholly extinct in the heart of the old Celtic, Scandinavian, and Teutonic families. To call the mediæval literature proceeding from these sources Christian is only to prove how far we have lost, or never received, the true conception of Christianity. In admiring such a literature, we give no evidence of a return towards Catholicity; we only show that we are doing our best to return to the state of the barbaric nations before the church had commenced the work of their conversion, and are trying to satisfy our souls with mere vagaries or to enrich ourselves with the *débris* of old barbaric nationalities, idolatries, and superstitions. (Vol. x. pp. 259, 260.)

#### INFERIORITY OF MEDIÆVAL MEN TO THE ANCIENTS.

IN all those lofty qualities of the civilized man, in themselves indifferent to vice or virtue, the man of mediæval history appears to us far inferior to the man of Greek and Roman antiquity. Compared with the latter, he seems to us a mere dwarf, stunted and warped in his growth by a one-sided and incomplete culture. We find in the mediæval man the moment he steps out of religion very little of that simplicity, naturalness, repose, sustained courage,



prudent energy, sedate strength, greatness of soul, constancy of will, firmness of resolution, or force of character which so strikes and charms us in the men of classic antiquity. There is, as Gioberti—a writer whom we like for some things and dislike for many—has well suggested, a considerable distance between the men of Plutarch and Livy and the romantic heroes and lion-hearted warriors of Boiardo and Ariosto, with their mad adventure and their silly love-makings.

The causes of this inferiority of the mediæval man, and perhaps equally of the man of our times, we have no space to consider now at length. The remote cause of it lies, no doubt, in the depravity of human nature, in consequence of which men will do a thousand times more to improve themselves and society for the sake of self or of worldly or human greatness than they will for the sake of God or at the command of duty. (Vol. x. pp. 261, 262.)

Though the remote cause is in the corruption of human nature and the fact that paganism imposed less restraint on its operations than Catholicity, the proximate cause of this inferiority is in the schism which has always existed, since the institution of the church, between the secular and the spiritual elements of society. The secular element has never been brought into harmony with the spiritual. The church could not do it at first, because the state was pagan and persecuted her; and it took her full three hundred years to convert it. But she had no sooner converted it than the barbarians began their invasion, and she had to commence her struggle against barbarism, which, in part, still continues. She has never been able to baptize secular life and to institute a culture as perfect for it as that which she

has always sustained is for the religious life. The secular order has therefore, from the first, remained outside of Christianity, and the secular mind has never been informed with the Christian spirit. The spirit of all secular art, secular literature, secular science, even when cultivated by Catholics, is and always has been, from Nero to Mazzini, unchristian. This is obvious to every one. Whenever we leave the religious order, escape its external control, and abandon ourselves instinctively to secular pursuits, or in any degree yield to the spirit of the secular order, however pure our intentions in the outset, however firm our faith, sincere and earnest our attachment to our religion, we are imperceptibly borne away in a direction hostile to Christianity, and, ere we suspect danger, are sunk in the quicksands of vice or dashed against the rocks of heresy or infidelity. We have a striking proof of this in La Mennais, another in Padre Ventura, and still another, we fear, in Gioberti—three of the greatest and, in various ways, most extraordinary men of our times. All three set out sincere, earnest, and enlightened Catholic priests, with rare philosophical genius and attainments and rarer knowledge of the spirit and tendencies of the age. La Mennais has fallen to the lowest depths; Ventura\* has, by his recent conduct at Rome, outraged the feelings of the whole Catholic world; and Gioberti, as his case now stands, or as it is known to us, we must regard as having betrayed his religion and forfeited all his claims upon sincere Catholics. What can more clearly prove that the secular order remains even to this day unbaptized, and that whoever follows its spirit is sure to find himself on the side against the religion of God?

\* Father Ventura afterwards more than regained all he had lost.—ED.

Our modern literature is all full of this schism between the two orders, and the secret of most of the movements of our times is the effort to heal it. From Pusey to Parker, Ventura to Proudhon, the Hegelians to the Fourierists and Icarians, the harmony of the two orders is the secret, in general the avowed, object. But, unhappily, nearly all efforts not only fail, but tend to widen the breach; because they are efforts to heal the schism by harmonizing the spiritual with the secular instead of the secular with the spiritual. Here is the grand difficulty. As friends of religion we are obliged to hold on, in most countries, to things as they are—to desist from efforts to effect such educational improvements and social ameliorations as are good in themselves, such as are really needed, and such as we are most anxious to effect—because we cannot, in the present state of the world, make a single move in their behalf without throwing the power into the hands of the men who would subject the spiritual order to the secular, destroy the whole influence of religion, and with it the very conditions of civilization. The certain evil that would follow would infinitely outweigh the good we could effect. (Vol. x. pp. 263, 264.)

#### THE CHURCH NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE MIDDLE AGES.

WE recognize no church *of* the middle ages; but the church *in* the middle ages, as in all ages, . . . we hold to be irreproachable, not, indeed, because we are a great admirer of those ages themselves, nor because we believe they were themselves irreproachable, but because what there was in them objectionable proceeded from causes independent of the church and hostile to her, which she had no power to control

and could remove only in proportion as she could induce men to become voluntarily her subjects. There were, doubtless, things which she did then that she would not do now; for the circumstances now are different and do not demand, might not even justify, them. She is in the world to bless it; and while her doctrines and principles remain eternally unvaried and invariable, she applies them with perfect freedom to the circumstances of time and place. She never permits herself to become the slave of routine or of stereotyped modes of exterior action. When society is in an exceptional state she deals with it accordingly. When it throws upon her the burden of providing for the poor, she does it in the best manner existing circumstances allow. We rejoice when we read that seventeen thousand poor were fed in one day at Cluny, and we see in the fact her maternal solicitude and forethought for even the temporal subsistence of her children; but we see no evidence in it of the perfection of the secular order of the time, and no reason for wishing to perpetuate a state of society that leaves such a number of poor daily to be fed at a single monastery. Many of the institutions which the church founded and cherished in the middle ages have passed away, or must pass away, with the social changes which are constantly taking place; but this is no cause of reproach to her or of alarm to us. Others, better adapted to the altered circumstances of new ages, she will institute in their place and gain the same ends by other means. And thus it is that while we adhere to the church in all times, and *because* we do so, we are free to condemn barbarism wherever we find it and to labor with all our zeal and ability for an advanced and, if possible, an ever-advancing civilization. (Vol. x. p. 266.)

PROPOSED ALLIANCE OF RELIGION AND  
DEMOCRACY.

WE are at some loss to understand what is meant by forming an *alliance* between religion and liberty. To call for the forming of such an alliance seems to us to imply, what is not true, that religion has heretofore been divorced from liberty, and has remained alone or formed an adulterous union with tyranny and oppression. An alliance presupposes, also, that the allies are separate and independent powers; but we are not aware of any such power as liberty separate from religion and independent of it. Religion is the origin, ground, and condition of liberty. Where religion is, there is liberty; where religion is not, whatever of license there may be, there is not liberty and cannot be. The two are in their nature inseparable, and indistinguishable even, save as the effect is distinguishable from the cause, the property from the essence, the stream from the fountain. How, then, form an alliance between them, since they are already in their very nature so intimately united? How form an alliance between the sun and its rays or the rainbow and its tints?

That there has been and is a party throughout most European nations clamoring for liberty as separated from religion, we are not ignorant; but they clamor for what has and can have no real existence under that sacred name. That this party has made and still makes war on the church, that it has believed and still believes, or pretends to believe, that the church is the enemy of liberty, and that to become free it is necessary to overturn the altar as well as the throne, is lamentably true; but who that loves religion and is imbued with the lessons of the gos-

pel can advocate an alliance of the church with these, or pretend that to accept and support, not, indeed, their means, but the end they are really seeking, would be to accept and support the cause of liberty? That which the enemies of the church, the desecrators of all holy things, and the blasphemers of God clamor for is not liberty and can by no ecclesiastical alchemy be transmuted into liberty. There is with these not merely a mistake as to the means, agencies, or influences by which the end is to be gained, but a mistake as to the end itself. With what in them is religion to form an alliance? Or what energy have they from which she could profit? (Vol. x. pp. 70, 71.)

Where the end proposed is distinctly religious and is sought from religious motives, the church may, undoubtedly, side with those who are seeking it, bless their efforts, and make common cause with them; for their cause is hers and she does but use them for the accomplishment of her own purposes. But where the end is not itself distinctly religious and is not referred to a distinctly religious end—is not to secure the freedom and independence of the church and to enable her to pursue freely, without let or hindrance, her divine mission of teaching, saving, succoring, and solacing mankind, but to procure a merely temporal or earthly good—we see not how she can make common cause with those who are in pursuit of it without implying that heaven makes a compact with earth. The church may, and assuredly does, promote men's earthly well-being, but never save as incidental to her promotion of their spiritual and eternal interests. The temporal follows the eternal, but does not precede it and is not sought by it. "Seek first the kingdom of God and

his justice, and all these things shall be *added* unto you" is the principle on which the church proceeds and the invariable law which she prescribes to her children. The heavenly is gained only by being the direct and sole object of pursuit; but the earthly only by not being so sought, and, indeed, only by not being sought at all. "He that will save his life shall lose it, and he that will lose his life for my sake shall find it." We know no exceptions to this rule.

Now, these European populations seeking popular forms of government are not seeking these as a religious end, nor, indeed, for a religious end, but solely with a view to their own social or temporal well-being. They have not in view the interests of religion; they are not disposed to struggle for the freedom and independence of the church, or to remove a single obstacle in the way of her fulfilling in them, or for them, her divine mission; they have in view only their own earthly interests. These they may,—in so far as they violate no law of God, omit no moral or religious duty,—no doubt, lawfully seek; but the church cannot, while they seek them only in reference to an earthly end, make common cause with them without an abandonment of her own principle of action and in some measure compromising her divine mission. Moreover, it is not a sound view to identify even civil liberty with popular forms of government. Freedom is possible under any and every form of government; and so is tyranny. Republics can tyrannize and oppress as well as monarchies, and we see among ourselves that under the most democratic institutions on earth three millions of the population out of twenty can be held in abject slavery. Wherever the government is wisely and justly administered, whatever its form, there is civil

freedom, and wherever it is not so administered, there is not civil freedom; and the chances of a wise and just administration are not in proportion to the more or less popular form of the government, but to the more or less influence which religion has over the nation. Wherever the church is free and is able to exert her legitimate influence, the government will be as wisely administered as with human frailty can be expected; but where she is not free, or where her influence is not exerted, there is and can be no guaranty of such administration, whatever the contrivances of statesmen or in whose hands soever may be placed the reins of government.

As long as the European populations place their temporal well-being before their spiritual and eternal, not even the church can emancipate them and secure them the blessings of civil liberty. Political changes will prove unavailing, and the evil which is now concentrated in the court would only be diffused through the mass, and for one tyrant give a hundred. No siding with the people, no consecration of their banner and blessing of their cause, will deliver them from oppression unless they in themselves seek liberty, not for an earthly, but for a heavenly end—unless they place the church first in their affections and obedience and seek freedom for her sake instead of their own.

Undoubtedly if the church were to proclaim common cause with the movement for popular institutions, the great body of those who are seeking them would applaud her and rally under her banner, because they could rally under hers without deserting their own. She and they would certainly come together; not by their going to her, but by her coming to them. They would, no doubt, hail her as a



welcome ally and drink many a toast to her health so long as she claimed to be *only* an ally; but the moment she should seek to restrain their lawlessness, to compel them to observe discipline, or claim the right to command their forces, they would raise the cry, *À bas l'Église! vive la République!* and she would find herself under the disadvantage of seeming to them to oppose the very cause she had sanctified and the very banner she had blessed. The alliance would secure her an infusion of popular energy while she obeyed the popular passion and exerted herself only to carry out the popular will, but no longer. For a moment she would seem to be strengthened by the alliance, but having by it made a concession to the people and told them that they were justifiable in their cause, she would in reality only be weakened by it.

But it is said the populations have become hostile to the church in consequence of their belief that she is unfriendly to civil liberty, and unless she espouses the cause they have so much at heart they will neither submit nor listen to her. There may be some truth in this, but we cannot accept the conclusion that therefore she must disabuse them by espousing that cause. An astute politician in old pagan times might have reasoned with equal justice: The bulk of the pagan people believe the church is opposed to what they hold to be religion and will not submit or listen to her teaching; it is necessary, therefore, that she disabuse them by offering incense to the idols. No matter whether the idol be Jupiter, Venus, or civil liberty, an alliance with its worship is alike inadmissible. It is not for those without to propose conditions to the church, nor is it for her to make concessions to them. She proposes the condi-

tions; if we abuse our free will and reject them and destroy our own souls, the responsibility rests on us, not on her.

It is, undoubtedly, desirable to disabuse the populations of their error, but it cannot be done in the way proposed. The church cannot, in order to disabuse them, consent to take the law from them. The policy recommended would procure, not their submission to her, but hers to them. They who submit to the church for the sake of any temporal good do not submit to her at all, nor do they become in reality any more or better Catholics than they were before. The European populations, to a considerable extent, no doubt, place the melioration of society and the establishment of political liberty before every other object. But this is a grave error on their part—an error to be corrected, not sanctioned. For the church to make common cause with them were only to confirm them in it. Nay, this very error is one of the chief obstacles to the realization of the social improvement and civil liberty they demand. Their eagerness overleaps itself and fails of its aim. The church can do nothing for them save in proportion as she is able to disabuse them of this error and bring them to place God and heaven before all things else. As long as they entertain their present false view the church cannot rely on them—cannot work with them without falling herself into error—and they are out of the condition of either effecting or receiving their emancipation. The church can really aid only those who love and obey her—submit themselves to her instructions and authority. (Vol. x. pp. 72-75.)

FREEDOM OF THE CHURCH WILL SECURE  
CIVIL FREEDOM.

FINALLY, we cannot understand how the church can raise the banner of democracy and call upon the faithful to rally under it. She prescribes no particular form of government; in her view, all forms of government, when and where legitimately established or legally existing, are alike sacred and obligatory. She commands the administrators of governments, whether they be kings, nobles, or the people, to administer the government wisely and justly, in subjection to the law of God, for the public good. This is as far as she ever goes. How, then, can she side with the people in their movements for popular forms of government? Is she to change her policy, pursued without deviation for eighteen hundred years, and at this late day propose a particular form of government as an article of faith? Or because kings now are tyrants is she to preach up democracy, and when democracy becomes a tyrant, to be obliged to preach up monarchy? There is in the demand, it strikes us, quite too much of short-sighted human policy, pursuing a course to-day which it must retrace to-morrow, or which seeks to gain a temporary object at the expense of an eternal principle.

But if we oppose the policy which seems to us to be recommended in the oration before us, it is not because we oppose liberty or are the friends and apologists of the crowned tyrants or imbeciles of Europe. We have no sympathy with the policy of the principal European courts. That policy is opposed to the freedom and independence of the church, without which no people can be free and no

government wisely and justly administered. We abhor and detest it because it is hostile to freedom of conscience and would enchain the word of God—because it would subject the spiritual to the temporal and rob Almighty God of his own. Let there be a crusade preached against them in behalf of the freedom and independence of the church—let the populations be summoned to break the cords with which these infidel governments bind the Lord's anointed, and we will be first among the foremost to bind on the cross and march to the battle-field, to victory or immortality. In securing this, the highest of all liberties and the source and guaranty of all liberty worthy of the name, the people would be emancipated from their tyrants to the full extent compatible with human infirmity. Civil freedom would be secured for all. "If the Son make you free, you shall be free indeed." It is, therefore, the freedom of the Son, the freedom wherewith he makes free, that we should first of all—nay, alone—seek, and all other freedom shall be added thereto. Seek God alone, and you find what you seek, and, over and above all, the good you did not seek. Give all to God and he gives all back to you in a hundred fold.

We wish the church to go as far against the governments of Europe as Padre Ventura does; but for her own emancipation, which includes every other emancipation. We would have her go, as she always does, to the extent of her power, for her own liberty; but not for liberalism, whether conspiring in secret with free-masons and carbonari, marching openly with Swiss radicals to the destruction of states and the desecration of temples, or assuming the Quaker garb of peaceful agitation. Then the end proposed would be distinctively religious, and the church

might well consecrate the banner and bless the armies of the warriors enlisted; for they would be her own soldiers, her own sons, not foreign allies or mercenaries. In a work of this kind every Catholic could sympathize, and would give at least his prayers for its success.

We admire our great and good father Pius IX. for the administrative reforms he has introduced into the immediate patrimony of St. Peter; but we admire him still more for the free, bold, and commanding attitude which he assumes before the lay lords of the earth—recalling the sainted Hildebrand, the heroic third Alexander, and the third Innocent, who made crowned heads feel and acknowledge that the church is paramount to the state, and that, when she speaks, kings, as well as the meanest of their servants, must bare the head and listen. Thanks, devout thanks, be to Almighty God, who has sent us a successor of St. Peter that brings back the heroic ages and, in the face of an infidel, and scoffing, and time-serving generation, renews the chivalry of the cross and speaks in the tone that becomes the vicerent of God on earth! Let the faithful rally at his bidding; let them glory in his reassertion of the independence of the spiritual power, that as pontiff, as well as prince, he spurns the dictation of the Austrian, the wiles of the Gaul, and the cajoleries of the Briton; let them support him by their prayers and, if need be, by their deeds; and be assured that the tyranny which now weighs so heavily upon the European populations will be lightened, the chains which bind the souls of the toiling and starving millions will be broken, Christian civilization, so fatally interrupted by the Protestant rebellion in behalf of heathenism, will resume its march and effect for

man as full a measure of earthly well-being as it can be for his interest to possess. (Vol. x. pp. 76-78.)

## THE SPREAD OF SOCIALISM.

NOTHING, to a rightly instructed mind, is more ridiculous or absurd than the infidelity which so extensively prevailed in the last century and which under another form prevails equally in this. Yet when the philosophy which necessarily implied it first made its appearance, few comparatively took the alarm, and even learned and sound churchmen were unable to persuade themselves that there was any serious danger to be apprehended. When the philosophers and literary men went further and, developing that philosophy, actually made free with the Scriptures and even the mysteries of faith, the majority of those who should have seen what was coming paid little attention to them, jested at the incipient incredulity with great good-humor, felt sure that no considerable number of persons would proceed so far as to deny not only the church, but the very existence of God, and flattered themselves that the infidelity which was manifest would prove only a temporary fashion, a momentary caprice, which would soon become weary of itself and evaporate. Nevertheless, all the while the age was virtually infidel, and thousands of those who had persisted in believing there was no danger were themselves but shortly after driven into exile or brought to the guillotine by its representatives. The same thing occurs now in regard to socialism. The great body of those who have faith and sound principles look upon it as the dream of a few isolated individuals, as undeserving a moment's attention, and

think it a waste of time and breath even to caution the public against it. Yet in one form or other it has already taken possession of the age, has armed itself for battle, made the streets of Paris, Berlin, Frankfort, Vienna, and other cities run with blood, and convulsed nearly the whole civilized world. It is organized all through Europe and the United States; scarcely a book, a tract, or a newspaper is issued from a constantly teeming press that does not favor it, and there is scarcely anything else going that can raise a shout of applause from the people; and yet we are told, even by grave men, that it is a matter which need excite no apprehension. (Vol. x. pp. 81, 82.)

#### THE REMEDY FOR SOCIALISM.

THE only possible remedy is not declamation against the horrible results, the pernicious conclusions, at which the popular mind arrives—the resource of weak men—but the correction of the popular premises and recalling the people to sound first principles. Once concede that even political equality is a good, an object worth seeking, you must concede that social equality is also a good; and social equality is necessarily the annihilation of religion, government, property, and family. The same principle which would justify the Moderate Republicans of France in dethroning the king would justify M. Proudhon in making war on property, declaring every rich man a robber, and seeking to exterminate the *bourgeoisie*, as these have already exterminated the nobility. There is no stopping-place between legitimacy—whether monarchical or republican legitimacy—and the most ultra socialism. Once in the

career of political reform—we say political, not administrative, reform—we are pledged to pursue it to its last results. We are miserable cowards, or worse, if we shrink from the legitimate deductions from our own premises. There is not a meaner sin than the sin of inconsequence—a sin against our own rational nature which distinguishes us from the mere animal world. If we adopt the socialistic premises we must go on with the socialists in their career of destruction; nay, we shall be compelled to do so or strew the battle-field with our dead bodies. If we recoil from the socialistic conclusions we must re-examine our own premises and reject distinctly, unreservedly, and heroically every socialistic principle we may have unwittingly adopted, every socialistic tendency we may have unintentionally cherished.

The people, it is well known, do not discriminate, do not perceive, until it is too late, the real nature and tendency of their principles. They mix up truth and falsehood, and can hardly ever be made to distinguish the one from the other. They adopt principles which appear to them sound and wholesome, and which under a certain aspect are so, and, unconscious of aiming at what is destructive, they place no confidence in any who tell them they expose themselves to danger. They see no connection between their principles and the conclusions against which we warn them, and which they at present, as well as we, perhaps view with horror; they therefore conclude that the connection we assert is purely imaginary, that we ourselves are deceived or have some sinister purpose in asserting it; that we are wedded to the past, in love with old abuses, because, perhaps, we profit or hope to profit by them; that we do not understand our age, are narrow and con-



tracted in our views, with no love or respect for the poorest and most numerous class. In a word, they set us down as rank conservatives or aristocrats. No age ever comprehends itself, and the people, following its dominant spirit, can never give an account of their own principles. They never trace them out to their last results, and are unable to follow the chain of reasoning by which horrible consequences are linked to premises which appear to them innocent. They never see whither they are going. (Vol. x. pp. 85, 86.)

#### SOCIALISM ASSUMES THE CHRISTIAN GARB.

VEILING itself under Christian forms, attempting to distinguish between Christianity and the church, claiming for itself the authority and immense popularity of the Gospel, denouncing Christianity in the name of Christianity, discarding the Bible in the name of the Bible, and defying God in the name of God, socialism conceals from the indiscriminating multitude its true character, and, appealing to the dominant sentiment of the age and to some of our strongest natural inclinations and passions, it asserts itself with terrific power and rolls on in its career of devastation and death with a force that human beings, in themselves, are impotent to resist. Men are assimilated to it by all the power of their own nature and by all their reverence for religion. Their very faith and charity are perverted, and their noblest sympathies and their sublimest hopes are made subservient to their basest passions and their most grovelling propensities. Here is the secret of the strength of socialism, and here is the principal source of its danger.

The open denial of Christianity is not now to be dreaded; the incredulity of the last century is now in bad taste and can work only under disguise. All the particular heresies which human pride or human perversity could invent are now effete or unfashionable. Every article in the creed has been successively denied, and the work of denial can go no further. The attempt to found a new sect on the denial of any particular article of faith would now only cover its authors with ridicule. The age laughs at Protestantism and scorns sectarianism. The spirit that works in the children of disobedience must, therefore, affect to be Christian, more Christian than Christianity itself, and not only Christian, but *Catholic*. It can manifest itself now and gain friends only by acknowledging the church and all Catholic symbols, and substituting for the divine and heavenly sense in which they have hitherto been understood a human and earthly sense. Hence the religious character which socialism attempts to wear. It rejects in name no Catholic symbol; it only rejects the Catholic sense. If it finds fault with the actual church, it is because she is not truly catholic, does not understand herself, does not comprehend the profound sense of her own doctrines, fails to seize and expound the true Christian idea as it lay in the mind of Jesus and as this enlightened age is prepared to receive it. The Christian symbol needs a new and a more catholic interpretation, adapted to our stage in universal progress. Where the old interpretation uses the words God, church, and heaven, you must understand humanity, society, and earth; you will then have the true Christian idea and bring the Gospel down to the order of nature and within the scope of human reason. But while you

put the human and earthly sense upon the old Catholic words, be careful and retain the words themselves. By taking care to do this you can secure the support of the adherents of Christianity, who, if they meet their old, familiar terms, will not miss their old, familiar ideas; and thus you will be able to reconcile the old Catholic world and the new, and to go on with humanity in her triumphant progress through the ages.

Since it professes to be Christian and really denies the faith, socialism is a heresy; and since by its interpretation it eviscerates the Catholic system of its entire meaning, it is the *résumé* of all the particular heresies which ever have been or can be. The ingenuity of men, aided by the great enemy of souls, can invent no further heresy. All possible heresies are here summed up and actualized in one universal heresy, on which the age is proceeding with all possible haste to erect a counterfeit Catholicity for the reception and worship of Antichrist as soon as he shall appear in person. (Vol. x. pp. 92-95.)

#### THE ESSENCE OF SOCIALISM.

WHAT we have said will suffice to show the subtle and dangerous character of socialism, and how, although the majority may recoil from it at present, if logically drawn out by its bolder and more consistent advocates, the age may nevertheless be really and thoroughly socialistic. We know that the age seeks with all its energy, as the greatest want of mankind, political and social reforms. Of this there is and can be no doubt. Analyze these reforms and the principles and motives which lead to them, which induce the people in our days to struggle for

them, and you will find at the bottom of them all the assumption that *our good lies in the natural order and is not attainable by individual effort*. All we see, all we hear, all we read, from whatever quarter it comes, serves to prove that this is the deep and settled conviction of the age. If it were not, these revolutions in France, Italy, Germany, and elsewhere would have no meaning, no principle, no aim, and would be as insignificant as drunken rows in the streets of our cities.

But the essence of socialism is in this very assumption that our good lies in the natural order and is unattainable by individual effort. Socialism bids us ~~follow nature, instead of saying, with the Gospel, Resist nature~~. Placing our good in the natural order, it necessarily restricts it to temporal goods, the only good the order of nature can give. For it, then, evil is to want temporal goods and good is to possess them. But in this sense evil is not remediable or good attainable by individual effort. We depend on nature, which may resist us, and on the conduct of others, which escapes our control. Hence the necessity of social organization, in order to harmonize the interests of all with the interest of each, and to enable each by the union of all to compel nature to yield him up the good she has in store for him. But all men are equal before God, and, since he is just, he is equal in regard to all. Then all have equal rights—an equal right to exemption from evil and an equal right to the possession of good. Hence the social organization must be such as to avert equal evil from all and to secure to each an equal share of temporal goods. Here is socialism in a nut-shell, following as a strictly logical consequence from the principles or assumptions which the age adopts and

on which it everywhere acts. The systems drawn out by Owen, Fourier, Saint-Simon, Cabet, Proudhon, or others, are mere attempts to realize socialism, and may or may not be ridiculous and absurd; but that is nothing to the purpose if you concede their principle. These men have done the best they could, and you have no right to censure them as long as you agree with them in principle, unless you propose something better. (Vol. x. pp. 94, 95.)

#### ONLY CHRISTIANITY CAN REMOVE EVILS.

Now, we agree with La Mennais that Christianity has a political and social character, and with the editor of *The Boston Quarterly Review* that Christianity seeks the good of man in this life as well as in the life to come. We say with all our heart, "On the earth was he [our Lord] to found a new order of things, to bring round the blissful ages, and to give to renovated man a foretaste of heaven. It was here the millions were to be blessed with a heaven, as well as hereafter." No doubt of it. But *in* the new order and *by* it—not out of it and independently of it. Out of the new order and independently of it the millions are, to say the least, no better off than if it did not exist, and have no right to any portion of its blessings. The socialists, when they attempt to press Christianity into their service, are bad logicians. They are right when they tell us that our Lord came to found a new order of things, for he certainly did come for that purpose; they are right when they tell us that it is Christian to seek a heaven on earth for the millions, for there is a Christian heaven here for all men if they choose to accept it; but when they say this they are bound to add that this heaven

is in the new order established, and is to be sought in it and by obedience to its principles. It is Christian to seek that order of happiness which Christianity proposes, by the means which it prescribes; but to seek another order of happiness, and by other means, is not *therefore* necessarily Christian and may even be antichristian. Here is the point they overlook and which vitiates all their reasoning.

Let no one say that we allege that man must forego any good while in this world in order to gain heaven hereafter. It would be no great hardship, even if it were so; but our God deals much more liberally with us, and requires us to give up, in order to secure heaven hereafter, only what makes our misery here. The socialist is right in saying that there is good for us even in this world; his error lies in placing that good in the natural order and in making it unattainable by individual effort. Our good lies not in the natural order, but in the supernatural order—in that new order which our Lord came to establish. In that order there is all the good we can conceive, and attainable by simple voluntary efforts. Out of that order there is no good attainable either by the efforts of individuals or by association, because out of it there is no good at all. Temporal goods, giving to the term the fullest possible sense, are not good, and, sought for themselves, are productive only of evil. Here is the first error of the socialists. No evil is removable, no good is attainable, as long as any earthly or merely natural end is held to be, for its own sake, a legitimate object of pursuit. There is and can be good for no one, here or hereafter, save in seeking *exclusively* the end for which Almighty God has intended us, and by the means and in the way he himself has appointed. Now, this end is

neither in this world nor of this world, neither in nature nor of nature, and therefore can be gained, can be promoted, by no natural effort, by no natural means—neither by political changes nor by social changes, neither by political democracy nor by social democracy. These things have and can have no necessary connection with it. It is a mistake, then, to regard them, in themselves, as ever in any degree desirable. (Vol. x. pp. 96, 97.)

### SOCIALISM DESTROYS LIBERTY.

THE socialists are right when they say that the Christian law is the law of liberty, but not therefore necessarily right when they term the movements of the people for what they call liberty Christian movements, originating in Christian principle. Undoubtedly, the Christian law is the law of liberty. Our Saviour came to free us from bondage, and whom he makes free is free indeed. In the order he establishes, our highest good, our only good, whether for time or eternity, is entirely independent of the world. Nothing in the universe can hinder us, against our will, from attaining to it. We have only to will it and it is ours, and we are always and everywhere free to will. No one depends on nature or other men for the power to fulfil his destiny, to gain the end for which he was intended. Here is the Christian doctrine of liberty, the glorious liberty which our religion reveals and which we know by divine faith is no deception. But the liberty the socialists commend, and which the people are seeking, is not Christian liberty, for it is not liberty at all. Socialism, by its very principle, enslaves us to nature and society and subjects us to all the fluctu-

ations of time and sense. According to it man can attain to true good, can gain the end for which he was made, only in a certain political and social order, which it depends on the millions, whom the individual cannot control, to construct, and which, when constructed, may prove to be inconvenient and inadequate and require to be pulled down and built up again. The individual, it teaches us, can make no advance towards his destiny but in proportion as he secures the coöperation of his race. All men must be brought down or brought up to the same level before he can go to the end for which his God made him; each man's true good is unattainable till all men are prepared to take "a pull, a strong pull, a long pull, and a pull all together," to attain theirs! This is slavery, not liberty. Nay, it denies the possibility of liberty and makes slavery the necessary condition of all men. Is not he a slave who is chained to nature for his good, or to a social organization which does not exist and which depends on the wisdom, the folly, the passions or instincts, the whims or caprices of other men to create or to destroy? Who can deny it? He only is free, he only knows what freedom is, who tramples the world beneath his feet, who is independent of all the accidents of time and space, of all created beings, and who has but to will and all heaven is his, and remains his, though the entire universe fall in ruins around him. (Vol. x. pp. 97, 98.)

#### HOW FAR CHRISTIANITY REMOVES EVILS.

OF course we do not pretend that by conforming to the Christian order the political and social equality contended for will be obtained; we do not pre-



tend that there will be no more pain, no more sorrow, no more poverty, no more hunger or thirst. These things will remain, no doubt, as facts; but we have shown that they are not necessarily evils and that their removal is not necessarily a good. These things have their uses in this world or they would not be suffered to exist. To the just they are mercies, salutary penance, or occasions of merit—purging the soul from the stains of past transgressions or giving it an occasion to rise to higher sanctity and a higher reward. To the sinner they may be the occasion of evil; but, if so, only because he does not receive them in a proper disposition and because by his malice he refuses to profit by them. But even to him they are no more hurtful than their opposites—often not so hurtful. By conforming to the Christian order, all so-called temporal evils, in so far as evil, are removed, and all so-called temporal goods, in so far as good, are secured; and this is all that can be asked. (Vol. x. p. 102.)

## PHILOSOPHY.

### PHILOSOPHY STARTS WITH THOUGHT.

PHILOSOPHY is the creation of the human understanding, naturally or supernaturally enlarged and enlightened. All begins and ends with Thought, our only medium of knowledge, whatever its sphere or its degree. Thought is, for us, always ultimate. We cannot go before nor behind Thought; for we have nothing but thought with which to go before or behind it. (Vol. i. p. 58.)

### ANALYSIS OF THOUGHT.

THOUGHT is either intuitive or reflective. The careful analysis of intuitive thought, intuition, . . . discloses these three elements: subject, object, and their relation, always distinct, always inseparable, given simultaneously in one and the same complex fact. Deny one or another of these elements, and there is and can be no thought. Remove the subject, and there is no thought, for there evidently can be no thought where there is no thinker; remove the object, and there is equally no thought, for to think nothing is simply not to think; and, finally, deny the relation of subject and object, and you also deny all thought, for certainly the soul cannot apprehend an object or an object be presented to the soul with no relation between them. (Vol. ii. p. 42.)

## SUBJECT AND OBJECT ALIKE CERTAIN, 1

THE three elements of thought being given simultaneously and synthetically in one and the same fact, they all three rest on the same authority and are equally certain both subjectively and objectively. Here we escape the interminable debates of philosophers as to the passage from the subjective to the objective, and, in military phrase, flank the question of the certainty of human knowledge and thus render all arguments against either subjectivism or scepticism superfluous. There is no passage from the subjective to the objective if the activity of the subject alone suffices for the production of thought, and no possible means of a logical refutation of scepticism. If the soul alone could suffice for thought, nothing else would be necessary to its production, and thought would and could affirm no reality beyond the soul itself; no objective reality could ever be proved, and no real science would be possible. All objective certainty would vanish, for we have and can have only thought with which to prove the objective validity of thought. Hence it is that those philosophers who regard thought as the product of the soul's activity alone have never been able to refute the sceptic or to get beyond the sphere of the subject. (Vol. ii. p. 43.)

If the object were purely passive, or did not actively concur in the production of thought, it would be as if it were not, and the soul could no more think with it than without it. It is the fact that the object actively concurs in the production of thought that establishes its reality, since what is not or has no real existence cannot act, cannot present or affirm itself. . . . The soul cannot act without the object,

nor unless the object is placed in relation with it; consequently the soul can no more create the relation than it can create the object or itself. The object with the relation, or the correlation of subject and object, then, is presented to the soul or given it, not created or furnished by it.

The soul, unable to think by itself alone or in and of itself, can think even itself, find itself, or become aware of its own existence only in conjunction with the object intuitively presented; each of the three elements of thought therefore not only rests on the same authority, but each is as certain as is the fact of consciousness or the fact that we think. The object is affirmed or affirms itself objectively, and is real with all the certainty we have or can have of our own existence. Further than this thought itself cannot go; we cannot from principles more ultimate than thought demonstrate thought; but it is not necessary, for he who thinks knows that he thinks, and cannot deny that he thinks without thinking, and therefore not without affirming what he denies. This is all that can be asked, for a denial that denies itself is equivalent to an affirmation. (Vol. ii. pp. 44, 45.)

The object, if given simultaneously with the subject in the fact of thought, precedes it in the order of being or real order; for it presents or affirms itself as the necessary condition of the soul's activity and of her apprehension of her own existence even. It is first in order, and its analysis should precede that of the soul; for as the subject is given only in conjunction with the object, or as reflected or mirrored in it, it is only as reflected or mirrored in the object that it can know or recognize its own powers or faculties. The object determines the faculty, not the faculty the object. . . .

The analysis of the object, like that of thought, if we mistake not, gives us, or discloses as essential in it, three elements, the ideal, the empirical, and the relation between them. The ideal is the *a priori* and apodictic element, without which there is and can be no intelligible object, and consequently no thought; the empirical is the fact of experience, or the object, whether appertaining to the sensible order or to the intelligible, as intellectually apprehended by the soul; the relation is the *nexus* of the ideal and the empirical, and is given by the ideal itself. (Vol. ii. p. 47.)

#### THE IDEAL IS OBJECTIVE.

THE object of thought always presents itself either as contingent or as necessary. The categories of necessity and contingency not being empirical, since they are the forms under which we necessarily apprehend every object we do apprehend, we call them ideas, or the ideal. The question to be settled is, Is the ideal, without which no fact of experience is possible, on the side of the object or on the side of the subject? Kant places it on the side of the subject and subjects the object to the laws of the soul; we place it on the side of the object and hold that it is that without which the object is not intelligible, and therefore no object at all. Hence we maintain that the object of thought is not a simple unit, but consists of three inseparable elements, the ideal, the empirical, and their relation. ) The proof that we are right is furnished in our analysis of thought, and rests on the principle that what is not is not intelligible, and that no object is intelligible *save* as it really exists. This follows necessarily from the

fact we have established that the object presents or affirms itself by its own activity. Contingent existences are active only in their relation to the necessary, consequently are intelligible or cognizable only in their relation of contingency. Then, as certain as it is that we think, so certain is it that the ideal is on the side of the object, not on the side of the subject. This will appear still more evident when we recollect that the contingent is not apprehensible without the intuition of the necessary on which it depends, and the necessary is and can be no predicate of the subject, which is contingent existence, not necessary being, since it depends on the object for its power to act.

( It follows from this that the ideal is given intuitively in every thought as an essential element of the object, and therefore that it is objective and real. . . . Cognition or perception is an act of the soul in concurrence with the object, and the soul, though the *forma corporis*, or informing principle of the body, never in this life acts without the body, and consequently can perceive the ideal only as sensibly represented. The ideal is really given in intuition, but not by itself alone; it is given in the empirical fact as its *a priori* condition, and is distinctly held only as separated from it by reflection, the *intellectus agens*, or active intellect, as maintained by St. Thomas and the whole peripatetic school, as well as by the official teaching in our Catholic schools and colleges generally.

Ideal intuition is not perception or cognition. Perception is empirical, whether mediate or immediate and whatever its object or its sphere, and in it the soul is always the percipient agent. Intuition of the ideal is solely the act of the object, and

in relation to it the intellect is passive. It corresponds to the intelligible species of the peripatetics, or rather to what they call *species impressa*. . . . Now, as we have shown that the intellect cannot act prior to the presentation of the object or till the object is placed in relation with it, it cannot then, either in the sensible or the intelligible order, place itself in relation with the object, but the object, by an objective act independent of the intellect, must place itself in relation with the subject. This is the fact that underlies the doctrine of the peripatetic phantasms and intelligible species, and translated into modern thought means all simply what we call ideal intuition, or the presentation or affirmation of the object by itself or its placing itself by its own act in relation to the intellect as the *a priori* condition of perception.

But as the soul cannot act without the body the intelligible cannot be presented save as sensibly represented; and therefore only in the phantasmata or sensible species, from which the active intellect abstracts, divides, disengages, or separates—not infers—them. Yet the intelligible, the ideal, as we say, is really presented, and is the object in which the intellect terminates or to which it attains. (Vol. ii. pp. 51-54.)

#### UNIVERSALS.

It is necessary to be on our guard against confounding the question of the reality of the ideal or universal and necessary ideas . . . with the scholastic question as to the reality of universals. . . . The universals of the Schoolmen are divisible into classes: 1, Whiteness, roundness, and the like, to which some think Plato gave reality, as he did to justice,

the beautiful, etc., and which are manifestly abstractions, with no reality save in their concretes from which the mind abstracts them; 2, Genera and species, as *humanitas*. The Scholastics, as far as our study of them goes, do not sharply distinguish between these two classes, but treat them both under the general head of universals. . . .

The reality of genera and species is very plainly taught in Genesis, for it is there asserted that God created all living creatures each after its kind; and if we were to deny it, generation as the production of like by like could not be asserted; the dogma of Original Sin, or that all men or the race sinned in Adam, would be something more than an inexplicable mystery, and we have observed that those theologians who deny the reality of the species have a strong tendency to deny original sin, or to explain it away so as to make it not sin, but the punishment of sin. Certainly if the race were not one and real in Adam, it would be somewhat difficult to explain how original sin could be propagated by natural generation. It would be equally difficult to explain the mystery of Redemption through the assumption of human nature by the Word, unless we suppose, what is not admissible, that the Word assumed each individual man, for to suppose a real human nature common to all men is to assert the reality of the genus or species. The denial of the reality of genera and species not only denies the unity of the race and thus denies Original Sin, the Incarnation, Redemption, and Regeneration, but also impugns, it seems to us, the Mystery of the Blessed Trinity, by denying the unity of the nature or essence of the three persons of the Godhead, and certain it is that both Rosceline and Abelard were accused



of denying or misrepresenting that ineffable Mystery. . . .

As to the other class of universals, . . . they are conceptions, existing *in mente cum fundamento in re*, that is, mental abstractions, formed by the mind operating on the concretes given in intuition. They have their foundation in reality. There is a basis of reality in all our mental conceptions, even in our wildest imaginations and our most whimsical fancies, for we neither think nor imagine what is absolutely unreal. (Vol. ii. pp. 54-56.)

#### ANALYSIS OF THE IDEAL.

THE analysis of thought gives us three inseparable elements, all equally real: subject, object, and their relation; the analysis of the object gives us also three inseparable elements, all objectively real, namely, the ideal, the empirical, and their relation. The analysis of the ideal, we shall see, gives us again three inseparable elements, all also objectively real, namely, the necessary, the contingent, and their relation, or being, existences, and the relation between them. (Vol. ii. p. 56.)

Real and necessary being is independent and can stand alone, but we found in our analysis of the object another line of categories, the contingent, the particular, the dependent, etc., equally necessary as the *a priori* condition of experience or empirical intuition, and therefore included in the ideal element of the object, and therefore given or presented in ideal intuition. . . . The analysis of the ideal shows that the necessary and the contingent are both given in the ideal intuition, and there is no need of attempting to conclude either from the other. They are

both primitive, and being intuitively given, both are and must be objectively real. (Vol. ii. pp. 58, 59.)

#### REALITY OF THE NECESSARY AND CONTINGENT.

BUT the necessary and the contingent are abstract terms and are real only in their concretes. There is and can be no intuition of necessary and contingent as abstractions; for as abstractions they have no objective existence, and therefore are incapable of presenting or affirming themselves in intuition, which, as we have shown, is the act of the object, not of the subject. The necessary must therefore, since we have proved it real, be real and necessary being, and intuition of it is intuition of real and necessary being. In like manner, intuition of the contingent is not intuition of contingent nothing, but of contingent being, that is, existences, the *ens secundum quid* of the Schoolmen. This is what we have proved in proving the reality of the ideal. Ideas without which no fact of knowledge is possible, and which through objective intuition enter into all our mental operations, are not, as they are too often called, abstract ideas, but real. —

We have reduced, provisorily, the ideas or categories to two, necessary and contingent, which we find, in the fact that they are intuitively given, are real, and if real, then the necessary is real and necessary being and the contingent is contingent, though real, existence. Then the analysis of the ideal or *a priori* element of human knowledge gives us being, existences, and their relation. These three terms are really given intuitively, but, as we have seen, in the fact of thought or experience they are given as an inseparable element of the object, not as

distinct or separate objects of thought, or of empirical apprehension, noetic or sensible. They are given in the empirical fact, though its *a priori* element and the mind by its own intuitive action does not distinguish them from the empirical element of the object, or perceive them as distinct and separate objects of thought. We distinguish them only by reflection, or by the analysis of the object, which is complex, distinguishing what in the object is ideal and *a priori* from what is empirical and *a posteriori*. When we assert the necessary and contingent as ideas, the mind, again, does not perceive that the one is being and the other existence or dependent on being; the mind perceives this only in reflecting that if given they must be objective and real, and if real, being and existence, for what is not being, or by or from being is not real. The identity of the ideal and the real and of the real with being and what is from being is arrived at by reflection, and is, if you insist on it, a conclusion, but, as the logicians say, an explicative, not an illative conclusion.

But we have reduced the categories to the necessary and contingent, and found the necessary identical with real and necessary being, *ens necessarium et reale*, and the contingent identical with contingent existence, *ens secundum quid*. Being is independent and can stand alone, and can be asserted without asserting anything besides itself; for who says *being* says being *is*. . . . But a contingent existence cannot be thought by itself alone, for contingency asserts a relation and can be thought or asserted only under that relation. It would be a contradiction in terms to assert ideal intuition of the contingent as independent, self-existent, for it would not then be contingent. The contingent, as the term

itself implies, has not the cause or source of its existence in itself, but is dependent on being. The relation between the two categories is the relation of dependence of the contingent on the necessary, or of contingent existences on real and necessary being.

This relation we express by the word existences. The *ex* in the word *existence* implies relation and that the existence is derived *from* being, and though distinguished from it depends on it, or has its being in it and not in itself. (Vol. ii. pp. 59, 60.)

#### RELATION OF BEING AND EXISTENCES.

THERE remains now to be considered the third term, or the relation of the contingent to the necessary, or of existences to being. Being and existences comprise all that is or exists. What is not real and necessary, self-existent and independent being, is either nothing or it is from being and dependent on being. Existences are, as we have seen, distinguished from being, and yet are real, for the idea of contingency is given in the objective intuition or in the ideal element of the object. Existences are then real, not nothing, and yet are not being. Nevertheless they are, as we have seen, related to being and dependent on it. But they cannot be distinct from being and yet dependent on being unless produced from nothing by the creative act of being. Being alone is eternal, self-existent, and besides being there is and can be only existences created by being. Being must either create them from nothing by the sole energy of its will, or it must evolve them from itself. Not the last, for that would deny that they are distinct from being; then the first must be accepted as the only alternative. Hence the analysis

of the ideal gives us being, existences, and the creative act of being as the *nexus* or *copula* that unites existences to being, or the predicate to the subject. (Vol. ii. p. 61.)

### ANALYSIS OF THE RELATION.

THE analysis of the relation is not practicable in the sense of the other analyses we have made; for as relation it has only a single term, and prescinded from the related is simply nullity. We can analyze it only in the related, in which alone it is real. In the fact of thought we have found that the object is active, not passive as most philosophies teach; and therefore that it is the object that renders the subject active, reduces it to act, and therefore creates it. St. Thomas and, we believe, all the Scholastics teach that in the reception of the phantasms and the intelligible species the mind is passive. That which is purely passive is as if it were not, for whatever really is or exists is or exists *in actu* and therefore is necessarily active. Since, then, the phantasms and species proceed from the object, it follows that the object actualizes the subject and renders it active or *intellectus agens*. Hence the relation of object and subject in the fact of thought is the relation of cause and effect. The object actualizes or creates the subject, not the subject the object.

The relation we have found of the ideal and empirical is also the relation of cause and effect. The empirical we have found is impossible without the ideal, for it depends on it and does not and cannot exist without it. That without which a thing does not and cannot exist and on which it depends is its cause. The ideal then causes, produces, or creates

the empirical, and therefore the relation between them is the relation of cause and effect. Ideal space produces empirical space and ideal time produces empirical time. As the ideal is real and necessary being, *ens necessarium et reale*, as we have seen, ideal space is and can be only the power of being to externalize its own acts, in the order of coexistences, and ideal time can only be the power of being to externalize its own acts successively, or progressively. Empirical space is the effect of the exercise of this power producing the relation of coexistence; empirical time is its effect in producing the relation of succession, or progressive actualization. The relations of space and time are therefore resolvable into the relation of cause and effect. . . .

As all the categories of the upper line are integrated in real and necessary being, and as all the categories of the lower line are integrated in existences, so all relations must be integrated in the relation of being and existences, which is the act of being, producing and actualizing existences, and therefore the relation of cause and effect. Hence there are and can be no passive relations, or relations of passivity. Whatever is or exists is active, and God, who is being in its plenitude and infinity, is, as say the theologians, *actus purissimus*, most pure act. Only the active is or exists; the passive is non-existent, is nothing, and can be the subject of no predicate or relation. (Vol. ii. pp. 62-64.)

#### THE RELATION THAT OF CAUSE AND EFFECT.

It follows from this that the relation of subject and object, or rather of object and subject, in every thought is the relation, as we have said, of cause and

effect. It is the third term or copula in the ideal judgment, and is in every judgment, whether ideal or empirical, that which makes it a judgment or affirmation. . . . Being and existences as subject and predicate constitute no judgment without the copula that joins the predicate to the subject. As the copula can proceed only from being, or the subject of the predicate, as its act, the ideal judgment is necessarily *ens creat existentias*; and as the object creates or produces the predicate, the judgment in its three terms is divine and apodictic, the necessary and apodictic ground of every human or empirical judgment, without intuition of which the human mind can neither judge nor exist.

It is not pretended of course that all judgments are ideal, any more than it is that every cause is first cause. There are second causes, and consequently second or secondary, that is, empirical judgments. The second cause depends on the first cause, which is the cause of all causes; so the empirical judgment depends on the ideal or divine judgment which it copies or imitates, as the second cause always copies or imitates in its own manner and degree the first cause. There is no judgment—and every thought is a judgment—without the creative act of being creating the mind and furnishing it the light by which it sees and knows; yet the immediate relation in empirical judgments, that is, judgments which the soul herself forms, though a relation of cause and effect, is not the relation between being and existences, . . . which were sheer pantheism, inasmuch as it would deny the existence of second causes and make God the sole and universal actor. The relation in the ideal judgment is only *eminently* the cause in the empirical judgment, in the sense in which being is the eminent

cause of all actions, in that it is the cause of all causes.

The copula or relation in the ideal judgment is the creative act of being, or subject creating the predicate, as we shall soon prove, and uniting it to itself. This is true of all relations. The first term of the relation of subject and predicate is the cause of the second term, and by its own causative act unites the predicate to itself as its subject. Second causes have, in relation to the first cause, the relation of dependence, are produced by it, are its effects or predicates; but in relation to their own effects they are efficient causes and represent creative being. We are existences and wholly dependent on real and necessary being, for our existence and our powers are simply the effect of the divine creative act or activity; but in relation to our own acts we are cause; we are the subject, they are the predicate, and our act producing them is the copula. In this sense the second cause copies the first cause and the empirical judgment copies the ideal or, as we have called it, the divine judgment.

We say this not by way of proof that the relation between being and existences is the creative act of being, which follows necessarily from the reduction of the categories to being, existences, and their relation, or subject, predicate, and copula, for the copula can be nothing else than the creative act of being; but to prevent the mistake of supposing that being is the agent that acts in our acts, and that our acts are predicates of the divine activity. (Vol. ii. pp. 65-67.)



## THE FACT OF CREATION.

YET though being is sufficient in all respects for itself, it is cognizable by us only *mediante* its own act creating us and affirming itself as the first term or being in the ideal element of the object in thought, and therefore only in its relation to the second term, or existences. This relation under which both being and existences, the necessary and the contingent, are given, is the creative act of being, as we have seen, and therefore, as that *mediante* which both being and existences are given, is necessarily itself given in ideal intuition. It is as necessarily given in the object in every thought as either being or existences, the necessary or the contingent, and therefore is objectively as certain as either of the other two terms without which no thought is possible, and is in fact more immediately given, since it is only *mediante* the relation or creative act of being that either being or existences themselves are given or are objectively intuitive.

But not therefore, because being is cognizable only in its relation to existences, does it follow that being itself is relation or that all our cognitions are relative, or, as Gioberti maintains, that all truth is relative; nay, that the essence of God, as implied in the mystery of the Holy Trinity, is in relation, in the relation of the three Persons of the Godhead. The relation is given in ideal intuition as the act of real and necessary being. The relation then is extrinsic, not intrinsic, and since being is real, necessary, independent, self-existing, and self-sufficing, the creative act must be not a necessary, but a free, voluntary act on the part of being. The relation, then, is not intrinsic, but freely and voluntarily assumed.

Being is given in ideal intuition *mediante* its creative act, then as creator or *ens creans*. But as nothing extrinsic or intrinsic can oblige being, which is independent and self-sufficing, to create or to act *ad extra*, it must be a free creator, free to create or not to create, as it chooses. Then being must possess free will and intelligence, for without intelligence there can be no will, and without will no choice, no free action. Being then must be in its nature rational, and then it must be personal, for personality is the last complement of rational nature, that is, it must be a suppositum that possesses, by its nature, intelligence and free will. Then being, real and necessary, being in its plenitude, being in itself, is—God, and the creator of the heavens and the earth, and all things visible and invisible. (Vol. ii. pp. 71, 72.)

## INTUITION AND REFLECTION.

WHILE we have by our analysis of thought established the reality of the object, or its existence *a parte rei*, and asserted the objectivity and therefore the reality of the ideal, we have nowhere found or asserted the ideal alone as the object in thought. We have found and asserted it only as the ideal element of the object, which must in principle precede the empirical element, but it is never given separately from it, and it takes both the ideal and the empirical in their relation to constitute the object in any actual thought. The ideal and the empirical elements of the complex object are distinguished by the *intellectus agens*, or reflection, in which the soul acts, never by intuition, ideal or empirical, in either of which the action originates with the object. Most men never do distinguish them during their whole lives; even

the mass of philosophers do not distinguish them or distinguish between intuition and reflection. The peripatetics, in fact, begin with the reflective activity, and hardly touch upon the question of intuition, save in what they have to say of phantasms and species. Their principles they take from reflection, not from the analysis of thought or its object. We do not dissent from their principles or their method, but we do not regard their principles as ultimate, and we think the field of intuition, back of reflection, needs a culture which it does not receive from them, not even from St. Thomas, still less from those routinists who profess to follow him. We do not dissent from the Thomist philosophy; we accept it fully and frankly, but not as in all respects complete. There are, in our judgment, questions that lie back of the starting-point of that philosophy, which, in order to meet the subtilities and refinements of modern pantheists or atheists, the philosopher of to-day must raise and discuss.

These questions relate to what in principle precedes the reflective action of the soul, and are solved by the distinction between intuition and reflection and between ideal intuition and empirical intuition or perception, that is, cognition. What we explain by ideal intuition the ancients called the dictates of reason, the dictates of nature, and assumed them to be principles inserted in the very constitution of the human mind; Descartes called them innate ideas; Reid regarded them as constituent principles of man's intellectual and moral nature; Kant, as the laws or forms of the human understanding. All these make them more or less subjective and overlook their objectivity, and consequently cast doubts on the reality of our knowledge. "It may be real to

us, but how prove that it is not very unreal to other minds constituted differently from ours?" We have endeavored to show that these are the ideal elements of the facts of experience and are given in objective or ideal intuition, which is the assertion to the mind by its own action of real and necessary being itself, and therefore our knowledge, as far as it goes, is universally true and apodictic, not true to our minds only.

The objection commonly raised to the ideal formula, *Ens creat existentias*, is not that it is not true, but that it is not the principle from which philosophy starts, but the end at which philosophy arrives. This, in one sense, if we speak of the reflective order, is true, and the philosophy most in vogue does not reach it even as its end at all. Yet by using reflection we shall find that it is given in the object of every thought, as we have shown, the first as well as the last. Ideal intuition is a real affirmation to the mind by the act of the ideal itself, but it is not perception or distinct cognition, because, as we have said, it is not given separately, but only as the ideal or *a priori* element of the object, and is never intuitively distinguished or distinguishable from it. This is, we think, a sufficient answer to the objection, which is founded on a misapprehension of what is really meant by the assertion that the ideal formula is the principle of science and intuitively given. It is so given, but it is only by reflection that the mind distinguishes it and is aware of possessing it. (Vol. ii. pp. 74-76.)

#### EXISTENCES.

EXISTENCES are distinguishable from being and are nothing without the creative act of God. Only that

act stands between them and absolute nullity. God then does not form them from a preëxisting matter, but creates them from nothing. He does not evolve them from himself, for then they would be the divine Being itself and indistinguishable from it, contrary to what has already been established, namely, that they are distinguished from God as well as joined to him *mediante* his creative act. God is not a necessary but a free creator; creatures are not then evolved from his own being, but himself, a free creator, is necessarily distinct from and independent of them; and as without creation there is nothing but himself, it follows necessarily that he must, if he creates existences at all, create them from nothing, by the word of his power, as Christian theology teaches.

But the fact that they are creatures and distinct from the Creator proves, also, that they are substances, or substantial existences, and therefore, as philosophers say, second causes. If creatures had no substantial existence they would be mere phenomena or appearances of the divine Being or substance, and therefore could not be really distinguishable from God himself; which would be a virtual denial of the creative act and the reality of existences, and therefore of God himself; for it has been shown that there is no intuition of being save *mediante* the creative act of being, or without the intuition of existences, that is, of both terms of the relation. It would deny, what has been amply proved, that the object of intuition, whether ideal or empirical, is and must be real, because it does and must present or affirm itself, which if unreal or mere appearance it could not do, since the unreal has no activity and can be no object of thought. . . . Moreover, the object

in intuition presents or affirms itself as it is, and existences all present or affirm themselves as real, as things, as substances, as second causes. (Vol. ii. pp. 76, 77.)

Existences are substantial, that is, active or causative in their own sphere or degree. The definition of substance by Leibnitz—though we think we have found it in some of the mediæval doctors, as *vis activa*, corresponding to the German *Kraft* and the English and French *force*—is a proper definition so far, whatever may be thought of what he adds, that it always involves effort or endeavor. In this sense existences must be substances or else they could not be given intuitively, as in our analysis of the object we have seen they are, for in intuition the object is active and presents or affirms itself. Strictly speaking, as we have seen in the analysis of relation, nothing that exists is or can be passive, for passivity is simply *in potentia ad actum*; whatever exists at all exists *in actu* and so far is necessarily *vis activa*. Existences in their principle are given intuitively, and their principle cannot be substantial and they unsubstantial. But it is necessary here to distinguish between the *substans* and the *substantia*, between that which stands under and upholds or supports existences or created substances and the existences themselves. The *substans* is the creative act of God, and the *substantia* or existence is that which it stands under and upholds. (Vol. ii. p. 78.)

## GOD IS FREE.

THE cosmic phenomena are not phenomena of the divine Being, but are phenomena or manifestations of created nature, and of God only *mediante* his crea-

tive act. The cosmos, with its constitution and laws or nature, is his creature; produced from nothing and sustained by his creative act, without which it is still nothing. God then, as the creator of nature, is independent of nature and necessarily supernatural, supercosmic, or supramundane, as the theologians teach and as all the world, save a few philosophers, scientists, and their dupes, believe and always have believed.

God being supernatural, and the creative act by which he creates and sustains nature being a free act on his part, the theory of the rationalists and naturalists that holds him bound, hedged in, by what they call the laws of nature, is manifestly false and absurd. These laws do not bind the Creator, because he is their author. The age talks much of freedom and is universally agitating for liberty of all sorts, but there is one liberty, without which no liberty is possible, it forgets—the liberty of God. To deny it is to deny his existence. God is not the Fate or inexorable Destiny of the pagan classics, especially of the Greek dramatists. Above nature, independent of it, subject to no extrinsic or intrinsic necessity except that of being and of being what he is, God is free to do anything but contradict, that is, annihilate himself, which is the real significance of the Scholastic “principle of contradiction.” He cannot be and not be; he cannot choose to be and not to be what he is, for he is real and necessary being and being in its plenitude. He can do nothing that contradicts his own being or attributes, for they are all necessary and eternal, and hence St. Paul says, “it is impossible for God to lie.” That would be to act contrary to his nature, and the divine nature and the divine being are identical and indistinguishable

*in re.* It would be to contradict his very being, his own eternal, immutable, and indestructible essence, and what is called the nature of things.

Saving this, God is free to do whatever he will, for extrinsic to him and his act nothing is possible or impossible; since extrinsic to him there is simply nothing. His liberty is as universal and as indestructible as his own necessary and eternal being. He is free to create or not as he chooses and as in his own wisdom he chooses. The creative act is therefore a free act, and as nature itself, with all its laws, is only that act considered in its effects, it is absurd to suppose that nature or its laws, which it founds and upholds, can bind him, restrict him, or in any way interfere with his absolute freedom. God cannot act contrary to his own most perfect nature or being, but nothing except his own perfection can determine his actions or his providence. Following out the ideal judgment, or considering the principles intuitively given, they are alike the principles of the natural and of the supernatural. They assert the supernatural in asserting God as creator; they assert his providence by asserting that creation and conservation are only one and the same act, and the free act, or the act of the free, uncontrolled, and un-necessitated will of God. Hence also it follows that God is free, if he chooses, to make us a supernatural revelation of his will and to intervene supernaturally or by miracles in human or cosmic affairs. Miracles are in the same order with the fact of creation itself, and if facts, are as provable as any other facts. (Vol. ii. pp. 80, 81.)



## GOD AS FINAL CAUSE.

THAT God is the final cause of creation follows necessarily from the fact that he is its free, voluntary first cause. If God were, as Cousin maintains, a necessary creator, he could act only *ad finem*, not *propter finem*, and therefore could not be asserted as the final cause of creation; but being a free creator, not compelled by any extrinsic or intrinsic necessity, as he cannot be, since he is being in its plenitude, *ens perfectissimum*, he can create only for some end, and consequently only for himself, for besides himself there is and can be no end for which he can create. He is therefore the final cause of creation, as well as its first cause. Hence St. Paul tells us that "for him, and in him, and to him are all things." The conclusion is strengthened by considering that God being all-powerful and essentially wise and good, it would contradict his own being and attributes to create without any end or for any but a good purpose or end, and he alone is good, for the very reason that he alone is being, and his creatures are being and good only by participation.

No doubt it may be said that God creates for the good of creatures, but he is the good as he is the being of creatures, and he can give them good only by giving them himself, for besides himself there is no good for them, since besides him there is no good at all. The end or final cause of a creature is its good, and when we say God is the final cause or end of a particular existence, we say he is that which it must seek and possess in order to attain to and possess its supreme good or beatitude. When we say God creates all things for himself, we simply mean that he creates all things for the manifestation of his own

glory in the life and beatitude of his creatures. The end or final cause of an existence is in obtaining the complement or perfection of its being. It is not simply beatitude, but beatitude in God that is the end. Creation flows out from the infinite fulness of the divine Love, which would diffuse itself in the creation and beatitude of existences, and God cannot beatify them otherwise than through their participation of his own beatitude. God, then, is the ultimate and the final cause of creation.

But why could not God create existences for progress or for progress through infinity? That would be a contradiction in terms. Progress is motion towards an end, and where there is no end there is and can be no progress. Progress is advancing from the imperfect to the perfect, and if there is no perfect there can be no advance towards it; if there is progress it must finally come to an end. The doctrine of infinite or indefinite progressiveness of man, so popular in this nineteenth century, is based on the denial alike of creation and the final cause of man and the cosmos. It supposes development instead of creation and admits only the physical laws of nature, which operate as blind and fatal forces, like what is called instinct in man and animals. Hence we have a class of scientists who seek to elevate man by improving, through wise and skilful culture, the breed. How do these men, who deny God as final cause and hold the theory of development or evolution, account for the existence of moral ideas or the universal belief in a moral law? This belief and these ideas cannot be obtained either by observation or by induction from the study of the physical laws of nature; and if we hold them to be given intuitively, we assert their reality, affirm that

there is a moral order, and then, a final cause of creation.

We maintain that the soul really has intuition of God as final cause in a sense analogous to that in which we have seen it has intuition of being as first cause. . . . The soul desires beatitude; but it cannot desire what it has no intuition of, or what is in no sense presented or affirmed to it, and since God is himself this beatitude, the soul must have some intuition of God as its good or final cause. It is true, St. Thomas says the soul does not know explicitly that it is God that presents or affirms himself as the beatitude it desires. It does not know that it is God any more than it does when it sees a man coming without being able to distinguish whether it is Peter or some other man that is coming; yet it is as really intuition of God as final cause, as the intuition of the idea is intuition of God as real and necessary being, or as first cause. In neither case is there a distinct or explicit cognition that what is presented is God, and it comes to know that it is so only by reflection.

Certainly every soul desires happiness, supreme beatitude; and desire is more than a simple want. Desire is an affection of the will, a reaching forth of the soul towards the object desired. What a man desires he, in some degree at least, wills; but will is not a faculty that can in any degree act without light or intelligence. The soul can will only what is presented to it as good; it cannot will evil for the reason that it is evil, though it may will the lesser good instead of the greater and a present good instead of a distant or future good; for it has the freedom of choice. Yet it is certain that the soul finds its complete satisfaction in no natural or created

good. It craves an unbounded good and will be satisfied with nothing finite. Why, but because it has an ever-present intuition that it was made for an infinite good? Why, but because God the infinite everywhere and at every instant presents or affirms himself to the soul as that alone which can fill it or constitute its beatitude? The fact that every limited or created good is insufficient to satisfy the soul has been noted and dwelt on by philosophers, sages, prophets, and preachers in all ages of the world, and it is the theme of the poet's wail and the source of nearly all life's tragedies. Yet it is inexplicable on any possible hypothesis except that of supposing the soul was made for God and has an intuitive intimation of the secret of its destiny.

Assuming, then, the intuition of God as final cause in the desire of beatitude, the assertion of it rests on the same authority that does the assertion of the ideal as being, or being as God, and therefore, as our several analyses have proved, it is as certain as either the subject or object in the fact of thought or as the fact that we think or exist. In fact, as we have already seen, it is included in the creative act of being as a free, voluntary act. Being cannot act freely without will, and no one can will without willing an end; and no good being without willing a good end. No really good end is possible but God himself; we may therefore safely and certainly conclude God is our last cause as well as our first cause, at once the beginning and end, the Alpha and the Omega of all existences, the original and end of all things.

We are now able to assert for man a moral law and to give its reason in distinction from the natural or physical laws of the scientists. The physical laws are

established by God as first cause and are the laws or creative forces operative in existences in their procession, by way of creation, from God as first cause; the moral law is established by God as final cause, and prescribes the conditions on which rational existences can return to God without being absorbed in him and fulfil their destiny or attain to perfect beatitude. This completes the demonstration of Christian Theism. (Vol. ii. pp. 83-86.)

### THE DUTY TO OBEY GOD.

WHAT, then, is the ground of the right of God to command us and of our duty to obey him? The ground of both is in the creative act. God has a complete and absolute right to us, because, having made us from nothing, we are his, wholly his, and not our own. He created us from nothing, and only his creative act stands between us and nothing; he therefore owns us, and therefore we are his, body and soul, and all that we have, can do, or acquire. He is therefore our sovereign Lord and Proprietor, with supreme and absolute dominion over us, and the absolute right, as absolute owner, to do what he will with us. His right to command is founded on his dominion, and his dominion is founded on his creative act, and we are bound to obey him, whatever he commands, because we are his creature, absolutely his, and in no sense our own. (Vol. ii. p. 91.)

### OBLIGATION OF WORSHIP.

THE essential principle of religion is perfect trust in God and obedience to his sovereign will, the unconditional surrender of our wills to the will of our

creator. This is only what the moral law enjoins, for the first law of justice is to give to every one his due or his own, and we owe to God, as has been seen, all that we are, have, or can do. This shows that religion and morality in their principle are one and the same and therefore inseparable. There is, then, no morality without religion and no religion without morality. He who refuses to keep the commandments of God and to render him his due violates the moral law no less than he does the religious law. . . .

But this is not all. If the moral law requires our unreserved obedience to the commands of God, it requires us to honor, love, trust, and obey him in all things, and therefore to worship him in the way and manner he prescribes. If, then, he is pleased to make us a supernatural revelation of his will and to promulgate supernaturally a supernatural law, we are bound by the moral or natural law to obey it, when promulgated and brought to our knowledge, as unreservedly as we are to obey the natural law itself. If Christianity be, as it professes to be, the revelation of the supernatural order, a supernatural law, no man who knowingly and voluntarily rejects or refuses to accept it fulfils the natural law or can be accounted a moral man. (Vol. ii. pp. 93, 94.)

## PHILOSOPHY OF THE SUPERNATURAL.

### THE TWO PHILOSOPHIES.

PHILOSOPHY is the science of principles; not, as the superficial thinkers or unthinkers of our materialistic age would have us believe, of sensible or material facts, the proper object of the physical sciences, as astronomy, electricity, chemistry, mechanics, geology, hydraulics, etc. Principles precede facts, originate and govern them. Indeed, we know not facts themselves nor understand their significance or meaning until we have referred them to their principles. . . . All principles are supersensible and are objects of the intellect, in no case of the senses. Some of them are known or knowable by the light of nature; others only by the light of supernatural revelation. The science of the former is the philosophy of the natural; of the latter, is the philosophy of the supernatural.

These two philosophies are of principles equally certain; for the light of reason and the light of revelation are both emanations of the divine light or Logos, and each is infallible. We may err and take that to be reason which is not reason or that to be revelation which is not revelation; but neither can itself err, for both rest on the veracity of God, who is Truth itself and can neither deceive nor be deceived. The science of revealed principles is as truly science as is the science of principles known by the light of nature, and differs from it only as to

its medium. We may, then, speak of the philosophy of the supernatural with as much propriety and confidence as of the philosophy of the natural.

The philosophy of the supernatural follows the analogy of the natural. The philosophy of the natural presents the principles of the natural so far as they are cognizable by natural reason in their intelligible phase, their relation to one another, and the facts of the sensible order which they explain and govern. The philosophy of the supernatural presents the principles so far as revealed of the supernatural order, their mutual relation and reciprocal dependencies, and their relation to the natural order which they explain and complete, and which without them is not only incomplete, but absolutely without purpose or meaning. (Vol. ii. pp. 271-273.)

#### DEFECT OF THE SCHOLASTIC METHOD.

THE questions treated belong properly to the domain of theology, but lie back of those ordinarily treated by our modern theologians. Since the rise of scholasticism theology has pursued the analytical method and has been, for the most part, studied in separate questions and articles in detail, rather than as a uniform and indissoluble whole. The articles and dogmas of faith have been dissected, analyzed, accurately described, and labelled, but except by a few superior minds not presented in their unity or as integral and inseparable members of one living body. The objection of the traditionalists to the scholastic method that it is rationalistic and of Döllinger and German professordom that it is theological, not historical, and places reason above revelation, deserves no respect and, if we are not mistaken, has been rep-



robated by the Holy See. As against the traditionalists and the German professors, the scholastic method is approved in the *Syllabus*, but this does not prohibit us from pointing out that it tends to make the student lose sight of the faith objectively considered as an organic whole. What moderately-instructed theologian ever regards the natural and the supernatural as parts of one dialectic system, distinct, if you will, but inseparable in the divine decree, or that does not look upon them as two disconnected and independent systems? Who ever thinks of looking below the dogma to the catholic principle that underlies it, governs it, and binds it to every other dogma, and integrates it in the living unity of the divine purpose in creation? (Vol. ii. p. 273.)

#### THE AGE HAS LOST FAITH IN THE SUPERNATURAL.

ALL we aim at here is to show that there is a philosophy of the supernatural as well as of the natural; and that we live in times when for the vindication of the faith against the various classes of its enemies, it is necessary to recognize and study it to a far greater extent than it is ordinarily studied in our seminaries. The age has no respect for authority, and though we prove conclusively that the church is divinely commissioned and assisted to teach the faith, and is therefore infallible, we do not meet the real difficulties of the more cultivated classes of unbelievers or prepare them to accept any article, dogma, or proposition of faith for the reason that she teaches it. The world outside of the church may be credulous and superstitious, able, as Clemens of Alexandria said to the Greeks, "to believe anything

and everything except the TRUTH," but have undeniably lost all faith in the supernatural order, and really believe only in the natural, if indeed even so much as that. Our spiritists, who profess to have communications with the spirits of the departed, do not really admit a supernatural order. The real cause of this unbelief, so far as it is intellectual, not moral, is in the assumption that the natural and the supernatural are held by the church as by the sects to be two separate, independent, and unrelated orders, indeed as two antagonistic orders. They take their views of Christian theology not from the teaching of the church, but from such errorists as Calvinists and Jansenists, who in their theories demolish nature to make way for grace. The supernatural appears to them an anomaly in the Creator's works; something arbitrary, illogical, without any reason in the nature of things or the principles of the universe. No amount of evidence, they contend, can suffice to prove the reality of any order that is above nature or the reach of natural reason. Hence they attempt to reduce miracles and all marvellous events, too well authenticated to be denied as facts, to the natural order, explicable by natural laws, though we may as yet be ignorant of these laws. (Vol. ii. p. 274.)

#### RELATION OF THE NATURAL AND THE SUPERNATURAL.

THE natural and supernatural are two parts of one original plan of creation, and are distinguished only as the initial is distinguished from the teleological or completion. The natural is initial, the supernatural is teleological, or the perfection or fulfilment of the natural. It was in the beginning, *ἐν ἀρχῇ*, in prin-

*cipio*, the design of the Creator that the natural should be perfected, completed, or fulfilled in the supernatural. Indeed, we do not understand how the natural could possibly be perfected in the natural, the creature, which is necessarily imperfect, in the creation. To assume that man can be perfected in the natural order is to assume that he has no destiny, his existence no purpose, and therefore no meaning, which would be tantamount to assuming that he is a mere nullity, nothing at all. Man, nature, the universe, all creation, originates in and proceeds by the creative act of God from the supernatural, for God the Creator is necessarily supernatural, that is, above and over nature. Nature originates in the supernatural, and since we know from revelation, and might infer from reason itself, that God creates all things for himself, it has and can have its destiny or end only in the supernatural. The good of every creature is in attaining its end, the fulfilment or perfection of its nature, and hence the notion broached and defended by some theologians—not, indeed, of the first order—of a natural beatitude is inadmissible and originates in a superficial and incomplete view of the Creator's design in creation, and, we may add, of the nature of things, in the very assumption on which is founded the objection of the unbeliever. They consider nature as a whole, and once created with its laws that it suffices or might have sufficed for itself—a purely deistical conception, and not changed in its nature by what these same theologians add, that God by his superabounding goodness has provided for those that love him something better, even supernatural beatitude. There is and can be no natural beatitude; because whatever is natural is finite, and the soul hungers and thirsts for an un-

bounded good and can be satisfied with nothing short of the Infinite; that is to say, God himself, who is the Supreme Good in itself. "I shall be satisfied," says holy Job, "when I awake in thy likeness." There is rest for the soul only in God. Prophets, poets, and sages of all nations and ages, as well as Christian preachers, have borne witness to the insufficiency of every created or finite good to satisfy the soul and give it real beatitude. All this proves that man was created for a supernatural, not a natural, beatitude or end, and therefore that the supernatural entered into the divine plan of creation. Whence it follows that the alleged *status naturæ puræ* is a pure abstraction and has never existed in an actual state, as the theologians who insist on it, for the most part, concede and hold, as we do. We are laboring to prove that man, in point of fact, is and always has been under a gracious or supernatural providence, and, therefore, from the first destined to a supernatural end, attainable only through a supernatural medium. The original justice in which Adam was constituted and which placed him on the plane of his destiny was supernatural, not produced by his nature; and when by his prevarication he lost it he fell below his nature, became darkened in his understanding, weakened in his will, and captive to Satan, from whose power he is delivered only by the Incarnate Word.

That man is created for a good that transcends nature is indicated not only by his inability to satisfy himself with any natural, that is, created good, but also by his consciousness of his own imperfection or incompleteness, that his reason is limited, and that he is capable of being more than he is or can be by his unassisted natural powers. There is something

mysterious and inexplicable to us in this fact—a fact which seems to us to imply that we have an obscure sense of the supernatural, which the vast majority of mankind in all ages and nations in one form or another recognize. (Vol. ii. pp. 275, 276.)

### PRINCIPLES OF THE SUPERNATURAL.

THE *principium*, or principle, as we have seen, of philosophy, or rational science, or the science of reason, is *Ens creat existentias*. . . . Being creates or is creating existences, corresponding to the first verse of Genesis. *In principio, Deus creavit celum et terram*, or to the first article in the creed, “I believe in one God, maker of heaven and earth, and all things visible and invisible.” . . .

The principle of theology, or what we here call supernatural philosophy, and known to us only by revelation, is, “The Father through Christ deifies or is deifying existences or creatures,” that is, supernaturally elevating them to union or oneness with God, the creature to oneness with the Creator. The medium of this deification is the Incarnation, or the Word made flesh. The fact affirmed in the ideal or rational formula that existences proceed from God by way of creation, or that God creates the world and is its first cause, proves that he creates it for some end, that it has a final cause, and a final cause and end, like its first cause, above and beyond itself. We know from rational philosophy that our final cause or the end for which we are created is supernatural, but we know only in a general way that it is supernatural, not specifically or in particular in what it consists. This we know only by revelation. We can know from reason that God creates us for himself, because

besides him there is nothing for which he can create us. But we cannot know from reason that he creates us to deify us, to make us one with himself, "partakers," as St. Peter says, "of his divine nature," *naturæ consortes divinæ*. Nor can we know by natural reason that this deification of the creature is to be effected through the Incarnation or the Word made flesh. The whole principle and scope of the teleological order, the second cycle or the return of existences to God without absorption in him as their final cause or last end, transcends the reach of our natural faculties or the light of nature, and is known only by supernatural revelation.

As the philosophy of the natural order consists in the reduction of the facts of that order to their principles and their integration in the ideal or rational formula, *Ens creat existentias*, so supernatural philosophy, or theology, consists in the reduction of all the facts, mysteries, articles, and dogmas of the supernatural order and their integration in the revealed formula, The Father through Christ deifies or is deifying *existentias*, or the creature, that is, elevating the creature to oneness with the Creator. The medium of the revealed formula is the Word made flesh or the Incarnation, that is, the Hypostatic Union, by which the created nature becomes the nature of God, or the creature is made one with the Creator, as the medium of the rational or ideal formula is the creative act of Being, *Ens*, or God. It is in this medium or creative act that the natural and supernatural coalesce and become one, for the Hypostatic Union, or the Incarnation of the Word, is effected by the creative act, and is that act raised to its highest power, is its supreme effort; for it is impossible for the creative act to rise higher or to

go further than to make the creature one with its Creator. The two orders, the natural and supernatural, are dialectically united by one and the same medium and—inasmuch as both proceed from the same principle—by one and the same divine creative act. (Vol. ii. pp. 278–281.)

### THE INCARNATION.

THE point we make here is that the act which creates the natural is the identical act which creates the Hypostatic Union and founds the supernatural. The Hypostatic Union or Incarnation is itself in the initial order, in the first cycle, or the order of the procession of existences by act of creation from God as first cause. It completes that order by carrying the creative act to its highest pitch, and initiates or founds the teleological order, or the order of the return of existences without absorption in him to God, as final cause, or their last end. This order, called by St. Paul the new creation and usually termed the supernatural order, is therefore founded on the Incarnation. In it we enter by regeneration, and the race are propagated by the election of grace from Christ by the Holy Ghost, as in the first cycle, or the initial order, they are propagated from Adam by natural generation. Hence Christ is called the second Adam, the Lord from heaven. He is the Father of regenerated humanity, as Adam is of generated or natural humanity. Hence we see the reason why without the new birth it is impossible to enter the kingdom of heaven or to see God.

If the natural and the supernatural universe are homogeneous parts of one and the same system, the point on which we here specially insist, the

whole of both parts have their unity in the principle from which they proceed, and as the natural is created and exists for the supernatural, it is integrated in the principle of the supernatural, *Verbum caro factum est*, or the Incarnation. Hence it follows that the entire creation, whether in the natural or supernatural, the initial or the teleological order, exists for the Incarnation, and finds in its relation to the Word made flesh its significance, its purpose, its unity, and its integrity. This granted, it follows again that the denial of the Incarnation would be the denial not only of the entire supernatural order or the whole Christian system, but of all existences, whether natural or supernatural, by denying this final cause as essential to any created existence as the first cause. It would deny the very end for which all things exist, and deny the universe itself by denying it any purpose or meaning. What means nothing is nothing. The Incarnation is the key to all the Creator's works, and we have not mastered theology or the philosophy of the supernatural till we are able to say that the denial of any one item in those works involves the denial of the Incarnation, or the Word made flesh. It is the highest and supreme principle of all science, and without it nothing in the universe is scientifically explicable. (Vol. ii. pp. 281, 282.)

#### UNITY OF THE FAITH.

It follows from the unity of the principle of both the natural and the supernatural that the creation in both its parts is one system, and also that the faith is one, and the several articles and dogmas recognized and treated by theologians form not simply



a union, but are strictly one, flowing from one and the same principle, through one and the same medium, to one and the same end. Hence the destructive nature of heresy, which accepts some articles of the faith and rejects others. As all depend alike on the Incarnation, the principle of the teleological order, the denial of any one item of the faith is the denial of the Incarnation. All heresy impugns the Incarnation and is of the nature of infidelity, or the absolute rejection of Christ, the Word made flesh. This theology or the philosophy of the supernatural must establish . . . by descending to particulars and showing it in detail. (Vol. ii. p. 283.)

#### NO NEW THEOLOGY.

THEOLOGY, as we have said, is not a new or a progressive science. As there can be no new faith, so can there be no new theology or science of faith, though theologians may differ among themselves by a more or less perfect knowledge of it. Theologians hold their principles from faith and reason, both of which are invariable, universal, and the same in all ages and nations. Reason was all in the first man that it is in us or can be in his latest posterity, and there has never been but one revelation, according to St. Thomas, which was made in substance to our first parents in the garden, and hence, says St. Augustine, faith does not vary; as believed the fathers, so believe we, only they believed in Christ who was to come and we believe in Christ who has come. Hence whatever is permanent, invariable, and universal in the various religions, superstitions, and mythologies of the heathen, is either the dictate of reason or derived by tradition from the primitive revelation

made to Adam and Eve before their expulsion from the garden. Our Lord did not come to make a new revelation or to introduce a new faith, but to do and suffer those things which were promised and which were necessary to perfect the faith of the fathers; for if he had not come and done and suffered what he did, their faith would have been vain, as also would be ours. Theology is the science of faith, or the revealed order, in its logical relations with the rational order, of its several parts with one another and of all its parts with the whole, in which they are integrated and, so to speak, consummated, or of which, in the divine plan of creation, they are constituent parts. (Vol. iii. pp. 547, 548.)

#### ANALYTIC AND SYNTHETIC THEOLOGY.

Now, in constructing theology or reproducing in our theological science the divine plan of creation as made known to us by reason and revelation, we may adopt, with one class of theologians, the analytical method, and treat the subject-matter in its parts in distinct questions and articles, without special attention to the relations of the parts to the whole or to one another; or we may adopt the synthetic method of the early fathers and treat the parts in their dialectic relations with one another and with the whole which integrates them. But whichever method we adopt, it must be one and the same theological science we draw out and present. We must also bear in mind that neither of the two methods ever is or ever can be pursued by itself alone. Analysis presupposes synthesis, for we cannot analyze what is not presented *in globo* or as a whole; and synthesis presupposes analysis, for we cannot

treat parts in relation to one another, or in relation to the whole which integrates them, unless we have analyzed them, so far at least as to know that they are parts. The difference of the two methods is that in the one synthesis predominates, in the other analysis; or that in the one we seek to draw out and present the truth, or the real, in its dialectic relations, and in the other we seek to study and present it in its analytic relations. The analytic theologian will, in treating of grace, treat it in its several divisions, as *gratia præveniens*, *gratia adjuvans*, *gratia sufficiens*, *gratia efficax*, *gratia habitualis*, *gratia actualis*, etc.; the synthetic theologian, without denying these distinctions, will consider these several graces in their unity and in relation to the church, their medium; also the church in relation to the Incarnation, the source and fountain of all grace; and, still further, the Incarnation in relation, on the one hand, to the ineffable mystery of the Trinity, and, on the other, in relation to the eternal decree of creation and the teleological order. . . .

St. Thomas and all theologians of the first order in reality do the same. The *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, if eminently analytic, is, to all who diligently study and understand it, also eminently synthetic, both in its philosophy and its theology. It is the very essence of theological science, as we have said above, to present the several mysteries, articles, dogmas, and propositions of faith in their synthetic or organic relations with one another, with the natural or rational order, and with the order of glory as far as revealed. The orders are not all known in the same way. We know the natural or initial order by the light of reason; in the supernatural and revealed order we know analogically by

the light of faith; in the final order, glorification or heaven, we know by the light of glory, or what the theologians call the *ens supernaturale*; but these several orders are one created reality in its relations through the creative act to God as first cause and as final cause; and these several lights are only different degrees of one and the same divine light consummated in glory, in which the glorified are made partakers of the divine nature, *divinæ consortes naturæ* (2 Pet. i. 4). The design of all theology is to show this. . . .

There is no doubt that some meticulous theologians, while composing their theology from definitions of the church, which are necessarily analytic because made only on occasion of insurgent errors, and consequently propose the faith only so far as necessary to condemn them and to put the faithful on their guard against them, have failed to grasp the grand synthesis revealed by faith and taught in the catechism. Some have maintained that nothing is *de fide* till defined by the church, and hence have concocted a theory of development and maintained that the volume of faith is increased with each new definition, forgetting that the church, since she is infallible, can define nothing to be *de fide* which has not been of faith from the beginning, always and everywhere. (Vol. iii. p. 549.)

#### CREATION A DIALECTIC WHOLE.

THE real or created order is in the plan of the creator or the divine decree a dialectic whole, not as Pope sings,

"All are but parts of one stupendous whole  
Whose body nature is, and God the soul,"

which is pure pantheism; but parts of one *created* whole united to God, not as the body to the soul, but as the creature to the creator, by the creative act of God, distinguishable from God, as the act is from the actor.

God is infinite in his freedom, because infinite in his power, and is free to create or not to create as he wills; and if he wills to create he is free to create what and as he wills. To the question, "Why has he created the universe as he has or as it is?" the only answer is, and it is sufficient, "Because he has so willed." The vessel has no right to say to the potter, "Why hast thou made me thus?" The creator is not responsible to his creatures nor bound to give them a reason for creating them. But God, though he can do whatever he wills, cannot annihilate his own being or contradict his own nature or essence, as the blessed apostle evidently implies when he says, "It is impossible for God to lie." In creating or willing, God must create or will according to his own intrinsic nature or essence. Since, then, God is, in his very essence, supremely logical and creates all things by the Logos—logic in itself—who is God, all his works, his entire creation, are necessarily supremely logical; logical in all their parts and as a whole. Consequently there must be always a reason in the created order for whatever exists in it. Every part must have its place and its *raison d'être*, and there can be in the universe no sophisms, no anomalies, no irregularities, no inconsistencies, no contradictions or irreconcilable dualisms or opposites. So much follows necessarily from the revealed mystery of the Holy Trinity, and so much follows, also, from the character of God the creator, as cognizable by the light of nature. (Vol. iii. p. 551.)

## HETERODOXY UNSYSTEMATIC.

THE principal objections to Christianity, in our day at least, grow out of ignorance of this fact, and arise from the three orders being regarded as three distinct and mutually independent orders, and the mysteries, articles, and dogmas of faith being apprehended as isolated and unrelated facts or statements, independent one of another, without any logical connection between them, as heterodoxy necessarily presents them, since heterodoxy is necessarily incomplete, illogical, or sophistical. Heresy never hangs together; its several parts never cohere and never constitute a complete or organic whole. Take any form of Protestantism you please, and you will find that the articles and dogmas it retains from orthodoxy are for it anomalies and have no systematic place or significance. It asserts the supernatural, but it has no place, no necessity for it in its conception of creation or of the divine decree to create; and there is in its system no reason why the natural order alone should not suffice for itself and be at once initial and teleological, and the more logical among Protestants are constantly struggling against tradition and formal creeds, to eliminate the supernatural and to assert the sufficiency of the natural. In no Protestant system has the assertion of the mystery of the Trinity or the mystery of the Incarnation any necessity or serves any purpose recognized by the system itself. There is nothing in the divine order as conceived and presented by Protestant theologians that cannot be explained without as well as with the assertion of either mystery. The church, with Protestants, performs no office, has no function, no significance, and is either a self-constituted society, a voluntary asso-

ciation, or a state establishment. Even in the belief of Protestants themselves it is no essential medium of salvation or of the Christian life, and the most straight-laced among them hold practically that men can be saved without the church as well as with it—if only distinguished for intellect or wealth; for we find them every day canonizing such, even before the last obsequies have been paid to their bodies. What better, according to the Protestant presentment of it, is Christianity than Greek and Roman philosophy? or why should sensible men trouble their heads about it, except to get rid of it? (Vol. iii. pp. 551, 552.)

### THE CHURCH.

PROTESTANTS also object to the church, her constitution, doctrines, and worship, for the same reason. Having and seeking no logic in their own system, and knowing that Christianity, as they hold it, is made up of disconnected particulars and isolated doctrines, they fail to perceive that Catholicity is an organic whole, in which all the parts cohere and have their reason. They reject the authority and office of the church, but only because they isolate her from the Incarnation and the mediatorial kingdom of Christ. If they held, with St. Paul, that she is the body of Christ, in which he carries on his work of mediation, and understood that the Holy Ghost dwells in her, the Comforter, the Spirit of Truth, who leads her into all truth, they would see that they could object neither to her office nor her authority without objecting to the Incarnation and to the "man Christ Jesus, the mediator of God and men." Christianity is, as we have said more than once, concreted in the church, and without her would

be to us only a naked and powerless idea, with which we could have no communion or relation. So as to the papal constitution, the church could have no unity or catholicity, no individuality, no visible personality, and therefore no visible existence without the pope. The pope, in the visible order, is the person of the church. To deny the visibility of the church is to deny the church herself; for the invisible church, or soul of the church, as some say, is simply Christ the Word incarnated by the Holy Ghost in the womb of the immaculate Virgin without any representation. They themselves have no church, for what they call their churches are not a living organism, but either state establishments or voluntary associations living no life but what is brought to the establishment or association by its members, or what it derives from the secular order. They are not joined to Christ by a living union and living his life. They have nothing of Christ but the name. If we, like them, held the church disunited with Christ and composed of frail and erring mortals, we could attach no more importance to her than they do to their purely human associations; but taken, as Catholicity teaches, as growing out of the Incarnation, her constitution and office are integral in the Catholic faith and theology, strictly dialectic, and the denial of any part of her teaching, from the supremacy and infallibility of the pope down to the virtue of holy water or the blessing of ashes, would logically involve the denial of the whole, not only because the denial of any proposition carries with it the denial of the authority on which the whole rests, but also because it would break the internal chain which binds all the parts into one organic whole, as we have already shown. The denial of the papacy denies the



church; the denial of the church denies the Incarnation; the denial of the Incarnation denies the teleological order; the denial of the teleological order denies finality, that is, God as final cause; and the denial of God as final cause denies him as first cause and effaces alike nature and grace, the natural and the supernatural, Christianity and creation, all being and existences. (Vol. iii. pp. 552, 553.)

### THE WORSHIP OF SAINTS.

PROTESTANTS object to the *cultus sanctorum* as authorized by the church and practised by Catholics; but for a similar reason, because they do not see its dialectic relation to the Incarnation, to the mediatorial principle, and to the communion of saints, and therefore do not see that to deny it would be to deny the whole Christian order, nay, creation itself. The mediatorial principle is universal and enters into the very being and essence of God himself, in whom is the prototype of all created things. The three Persons of the ever-blessed Trinity, indistinguishable from the divine being, are distinguished *inter se* as principle, medium, and end. The Father is principle, the Son, or Word, is medium, and the Holy Ghost the end or consummator. In all acts, *ad extra*, of creation or of providence the three Persons equally concur, but in diverse relations, the Father as principle, the Son or Word as medium, and the Holy Ghost as end or consummator. The Logos, or Word, is the medium of creation. Hence St. John i. 3 tells us: "All things were made by him, and without him was made nothing which was made." So again in the palingenesia, or "new creation," founded by the Incarnation, or Word made

flesh, the three Persons also concur, but in the same diverse respects; the Father as principle, the Son as medium, and the Holy Ghost as consummator or sanctifier. Hence the Son was incarnated, *Verbum caro factum est* (ibid. 14), as "the one mediator of God and men" (1 Tim. ii. 5), not the Father nor the Holy Ghost. The Word, in the creation of the natural order, the cosmos, is the medium or mediator; and the Word incarnate, "the man Christ Jesus," in the palingenesia, or new creation, redemption, and glorification, is the medium, the mediator of God and men. The principle of mediation is therefore universal and at the foundation of all orders, natural and supernatural.

In the Incarnation God assumes human nature to be his own nature, without parting with his divine nature. So that the two natures, remaining forever distinct, without confusion or intermixture, are forever hypostatically united in the one divine Person of the Word. This one Person, the Word, who was in the beginning with God, and who is God, in whom are the two natures, is the one Christ, the mediator of God and men, the MAN Christ Jesus. But the saints are his brethren, and partake of his divine nature as well as of his human nature, and hence are said to be deified. . . . Human nature, by the hypostatic union, is deified, as says Pope St. Leo Magnus, but in the divine personality of the Word, not in a human personality; and the blessed in heaven, however closely united to God, retain forever their human personality, which never becomes absorbed in the divine personality, as in the case of the human nature assumed by the Word.

Yet the saints are like unto Christ, as says the beloved apostle: "Dearly beloved, we are now the

sons of God: and it hath not yet appeared what we shall be. We know that when he shall appear, we shall be like him, because we shall see him as he is" (1 John iii. 2). That is, the blessed bear a higher likeness to God than that image and likeness to which Adam was created or than that which is given us in the new birth even. They partake of the divine nature as well as of the human nature of their Lord, as St. Peter says: "He has given us very great and precious promises, that you may be partakers of the divine nature—*divinæ consortes naturæ*" (2 Pet. i. 4). If we are led by the spirit of God we are the sons and heirs of God and joint-heirs with Christ even before we are glorified with him (Rom. viii. 14-17): but the saints are glorified and partake of the divine nature, which is only promised in this life and held by faith; they have become like him in that higher likeness of which St. John speaks. They have entered into the glory of their Lord, are sharers with him in the glory of his mediatorial kingdom. They have entered into their joint-inheritance and must be regarded as co-workers with him. They are, in some sense, Christs, therefore mediators by participation of both his human and divine natures, though, of course, not of his divine personality.

Being thus exalted, deified in their nature through its assumption by the Word, and participating of the divine nature, the *cultus sanctorum* is strictly dialectic and is only their due, and, in fact, is below their real worth. It detracts nothing from the worship due to God or to the man Christ Jesus, because it is through the mediation of the Word made flesh that the saint acquires his worth and becomes a co-worker with him in his mediatorial kingdom, or a mediator

in a participated sense; and worth acquired by grace or the gift of God is as much the saint's own as if inherited from nature or obtained by the sole exercise of his natural powers, and is equally entitled to be recognized and honored or worshipped. We did not understand this when in a former article we treated the question, and represented the *cultus sanctorum* as the worship of God in his works and in his noblest works, the beatified saints. Such worship is proper, but it is the worship of God and honors God, but honors not the saint any more than it does any other creature of God. But as here presented we not only honor God in his saints, but we honor the saints themselves for what they are, for the virtues they possess through the gifts of grace. God in rewarding the saints rewards his own gifts; and so he would were he to reward us for our natural virtues, since we are by nature his creatures and have only what he gives us. (Vol. iii. pp. 553-556.)

#### THE WORSHIP OF THE BLESSED VIRGIN.

THE worship of the Blessed Virgin as St. Mary rests on the same principle; and the higher worship we render her as Mother of God, called *hyperdulia*, rests on her relation to the Incarnation, her share therein and the rank or position she necessarily holds in consequence. As St. Mary she is surpassed or equalled by no saint in the calendar. Through the merits of Jesus Christ she was preserved in the first instant of her conception from all taint of original sin, and was never for one moment under the power of Satan; she was conceived and born without sin; she was full of grace, never in her whole life committed the slightest venial fault; she

was all-holy as all-beautiful and the model of every Christian grace and virtue. As mother of Christ, and therefore mother of God, she is blessed among women, above all women, and holds a rank which no other woman, nay, no other creature does or can hold. As Mother of God she necessarily holds the highest rank that any creature not hypostatically united to the divine Word can hold, next below the eternal God himself, above all angels, arch-angels, cherubim, seraphim, thrones and dominations, principalities and powers, all created orders, and is rightly crowned Queen of heaven. The error of Nestorius in refusing to recognize her as *θεοτόκος*, *Dei Genitrix*, or mother of God, was in denying the hypostatic union, or dissolving Jesus, which made him Antichrist (1 John iv. 2, 3); and in maintaining, as do most Protestants, that only the humanity was born of Mary, not the humanity hypostatically, indissolubly, and forever united to the divine person or Word, who is God. The human nature of Christ has no human personality; its personality is the Word, or Son of God; and as the human nature taken from the Virgin must have been conceived and born a person, Mary is as truly the mother of the Person born of her as any mother is of her son, and therefore strictly and truly the Mother of God.

Now, as Mary's relation to the Incarnate Word is indissoluble and must ever remain, and as that relation places her in a position above all created orders next to the uncreated Trinity, simple logic suffices to show that the highest worship below the supreme worship, called the worship of *latria*, due to God alone, is her due and cannot be withheld without injustice. The worship is strictly logical and can-

not be denied, unless we deny the Incarnation and the catholic principle of mediation, the whole Christian order, indeed, the whole divine plan of creation as made known to us by reason and revelation. The charge of superstition against the *cultus sanctorum*, if we accept the apostolic doctrine of the communion of saints, the relation we have shown the saints bear to the Incarnate Word, and the position they hold as joint-heirs and coöperators with Christ in his mediatorial kingdom, is simply absurd. Spiritism, which evokes or consults the spirits supposed to hover over or around the graves of the dead, is superstition in the original sense and application of the term; but our invocation of saints has no affinity whatever with spiritism, for we do not evoke them, do not call upon them to appear or to communicate to us the secrets of the past, the present, or the future. We give the saints no honor not their due, and ask of them only to aid and enlighten us by their prayers to God and intercession with him for us, and, therefore, nothing injurious to the sovereign majesty of God or beyond their power.

The pretence that the worship we render to the Mother of God is idolatry and the grave nonsense babbled about Mariolatry must be ascribed to the lamentable fact that Protestants have no distinctively divine worship and are able to offer no worship due to God alone; and therefore, because they see us offering to Mary as high a worship as they are able to offer to God himself, they conclude that we offer her supreme worship and, of course, are idolaters. The distinctive act of supreme worship to God is sacrifice, and Protestants have no sacrifice, no altar, no priest, no victim. They hold, indeed, that Christ once in the end of the world offered himself as a sac-

rifice for all; but they deny that he gives himself to men to be offered by them as an acceptable and all-sufficient sacrifice to God and adequate to the debt we owe him. Christ not only offered himself once to God for the whole world, but he gives himself to us in the church to be offered up by us upon our altars in the sacrifice of the Mass, a clean and acceptable offering, as *our* offering through the priest, as our act of supreme worship to the ever-blessed Trinity. No creature, not all we have that is most precious or that we hold most dear, not even our life, can be a real sacrifice or an adequate worship of God; for all creatures, the earth and the fulness thereof are his already. Only God is an adequate offering to God; and this offering we can make because God gives himself to us, and him we offer by the hands of the priest in the Eucharistic sacrifice as *our* act of supreme worship. This worship we offer to God alone, never to a creature, not even to his ever-blessed and holy Mother. (Vol. iii. pp. 556-558.)

#### THE SACRIFICE OF THE MASS.

PROTESTANTS, rejecting the Eucharistic sacrifice offered daily on our altars, have no distinctive religious worship, nothing to offer to God which they may not and do not offer to creatures. Their worship consists simply of prayer and praise; but they pray to the king, the magistrate, the court, or the legislature, and they sing the praises of a distinguished beauty, an effective orator, an eminent statesman, a great poet, or the conquering hero. They may say with the Psalmist, "A sacrifice to God is an afflicted spirit; a contrite and humble

heart, O God, thou wilt not despise" (Ps. 1. 18); but the Psalmist does not mean to assert that no other sacrifice is required; he would simply teach us that no sacrifice, without an afflicted spirit and a contrite and humble heart, can be acceptable from the worshipper, for he concludes by saying: "Then shalt thou accept the sacrifice of justice [the sacrifices prescribed by the law], oblations and whole burnt-offerings; then shall they lay calves upon thy altar" (ibid. 21). Now, having themselves no real objective worship or sacrifices to offer to God, expiatory, propitiatory, imprecatory, or eucharistic, and having nothing more in their external service than they see us offering to the Blessed Virgin, they very illogically and falsely conclude that we offer her the supreme worship due to God alone, and cry out most lustily "Mariolatry!" and hold it the duty of the magistrate to extirpate us as idolaters. But they forget that, as St. Paul says (Heb. xiii. 10), "we have an altar whereof they who serve the tabernacle have no power to eat." We have in the sacrifice of the Mass a true and adequate worship of God which they reject, and which we offer to God alone, never to a saint, not even to Blessed Mary nor to any other creature. It is not that we offer undue honor to Mary and the saints, but that they offer no due honor to God; for the highest honor short of the unbloody sacrifice in our power to pay them is far, far below their exalted worth, and below that which the eternal God himself bestows on them, which is greater than the human heart can conceive. (Vol. iii. pp. 558, 559.)



## INVOCATION OF SAINTS.

THE invocation of saints, the frequent prayers we address to them, especially to Mary, holy Mother of God, are authorized by the mediatorial principle and by the relation of Mary and the saints to the Incarnation. They are co-workers with Christ, and being joined by a vital, we might say an organic, union with him, participate in his mediatorial work. We ask of them neither grace nor pardon; we ask only the help of their prayers to their God and ours; therefore, as we have said, nothing beyond their power. They and we form one communion; only we are on the way, while they have already arrived at home, are *in patria* and no longer pilgrims and sojourners in a foreign land. They are living, more living than we are, for they have entered into the fulness of life, life eternal. They can hear our prayers; and being filled with love and in living communion with us in this land of sorrows and vale of tears, they cannot be indisposed to listen to our prayers and to join their own to ours. The objections of Protestants betray their ignorance of the principle on which the Christian order is founded, and betray a doubt of the efficacy of prayer and also a doubt that the saints in glory retain their personality and are really living men, with all their human individuality and human faculties. In fact, to our non-Catholic world there is a dark cloud hanging over the life beyond the grave, and even the blest seem to them pale and shadowy, unsubstantial, like shades of Hades in the belief of the gentiles; and like the gentiles they sit in the region and shadow of death, filled with doubt and uncertainty, anxiety and despair. Death is to them the gate that opens

not to life and immortality, but to the dread unknown, perhaps to the inane; and they banish from their minds, as far as possible, the thought, by engrossing themselves in the pursuit of gain or in dissipation. (Vol. iii. pp. 559, 560.)

#### VALUE OF THE SYNTHETIC METHOD.

THE examples we have adduced show, especially in these times of the dislocation of men's minds, the value of the synthetic method of setting forth Catholic faith, and presenting the several mysteries, articles, and dogmas in their intrinsic relation to one another, and fixing the attention on the great principles on which rest all the orders or moments of creation, generation, regeneration, and glorification. The heterodoxy and infidelity of the age, aside from their moral causes, seem to us to grow out of the fact that people are taught the mysteries, articles, and dogmas without being duly shown the principles which underlie them, which are really catholic and are the principles alike of the three stages of creation, or the entire created order. Not seeing this, or that there is in Catholicity a reason for everything in it, the heterodox do not see why they may not choose among the doctrines the church teaches; why they may not choose this doctrine and reject that; why they may not hold the unity of God and reject the Trinity, the Humanity of our Lord without accepting his Divinity; why they may not accept the moral precepts of the Gospel without the mysteries and dogmas, between which they see no logical or necessary relation. The present tendency of most Protestants is to separate the rational order from the revealed and to fall back on the natural without the

supernatural. The common answer in regard to the supernatural order, that all the mysteries, articles, and dogmas rest on the same authority, and that authority, if sufficient for one, is sufficient for all, is a just and logically conclusive answer; but it seems to us desirable that people, as far as practicable, should be enabled to see that not only are all taught by the same divine authority, but that all are virtually connected one with another and with the whole; that no one or a part can be detached and denied without logically denying all: as we see exemplified in the more advanced Protestants. The moral precepts of the Gospel, and what is called the Christian life detached from faith, or the doctrines and mysteries of revelation, lose their Christian character, are reduced to the natural order, stand on the level of heathen morality, and are meritorious for this life only, not for the world to come. (Vol. iii. pp. 561, 562.)

THE END.

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